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AUTHOR 


HOFFDING.  HARALD 


TITLE: 


BRIEF  HISTORY  OF 
MODERN  PHILOSOPHY 


PLACE: 


NEW  YORK 


DATE: 


[1912] 


COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES 
PRESERVATION  DEPARTMENT 

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109 
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H^ffding,  Harald,  184^-1931. 

A  brief  history  of  modern  philosopliy,  by  Dr.  Harold 
HofTtling  ...  Authorized  translation  by  Charles  Finley 
Sanders  ...    New  York,  The  Macmillan  company  /1912] 

X  p.,  1 1..  324  p.    lOicm. 

Includes  a  section  on  Spinoza  (p.  67-78) 


Restrictions  on  Use: 


1.  Philosophy— Hist 


Library  of  Congress 


I.  Sanders,  Charles  Finley,  1869-        tr. 

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THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

MKW  YORK  •    BOSTON  •   CHICAGO 
DALLAS  •   SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limited 

LONDON  •    BOMBAY  •   CALCUTTA 
MKLBOURNB 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Ltd. 

TORONTO 


DR.  HAROLD  .  HOFFDING 

PROFESSOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY  AT  THE 
UNIVERSITY  OF  COPENHAGEN 


AUTHORIZED  TRANSLATION   BY 

CHARLES   FINLEY  SANDERS 

PROFESSOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY  AT  PENNSYLVANIA  COLLEGE,   GETTYSBURG,  PA. 

AUTHOR  OF  THE  ENGLISH  TRANSLATION  OF   JERUSALEM'S 

INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY 


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THE   MACMILLAN  COMPANY 


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PREFACE 

Professor  Harold  Hoffding  is  already  well  known  to  the 
English-speaking  world  through  the  translations  of  his 
Psychology,  Ethics,  Philosophy  of  Religion,  Problems  of 
Philosophy  and  his  History  of  Modem  Philosophy  (2 
vols.),  all  published  by  the  Macmillan  Company.  The 
fact  that  his  works  are  rapidly  finding  their  way  into 
English  and  other  languages  is  the  best  evidence  of  the 
esteem  in  which  his  work  is  held  and  of  his  importance  as 
a  thinker.  Bom  in  1 843 ,  professor  of  philosophy  in  Copen- 
hagen since  1883,  Doctor  Hoffding  has  worked  over  the 
whole  field  of  philosophy  with  great  thoroughness.  The 
original  (German)  edition  from  which  this  translation  is 
made  appeared  in  1905/  It  is  therefore  the  fmit  of  his 
ripest  scholarship.  The  book  is  clear,  compact  and  com- 
prehensive. The  various  schools  are  analyzed  and  criti- 
cized, and  the  thread  of  continuous  development  is  con- 
stantly kept  clearly  in  view.  These  features  constitute 
the  exceptional  merit  of  the  book  as  a  text.  The  student 
is  constantly  aware  that  a  familiar  spirit  is  safely  guiding 
him  through  the  bewildering  maze  of  philosophic  problems 
and  tentative  solutions. 

As  a  psychologist  Doctor  Hoffding  is  an  empirical  intro- 
spectionist.  He  is  thoroughly  modem  in  his  antipathy 
towards  metaphysical  speculation.  He  discovers  a  native 
tendency  in  man,  manifesting  itself  in  the  impulse  towards 
well-being,  the  source  or  further  meaning  of  which  is 
beyond  our  knowledge,  which  furnishes  the  basis  of  ethics. 


I 


*i^ 


.':« 


VI 


PREFACE 


Religion  is  the  reaction  of  the  human  mind  to  the  sense  of 
value  and  represents  the  highest  fimction  of  the  human 
mind.  As  a  critical  empiricist  he  possesses  a  peculiar 
advantage  in  the  interpretation  of  the  trend  of  philosophic 
thought.  We  offer  this  book  to  the  English  student 
because  of  its  merit,  as  an  efficient  guide  to  the  tmder- 
standing  of  modem  philosophy. 

C.  F.  Sanders. 

Gettysburg,  Pa. 


I 


July  20,  1 91 2. 


V 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

Introduction ""^^J 

FIRST  BOOK 

THR  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  RENAISSANCE 

A.  The  Discovery  of  ^jw-Watural  Man a 

1.  Pomponazzi,  I^achiav^,  Montaigne \  * 

2.  Vives,  Melanchilion,  ^thusius,  Grotius     ...'.'!  8 

3.  Bodin,  Cherbury,  Bohme ,'    ]  g 

4.  Ramus,  Sanchez,  Bacon j- 

B.  The  New  Conception  of  the  "World 21 

1.  Nicholas  of  Cusa !    ]    !  22 

2.  Telesius ^ 

3.  Copernicus , ^6 

4.  Bruno *  28 

C.  The  New  Science ^- 

1.  Leonardo .^ 

2.  Kepler *    vj 

3CGiE% \    \    \    \    \    W   \   39X 

SECOND  BOOK 

the  great  systems  y. 

1.  Descartes aTx 

2.  Hobbes .'.'.'.***    'c^>  y^ 

3-  fpj^^^ .'.'.*!.'!!!  r^ 

4.  Leibnitz , . 

THIRD  BOOK 

ENGLISH  empirical  PHILOSOPHY 

.'  i  \  I.  Locke 

2.  Newton   .    .    .         ,    .                                                  '    ,v< 
90 


P' 


ii 


/'  '^ 


"•■'?l 


vm 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 


i 


(>  3.  Berkeley 98 

4.  Shaftesbury 102 

5.  Hume 106 

6.  Smith 113 

FOURTH  BOOK  \ 

t 

PHILOSOPHY    OF    THE    ENLIGHTENMENT    IN    FRANCE    AND     GERMAN!^ 

A.  The  Philosophy  of  the  Enlightenment  in  France  and 

Rousseau 118 

1.  Voltaire  and  the  Encyclopedists   .........  118  ■ 

2.  Rousseau 123 

<  1*.:..  -    / 

B.  The  Philosophy  of  the  Enlightenment  in  Germany  and 

Lessing 132 

1.  The  German  Enlightenment 132 

2.  Lessing 135 

FIFTH  BOOK 

IMMANUEL   KANT  AND  THE  CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 

A.  Theoretical  Problems 140 

1.  The  Development  of  the  Kantian  Theory  of  Knowledge  140 

a.  First  Period.     1 755-1 769 140 

b.  Second  Period.     1769-1761 140 

2.  Critique  of  Pure  Reason 144 

a.  Subjective  Deduction       144 

b.  Objective  Deduction    .     .     . 146 

3.  Phenomena  and  Thing-in-itself 148 

4.  Criticism  of  Speculative  Philosophy 150 

B.  The  Ethico-religious  Problem 153 

1.  The  Historical  Development  of  the  Kantian  Ethics    .  154 

2.  The  Specifically  Kantian  Ethics 155 

3.  The  Religious  Problem 156 

4.  Speculative    Ideas    on    the    Basis    of    Biology    and 

"^  -^thetics       159 

C.  Opponents  and  First  Disciples 162 

1.  Hamann,  Herder,  Jacobi 163 

2.  Reinhold,  Maimon,  Schiller 165 


/ 


1 


CONTENTS  ix 

SIXTH  BOOK 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ROMANTICISM 

PAGB 

A.  The  Speculative  Systems 171 

1.  Fichte 171 

2.  Schelling lyy 

3-  Hegel 182 

B.  The  Critical  Romanticists 189 

1.  Schleiermacher 189 

2.  Schopenhauer , iqj. 

3.  Kierkegaard 201 

C.  The  Under-current   of   Criticism   in   the   Romantic 

Period 205 

1.  Fries 205 

2.  Herbart 207 

3.  Beneke 211 

D.  The  Transition  from  Romanticism  to  Positivism    .    .213 

1.  The  Dissolution  of  the  Hegelian  School 213 

2.  Feuerbach 214 

SEVENTH  BOOK 
positivism 

A.  French  Philosophy  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  before 

COMTE 210 

(The  Authority,  the  Psychological  and  the  Social  Schools.) 

B.  Augusts  Comte 224 

C.  English  Philosophy  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  beforb 

John  Stuart  Mill 231 

D.  John  Stuart  Mill 237 

E.  The  Philosophy  of  Evolution i    .    .  246 

1.  Charles  Darwin 247 

2.  Herbert  Spencer 250 


\^\ 


X  CONTENTS 

PAGB 

F.  Positivism  in  Germany  and  Italy 260 

1.  Duhring 261 

2.  Ardig6 264, 

EIGHTH  BOOK 

NRW  THEORIES  OF  THE  PROBLEM  OF  BEING  UPON  A  REALISTIC 

BASIS 

Introduction.    (Modern  Materialism) 268 

A.  Modern  Idealism  in  Germany 271 

1.  Lotze •••  271 

2.  Hartmann 275 

3.  Fechner 278 

4.  Wundt 280 

B.  Modern  Idealism  in  England  and  France      ....  284 

1.  Bradley 284 

2.  Fouill^e 287 

NINTH  BOOK 
new  theories  of  the  problems  of  knowledge  and  of  value 

A.  The  Problem  of  Knowledge 289 

1.  German  Neokantianism 290 

2.  French  Criticism  and  the  Philosophy  of  Discontinuity  292 

3.  The  Economico-biological  Theory  of  Knowledge     .    .  296 

1.  Maxwell,  Mach 298 

2.  Avenarius 299 

3.  William  James 301 

r 

B.  The  Problem  of  Value 303 

j  I.  Guyau .••....  304 

2.  Nietzsche 306 

3.  Eucken 310 

4.  William  James 312 

Chronology  of  the  most  Important  Works 315 

Index 321 


A    BRIEF    HISTORY    OF 
MODERN   PHILOSOPHY 


s 


!1 


BRIEF  HISTOEY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY 


■^ 


INTRODUCTION 

The  subject  matter  of  the  history  of  philosophy  consists 
of  the  efforts  which  individual  thinkers  have  made  to 
explain  or  perchance  to  solve  the  ultimate  problems  of 
knowledge  and  of  being.  Modem  philosophy— i.  e.  the 
philosophy  of  the  last  three  centuries — ^has  been  specially 
concerned  with  four  great  problems.  These  problems, 
moreover — ^as  I  have  shown  in  my  Philosophic  Problems 
(Eng.  Tr.  1905) — are  intimately  related  to  each  other, 
and  there  likewise  exists  a  most  significant  analogy 
between  them,  in  that  the  antithesis  of  continuity  and 
discontinuity  is  of  fundamental  importance  in  each  of 
them,  except  that  it  manifests  itself  under  different  forms. 

I.  The  psychological  problem  originates  from  the 
inquiry  concerning  the  essential  attributes  of  psychic 
life.  Is  the  soul  a  distinct  substance,  or  does  its  essential 
nature  consist  of  a  peculiar  activity?  Is  the  soul  com- 
posed of  a  variety  of  independent  elements,  or  is  it 
characterized  by  imity  and  totality?  The  discussion 
of  these  questions  can  be  of  value  only  as  it  is  based  upon 
a  detailed  investigation  of  psychical  phenomena  and 
functions.  It  will  likewise  appear  that  the  solution  of 
these  questions  has  a  very  important  bearing  on  the 
treatment  and  the  solution  of  the  remaining  philosophic 
problems. 

Whilst  psychological  investigation  finds  its  subject 
matter  in  the  bare  facts  of  psychic  life,  there  are  two 


r  » 


INTRODUCTION 


l<i 


further  problems  which  are  conditioned  by  the  antithesis 
of  fact  and  value  as  it  appears  in  psychic  life,  the  problem 
of  knowledge  and  the  problem  of  evaluation, 

2.  The  problem  of  knowledge  springs  from  the  inquiry 
into  the  presuppositions  of  knowledge  and  the  limits 
within  which  our  thought  processes  are  vaHd  (thus  in- 
cluding the  sphere  of  psychologic^  investigation).  The 
primary  origin  of  thought  is  spontaneous,  a  reaction 
produced  by  events  which  are  not  the  result  of  thought. 
To  what  extent  are  we  then  justified  in  ascribing  real 
meaning  to  the  results  of  thought?  Wherein  does  the 
truth  of  knowledge  consist? 

3.  Whilst  the  problem  of  knowledge  has  special  refer- 
ence to  the  intellect,  the  problem  of  evaluation  grows  out 
of  the  inquiry  into  the  validity  of  judgments  pertaining 
to  htunan  conduct  and  social  institutions — particularly 
those  that  rest  on  the  processes  of  will  and  emotion. 
What  constitutes  the  standard  for  such  a  judgment? 
Upon  what  foundation  does  the  validity  of  the  concepts 
of  good  and  bad  rest?  And  is  it  possible  to  apply  these 
concepts  with  logical  consistency?  The  scope  of  the 
problem  becomes  increasingly  comprehensive  the  moment 
we  test  the  validity  of  the  judgment,  not  only  as  per- 
taining to  human  conduct  and  vital  forms,  but  Hkewise 
to  Being  and  the  universe  in  general.  We  then  pass  from 
the  problem  of  ethics  to  that  of  religion. 

4.  Finally  we  may  also  inquire  concerning  the  nature 
of  Being,  of  which  thinking,  feeling  and  volitional  being 
are  but  a  single  part.  This  gives  rise  to  the  problem  of 
Being,  1.  e.  the  problem  of  cosmology  or  metaphysics.  Is 
it  possible  to  elaborate  a  general  world  theory  according 
to  scientific  methods?  And  what  wotdd  be  the  nature 
of  such  a  theory?    If  we  organize  our  experiences  and 


INTRODUCTION 

infer  the  ultimate  consequences  of  our  knowledge  what 
P^^J^  w^  fur^  an  adequate  explanation  ^f  tl 

The  nature  and  method  of  the  treatment  of  these 

and  ^kstoncal  conditions  of  the  dififerent  perioi. 
And  m  those  problems  which  He  on  the  bonierland  of 
thought  even  the  personaUty  of  the  thinker  wiU  hkewise 
have  Its  effect     It  is  for  this  reason  that  a  comparS 
treatment  of  the  problems  as  history  presents  fhem  1 
of  such  great  miportance.    The  various  statements  and 
solutions  of  the  problem  possess  more  than  a  purely 
philosophic  int«-est.    They  have  likewise  an  important 
bearing  on  the  history  of  civihzation  and  on  psychology 
They  are  responses  in  a  great  discussion  which  is  pro^ 
ceeding  through  ages.    Each  response  is  something  niore 
than  a  mere  intellectual  structure,  it  is  likewise  the  sign 
o^^a  spmtual  oirrent.    The  history  of  philosophy  there- 


1' 


FIRST  BOOK 

THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    THE    RENAISSANCE 

A.    The  Discoverv  or  the  Natural  Man 

BURCKHARDT,  in  his  famous  treatise,  Die  Kidtur  der 
Renaissance  in  Italien,  characterizes  the  Italian  renais- 
sance as  the  discovery  of  man.    The  historical  conditions 
led  to  the  emancipation  of  the  individual.    Man  was  no 
longer  estimated  from  the  mere  viewpoint  of  Ins  relation- 
ship to  the  Church  or  to  his  guild.    He  now  became  the 
subject   of   speciaUzed   interest   and   study.    The   dis- 
covery of  ancient  Uterature  and  art  likewise  contnbuted 
to  this  end.    Man  found  a  distinct  form  of  culture  out- 
side the  Church,  with  laws  and  ideals  of  its  own.    This 
expansion  of  the  horizon  furnished  the  opportumty  for 
comparative  study.    In  the  north  Protestantism,  with 
its  emphasis  on  personal  experience  and  its  insistence 
that  civil  life  is  independent  of  the  Church,  showed  a 
similar  tendency.    In  this  way  it  became  possible  even 
here  to  develop  both  a  theoretical  and  a  practical  interest 
in  things  which  are  purely  human.    Hence,  both  m  the 
north  and  in  the  south,  we  find  a  number  of  mterestmg 
movements  in  the  realm  of  the  mental  sciences  during 
the  period  of  the  Renaissance. 

I  Pietro  Pomponazzi's  Uttle  book,  De  tmmoHahtale 
anim<z  (1516),  may  be  regarded  as  an  introduction  to  the 
philosophy  of  the  Renaissance.  Pm^22SSZi.  was  born 
at  Mantua  in  1462,  served  with  great  distinction  in  the 
capacity  of  teacher  of  philosophy  in  Padua  and  Bologna, 
and  died  in  the  latter  city  in  1525-    His  fnendship  witii 


MACHIAVELLI 


Cardinal  Bemho,  who  enjoyed  the  favor  of  Pope  Leo  X, 
saved  him  from  persecution;  but  his  book  was  burnt  by 
the  inquisition.     His  philosophic  significance  is  due  to 
his  theory  that  the  various  forms  and  gradations  of  soul- 
life  constitute  a  continuous  natural  series,  and  that  ethics 
is  self-explanatory.    In  opposition  to  the  ecclesiastical 
AristoteHans  he  shows  that  the  immortality  of  the  soul 
is  incapable  of  philosophic  proof.    Even  in  its  highest  ^ 
forms  soul-life  is  dependent  on  material  conditions  and 
its  existence  after  the  dissolution  of  the  body  cannot  be 
demonstrated.    There  is  no  occasion  moreover  to  criticize 
this  conclusion  on  ethical  grounds.    On  the  contrary, 
man  is  obHged  as  well  as  capable  of  doing  good  without 
the  hope  of  immortahty;  virtue  is  its  own  reward.    This  " 
is  the  conclusion  of  the  philosophy  which  is  based  on  ^ 
natural  reason.    But,  according  to  Pomponazzi,  the  mil 
may  transcend  reason:  man  can  believe  things  which  he    • 
is  incapable  of  proving;  faith  proceeds  from  will,  from  ^ 
personal  impulse.    By  means  of  this  separation  between 
reason  and  will,  between  knowledge  and  faith,  Pomponazzi 
conformed  his  theory  with  the  authorized  doctrines  of 
the  Church.     He  resorted  to  the  same  expedient  in  rec- 
onciling the  reality  of  the  human  will  with  divine  om- 
nipotence.   The  Church  rejected  this  distinction. 

Nicolo  da  Machiavelli  introduced  the  naturalistic 
method  of  investigation  into  politics  and  ethics  in  the  " 
same  manner  as  Pomponazzi  had  revived  the  naturalistic 
psychology  and  ethics  of  genuine  Aristotelianism.  De- 
scended from  an  old  Florentine  family  (b.  1469),  he  entered 
the  diplomatic  service  of  the  republican  government  of 
his  native  city  which  furnished  him  a  splendid  opportunity 
for  studying  men  and  affairs.  After  the  fall  of  the  Repub- 
Hc  (151 2)  he  joined  the  Medici,  which  brought  him  the  pro- 


\ 


0  THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   RENAISSANCE 

found  contempt  of  his  fellow  citizens,  who  refused  to  accept 
his  services  after  the  republican  government  was  again 
restored.  He  died  in  1527. — Political  interest  made  him 
a  thinker.  The  misfortunes  of  Italy  and  its  consequent 
conditions  inspired  him  with  a  desire  to  restore  its  ancient 
spirit  and  power.  Why  should  we  imitate  the  splendid 
arts  of  the  ancients  and  neglect  their  splendid  deeds?  But 
the  sole  possibility  of  accomplishing  anything  great  re- 
quires us  to  press  forward  to  the  realization  of  great  ideals 
without  scruple!  There  are  passages  (especially  in  his 
Principe)  in  which  Machiavelli  seems  to  regard  the  ideal 
which  a  man  proposes  as  an  indifferent  matter,  if  he  only 
pursues  it  unscrupulously  and  energetically.  But  in  the 
background  of  his  thought  there  was  constantly  but  a 
single  ideal;  the  unity  and  the  greatness  of  Italy.  He 
regarded  everything  right  which  would  contribute  towards 
the  realization  of  this  ideal.  Finding  the  Italians  of  his 
age  lacking  in  a  proper  appreciation  of  greatness,  he 
attributes  it  to  the  softening  influence  of  the  Church  and 
of  Christianity.  In  his  Discorsi  (Dissertations  on  the 
first  ten  books  of  Livy)  he  draws  comparisons  between 
the  mind  of  antiquity  and  that  of  his  own  age,  thus  laying 
the  foundation  for  a  comparative  ethics  which  was  highly 
unfavorable  to  the  modem  period.  Honor,  magnanimity 
and  physical  prowess  are  not  sufficiently  appreciated  now, 
and  this  is  due  to  the  fact  that  Christianity  places  the 
ideal  of  htmianity  in  a  transcendent  world.  To  Machi- 
avelli it  is  perfectly  clear  that  these  attributes  assess 
more  than  secondary  value,  they  are  intrinsically  meritori- 
ous. Machiavelli  reveals  the  true  spirit  of  the  Renaissance 
both  by  the  purely  human  ideal  which  he  presents  to  his 
fellow  countrymen,  as  well  as  by  his  emulation  of  power 
for  its  own  sake. 


1 

r 

\ 


i 


MONTAIGNE  7 

The  spirit  of  the  Renaissance  was  likewise  manifest  in 
France.     Michel  de   Montaigne   (i 533-1 592),   a  French 
nobleman,  spent  his  life  in  his  private  castle  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Bordeaux,  far  removed  from  the  great  move- 
ments agitating  his  age,   devoting  himself  to  literary  * 
pursuits.     His  interest   in   a  purely  naturalistic  inter- 
pretation of  human  life,  as  he  knew  it  from  travel,  books 
and  above  all  from  introspection,  reveals  his  thoroughly 
modem  spirit.    At  the  beginning  of  his  essays  (which 
appeared  1 580-1 588)  he  remarks;  je  suis  moy-mesme  le 
sujet  de  mon  livre.     Closer  study  however  reveals  the 
fact  that  it  is  the  way  in  which  nature  manifests  itself 
in  his  own  life  that  really  appeals  to  him.     Natiu-e,  the 
great  Mother  of  us  all,  reveals  herself  in  a  distinctively 
unique  manner  in  every  individual.    Every  htmian  being  \ 
has  his  forme  maistresse,  his  ruling  passion.     It  is  this  I 
interest   that   accounts   for    Montaigne^s   own   personal 
observations  as  well  as  for  his  thorough  study  of  ancient 
literature.     His  enthusiasm  for  nature  and  his  insight 
into  the  multiplicity   of   individual  peculiarities  cause  *" 
him  to  revolt  against  all  dogmatism,  both  the  rationalistic 
and  the  theological.     He  opposes  them  both  on  the  ground 
of  the  inexhaustible  wealth  of  experience,  which  neither 
the  faith  of  reason  nor  of  dogma  can  satisfy.    Our  in- 
vestigations constantly  lead  to  the  discovery  of  a  greater 
nimiber  of  differences  and  variations  and  thus  increase 
the  difficulty  of  reducing  them  to  general  laws.    And  we 
must  remember,  furthermore,  that  our  knowledge  of  the 
objective  world  is  through  sense  perception,  and  that  the 
sense  organs  as  a  matter  of  fact  only  reveal  their  own 
state,  not  the  real  nature  of  objects.    And  finally,  if  we 
attempt  to  form  a  conception  of  Deity,  we  imagine  Him 
in  human  form,  just  as  animals  would  conceive  Him  in 


\\ 


8 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  RENAISSANCE 


animal  form,  and  we  presume  that  this  whole  universe 
was  created  and  is  preserved  for  the  welfare  of  man  alone. 
— But  Montaigne  is  not  a  sceptic.    There  are  two  funda- 
mental ideas,  vitally  related  to  each  other,  to  which  he 
firmly  holds,  viz.  the  idea  of  the  variety  of  individual 
peculiarities,  and  the  idea  of  the  eternity  of  nature  re- 
vealing itself  in  every  natm-al  event. 
l,Luis^d-a^  (bom  in  Valencia  1492,  died  in  Brugge 
1542),  a  Spanish  scholar,  whose  contributions  to  philology 
and  pedagogy  have  likewise  been  of  great  importance, 
became  the  forerunner  of  modem  empirical  psychology 
through  his  book  De  anima  vita  (1538).     He  insists  that 
experience  must  be  the  foundation  of  all  knowledge  and, 
\tme  to  this  principle,  he  holds  that  our  chief  concem  is 
Inot  to  know  what  the  soul  is,  but  to  know  how  it  acts. 
/He  therefore  imdertakes  to  emancipate  psychology  from 
\  metaphysics  and  theology.    He  follows  the  descriptive 
rather  than  the  analytic  and  explanatory  method.    His 
description  of  the  various  psychical  phenomena,  especially 
of  the  emotions,  still  retains  its  interest.    He  regards  the 
soul  and  the  vital  principle  as  identical,  and  he  constantly 
seeks  to  combine  physiology,  as  he  imderstands  it  from 
the  works  of   Galeny   with  his  psychology.    He  holds 
however  that,  whilst  the  souls  of  plants  and  of  animals 
(the  principle  of  organic  life  and  of  sensory  experience) 
evolve  from  matter,  God  creates  the  hirnian  soul.    The 
proof  of  the  divine  origin  of  the  soul  consists  of  the  fact 
that  man  is  never  satisfied  with  the  sensible  and  finite, 
but  is  forever  striving  to  realize  the  infinite. 

Two  years  after  the  appearance  of  Vives^  work,  Philip 
Melanchthon  (1495-1560),  the  reformer  and  "Preceptor  of 
Germany,"  published  his  Liber  de  anima,  a  book  which 
made  a  profoimd  impression  upon  Protestantism.    He 


MELANCHTHON  9 

follows  Aristotle  and  theology  more  closely  than  Vives  and 
his  book  is  therefore  of  less  importance  for  the  history  of 
psychology  than  that  of  Vives-,  Melanchthon's  mild 
conception  of  himian  natiu-e,  contrasting  sharply  with 
that  of  Luther  and  the  Lutheran  zealots,  had  a  wholesome 
influence  however.  His  theory  of  the  "natural  light'* 
shows  this  clearly:  there  are  a  number  of  ideas  implanted 
in  us  by  God,  hence  innate  (notiti®  nobisctim  nascentes), 
and  these  form  the  basis  of  all  thought  and  of  all  value- 
judgments.  This  "natural  Hght''  was  darkened  by 
the  Fall  which  necessitated  the  giving  of  the  law  at  Sinai. 
The  content  of  the  ten  commandments  however  is  the 
same  as  the  "natiu-al  light."  It  follows  therefore  that 
ethics  may  be  founded  on  human  nature  (nattu-alistically). 
But  it  is  powerless  to  quicken  the  Hfe  of  the  spirit  and 
give  peace.     (Philosophiae  moralis  epitome.) 

The  doctrine  of  the  natural  light  was  taken  up  enthusiasti- 
cally by  the  Reformed  provinces  and  appHed  most  rigor- 
ously, especially  with  reference  to  the  idea  of  authority 
and  of  the  state.  John  Althaus  (Althusius,  1557-1638),  the 
Burgomaster  of  Emden,  made  this  theory  the  basis  of 
his  idea  of  popular  sovereignty  in  his  Politica  methodice 
digesta  (1603).  Even  before  him,  Jean  Bodin  (in  La 
repuhlique,  1577)  had  conceived  and  elaborated  the  idea 
that  sovereignty  is  indivisible  and  can  exist  in  but  a  single 
place  in  the  state.  Althaus  now  teaches  that  it  always  \ 
belongs  to  the  people.  Riders  come  and  go,  but  the 
people  constitute  the  permanent  foundation  of  the  state. 
They  are  the  source  of  all  authority  because  it  is  their 
welfare  that  constitutes  the  cause  and  purpose  of  the  • 
existence  of  the  state.  As  a  matter  of  history  the  sover- 
eignty of  the  people  is  revealed  in  the  first  place  by  the 
fact  that  in  most  states  there  are  a  ntunber  of  ofi&cers 


;i 


I 


lO 


THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE   RENAISSANCE 


GROTITJS 


II 


exercising  governmental  control  by  virtue  of  their  appoint- 
ment by  the  people,  and,  in  the  second  place,  by  the  fact 
that  the  people  terminate  the  government  of  tyrannical 
princes  by  revolution.     From  the  viewpoint  of  philosophy, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  theory  of  popular  sovereignty  is 
demonstrated  by  the  fact  that  either  an  expressed  or 
tacit  contract  (pactum  expressum  vel  tacitum)  underlies 
the  origin  and  perpetuity  of  the  state;  it  is  by  virtue  of 
such  contract  that  the  people  institute  organized  society 
and    submit    themselves    to    governmental    authority. 
Althaus  therefore  maintains  that  the  purpose  of  this  con- 
tract can  be  nothing  else  than  the  welfare  of  the  people. 
He  seems  to  construe  this  contract  more  in  the  form  of  a 
directive  idea  than  as  an  historic  fact.     The  state  is 
simply  the  most  comprehensive  community;  its  ante- 
cedents being  the  narrower  circles  of  the  family,  the 
neighborhood  a,nd  the  corporation. 

The  appearance  of  Hugo  Grotius'  De  jure  belli  et  pads 
(1625)  marks  an  epoch  in  the  sphere  of  jui4si)rudcnce  and 
political  theory.  Bom  at  Delft  in  1583,  his  great  learn- 
ing in  the  field  of  jurisprudence  and  of  theology  attracted 
attention  early  in  life.  Politically  he  U^longcd  to  the 
aristocratic  and  Hberal  theological  party  of  ObernbarncvelL 
He  was  rescued  from  the  imprisonment  into  which  he  wajj 
cast  after  the  fall  of  Obernbarnevelt  by  his  ^life's  cunning. 
Thereafter  he  lived  in  Paris,  and  finally  received  the 
appointment  of  ambassador  to  Sweden  (1645).  Grotims 
makes  war  his  starting  point  and  inquires  how  it  may  be 
abolished.  There  are  four  kinds  of  war  between  states: 
between  an  individual  and  the  state— between  ciifFcrent 
individuals— between  the  state  and  the  individual. 
I .  When  states  declare  war  they  have  no  ri^ht  to  abrogate 
the  rights  of  the  individual  and  the  obligations  of  humanity. 


War  must  be  conducted  for  the  sake  of  peace,  and  hence 
not  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  peace  impossible.     It  is 
through  this  principle  that  Grotius  became  the  founder  of 
the  modem  theory  of  popular  sovereignty.     2.  When 
the  individual  declares  war  against  the  state  it  is  an 
act  of  rebellion,  and,  in  evident  opposition  to  Althaus, 
Grotius  denies  the  right  of  the  people  to  revolt.     3.     War 
between  individuals,  in  a  well-regulated  state,  is  limited 
to  justifiable  self-defense.    4.    War  of  the  state  against 
the    individual    takes    the    form    of   punishment.     The 
state's  right  to  pimish  must  not  be  construed  as  the  right 
of  expiation.     Punishment  is  justified  only  in  case  the 
pain  imposed  on  the  individual  contains  the  possibility 
of  greater  good  both  to  the  individual  himself  aixl  to  the 
community.— In  all  of  these  various  oontingcDcies  the 
authority  of  the  law  is  independent  of  theological  grounds. 
It  proceeds  from  human  nature  (ex  principii.s  homini 
intemis).    Human   beings   congn>gaie   and   are  led   to 
organize  societies  under  the  influence  of  a  native  social 
impulse  (appctitus  societatis);  but  tbe  constitution  of 
society  presupposes  certain  principle;  of  government- 
above  all  the  inviolability  of  every  proanwc— and  the 
pcH)plo  therefore  pledge  themselves  to  the  observance 
of  these  rules  either  by  expressed  or  tacit  contract.    The 
obligation  to  keep  promises,  according  to  Grotius,  i^ts 
upon   a    primitive   promise.    In   direct   opjxxsition    to 
Althaus,  Groiius  holds  that  the  people— i.  c.  after  Uwiy 
have  constituted  society  on  the  basis  of  the  immitive 
contract — am  renounce  its  sovereignty  absolutely  because 
it  confers  it  on  a  prince  or  corporation.    His  tlieory  of 
the  relation  of  the  state  to  religion,  on  the  other  hand^ 
b  more  liberal  than  that  of  the  strictly  confessional 
AUhatis:  The  only  requirement  wliich  the  state  can  make 


i 


X2 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  RENAISSANCE 


BOHME 


n 


of  its  subjects  is  the  acceptance  of  general  religious  ideas 
(the  unity  of  Deity,   predestination). 

3.    The  general  religious  ideas  which  Grotius  has  in 
mind,  and  which  even  Melanchthon  accepted,  were  elabo- 
rated by  a  series  of  thinkers  in  more  or  less  direct  op- 
position to  the  confessional  conception.    Similar  ideas 
had  ah-eady  been  expressed  during  the  period  of  the  older 
Itahan  Renaissance  (especially  in  the  Platonic  Academy 
at  Florence).    Jean    Bodin    (a   Frenchman   learned   in 
law,  d.  1596),  previously  mentioned,  in  his  remarkable 
work  called  the  Dialogue   of  Seven    Men    (Colloquium 
Heptaplomeres)  describes  a  conversation  between  men 
whose   reHgious   viewpoints    were    widely   at   variance. 
Two  of  the  men,  defending  natural  religion— one  of  them 
dogmatically,  the  other  more  critically— engage  in  con- 
troversy with  a  CathoHc,  a  Lutheran,  a  Calvinist,  a  Jew, 
and  a  Mohammedan.    According  to  Bodin,  true  religion 
consists  in  the  ptmfied  soul  turning  to  God,  the  infinite 
essence.    This  reHgion  can  be  exercised  within  any  of  the 
various  religions,  and  the  seven  men  therefore  separate 
in  charity  and  peace. 

Bodin's  book  was  in  circulation  for  a  long  time  in 
nothing  but  manuscript  copies.  In  1624,  however,  the 
English  diplomat,  Herbert  of  Ckerbury,  pubHshed  his  book 
De  veritate,  which  remained  the  text  book  of  natural 
religion  for  a  long  mmiber  of  years.  Cherhury  takes 
issue  with  those  on  the  one  hand  who  regard  confessional 
faith  as  superior  to  rational  knowledge,  and  seek  to  incul- 
cate such  faith  by  threats  of  future  punishment,  and  those 
on  the  other  hand  who  pretend  to  depend  wholly  on  the 
rational  understanding,  together  with  those  who  would 
derive  everything  from  sense  experience,  conceiving  the 
soul  as  a  blank  tablet  (tabula  Rasa).    He  holds  that  there 


13 


! 


is  an  immediate,  instinctive  sense  which  guides  all  men 
to  the  acceptance  of  certain  truths  (notitiae  communes). 
This  sense  is  the  natural  product  of  the  instinct  of  self- 
preservation,  which  is  another  instance  of  the  operation 
of  divine  predestination.  The  following  propositions 
are  instinctive  truths  of  this  order:  Two  contradictory 
propositions  cannot  both  he  true;  There  is  a  first  cause  of 
all  things;  No  one  should  do  anything  towards  another  which 
he  would  he  unwilling  to  suffer  in  return.  According  to 
Cherhury,  even  natiu-al  religion  rests  on  an  instinctive 
foundation,  an  inner  revelation  experienced  by  every 
human  soul.  The  evidences  of  this  revelation  consist  of 
the  fact  that  we  have  capacities  and  impulses  which 
finite  objects  fail  to  satisfy.  The  following  five  prop- 
ositions contain  the  essence  of  all  religion:  There  is  a 
Supreme  Being;  This  Being  must  he  worshipped;  The  truest 
worship  consists  of  virtuous  living  and  a  pious  disposition; 
Atonement  for  sin  must  he  made  hy  penitence;  There  are 
rewards  and  punishments  after  the  present  life.  Questions 
which  go  beyond  these  five  propositions  need  give  us  no 
concern. 

Jacob  Bbhme  (1575-1624),  the  Gorlitz  cobbler,  and  the 
profoimdest  religious  thinker  of  this  period,'  does  not 
intend  to  oppose  positive  religion,  as  is  the  case  with 
Bodin  and  Cherhury,  He  means  to  be  a  good  Lutheran. 
He  simply  wishes  to  furnish  a  philosophy  which  will  har- 
monize with  Protestantism.  Although  a  mere  artisan, 
the  influence  of  mysticism  and  natural  science  gave  rise 
to  grave  doubts  in  Bbhme^s  mind.  He  accepted  the 
Copemican  astronomy.  He  could  no  longer  regard  the 
earth  as  the  center  of  the  universe.  But  must  it  not 
follow  therefore  that  man  is  but  a  negligible  quantity  in 
the  universe,  and  is  it  not  true  that  the  great  world  proc- 


14 


14 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF   THE  RENAISSANCE 


RAMUS 


esses  must  take  their  course  regardless  of  the  fate  of 
man?    Notwithstanding  all  this,  if  we  should  still  pre- 
sume to  maintain  our  faith  in  God  as  the  author  of  the 
universe,  what  shall  we  say  in  explanation  of  the  evil, 
strife  and  suffering  which  everywhere  abounds?    After 
profound  spiritual  struggles  Bbhme  discovered  answers  to 
these  questions  which  he  pubHshed  in  his  Morgenrote  im 
A  ufgang  ( 1 6 1 2) .    His  thought  moves  in  majestic  symbols 
drawn  from  the  Bible  and  the  chemistry  or  alchemy  of  his 
time.    He  is  however  fully  aware  that  these  symbols 
can  express  the  piure  thought  relations  but  very  imper- 
fectly.   He  was  also  well  aware  of  the  fact  that  his  ideas 
went  beyond  the  theology  of  the  church.    But  he  stoutly 
denied  the  charge  that  his  ideas  were  heathen.     "/  write 
like  a  philosopher,  not  like  a  heathenr    He  meets  the 
first  doubt  with  the  idea  of  the  presence  of  God's  power 
and  nature  in  everything—in  the  human  body  as  well  as 
in  the  stellar  spheres,  and  the  latter  must  therefore  be 
possessed  of  a  kind  of  life— in  human  souls  and  throughout 
infinite  space.    As  a  matter  of  fact  our  bodies  reveal  the 
same  elements  as  are  found  in  the  other  objects  of  nature. 
In  objective  nature  the  divine  activity  is  veiled;  but  in 
the  mind  of  man  it  is  clearly  conscious.     It  follows  there- 
fore that  we  possess  what  is  highest  within  ourselves* 
and  there  is  no  need  that  we  should  seek  it  beyond  the 
stars.    He  solves  the  second  doubt  with  the  idea  that 
man  must  assume  an  original  multiplicity  within  the 
divine  unity,  on  the  ground  that  multiplicity  cannot  be 
derived  from  unity,  and  moreover  because  opposition 
and  difference  are  necessary  conditions  of  consciousness: 
"A  being  incapable  of  experiencing  contrasts  could  never 
become    conscious   of   its   own    existence."   But  multi- 
pHcity  and  contrast  furnish  the  possibility  of  disharmony, 


15 


of  strife  and  evil.  The  origin  of  evil  is  explained  by  the 
fact  that  a  single  element  of  Deity  strives  to  become  the 
whole  Deity.  This  accotmts  for  the  profound  conflict 
and  the  intense  suffering  in  the  world  through  which  man 
and  nature  are  to  fight  their  way  through  to  peace.  In 
this  conflict  God  is  not  far  off:  it  is  indeed  his  own  inner 
conflict.  ''Everyone  whose  heart  is  filled  with  love  and  who 
leads  a  compassionate  and  sweet  tempered  life,  fighting 
against  evil  and  pressing  through  the  wrath  of  God  into  the 
light y  lives  with  God  and  is  of  one  mind  with  God,  God  requires 
no  other  service,'' 

4.  The  effort  to  attain  a  natural,  purely  himiamstic 
conception  likewise  affected  the  logic  of  the  Renaissance, 
as  well  as  the  psychology,  ethics  and  philosophy  of  relig- 
ion. The  scholastic  logic,  by  which  is  meant  the  logic  of 
the  middle  ages,  was  primarily  the  servant  of  theology  and 
of  jurisprudence;  it  was  adapted  to  the  single  purpose  of 
drawing  valid  conclusions  from  the  presuppositions 
established  by  authority.  But  an  effort  was  now  being 
made  to  discover  the  relation  which  exists  between  logical 
rules  and  natural,  spontaneous,  informal  thought.  It 
was  with  this  end  in  view  that  Pierre  de  la  Ramee  (Petrus 
Ramus)  attacked  the  Aristotelian  logic  {Institutiones 
Logicim,  1554,  French  Ed.  1555).  He  was  the  son  of  a 
charcoal  burner  (bom  in  northern  France  151 5),  and  it 
was  by  sheer  dint  of  his  thirst  for  knowledge  and  his  in- 
defatigable energy  that  he  forged  to  the  front  and  enjoyed 
a  most  successful  career  as  a  teacher  in  the  College  of 
France.  Being  a  Protestant,  he  fell  a  victim  to  the  mas- 
sacre of  St.  Bartholomew's  night  (1572).  Ramus  called 
attention  to  the  fact  that  the  earliest  philosophers  had 
no  formal  logic,  and  that  the  spontaneous  functions  of 
thought  are  not  confined  to  these  men,  but  that  they 


i!' 


iH' 


i6 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE   RENAISSANCE 


can  be  studied  in  the  mathematicians,  the  statesmen, 
the  orators,  and  the  poets  as  well.  These  observations 
however  still  failed  to  lead  Ramus  to  the  founding  of  a 
psychology  of  thought.  As  a  Humanist,  he  rejoices  in 
the  fact  that  the  classical  authors  could  be  of  service  to 
logic.  His  own  treatment  however  does  not  get  much 
beyond  the  theory  of  inference,  in  which  he  differs  but 
little  from  Aristotle.  A  controversy  between  the  Ramists 
and  the  Scholastics  arose  at  this  time— enlisting  France, 
England,  Germany  and  the  North— which  contributed 
greatly  to  the  development  of  freedom  of  thought. 

Franz  Sanchez  (1562-1632),  a  Spaniard,  professor  of 
medicine  and  philosophy  at  Montpelier  and  Toulouse, 
felt  the  need  of  substituting  a  new  method  for  the  scholas- 
tic  logic.     He    expresses    his    dissatisfaction    with    the 
existing  state  of  knowledge  in  his  book  Quod  nihil  scitur 
(1581).    The  further  he  presses   his  investigations  the 
greater  are  the  number  of  difficulties  which  he  finds. 
Owing  to  the  mutual  interdependence  of  all  things,  and 
the  infinitude  of  the  universe,  he  has  but  little  hope  of 
attaining  certainty  in  knowledge.     He  insists  on  obser- 
vation and  experiment  however,  and  takes  as  his  motto; 
Go  to  the  facts  themselves.     But  the  ultimate  ground  of 
certainty  is  nevertheless  within  the  human  mind  itself:  no 
external  knowledge  can  equal  the  certainty  which  I  have  of 
my  own  states  and  actions.    On  the  other  hand  however 
this  immediate  certainty  of  inner  experience  is  far  in- 
ferior to  the  knowledge  of  external  objects  in  point  of 
clearness  and  precision. 

Bacon's  enthusiastic  optimism  concerning  the  future 
prospects  of  science  presents  a  sharp  contrast  to  the 
pessimism  of  Sanchez,  He  hoped  for  great  things  and 
devised  magnificent  plans.    He  anticipated   great  ad- 


BACON 


17 


«l 


vancement  in  culture  which  was  to  be  brought  about  by 
the  mastery  of  the  forces  of  nature  through  the  aid  of 
natural  science,  a  study  which  ancient  and  mediseval 
thinkers  had  contemned.    The  aim  and  purpose  of  science 
is  the  enrichment  of  human  life  by  means  of  new  dis- 
coveries.    Bacon  nevertheless  bestows  high  praise  on  the 
^ve  of  contemplation  (contemplatio  rerum):  the  vision 
>^  Hght  is  far  more  glorious  than  all  the  various  uses  of 
jHght.    These    sublime    hopes    furnish   an   insight   into 
Bacon's  personal  character  and  his  method  of  doing  things. 
He  justified  the  use  of  every  available  means  in  acquiring 
the  conditions  without  which  he  thought  his  scientific 
plans  impossible,  on  the  plea  of  their  necessity  to  the 
realization  of  his  great  purposes. 

Francis  Bacon  of  Verulam  was  bom  of  an  excellent 
family  in  156 1.  In  order  to  acquire  the  influence  and  the 
wealth  which  he  regarded  as  necessary  to  his  purposes, 
he  threw  himself  into  politics  and  gradually  rose  to  promi- 
nent positions;  finally  attaining  to  the  office  of  Lord 
Chancellor.  But  he  gained  this  promotion  by  dishonor- 
able compromises  with  the  despotic  caprice  of  EHzabeth 
and  James  the  First.  Under  the  charge  of  bribery  and 
the  violation  of  the  law,  parliament  deposed  him  in  1621. 
His  last  years  were  spent  in  retirement  engaged  in  scien- 
tific pursuits.  He  died  in  1626.  His  political  activities 
had  not  prevented  him  from  continuing  his  studies  and 
the  production  of  important  works.  The  tragedy  of 
his  Hf e  consisted  in  the  fact  that  ulterior  demands  claimed 
his  attention  to  so  great  an  extent  that  not  only  his  real 
purpose  but  even  his  personal  character  had  to  suffer 
imder  it. 

Bacon  describes  himself  as  a  herald  (buccinator)  who 
announces  the  approach  of  the  new  era  without  par- 


y 

I 

ii 

N 


If 


i8 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF   THE   RENAISSANCE 


tidpating  in  it  himself.  He  insists  on  quitting  fruitless 
speculation  and  introducing  the  method  of  experience, 
induction,  in  every  department  of  knowledge, — in 
the  mental  sciences  as  well  as  in  the  natural  sciences. 
In  the  Novum  Organon  (1620)  he  examines  the  reasons 
why  the  sciences  are  inadequate  and  describes  the  in^ 
ductive  method.  In  the  De  Dignitate  et  Augmentis 
Scientiarum  (1623)  he  presents  a  sketch  of  the  actual 
state  of  the  sciences  and  proceeds  to  show,  frequently  in 
a  most  brilliant  manner,  the  gaps  which  still  remain  to 
be  filled. 

If  a  man  would  understand  nature  correctly,  he  must 
first  of  all  reduce  himself  to  a  blank  tablet.    No  one  can 
enter  the  kingdom  of  nature  except  as  a  little  child.    But 
we  are  all  hindered  to  a  greater  or  less  degree  by  various 
y  illusions,  both  native  and  acquired  (Idola  mentis).  These 
may  be  divided  into  four  classes.     The  first  class,  having 
its  origin  in  human  nature,  is  common  to  all  mankind 
K  (Idola  tribus).    This  is  why  we  are  constantly  disposed 
to  regard  things  from  the  viewpoint  of  their  relation  and 
their  similarity  to  ourselves,  rather  than  from  the  view- 
point of  their  true  place  in  the  general  order  of  the  tmi- 
verse — ex  analogia  hominis  instead  of  ex  analogia  universi. 
We  assimie  a  greater  degree  of  order  and  simplicity  in 
things  than  the  facts  justify.    We  discover  teleologic 
causes  in  nature  because  our  own  actions  reveal  such 
causes.    The  second  class  rests  on  individual  peculiarity 
V^  (Idola  specus;  every  one  interprets  nature  from  the  view- 
point of  his  own  cave) .  This  accounts  for  the  fact  that  some 
minds  are  more  impressed  by  the  differences  of  things, 
whilst  others  are  disposed  to  emphasize  their  resem- 
blances.   Some  are  constantly  striving  to  analyze  and 
reduce  things  to  their  elements;  others  are  engrossed  with 


I 


BACON 


19 


totalities.  The  third  class  is  due  to  the  influence  of 
language  upon  thought  (Idola  fori).  The  formulation^' 
of  words  is  governed  by  the  needs  of  practical  Hfe,  but 
exact  thought  frequently  requires  distinctions  and  com- 
binations whicb  differ  widely  from  those  of  common 
speech.  In  certain  cases  there  is  a  superabimdance  of 
words,  in  others  there  are  too  few.  The  fourth  class 
(Idola  theatri)  is  ascribed  to  .the  influence  of  traditional^ 
theories. 

We  must  get  rid  of  all  these  illusions.  Bacon  makes 
no  attempt  to  show  how  this  may  be  accomplished.  The 
conception  of  the  idola  tribus  contains  a  profound  prob- 
lem which  Bacon  failed  to  see,  a  problem  however  which 
acquired  vast  importance  at  a  later  period;  we  are  obliged 
in  every  case  to  interpret  reality  from  the  human  stand- 
point (ex  analogia  hominis) ;  but  in  that  case  the  question 
arises  as  to  how  our  knowledge  of  the  world  can  possess 
objective  validity. 

-Bacaw  takes  exception  to  the  prevalent  method  of  induc- 
tion on  the  groimd  of  its  being  limited  to  positive  cases 
(as  an  induction  per  enumerationem  simpHcem).  He 
insists  that  we  must  likewise  take  note  of  results  in  cases> 
where  the  phenomenon  under  consideration  is  absent.  He 
demands  fiuthermore  that  we  investigate  the  modifica- 
tions of  phenomena  under  varying  conditions.  After 
sufficient  material  has  been  gathered  by  these  methods — 
and  in  order  to  avoid  being  overwhelmed  by  the  confused 
mass  of  facts  (for,  citius  emergit  Veritas  ex  errore  quam  ex 
confusione) — ^it  is  necessary  to  formulate  a  tentative 
hypothesis  and  examine  the  cases  which  seem  to  establish 
or  refute  the  hypothesis.  Bacon's  method  is  therefore 
not  a  pure  induction.  He  has  a  presentiment  of  the 
profound  mutual  dependence  of  induction  and  deduction. 


I 


20 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  RENAISSANCE 


His  depreciation  of  the  quantitative  method  however 
prevents  him  from  attaining  the  true  method  of  natural 
science  as  we  find  it  in  his  contemporaries,  Kepler  and 
Galileo. 

According  to  Bacon,  the  method  of  induction  gives  us 
an  insight  into  the  "Forms"  of  things.  The  Baconian 
"  Forms,"  from  one  point  of  view,  bear  a  close  resemblance 
>  to  the  Platonic  ideas,  and  from  another  they  are  analogous 
to  the  laws  of  natural  science.  The  latter  conception 
he  frequently  emphasizes  very  strongly.  He  says,  e.  g. 
"If  the  Forms  are  not  regarded  as  principles  of  activity, 
they  are  nothing  more  than  fictions  of  the  human  mind." 
Generally  speaking.  Bacon  occupies  a  unique  position 
in  the  transition  from  the  ancient  and  scholastic  worid 
view  to  that  of  the  modem  period.  This  is  clearly  mani- 
fest in  his  effort  to  acquire  a  mechanical  theory  of  nature. 
We  never  understand  an  object  until  we  are  in  position 
to  explain  its  origin,  and  the  genetic  processes  of  nature 
are  brought  about  by  means  of  minute  variations  (per 
minima)  which  elude  our  senses.  But  science  uncovers 
the  secret  process  (latens  processus)  and  thus  reveals  the 
inherent  relation  and  continuity  of  events.  We  do  not* 
discover,  e.  g.  that  the  "Form"  of  heat  is  motion  through! 
sense  perception;  nor  do  the  senses  reveal  the  fact  that 
the  sum  total  of  matter  remains  constant  throughout  all 
the  changes  of  nature. 

Bacon  makes  a  sharp  distinction  between  science  and 
^religion.  The  former  rests  upon  sense  perception,  the 
latter  upon  supernatural  inspiration.  In  philosophy 
the  first  principles  must  be  submitted  to  the  test  of  in- 
duction; in  religion,  on  the  other  hand,  the  first  principles 
are  established  by  authority.  Reverence  towards  God 
increases  in  direct  proportion  to  the  absurdity  and  in- 


BACON 


31 


credibility  of  the  divine  mysteries  accepted.  Bacon  how- 
ever believes  in  the  possibility  of  a  purely  natural  theology. 
The  very  imiformity  of  nattiral  causation  reveals  the 
existence  of  deity. 

In  ethics  Bacon  makes  a  distinction  between  the  theory 
of  the  moral  idea  (de  exemplari)  and  the  theory  of  the 
development  of  the  will  (de  cultura  anima).  The  former 
he  finds  thoroughly  elaborated  by  the  ancients;  but  the 
latter  has  received  but  very  Httle  attention  hitherto. 

B.    The  New  Conception  of  the  World 

The  middle  ages  developed  its  theory  of  nature  as 
well  as  that  of  the  spiritual  life  on  the  foundation  of 
Greek  antiquity-^xcept  where  its  ideas  were  derived 
from  the  Bible  and  Christian  tradition.— They  received 
their  theory  of  medicine  from  Galen,  their  astronomy 
from  Ptolemy,  their  philosophy  from  Aristotle,  Their 
world  view  was  a  combination  of  the  theories  of  Aris-^ 
totle  and  Ptolemy  with  the  Biblical  doctrines:  the  earth 
is  stationary  and  forms  the  center  of  the  tmi verse; 
the  sun,  moon,  planets  and  the  fixed  stars,  attached  to 
firm  but  transparent  spheres,  revolve  aroimd  it.  The 
sub-limar  world,  i.  e.  the  earth  and  the  space  intervening 
between  the  earth  and  the  moon,  is  the  realm  of  change 
and  death.  Here  the  four  elements  (Earth,  Water,  Air, 
Fire)  are  in  a  state  of  constant  motion.  Each  seeks  its 
"natural  place."  Weight  consists  of  the  natural  tendency 
to  descend,  lightness  consists  of  the  tendency  to  ascend. 
Beyond  this  moon-sphere  is  the  reabn  of  ether,  consisting 
of  matter  which  has  no  "natural  place,"  which  is  therefore 
capable  of  continuing  its  motion  eternally  with  absolute 
regularity.  The  motions  of  the  heavenly  bodies — due 
to  this  absolute  regularity— are  a  direct  copy  of  the  nature 


I 


23 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  RENAISSANCE 


I  of  Deity.    They  move  in  circles  because  the  circle  is  tb« 

\  most  perfect  figure;  it  invariably  retiuns  into  itself  I 

The  universe  is  botmded  by  the  sphere  of  the  fixed  stars 

which  is  moved  by  the  Deity  himself,  whilst  the  lower 

spheres  are  moved  by  variotis  ethereal  spirits. 

This  world  theory  seemed  to  be  in  harmony  with  the 
authorities  of  the  age,  AristoUe  and  the  Bible,  and  at  the 
same  time  to  be  in  accord  with  the  direct  evidence  of 
'  sense  perception.  This  is  why  it  required  such  a  severe 
struggle  to  supplant  it.  It  not  only  required  the  re- 
/pudiation  of  venerable  authorities,  but  even  the  most 
familiar  sensory  impressions.  It  was  this  profoimd 
revolution  that  constituted  the  stupendous  task  of  the 
great  Copernicus.  The  epistemological  foundations  of 
the  ancient  world  view  were  imsettled  by  two  men  who 
had  no  acquaintance  with  its  doctrine. 

I.  Nicholas  Cusanus  (1401-1464),  a  profoimd  thinker 
with  Neoplatonic  and  mystical  tendencies,  had  even  in 
the  fifteenth  century  gone  beyond  the  traditional  view  of 
a  limited  and  stationary  imiverse.  Bom  in  Cues  (near 
Trier),  he  was  educated  by  the  "Brothers  of  the  Common 
Life."  He  afterwards  continued  his  studies  in  Italy. 
He  attained  to  high  ecclesiastical  positions  and  his  phi- 
losophy has  its  starting  point  in  theological  speculations. 
In  his  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  he. regards  the  Spirit  as  the 
uniting  principle  which  combines  the  oppositions  implied 
in  the  characters  of  Father  and  Son;  spiritus  sanctus  est 
nexus  infinitus.  He  afterwards  discovers  analogous 
principles  in  hmnan  knowledge  and  in  nature  generally.— 
Falckenberg^s  Grungzuge  der  Philosophie  des  Nicholas 
Cusanus  (Breslau,  1880)  and  M.  Jacobi's  Das  WeltC" 
gebdude  des  Kardinals  Nicholas  von  Cues  (1904)  are 
splendid  memoirs  of  this  remarkable  man. 


f 


. 


( 


I 


CUSANUS 


23 


All  knowledge  consists  of  a  process  of  combination 
and  assimilation.    Even  sense  perception  combines  vari- 
ous impressions  into  unitary  wholes  and  these  are  in 
tiuTi  reduced  to  ideas  and  the  ideas  finally  to  concepts. 
In  this  way  the  intellect  (intelligentia)  is  forever  striving 
for  imity— but  it  invariably  requires  an  antithesis,  some- 
thing "other  than"  (alteritas)  itself  to  effect  its  develop- 
ment.    Finally,  in  order  to 'transcend  the  antitheses, 
thought  tmdertakes  to  conceive  them  as  the  extremes  of 
a  continuous  series.     In  this  way  maximum  and  minimum 
are  united  by  a  continuous  series  of  magnitudes.    But 
we  are  tmable  to  reconcile  all  antitheses:  thought  cul- 
minates in  antitheses,  i.  e.  there  always  remains  an  un- 
assimilated  increment  beyond  itself.    It  is  as  impossible 
•for  our  thought  to  comprehend  the  Absolute  as  it  is  to 
describe  a  circle  of  pure  polygons,  even  though  we  may 
constantly  approach  it  more  closely.    Although  we  are 
incapable  of  conceiving  the  Absolute,  Deity,  we  never- 
theless understand  (such  is  the  nature  of  the  intellect) 
our  incapacity,  and  the  ignorance  in  which  our  thought 
cuhninates,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  is  a  scientific  ignorance^ 
(docta  ignorantia).     (One  of  the  most  interesting  of  the 
works  of  Cusanus  is  entitled  De  docta  ignorantia,) 

This  fimdamental  peculiarity  of  our  knowledge  is  like- 
wise of  importance  in  the  study  of  nature.  We  are  con- 
stantly striving  to  form  continuous  series  from  given 
points,  but  without  being  able  to  arrive  anywhere.  Thus, 
e.  g.  we  can  divide  our  idea  of  matter  to  infinity,  in  ex- 
perience we  must  always  be  satisfied  with  a  finite  division, 
and  the  atom  concept  therefore  always  remains  relative. 
It  is  the  same  with  the  idea  of  motion:  an  everlasting, 
perpetual  motion  were  only  possible  in  case  there  were 
no  resistance.    Here  Cusanus  anticipates  the  principle  of 


I 


;| 


m 


I 

I 


i 


24 


THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE   RENAISSANCE 


TELESIUS 


inertia.  And  the  same  thing  applies  even  to  the  deter- 
minations of  locality:  we  always  regard  the  objects  of 
the  universe  from  a  given  place  which  is,  for  the  time 
being,  the  center  of  the  universe  for  us;  the  universe  as 
such,  however,  can  have  neither  center  nor  circumference, 
and  all  motion  is  relative.    The  theory  that  the  earth  is 


at  thecenter  of  the  universe  is  therefore  false.  However 
if  it  is  not  at  the  center  of  the  imiverse,  it  cannot  be  at 
rest;  it  must  be  in  motion  even  though  we  do  not  perceive 
it.  There  is  no  grsiimd  therefore  for  the  assimiption  that 
the  processes  of  ori^  and  decay  should  be  confined  to 
the  sublunar  sphere;  we  must  rather  assume  that  all 
world  bodies  are  subject  to  similar  conditions  to  those 
of  the  earth.  According  to  Cusanus,  therefore,  the  same 
principle  which  precludes  our  knowledge  of  Deity  like- 
wise demonstrates  that  the  world  can  neither  be  limited 
nor  stationary  as  was  hitherto  believed. 

2.  It  was  characteristic  of  the  ancient,  aesthetic  con- 
ception of  natiu-e  to  emphasize  the  opposition  of  Form 
and  Matter.  The  "Forms''  of  natural  phenomena  like- 
wise contained  their  explanation.  Bernardino  Telesius 
(i 508-1 588)  introduces  the  concept  of  Force  (principium 
agens)  instead  of  Form  (in  his  work  De  rerum  natura, 
1565-1587),  as  the  opposite  of  Matter.  He  believes  that 
this  conforms  more  closely  with  the  facts  of  experience. 
The  "Forms"  were  mere  qualities,  which  explain  nothing. 
He  rejected  the  traditional  theory  of  the  "natural  places" 
and  the  qualitative  distinction  of  the  elements.  There 
are  as  a  matter  of  fact  but  two  fundamental  forces;  the 
one  expands  (heat),  the  other  contracts  (cold),  and  the 
various  "Forms''  which  Matter,  in  itself  unchanging 
and  quantitatively  constant,  asstmies  must  find  their 
explanation  by  reference  to  the  interaction  of  these  two 


25 


forces.  There  are  no  "natural  places, "  for  space  is  every- 
where the  same.  Different  places  in  space  do  not  of 
themselves  mvolve  any  qualitative  differences 

Telesius  was  bom  at  Cosenza  in  the  vicinity  of  Naples 
His  circumstances  were  sufficiently  comfortable  to  provide 
him  the  opportunity  to  devote  himself  to  science     He 
taught  in  the   University  of  Naples  and  founded  an 
Academy  m  his  native  city.    He  had  planned  to  sub- 
stitute  a  new  theory,  based  on  experience,  for  Aristotelian 
Scholasticism.     But  his  critical  equipment  was  inadequate 
to  the  accomplishment  of  this  ideal.     His  general  princi- 
pies  however  mark  an  important  advance.    The  details 
of  his  natural  philosophy  are  no  longer  of  interest.     But 
his  ideas  on  the  psychology  of  knowledge  still  continue 
to  be  of  considerable  importance.    He  tries  to  bring 
thought  and  sensation  into  the  closest  possible  relation  - 
bhould  an  object  which  has  once  been  perceived  in  the 
totahty  of  its  parts  and  attributes  recur  at  some  later 
time  with  certain  of  its  parts  and  attributes  lacking  we 
can  supply  the  parts  which  are  lacking  and  imagine  the 
object  as  a  totality  notwithstanding  the  fact  that    we 
perceive  it  but  in  part.    We  can  imagine  fire,  e.  g.  with 
all  Its  attnbutes,  even  though  we  only  see  its  hght,  without 
perceiving  its  heat  and  its  consuming  energy.     Intellection  ^ 
(intellegere)  is  the  process  of  construing  our  fragmentary 
expenence  into  such  a  totality.    Even  the  highest  and 
most  perfect  knowledge  simply  consists  of  the  ability 
to  discover  the  unknown  attributes  and  conditions  of 
phenomena  by  means  of  their  similarity  to  other  cases 
known  as  a  totality.    Inference  simply  means  the  rec- 
ogmtion  of  the  absent  attributes  by  this  method     The 
simplest  sensory  impressions  are  therefore  related  through 
a  large  number  of  intervening  degrees  to  the  highest 


rl^ 


26 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   RENAISSANCE 


COPERNICUS 


27 


/ 


product  of  scientific  thought,  and  there  is  no  ground  for 
attempting  to  deduce  our  knowledge  from  two  different 
sources  or  faculties.  The  problem  as  to  whether  similarity- 
is  a  sensory  quality  like  color  and  tone  remains  imsolved, 
as  even  Patrizzi,  a  contemporary  of  Telesius,  charged 
against  him. 

Telesius  is  inclined  to  ascribe  sensitivity  to  all  matter, 
just  as,  on  the  other  hand,  he  regards  the  soul  as  material 
(with  this  exception,  he  postulated  a  supernatural  part 
in  the  soul  on  theological  grounds  which  he  regarded  as  a 
forma  superaddita).  Every  himian  soul,  like  everything 
else,  possesses  a  native  impulse  towards  self-preservation, 
which  constitutes  the  foundation  of  ethics.  Himian 
virtues  represent  the  various  attributes  which  are  favor- 
able to  the  preservation  of  the  individual.  Wisdom  is 
an  indispensable  condition  which  must  therefore  co- 
operate with  all  the  other  virtues  (as  virtus  universalis). 
The  social  virtues,  which  are  comprehended  under  the 
concept  humanitas,  are  of  great  importance,  because 
intimate  association  with  others  is  a  necessary  condition 
of  self-preservation.  The  climax  of  all  virtue  however 
is  magnanimity  (sublimitas),  which  finds  its  sufficient 
satisfaction  in  its  own  personal  integrity  and  diligence. 
Telesius  conceived  his  ethics  in  the  spirit  of  the  Renais- 
sance, and  it  produced  a  lasting  impression.  His  natural 
philosophy  and  his  psychology  were  likewise  very  influ- 
ential, especially  over  Bacon  and  Bruno. 

3.  Nicholas  Copernicus  (Coppemick),  the  fotmder  of 
the  modem  theory  of  the  universe,  was  bom  at  Thorn 
(1473),  studied  at  Cracow  and  at  various  Italian  Uni- 
versities and  was  prebendary  at  Frauenburg,  partly  as 
Administrator,  devoting  part  of  his  time  to  his  studies. 
He  took  no  part  in  the  great  controversies  agitating  his 


age.  But  he  seems  to  have  had  a  measure  of  sympathy 
with  the  religious  movement,  and  he  feU  into  discredit 
during  his  latter  years  on  account  of  his  liberal,  humanistic 
tendency.  He  began  the  elaboration  of  his  astronomical 
theory  ah-eady  in  1506,  but  he  was  hesitant  about  its 
publication,  and  the  first  printed  copy  of  his  work  De^- 
revolutionibus  orhium  coslestium  only  appeared  shortly 
before  his  death  (1543).  The  matter  which  specially 
concems  us  is  the  epistemological  presuppositions  which 
form  the  basis  of  this  work.  Two  of  its  presuppositions 
must  claim  our  attention. 

Nature  always  takes  the  simplest  course.    The  theory  of  -" 
the  whole  universe  revolving  around  so  small  a  body  as 
the  earth  is  inconsistent  with  this  principle.    And  the    ^ 
case  is  similar  with  the  theory  that  the  planetary  orbits 
should  not  be  simple  circles  but  a  very  complicated  system 
of  epicycles.     On  the  other  hand,  if  we  regard  the  sun  as 
the  center  of  the  universe,  and  the  earth  and  the  planets 
as  revolving  around  it,  we  have  a  very  simple  theory  ofv 
the  universe. 

The  second  presupposition  is  the  principle  of  the  rel-  / 
ativity  of  motion  previously  suggested  by  Cusanus.     The  ^ 
perception  of  motion  is  not  adequately  explained  by  the 
mere  reference  to  the  fact  that  a  perceived  object  has 
really  changed  its  position  in  space.    It  may  likewise' 
be  due  to  the  fact  that  the  perceiving  subject  has  moved. 
If  we  therefore  assume  that  the  earth,  from  which  we 
observe  the  motion  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  is  itself  in 
motion  (around  its  axis  and  around  the  sun),  we  will 
be  in  position  to  explain  the  phenomenon  quite  as  well 
(only  more  simply)  as  the  traditional  theory. 

Copernicus  still  adhered  to  the  idea  of  a  finite  universe 
and  regarded  the  firmament  of  the  fbced  stars,  the  boun- 


iiJI 


'I'l^ 


pii] 


aS 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF   THE   RENAISSANCE 


BRUNO 


29 


1  '■ 


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dary  of  the  universe,  as  motionless.  He  believed  the 
planets  to  be  enclosed  in  a  series  of  concentric  permanent 
spheres  But  notwithstanding  this  he  prepared  the  way 
for  a  radical  change  in  the  theory  of  the  universe.  Facts 
which  apparently  rested  on  the  direct  evidence  of  sense 
perception  and  were  supported  by  the  most  famous 
authorities  must  now  be  regarded  as  discredited!  We 
must  awaken  to  the  fact  that  the  system  of  things 
which  constitutes  the  universe  admits  of  a  different 
interpretation  from  the  apparent  demands  of  sense 
perception. 

4.  Giordano  Bruno  (i  548-1600)  is  at  once  the  most 
profound  and  the  most  com-ageous  thinker  of  the  renais- 
sance period.  Strongly  influenced  by  the  philosophy  of 
antiquity  and  accepting  the  theories  discovered  by 
Cusanus  and  Telesius,  he  found  a  real  foundation  for  his 
theory  of  the  imiverse  in  the  new  astronomy,  as  elabo- 
rated by  Copernicus  and  later  by  Tycho  Brake. 

Bom  at  Nola  in  southern  Italy,  Bruno  entered  the 
Dominican  order  in  his  early  youth.  He  was  soon  charged 
with  heresy.  His  active  mind  and  restive  spirit  could 
not  endure  the  rigid  monastic  discipline.  He  fled  the 
cloister,  discarded  the  monastic  garb  and  began  a  wander- 
ing career  of  study  and  travel,  which  took  him  to  Switzer- 
land, France,  England  and  Germany.  He  appears  in 
the  capacity  of  teacher  in  Toulouse,  Paris,  Oxford  and 
Wittenburg;  but  nowhere  did  he  find  a  permanent  position. 
This  was  due  in  part  to  the  opposition  of  the  traditional 
schools,  and  in  part  to  his  restless  disposition.  But 
despite  his  wanderings  he  found  time  to  write  his  in- 
genious works,  among  which  the  Italian  dialogues,  pub- 
lished in  London  1584,  deserve  special  mention.  He 
never  regarded  reconciliation  with  the  Catholic  church 


as  impossible,  and  even  cherished  the  hope  of  returning 
to  Italy  and,  without  re-entering  the  cloister,  continuing 
his  Hterary  activities.  He  felt  that  his  career  north  of 
the  Alps  was  a  failure  and  Protestantism,  with  its  many 
little  popes,  was  more  reprehensible  to  him  than  the 
ancient  church  with  its  single  Pope.  He  finally  returned 
therefore,  but  was  arrested  by  the  Inquisition  at  Venice 
(1592)  and,  after  a  long  imprisonment,  burnt  as  a  heretic 
at  Rome  in  1600.    He  died  like  a  hero. 

Bruno  held  Copernicus  in  high  esteem  because  of  his 
lofty  mind.  It  was  he  who  had  lifted  him  above  the 
illusory  testimony  of  the  senses  to  which  the  vast  majority 
remained  enchained.  But  notwithstanding  his  unstinted 
admiration  for  the  man,  he  nevertheless  regarded  the 
Copemican  theory  as  inadequate  because  of  its  conception 
of  the  universe  as  bounded  by  the  sphere  of  the  fixed 
stars.  The  basis  of  Bruno's  opposition  to  this  theory 
was  two-fold,  its  failure  to  accord  with  his  theory  of 
knowledge  together  with  his  religio-philosophical  views. 

a.  The  sensory  evidence  of  an  absolute  world-center 
and  an  absolute  world-boundary  is  merely  apparent.  The 
moment  we  change  our  viewpoint  we  attain  a  new  center 
and  a  new  boundary.  Every  point  in  the  universe  can 
therefore  be  regarded  at  once  as  both  central  and  periph- 
eral. Abstract  thought  and  sentiency  agree  in  this; 
namely,  that  we  may  add  number  to  number,  idea  to 
idea,  ad  infinittmi,  without  ever  approaching  an  absolute 
boundary.  The  possibilities  of  progress  in  knowledge 
are  therefore  imlimited,  and  it  is  from  this  characteristic 
of  knowledge  (la  conditione  del  modo  nostro  de  intendere) 
that  Bruno  conceives  the  character  of  the  universe:  abso- 
lute boundaries  are  as  inconceivable  of  the  universe  as 
of  knowledge. 


r  1'' 


i 


It 


so 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF   THE   RENAISSANCE 


V 


It  follows  therefore  that  there  are  no  absolute  positions. 
Every  position  is  determined  by  its  relation  to  other 
positions.     One  and  the  same  point  may  be  either  center, 
pole,  zenith  or  nadir— depending  entirely  on  the  point 
from  which  it  is  observed  (respectu  diversorum).    There 
can  therefore  be  no  absolute  motion  and  no  absolute 
time.    The  ancients  based  their  theory  of  absolute  time 
on  the  absolute  regularity  of  the  motions  of  the  fixed 
stars;  but  since  the  motions  observed  from  any  particular 
star  differ  from  that  of  another  star  there  are  as  many 
times  as  there  are  stars.    And,  finally,  the  traditional 
theory  of  absolute  heaviness  and  lightness  is  likewise  an 
error;  its  tenability  was  based  on  the  presupposition  of  an 
absolute  center  of  the  universe.     Heaviness  and  hghtness 
must  therefore  be  understood  with  reference  to  the  various 
world-bodies.     Sun  particles  are   heavy   in   relation   to 
the  sim,  earth  particles  in  relation  to  the  earth.    Accord- 
ing to  Bruno,  "heaviness  is  the  expression  of  a  natural 
impulse  within  the  parts  to  return  to  the  greater  whole 
to  which  they  belong. 

The  principle  of  relativity  is  closely  connected  with 
the  theory  that  nature  is  everywhere  essentially  the  same. 
We  can  infer  the  conditions  in  other  parts  of  the  universe 
from  the  conditions  about  us  here  on  the  earth.  We 
observe  e.  g.  that  ships,  when  seen  at  a  distance,  appear 
to  be  motionless,  whilst  as  a  matter  of  fact  they  are 
moving  very  rapidly,  and  thus  by  analogy  we  may  assume 
that  the  fixed  stars  appear  to  be  motionless  by  reason 
of  their  great  distance  from  us.  There  is  no  justification 
for  maintaining  the  fixity  of  the  firmament  dogmatically 
as  the  ancients  and  even  Copernicus  had  done. 

Bruno  therefore  challenged  the  dogmatic  principles 
which  Copernicus  had  still  accepted.    He  saw  very  clearly 


BRUNO 


31 


however  that  the  matter  cannot  be  definitely  determined 
by  mere  speculative  generaHzations;  genuine  proof  can 
only  come  from  the  discovery  of  new  facts  of  experience 
And  he  beheves  furthermore,  and  rightly  so,  that  no  one 
can  mvestigate  the  matter  without  prejudice  who  adheres 
dogmatically    to    the    traditional    hypothesis.— At    one 
important  point  he  was  able  to  appeal  to  weU-defined 
facts.     He  rejected  the  theory,  still  accepted  by  Coper- 
nicus, that  the  stars  are  enclosed  in  permanent  spheres: 
//  the  earth  can  move  freely  in  space,  why  should  it  be  im- 
possible for  the  stars  to  do  the  same?    And  he  found  his 
conclusion  verified   by   Tycho  Brahe's  investigation  of 
comets,  which  as  a  matter  of  fact  pass  diagonally  through 
the  "Spheres''  whose  crystal  masses  were  supposed  to 
separate  the  various  parts  of  the  universe!    It  foUows 
therefore  that  the  contrast  of  heaven  and  earth,  of  perma- 
nent and  changeable  parts  of  the  universe,  is  untenable. 

b.  In  his  philosophy  of  religion  Bruno  starts  with  the 
infinitude  of  the  Deity.  But  if  the  cause  or  principle  of 
the  universe  is  infinite  it  must  follow  that  the  universe 
Itself  is  Hkewise  infinite!  We  are  unable  to  believe  that 
the  divine  fullness  could  find  expression  in  a  finite  uni- 
verse; nothing  short  of  an  infinite  number  of  creatures 
and  worlds  would  be  an  adequate  display  of  such  full- 
ness. 

Bruno  elaborated  his  theory  of  the  infinity  of  the  uni- 
verse in  two  dialogues,  the  Cena  de  la  ceneri  and  DeV 
tnflnito  universo  e  mondi  (1584),  and  in  the  Latin  didactic 
poem  De  tmmenso  (15Q1).  These  works  are  of  epochal 
miportance  in  the  history  of  the  human  mind.  Just  as 
this  wide  expanse  inspired  in  Bruno  a  feeling  akin  to 
deliverance  from  the  confines  of  a  narrow  cell,  so  the 
human    mind    is    now    presented    with    a    boundless 


f 


^^\ 


32 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   RENAISSANCE 


BRUNO 


t^i 


prospect  forever  promising  new  experiences  and   new 
problems. 

c.  Bruno  elaborated  his  general  philosophical  princi- 
ples, which  were  naturally  closely  related  to  the  new 
worid  theory,  in  the  dialogue  De  la  causa,  principio  e  uno 
(1584). 

Inasmuch  as  the  new  world  theory  annulled  the  op- 
position between  heaven  and  earth,  Bruno  undertakes 
the  task  of  annulling  all  oppositions  by  means  of  a  pro- 
founder  speculation.     Sharp  antitheses  originate  in  the 
human  mind  and  there  is  no  ground  for  ascribing  them 
to  nature.    Plato  and  Aristotle  e.  g.  had  no  warrant  in 
objective  fact  for  assuming  a  distinction  between  Form 
and  Matter.     There  is  no  absolute  Matter,  just  as  there 
is  no  absolute  position  and  no  absolute  time.    Absolute 
Matter  must  necessarily  be  absolutely  passive,  in  which 
case  it  could  acquire  form  and  development  only  through 
some  external  agency.     But  in  the  natural  worid  Forms 
are  not  introduced  into  Matter  from  without,  after  the 
manner  of  a  human  artist;  they  originate  from  within 
by  an  evolution  of  nature's  own  inherent  energy.     Matter 
is  no  less  divine  than  Form  and  it  persists  in  constant 
change  even  as  the  ancient  Atomists  had  observed.     Na- 
ture reveals  a  constant  cycle— from  inorganic  matter 
through  the  organic   processes  and  back  again  to  the 
inorganic.    According  to  Bruno's  own  statement,  he  was 
so  profoundly  impressed  with  this  idea  for  a  while  that 
he  was  inclined  to  regard  Forms  and  the  spiritual  factor 
in  the  universe  as  unessential  and  ephemeral.     Later  on 
however  he  perceived  that  Form  and  Spirit,  no  less  than 
Matter,  must  have  their  ground  in  the  infinite  Principle. 
He  admitted  that  everything  must  contain  a  spiritual 
principle,  at  least  potentially  (secondo  la  sostanza),  even 


33 


if  not  always  actually  (secondo  Patto).     The  ultimate 
source  of  all  things  consists  of  a  Being  which  transcends 
the  antitheses  of  Matter  and  Form,  potentiality  and 
reahty,  body  and  mind.     In  so  far  as  this  ultimate  source 
is  conceived  as  something  distinct  from  the  universe  it 
is  caUed^^' Cause,''  in  so  far  as  it  is  conceived  as  actively 
present  in  natural  phenomena  it  is  called  *' Principle" 
The  Deity  is  not  a  far  distant  being;  it  reveals  its  presence 
in  the  impulse  towards  self-preservation  and  it  is  more 
intimately  related  to  us  than  we  are  to  ourselves     It 
is  the  soul  of  our  soul,  just  as  it  is  the  soul  of  natui-e  in 
general,  which  accounts  for  the  all-pervasive  interaction 
throughout  universal  space. 

The  culmination  of  thought  likewise  marks  its  Hmit 
because  we  are  incapable  of  thinking  without  antitheses' 
Every  conceptual  definition  imposes  certain  limitations- 
the  infinite  Principle  is  therefore  incapable  of  definition' 
Theology  must  forever  remain  a  negative  science  i  e  a 
science  which  eliminates  the  limitations  and  antitheses 
from  the  concept  of  Deity.     The  only  significance  which 
positive  theology  can  have,  i.  e.  a  theology  which  under- 
takes to  express  the  infinite  Principle  by  definite  pred- 
icates, is   practical,  didactic   and  pedagogic.      It  must 
address  itself  to  those  who  are  incapable  of  rising  to  a 
theoretical  contemplation  of  the  universe.    God  is  indeed 
more  highly  honored  by  silence  than  by  speech. 

d.  The  ideas  described  above  are  characteristic  of  the 
most  important  period  of  Bruno's  philosophical  develop- 
ment.  It  is  possible  however  (with  Felice  Tocco,  in 
•his  valuable  treatise  Opera  latine  de  G.  Bruno,  1889)  to 
distinguish  an  earlier  and  a  later  period  in  his  development 
Dunng  the  first  period  Bruno's  philosophy  had  somewhat 
of  a  Platomc  character,  in  that  he  regarded  general  ideas 


I 


34 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   RENAISSANCE 


^ 


t 


as  the  highest  object  of  knowledge  and  the  universe  as  an 
emanation  from  Deity  (De  umbris  idearum,  1582).  But 
his  ideas  apparently  mean  something  different  from  the 
universal  concepts  (as  in  Plato).  He  seems  rather  to 
regard  them  as  laws  which  describe  an  actual  relationship 
(e.  g.  between  the  different  parts  of  the  body). — The 
last  period,  as  is  evident  from  the  De  triplici  minimo 
(1591),  is  noteworthy  for  its  emphasis  on  the  individual 
elements  of  being  between  which  this  actual  relationship 
obtains.  Sensory  objects  consist  of  parts  notwith- 
standing the  apparent  continuity  perceived  through  sense 
perception.  Bruno  calls  the  ultimate,  irreducible  (or 
first)  parts  atoms,  minima  or  monads.  There  are  various 
classes  of  monads,  and  he  even  calls  the  universe  and 
God  monads,  when  speaking  of  them  as  imits. 

The  distinctions  between  Bruno^s  three  points  of  view — 
the  theory  of  Ideas,  the  theory  of  Substance,  and  the 
theory  of  Monads — ^however  are  simply  matters  of  degree. 
e.  Bruno^s  ethics  conforms  with  his  general  theory 
of  the  universe.  His  Spaccio  de  la  hestia  trionfanta  (1584) 
evaluates  htmian  virtues  according  to  a  new  standard. 
Its  dominant  characteristic  is  the  prominence  given  to  the 
desire  for  truth  and  to  honest  toil.  Every  correct  evalua- 
tion presupposes  truth,  and  toil  is  the  nattu-al  consequence 
of  the  task  imposed  upon  man,  not  merely  to  follow  na- 
ture, but  to  bring  forth  a  new,  higher  order  of  nature, 
that  he  may  become  lord  of  the  earth.  In  the  Degli 
eroici  furori  (1585)  Bruno  describes  the  heroic  man  as 
one  who  is  aware  that  the  highest  good  can  only  be  realized 
through  strife  and  suffering,  but  who  never  despairs, 
because  pain  and  danger  are  evils  only  from  the  view- 
point of  the  world  of  sense,  not  from  the  viewpoint  of 
eternity  (ne  Tocchio  del  etemitade).    The  possibilities 


BRUNO 


35 


of  pain  increase  with  the  height  of  the  aim.  But  the 
heroic  man  finds  his  joy  in  the  fact  that  a  noble  fire  has 
been  kindled  in  his  breast-even  though  the  goal  should 
be  impossible  of  realization  and  his  soul  should  be  con- 
sumed by  its  profound  yearning.  This  courageous  wis- 
dom typifies  Bruno^s  character  as  it  appears  in  his  Hfe 
and  m  his  heroic  death  at  the  stake. 

C.    The  New  Science 

Without  any  disparagement  of  the  tremendous  im- 
portance of  the  free  investigations  in  the  sphere  of  mental 
science,  or  even  the  radical  change  in  the  general  theory 
of  the  universe,  the  fact  nevertheless  remains  that  the 
founding  of  modem  natural  science  had  a  far  profounder 
influence  upon  human  life.     The  contributions  of  an- 
tiquity are  likewise  in  evidence  here,  particularly  the  study 
of  the  writings  of  Archimedes.     The  real  cause  however 
must  be  traced  to  the  increasing  interest  in  the  industries 
mechamcs  and  engineering  operations,  especially  in  the 
Italian  cities.     Galileo  makes  mention  of  this  fact  at  the 
opemng  of  his  chief  work.     It  was  but  natural  therefore 
that  this  should  give  rise  to  a  desire  to  understand  the 
laws  and  principles  by  which  to  promote  these  operations. 
Ihen  foUowed  a  transition  from  the  achievements  of  man 
to  the  majestic  products  of  nature,  because  man  depends 
more  or  less  consciously,  on  the  analogy  between  human 
mechamcs  and  the  efficiency  of  nature. 

Modem  natural  science  created  a  new  method.  It 
substituted  observation  and  experiment  together  with 
analysis  and  computation  for  speculation  and  dogmatic 
constmction  on  the  one  hand  and  the  mere  collection  of 
facts  on  the  other.  The  human  mind  evolved  new  func- 
tions,  whose  nature  and  value  necessarily  suggested  new 


'^f\f 


il 


36 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  RENAISSANCE 


m 


problems  in  the  philosophy  of  knowledge.     Owing  to  the 
fact  that  the  new  method  was  applied  almost  exclusively 
to  the  reahn  of  matter,  the  concept  of  matter  naturally 
came  to  the  foreground.    And  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  was 
not  until  then  that  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  mind  and 
matter  could  be  sharply  and  definitely  stated.    Ethics  and 
the  philosophy  of  reHgion  likewise  received  their  comple- 
ment of  new  data.     The  self-sufficiency  of  man  was  mag- 
nified.   New  forms  of  social  life  were  evolved,  especially 
through  the  progressive  division  of  labor  made  possible 
and  necessary  through  the  mechanical  inventions.     The 
growing  conviction  of  the  prevalence  of  fixed  natural  laws 
required  a  restatement  and  a  more  precise  definition  of  the 
problem  of  reHgion.     Man's  general  attitude  to  the  uni- 
verse, both  in  its  theoretical  and  its  practical  aspects,  un- 
derwent a  most  remarkable  change. 

We  shall  mention  three  men  as  the  real  founders  of 
modem  science. 

I.  Leonardo  da  Vinci  (1451  iK^ig),  the  famous  artist, 
whose  varied  talents  made  him  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
characters  of  the  Renaissance  period,  is  known  to  us 
through  several  fragments  in  natural  science  and  philos- 
ophy which  are  of  great  importance.  His  manuscripts 
became  scattered  and  none  were  published  until  late  in 
the  nineteenth  century.  {E,  P.  Richter  has  pubHshed  a 
good  collection.  London,  1883.  A  German  translation 
of  the  most  important  fragments  was  pubhshed  by  M, 
Herzfeldy  Leipzig,  1904.) 

Experience  is  the  common  mother  of  all  knowledge. 
But  we  cannot  stop  on  the  plane  of  mere  observation. 
We  must  find  the  internal  bond  of  nature  (freno  e  regula 
interna)  which  explains  the  vital  relation  of  things  and 
events.    And  the  only  possible  method  of  doing  this  is 


KEPLER 


37 


by  the  aid  of  mathematics.    Mathematical  deduction  is 
the  only  method  of  discovering  the  unknown  from  the 
give^^  facts  of  nature.     We  thus  find  even  here  a  clear  ex- 
pression of  all  the  characteristics  of  modem  method,  viz. 
the  proper  coordination  of  induction  and  deduction.-^ 
Certain  statements  of  Leonardo's  indicate  a  sturdy  natu- 
ralism.   The  only  thing  we  can  know  about  the  soul  is  the 
nature  of  its  functions  and  its  activity  as  an  organic  prin- 
aple;  whoever  cares  to  know  more  must  inquire  of  the 
^       Monks!    Nature  consists  of  a  majestic  cycle  between  the 
J     morgamc  and  the  organic,  and  between  the  animate  and 
the  mammate.    Nature  always  takes  the  simplest  course. 
There  is  reason  therefore  to  hope  for  a  great  future  with 
respect  to  the  knowledge  of  nsLtnre.— Leonardo  suggested 
a  number  of  interesting  anticipations  of  the  principle  of 
inertia  and  of  energy.    He  stands  solitary  and  alone  in 
his  own  age.     It  was  not  until  a  century  later  that  any 
advancements  were  made  along  the  lines  which  he  indi- 
cated. 

^   b.  ^  John  Kepler  (1571-1630),  the  famous  astronomer, 
is  an  interesting  example  of  the  evolution  of  an  exact  scien- 
tific conception  of  nature  from  a  mystic-contemplative 
starting-point.     His  first  treatise  (Mysterium  cosmography 
tcum,  1597)  is  based  on  theological  and  Pythagorean  prin- 
ciples.    The  universe  is  the  manifestation  of  God.    The 
paths  and  motions  of  the  heavenly  bodies  must  therefore 
reveal  certain  harmonious  and  simple  geometrical  rela- 
tions.    The  Holy  Ghost  is  revealed  in  the  harmonious  ratio 
of  magnitudes  of  stellar  phenomena,  and  Kepler  thinks  it 
possible  to  constme  this  magnitudinal  ratio.     Later  on 
however  he  simply  maintained  the  general  belief  that  cer- 
tain quantitative  ratios  must  exist  between  the  motions 
ot  the  planets  and  formulated  the  results  deduced  from 


:Nl 


i> 


( 


I 


Hlii 


38 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE   RENAISSANCE 


Tycho  Brahe^s  observations  in  the  laws  which  bear  his 
name.  He  afterwards  demonstrated  the  quantitative 
ratios  on  the  basis  of  the  facts  of  experience.  Here  his 
method  involved  the  combination  of  the  experimental 
with  the  mathematical  method.  Just  as  he  had  at  first 
— ^  established  the  principle  that  nature  conforms  to  mathe- 
matical laws  by  the  theological  method,  so  he  further  be- 
lieves that  the  planets  are  guided  in  their  course  by  sepa- 
rate planetary  souls,  even  as  the  entire  world-system  is 
directed  by  the  world-soul  which  dwells  in  the  sun.  His 
explanation  of  nature  therefore  was  thoroughly  animistic 
or  mythological.  Later  on  in  life  he  held  that  science  must 
make  no  asstmiptions  except  such  as  can  be  actually  de- 
duced from  experience.  He  calls  such  causes  vera  causa. 
He  also  rejected  the  idea  of  planetary  souls  which  as  a 
matter  of  fact  are  never  actually  given  in  experience.  In 
his  Astronomia  nova  s.  physica  cosies tis  (1609)  he  makes  the 
transition  from  theology  and  animism  to  pure  natiu-al 
science.  He  defends  his  belief  in  the  importance  and 
truth  of  the  quantitative  method  psychologically  and  em- 
pirically as  well  as  theologically.  Mathematical  knowl- 
edge is  the  clearest  and  the  most  certain  knowledge  which 
we  possess  and  it  becomes  us  therefore  to  apply  it  as  widely 
as  possible.  The  processes  of  natiwe  are  qualitatively 
modified  by  our  subjective  states  (pro  habitudine  subjecti). 
Perfect  certainty  and  objectivity  can  only  be  attained  by 
the  quantitative  method.  And,  finally,  experience  reveals 
the  fact  that  all  material  phenomena  have  quantitative, 
especially  geometrical,  attributes;  "the  method  of  meas- 
urement can  be  applied  wherever  there  is  matter"  (ubi 
materia,  ibi  geometria).  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  universe 
participates  in  quantity  (mundus  participat  quantitate). 
Kepler  elaborates  his  general  conception  of  scientific 


GALILEO 


39 


method  in  his  Apologia  Tychonis,  All  science  is  based  on 
hypotheses.  But  hypotheses  are  by  no  means  to  be  re- 
garded as  arbitrary  notions.  They  must  vindicate  their 
title  by  the  harmony  of  their  logical  consequences  with 
the  given  facts  and  the  consistency  of  their  implications. 
Science  begins  with  the  observation  of  facts,  uses  these 
data  for  the  formulation  of  hypotheses  and  finally  seeks 
to  discover  the  causes  which  account  for  the  uniformity 
of  events. 

c.  Galileo  Galilei  (i  564-1642)  is  the  real  founder  of 
modem  science,  because  he  shows  the  clearest  under- 
standing of  modem  methods— the  method  of  induction 
and  deduction  as  mutually  complementary. 

If  induction  demanded  the  examination  of  every  pos- 
sible case,  inductive  inference  would  be  impossible.  But 
it  is  possible  to  examine  a  number  of  characteristic  cases, 
and  formulate  a  hypothetical  principle  by  an  analysis  of 
these  cases,  and  finally  prove  that  the  consequences  de- 
duced from  this  principle  are  in  accord  with  experience. 
In  order  to  make  this  deduction  and  show  its  agreement 
with  the  facts  correctly  we  must  be  in  position  to  state  our 
facts  in  quantitative  terms.  We  are  therefore  under 
necessity  of  measuring  phenomena  exactly.  Galileo 
raised  the  watchword;  Measure  everything  which  is  measur-  . 
able  and  reduce  the  things  which  will  not  admit  of  direct  meas- 
urement to  indirect  measurement, 

Kepler  had  previously  shown  that  matter  cannot  of  it- 
self pass  from  rest  to  motion.  Galileo  advances  a  step 
farther.  According  to  the  principle  of  simplicity,— 
which,  like  Copernicus,  Bruno  and  Kepler,  he  regarded  as  a 
^universal  law— he  maintained  that  a  body  tends  to  remain 
j  its  given  state  so  long  as  it  is  unaffected  by  external  in- 
lences.    A  body  can  therefore  of  itself  neither  change  its 


w 


\ 


i 


( 


M 


'«&iili.' 


I 


40 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  RENAISSANCE 


motion  nor  pass  from  motion  to  rest.    In  the  absence  of 
all  external  influences  a  moving  body  would  continue  its 
motion  indefinitely  at  the  speed  originally  given.    This  as 
a  matterof  cotirse  represents  an  ideal  case,  since  absolutely 
empty  space  is  unrealizable,  but  Galileo  showed  by  the 
experiment  of  rolling  a  ball  in  a  parchment  groove  that 
the  length  of  time  the  ball  continued  in  its  course  was  in 
direct  proportion  to  its  own  smoothness  and  the  smooth- 
ness of  the  parchment.     In  this  way  he  proved  the  prin- 
ciple of  inertia.    But  Galileo  likewise  thought  that  circular 
motion,  which  he  also  regarded  as  simple  and  natural,  as 
well  as  motion  in  a  straight  line,  would  be  continuous  if  all 
external  obstacles  could  be  eliminated.     In  his  investiga- 
tions of  the  motion  of  falling  bodies  he  likewise  starts  with 
the  principle  of  simpHcity,  with  a  view  to  showing  later 
that  it  is  verified  by  observation  and  experiment.     "// 
a  stone,  falling  from  a  given  position  at  considerable  height, 
accelerates  its  speed,  why  should  I  not  regard  the  acceleration 
as  due  to  its  simplest  explanation?    And  there  is  no  simpler 
explanation  of  acceleration  than  that  of  a  continuously 
uniform  increase.''— It  follows  further  from  the  principle 
of  inertia  and  the  law  of  falling  bodies  that  we  must  take 
account  of  the  energy  or  the  impetus  of  motion  (energia, 
momento,  impetu)  present  at  each  moment  as  well  as  the 
actual  sensible  motion. 

Galileo  elaborated  the  modem  theory  of  motion,  which 
forms  the  basis  of  physics,  in  his  Discorsi  della  nouve  scienze 
(1638). — His  Dialogo  sopra  i  due  massimi  sistemi  del  mondo 
(1632)  draws  a  comparison  between  the  Ptolemaic  and 
Copemican  world-systems,  without,  as  he  thought,  taking 
sides,  but  in  such  a  way  as  to  leave  no  doubt  as  to  his  real 
opinion.  This  brought  on  the  catastrephe  of  his  life,  n;) 
had  even  previously  (after  the  discovery  of  the  moondiQ 


GALILEO 


41 


Jupiter  and  of  sun-spots)  expressed  himself  publicly  as 
favonng  the  Copemican  system.    When  the  College  of 
the  Inquisition,  therefore,  in  the  year  1616,  placed  Coper^ 
mcus  book  on  the  Index,  he  is  said  to  have  promised  Car^ 
dtnal  Bellarmin  that  he  would  neither  defend  nor  dissem- 
inate the  Copemican  theory.    He  denied  that  the  Dialogo 
was  a  violation  of  this  promise  on  the  ground  that  he  had 
expressed  himself  hypothetically.    But  the  book  was  for- 
bidden,  and  the  old  man  of  seventy  was  required-under 
threat  of  torture~to  solemnly  abjure  "the  false  doctrine  " 
that  the  earth  is  not  the  center  of  the  universe  and  that  it 

T"';  t,  v!  ^^q^i^iti^^  held  him  under  suspicion  for  the 
rest  of  his  life  and  he  was  forced  to  have  his  works  pub- 
lished m  foreign  countries. 

It  has  akeady  been  observed  that  the  Copemican  theory 
beautifuUy  illustrates  the  unwisdom  of  accepting  our 
Ideas  as  the  expression  of  reality  without  further  question. 
Gahleo  emphasized  this  phase  of  the  new  theory  very 
strongly;  -Think  of  the  earth  as  having  vanished,  and  there 
will  be  neither  sun-rise  nor  sun-set,  no  horizon  even  and 
no  mertdtan,  no  day  and  no  night/  »    Later  on  he  expanded 
this  idea  so  as  to  include  the  whole  of  physical  nature.    In 
the  Dialogue  he  takes  occasion  to  observe  that  he  had 
never  been  able  to  understand  the  possibility  of  the 
transubstantiation  of  substances.    When  a  body  reaUy 
acquires  attributes  which  were  previously  lacking    it 
must  be  explained  by  such  a  rearrangement  of  its  parts  as 
would    neither    destroy    nor  originate    anything.    This 
clearly  asserts  the  principle  that  qualitative  changes  can 
only  be  understood  when  referred  to  quantitative  changes. 
Gahleo  had  already  stated  this  view  even  more  strongly  in 
one  of  his  earlier  works  (//  saggiatore,  1632).    Form,  mag- 
nitude, motion  and  rest  constitute  all  that  can  be  said  of 


m 


42 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  RENAISSANCE 


Ji- 


things;  they  are  the  primary  and  real  attributes  of  things 
(primi  e  reali  accidenti).  Our  disposition  to  regard  taste, 
smell,  color,  heat,  etc.,  as  the  absolute  attributes  of  things, 
on  the  other  hand,  is  due  to  sense-prejudice.  We  give 
these  names  to  things  when  they  furnish  the  occasion  of 
certain  sensations,  but  these  sensations  take  place  within 
our  bodies.  They  do  not  inhere  in  things.  They  would 
vanish  if  the  corpo  sensitivo  were  to  vanish. — This  doc- 
trine, which  contains  the  principle  of  the  mechanical  con- 
ception of  nature,  acquired  vast  importance  in  the  in- 
vestigations into  the  theory  of  knowledge  in  the  following 
period. 


SECOND  BOOK 

THE   GREAT  SYSTEMS 

The  new  interests,  viewpoints,  and  discoveries  of  the 
Renaissance  naturally  gave  rise  to  a  desire  to  elaborate  a 
new  world-theory,  one  which  would  be  inherently  con- 
sistent and  at  the  same  time  conform  to  the  new  thought. 
It  was  but  natural  that  men  should  be  anxious  to  follow 
the  new  ideas  to  their  ultimate  consequences.     The  human 
mind  always  shows  a  certain  tendency,  more  or  less  pro- 
nounced, towards  the  systematization  of  knowledge  into  a 
unitary  theory,  and  the  more  peaceful  period  which  fol- 
lowed the  turmoil  and  strife  of  the  Renaissance  furnished 
a  splendid  opportunity  for  the  development  of  this  ten- 
dency.    ItassumedJheJa^_of^combi^^      the  new  world- 
view_and  the^aew  science  with  the'pEilosophy  of  mind  or 
spirit.     Here  Bruno  had  prepared  the  way.     He  had  not 
howevef  completely  grasped  the  new  scientific  method. 
He  was  unable  to  apply  the  mechanical  conception— 
by   means  of  which  a  multitude  of  problems  can  be 
stated  with  far  greater  precision— to  the  statement  of  his 
problem. 

Of  the  four  fundamental  problems  of  philosophy,  the  ' 
problem  of  Being  now  takes  first  rank.  Compared  with 
this,  other  problems,  despite  the  fact  of  their  frequent  and 
perplexing  obtrusiveness,  fall  into  the  background.  The 
constructive  method  was  courageously  applied  to  the  solu-/- 
tion  of  the  profoundest  problems  of  human  thought. 
Descartes,  the  first  of  the  group  of  the  great  systematizers, 
both  in  his  preliminary  essays  as  well  as  in  the  later  more 
positive  statement  of  his  theory,  still  reveals  a  distinct 

43 


y 


42 


THE  GREAT  SYSTEMS 


DESCARTES 


45 


^..ort  to  pave  the  way  for  speculative  construction  by 
means  of  exhaustive  analysis.  But  with  Hobbes  and 
Spinoza  the  constructive  element  is  predominant.  The 
only  way  we  can  discover  the  facts  and  analyses  by  which 
these  thinkers  estabHshed  their  definitions  and  axioms  is 
by  a  less  direct  method.  In  Leibnitz,  the  fourth  and  last 
of  the  group,  the  analytic  method  becomes  more  promi- 
nent again.  He  marks  the  transition  to  the  eighteenth 
century,  in  which  the  problems  of  knowledge  and  of  values 
acquire  an  exceptionally  prominent  place. 

The  increasing  favor  of  the  constructive  method  of  this 
period  is  closely  paralleled  by  the  dogmatic  character  of 
these  intellectual  efforts.  The  principles  of  the  mechan- 
ical theory  of  nature  were  regarded  as  absolute,  objective 
truths.  Leibniz  likewise  shows  some  divergence  from  his 
predecessors  on  this  point,  by  the  fact  that  he  subjects 
even  these  "primary  and  real"  attributes  of  things,  which 
were  regarded  as  absolute  data  in  the  mechanical  theory 
of  natiire,  to  a  critical  analysis. 

a.  Rene  Descartes  (i 596-1 650)  may  be  called  the  real 
founder  of  modem  philosophy.  He  was  the  first  to  in- 
qmre  after  the  ultimate  presuppositions  of  knowledge,  and 
his  theory  was  the  first  to  take  explicit  account  of  the  me- 
chanical explanation  of  nature  in  the  statement  of  the 
problem.  He  applies  the  analytic  method  in  searching 
for  ultimate  principles,  but  he  quickly  abandons  it  for  the 
constructive  method,  because  he  believes  it  possible  to 
demonstrate  the  necessity  and  rationality  of  the  principles 
ipf  the  mechanical  theory  of  nature.  He  regards  the  idea 
of  God,  the  validity  of  which  he  demonstrates  by  the  spec- 
ulative method,  as  an  absolute  terminus  of  reflective 
thought.  Descartes  thus  presents  a  peculiar  combination 
of  keen  analysis  and  dogmatic  assertion. 


Descartes  was  the  son  of  a  French  nobleman,  and  his 
economic  independence  furnished  him  the  opportunity  of 
devoting  himself  whoUy  to  meditation  and  scientific  re- 
search.    His  Discours  de  la  methode  ( 1 63  7)  is  an  interesting 
philosophical  autobiography.    He  received  his  education 
at  a  Jesuit  CoUege,  but,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  he  • 
had  among  his  tutors  the  best  teachers  of  his  age,  he  was 
very  much  dissatisfied  with  his  acquirements  when  he 
had  finished  his  studies.    He  knew  many  things,  but  a  con- 
sistent system  and  clear  fundamental  principles  were  lack- 
mg.    He  was  particulariy  fond  of  mathematics  but  it 
seemed  to  be  nothing  more  than  a  fiction  of  the  human 
brain.    He  finally  plunged  into  public  life,  trying  one 
thing  after  another,  but  was  invariably  driven  back  to 
his  solitude  by  his  insatiable  thirst  for  knowledge.    He 
finally  resolved  to  make  a  first  hand  study  of  practical  life 
in  the  army  and  the  courts  of  the  nobiHty.    But  at  every 
venture  he  returned  again  to  quiet  meditation.     During 
the  winter  of  161 9,  while  in  camp  with  the  army  of  the 
Elector  of  Bavaria,  he  experienced  a  scientific  awakening. 
In  a  moment  of  intellectual  enthusiasm  a  plain  way  of 
escape  from  his  doubt  appeared  to  him.    If  we  begin  with"! 
the  simplest  and  clearest  ideas  and  pass  step  by  step  to  / 
the  more  complex  problems,  the  confusing  multiplicity  of  / 
our  ideas  will  vanish.    We  can  then  arrange  our  thoughts  j 
in  such  an  orderly  manner  that  the  successive  steps  can  I 
always  be  deduced  from  their  antecedents.    He  followed  J 
this  principle  both  in  his  mathematical  and  in  his  philo- 
sophical investigations.    After  several  years  of  study  in 
Paris  he  returned  to  Holland,  where  he  believed  he  could 
pursue  his  investigations  with  less  danger  of  disturbance. 
There  is  no  doubt  however  that  the  severe  injunctions 
against  antischolastic  theory  formed  part  of  his  motive 


46 


THE  GREAT  SYSTEMS 


DESCARTES 


for  leaving  France.  But  even  in  Holland  he  became  in- 
volved in  controversies,  because  both  Protestant  and 
Roman  Catholic  theologians  regarded  his  philosophy  with 
suspicion.  At  the  invitation  of  Queen  Christina  he  spent 
his  last  years  in  Sweden. 

I.    Descartes y  who  was  a  great  mathematician  himself 
(foimder  of  Analytical  Geometry),  attributed  the   dis- 
tinction between  geometry  and  philosophy  to  the  fact  that 
the  former  is  based  upon  principles  concerning  which  there 
could  be  no  room  for  doubt,  whilst  the  controversies  in 
philosophy  pertain  to  these  very  principles.    The  dis- 
f  covery  and  establishment  of  first  principles  require  the 
/  use  of  the  analytic  method,  i.  e.  we  must  proceed  from  the 
^  given  or  the  provisionally  established  to  its  presuppositions. 
Analysis  finally  leads  to  simple  inttiitions,  and  these  in  turn 
originate  directly  through  experience.     The  subjective 
movements  of  intellect  are  of  this  sort,  e.  g.  that  a  triangle 
is  boimded  by  three  lines — that  a  thing  cannot  both  be 
and  not  be  at  the  same  time, — that  everything  has  a  cause, 
— ^that  the  effect  cannot  be  greater  than  its  cause, — that 
I  must  exist  if  I  think  {Regies  pour  la  direction  de  Vesprit^ 
evidently  written  1628-1629).     He  called  these  processes 
simple  intuitions,  and  afterwards  made  the  last  one  men- 
tioned the  basis  of  his  theory  (in  the  Discours  and  in 
the  Meditationes  which  appeared  in  1 641).     It  is  pos- 
sible to  doubt  every  idea  or  object  of  knowledge;  all  our 
/  perceptions  or  postulates  might  be  illusory.     But  doubt 
I  has  a  definite  Hmit.    Even  the  most  radical  doubt  pre- 
supposes thought.     Thought  is  a  reality  even  though  all 
of  its  conclusions  should  be  illusory.     Descartes  takes  the 
word  thought  in  its  broadest  sense:  thought  is  everything 
which  goes  on  in  consciousness.    When,  in  the  language 
of  his  famous  proposition,  he  says:  Je  pense,  done  je  suisl 


47 


(Cogito,  ergo  sum!)  he  might  as  well  have  said:  Je  sens 
je  veux,  doncje  ^«w/--ThawQrd_l!  therefore 'iOZfliti;,  er^o) 
is  inexact;  iorPesmks  does  not  reganl,the.proposition  as 
a  logical  deduction,  but  as  an  immediate  intuifeien,  a  sim- 
ple inteUectual  step,  through  which  w^  become  conscious 
that  we  are  conscious.—The  clearness  and  distinctness  of 
this  intuition,  according  to  Descartes,  furnish  the  crite- 
rion by  which  to  test  other  propositions-  There  are  two 
more  intuitions  however  which  he  thinks  are  just  as  clear 
and  self-evident  as  this  first  one,  namely  the  proposition  f 
that  everything  has  a^cause,  and  that  the  effegt^nnoj: 
be  greater  than  the  cause.  "^^  ^ ; 

^TTwe  examine"  olS-aifferent  ideas,  we  find  that  some  of 
them  can  be  attributed  to  external  and  finite  causes,  and 
that  others  are  produced  by  ourselves,  but  that  there  is  one 
idea  which  presupposes  an  infinite  cause— namely  the  idea 
of  God.    I^  myself  (which  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  I 
can  doubt)  a  fiHite,  imperfect  being,  and  I  cannot  Jhere- 
fore  have  formed  the  idea  of  an  infinite,  perfect  being. 
This  idea  must  have  its  origin  in  an  infinite  bein^,.    This 
IS  the  only  possible  explanation  of  the  fact  that  my  in- 
tellect,  as  soon  as  it  has  attained  mature  development 
forms  this  idea.     It  is  "innate,"  not  indeed  as  if  it  were 
consaously  present  at  the  very  beginning  of  life,  but  in 
the.  sense  that  there  is  a  disposition  to  form  it  in  the  very 
nature  of  the  inieWect,— Descartes  however  has  another 
proof  of  the  existence  of  God:  God,  the  perfect  Being,  must 
exist;  for  existence  is  perfection,  hence  the  denial  of  the 
existence  of  God  would  be  self-contradictory.    This  is  the 
so-caUed  ontological  proof,  which  finds  the  warrant  for 
the  existence  of  God  in  the  concept. 

It  is  only  after  Descartes  has  established  the  validity  of 
the  idea  of  God  (assuming  the  principle  of  causaHty  as  a 


N 


48 


THE   GREAT   SYSTEMS 


matter  of  course)  that  he  has  a  secure  foundation  for  the 
validity  of  knowledge  in  general:  for  a  perfect  being  can- 
not deceive. 

Descartes  bases  the  knowledge  of  reality  on  the  idea  of 
God,  just  as  Kepler  had  explained  the  conformity  of  nature 
to  mathematical  principles  on  theological  grounds.  But, 
in  that  case,  God  is  merely  an  explanation  of  the  sublime 
uniformity  of  nattu-al  phenomena,  rather  than  a  specifi- 
cally religious  concept.  Thus,  e.  g.  in  the  sixth  meditation, 
he  says,  ^^  By  nature  in  general^(natura  generaliter  spectata) 
I  simply  mean ^odhimsjlJi_or_t^^^  and  disposition  in- 

stituted Sco  or  dinatio)  by:  Him  in  created  things  J'  Every- 
thing which  is  to  be  accepted  as  true  must  fit  into  this 
great  system.  The  criterion  by  which  we  are  able  to 
distinguish  between  dream  and  wakeful  consciousness 
consists  in  the  fact  that  the  various  experiences  of  wake- 
ful life  can  be  coordinated  with  our  total  experiences  and 
recollections  without  a  break  in  the  system. — Descartes 
had  not  observed  that  this  criterion  was  already  contained 
in  the  causal  principle,  so  that  he  might  have  spared  him- 
self the  indirect  route  through  the  idea  of  God.  The  es- 
Itablishment  of  this  criterion  furnished  the  basis  of  a  new 
Conception  of  truth,  according  to  which  truth  consists  of 
the  internal  relation  of  perceptions  and  ideas,  instead  of 
their  harmony  with  something  unperceived. 

■Descartes  is  fully  aware  that  the  idea  of  God,  which  he 
makes  the  foundation  of  all  science,  is  not  the  popular  one. 
He  says  that  when  God  is  conceived  as  a  finite  being,  re- 
ceiving honor  from  men,  it  is  not  strange  that  His  exist- 
ence should  be  denied.  God  is  however  the  absolute 
Substance,  i.  e.  a  being,  which  exists  through  itself  (per 
se)y  requires  no  other  being,  in  order  to  exist.  It  is  true, 
Descartes  likewise  employs  the  concept  of  substanc 


DESCARTES 


49 


in 


reference  to  finite  things  (e.  g.  matter  and  the  soul);  he 
says  however  that  the  concept  cannot  be  used  univocally 
(univoce)  of  infinite  and  finite  bei^ig,  because  finite  beings 
are  always  dependent  and  the  term  substance  is  therefore 
applied  to  them  inexactly.  According  to  the  broader, 
inexact  linguistic  usage,  "Substance"  means  the  same  as 
thing  or  being,  the  subject  or  matter  or  substrate  of  given 
attributes./ 

2.    The  idea  of  God  not  only  guarantees  the  reality  of 
things,  but  it  is  likewise  the  source  of  the  fundamental 
principles  of   natural  science.     (Principia   Philosophies 
1644.)  •    ' 

Our  sense  impressions  serve  the  purpose  of  guiding  us 
in  practical  activities.     In  order  to  do  this  they  need  not 
be  like  the  things  themselves,  if  only  they  correspond  to 
them.    When  we  come  to  think  of  the  real  nature  of  things 
apart  from  our  sensations,  there  are  only  three  attributes 
which  are  incontrovertible:  extension,  divisibiHty  and  mo- 
biKty.    We  cannot  even  in  imagination  think  these  attri- 
butes away.    And  these  three  attributes  furnish  the  basis 
of  the  simplest  and  clearest  understanding  of  everything 
that  takes  place  in  the  material  universe,  whilst  quaHties 
merely  furnish  illusory  explanations.    All  the  attributes 
of  nature  may  therefore  be  referred  to  extension,  divisi- 
bility and  motion.    Qualities  however  are  simply  to  be 
ascribed  to  the  perceiving  subject. —Descartes  thus  delib- 
^ately  systematizes  the  mechanical  conception  of  nature.  - 
He  seems  to  have  been  led  to  this  conclusion  by  his  studies 
in  natural  science  during  the  years  1620-1629,  independent 
of  Galileo,  although  perhaps  influenced  by  Kepler.  \ 

He  derives  the  first  principles  of  the  mechanical  con- 
ception of  nature  from  the  concept  of  God.  As  perfect 
bemg  God  must  be  immutable.    The  idea  of  anything 


n_ 


so 


THE   GREAT   SYSTEMS 


i\ 


which  He  has  created  being  capable  of  changing  its  state 
without  some  external  cause  contradicts  this  immutability. 
Material  things  cannot  therefore  on  their  own  account 
{sua  sponte)  without  external  interference  (of  another 
material  thing)  pass  from  motion  to  rest  or  vice  versa. 
(Descartes  nevertheless  makes  a  reservation  in  the  interest 
of  his  spirituaHstic  psychology,  namely  that  it  is  perhaps 
possible  for  souls  or  angels  to  act  on  matter.)  Besides 
inertia,  Descartes  likewise  deduces  the  constancy  of  mo- 
tion (an  imperfect  antecedent  to  the  persistence  of  motion) 
from  the  tmchangeableness  of  Deity.  Conservation 
(which,  according  to  Descartes,  consists  of  an  incessant 
continuance  of  creative  activity)  implies  that  the  sum 
total  of  motion  implanted  in  matter  at  creation  must  re- 
main tmchanged.  The  distribution  of  motion  among  the 
various  parts  of  the  universe  may  vary,  but  no  motion  can 
be  lost  and  no  absolutely  new  motion  arise. 

Descartes  regards  the  teleological  explanation  of  nature, 
which  accounts  for  natural  phenomena  from  the  viewpoint 
of  ends,  as  inapplicable.  He  bases  his  rejection  of  final 
causes  on  theological  grounds.  Since  God  is  an  infinite 
being,  he  must  have  purposes  beyond  our  power  to  con- 
jecture, and  it  were  therefore  prestmiption  on  our  part  to 
suppose  it  possible  to  discover  the  purposes  of  natural 
phenomena.  There  are  likewise  many  things  in  the 
finite  universe  which  do  not  affect  us  in  the  least, — ^what 
sense  could  we  therefore  ascribe  to  their  having  been 
created  on  our  accoimt! — ^The  teleological  explanation  is 
therefore  rejected,  because  it  is  too  narrow. 
y/  Descartes  undertakes  a  detailed  explanation  of  nature 
on  the  basis  of  the  principles  thus  established.  He  differs 
from  Bacon  at  this  point  in  the  importance  which  he  at- 
taches to  deduction,  and  from  Galileo  (whose  importance 


; 


DESCARTES 


SI 


he  decidedly  underestimates)  in  his  inability  to  combine 
deduction  and  induction  in  the  investigation  of  the  facts 
of  experience.    He  regards  experience  as  nothing  more  i 
than  occasional,  because  he  thinks  that  science  can  only 
give  the  possible,  not  the  real,  explanation  of  phenomena. 
He  aims  to  restrict  himself  to  hypotheses,  and  he  does  -■ 
not  even  attempt  to  verify  these  hypotheses.    His  natural  i 
philosophy  thus  assumes  an  abstract  and  arbitrary  char- 
acter.   His  importance  rests  on  the  ideal  of  natural  science   . 
which  he  proposed:  namely,  to  deduce  phenomena  from 
their  causes  with  mathematical  necessity.    He  therefore 
took  no  account  of  an3rthing  but  the  geometrical  attri- 
butes of  things,  and  he  treated  the  concepts  of  matter  and 
extension  as  identical.    He  substituted  this  ideal  of  knowl-^^ 
edge  for  the  prevalent  scholastic  method  of  explanation,^ 
based  on  qualities  and  hidden  causes. 

Descartes  attempted  to  explain  the  existing  state  of  the 
Universe  by  mechanical  processes  of  development.  He 
assumes  a  primitive  condition  in  which  the  particles  of 
matter  exist  in  whirling  eddies  (vortices)  with  fixed  cen- 
ters. The  smaller  particles,  resulting  from  the  mutual 
friction  of  the  larger  particles,  were  compelled  to  congre- 
gate around  these  centers,  and  thus  formed  the  various 
world-bodies.  Some  of  these  bodies,  like  the  earth,  have 
lost  their  independence,  because  they  are  carried  along 
by  the  more  powerful  cycles  in  which  the  great  world- 
bodies  are  found.  Weight  consists  of  the  pressure  due  to 
the  rotary  motion,  which  drives  the  smaller  particles  into 
close  proximity  to  the  larger  bodies. — In  suggesting  this 
theory,  imperfect  as  it  is,  Descartes  anticipated  Kant  and 
LaPlace. 

Organisms,  as  well  as  the  World-all,  are  to  be  regarded 
as  machines.     If  physiology  is  to  become  a  science,  it  must 


Kit 


52 


THE  GREAT  SYSTEMS 


DESCARTES 


S3 


be  mechanics.    The  organism  must  be  subject  to  the 

''  general  law  of  matter.  Harvey^ s  discovery  of  the  circula- 
tion of  the  blood  (1628)  strengthened  Descartes^  conviction. 
Descartes  did  much  to  suppress  the  fruitless  theory  of  vital- 
ism which  explained  organic  phenomena  by  the  assumption 
of  a  specific  vital  energy.  In  the  department  of  nerve 
physiology,  like  Harvey  in  the  doctrine  of  the  circulation 
of  the  blood,  he  is  a  pioneer  because  he  was  the  first  to  de- 
scribe what  is  now  called  reflex  action,  i.  e.  muscular  activ- 
ity resulting  directly  from  an  objective  stimulus  without 
the  intervention  of  any  attendant  consciousness.  Des- 
cartes  ascribed  conscljusness  to  man  alone;  he  regarded 

•  animals  as  mere  machines. 

The  htmian  soul  interacts  with  the  brain,  or,  to  be  more 
exact,  with  a  distinct  part  of  the  brain  (the  pineal  gland, 
glandula  pinealis),  which,  in  Descartes^  opinion,  was 
centrally  located,  and  it  does  not  consist  of  pairs,  like  the 
other  parts  of  the  brain.  The  "vital  spirits"  (the  delicate 
fluid,  which,  according  to  the  physiology  of  the  age,  in- 
herited from  antiquity,  pours  through  the  nerves)  strike 
this  pineal  gland  and  the  impact  translates  it  to  the  soul, 

*thus  giving  rise  to  sensations.  If  the  soul  on  the  other 
hand  strikes  the  pineal  gland  it  can  produce  changes  in 

T^e  tendencies  of  the  "vital  spirits"  and  thus  give  rise  to 
muscular  activity. — Here  Descartes  contradicts  his  own 
doctrine  of  the  persistence  of  motion;  for  if  the  pineal 
gland  strikes  the  soul,  a  loss  of  motion  must  result,  and, 
conversely,  if  the  soul  excites  motion  in  the  pineal 
gland,  new  motion  must  arise.  He  of  course  limits 
the  action  of  the  soul  to  the  mere  matter  of  pro- 
ducing a  change  of  tendency;  but  this  requires  him 
to  postidate  an  arbitrary  exception  to  the  principle 
of  inertia. 


Descartes  places  great  stress  on  the  distinction  in  definin? 
the  soul  as  thinking  being,  and  matter  as  extended  being 
Their  fundamental  attributes  are  so  different  that  they 
must  be  called  two  different  substances,  and  moreover  in 
the  full  sense  of  the  word,  since  it  must  be  possible  for  the 
one  to  exist  without  the  other.  But,  in  that  case,  their 
interaction  becomes  an  impossibility;  for  Substance, 
stnctly  speaking,  cannot  be  acted  on  from  without 

In  his  special  psychology  (particularly  in  his  interesting 
treatise  on  the  emotions,  published  ^n  his  TraiU  des  pasi 
swns,  1649)  he  endeavors-in  harmony  with  his  dualistic 
theory-to  furmsh  a  separate  definition  for  the  mental 
phenomena  which  have  a  psycho-physical  basis  from 
those  which  are  purely  psychical.    Hence  he  makes  a 
distinction  between  sensation  and  judgment,  sensory  and 
mental  recoUection,  imagination  and  intellection,  desire 
and  will    affections   (passions)  and  emotions  {emotions 
tnlereures).    His  precision  at  this  point  is  rarely  equaUed 
even  by  spiritualists.  ^ 

Descartes'  ethics  bears  an  interesting  relation  to  his 
world  theory.    He  elaborated  the  details  of  this  phase  of 
his  theory  m  his  correspondence  with  Princess  Elizabeth 
Chnsttna  of  Sweden,  and  Chanut  the  French  ambassador 
to  Sweden.-He  emphasizes  the  cultivation  of  the  sub-  • 
jective  emotions,  rather  than  the  "passions"  which  de- 
pend on  external  influences.    But  improvement  in  knowl- 
edge  is  likewise  of  great  value:  we  discover  that  everything 
depends  on  a  Perfect  Being;  we  find  that  we  are  but  in- 
fimtesimal  parts  of  an  infinite  world,  which  cannot  have 
been  created  on  our  account.    We  finally  come  to  regard 
ourselves  as  parts  of  a  human  society  (Family,  State), 
whose  mterests  take  precedence  over  our  private  interests.  , 
it  IS  important  above  aU  else  to  distinguish  between  what 


S4 


THE   GREAT   SYSTEMS 


GEULINCX 


55 


is  within  our  power  and  what  is  not.  The  highest  virtues 
are  magnanimity  {generosite)  and  intellectual  love  towards 
God  {amor  intellectualis  del).  The  latter  is  capable  of 
governing  our  whole  life,  even  though  in  the  eyes  of  the 
theologians  it  should  perhaps  be  regarded  as  insufficient 

for  salvation. 

Cartesianism  was  the  first  form  in  which  the  thought  of 
the  new  age  became  accessible  to  wider  circles.    Not- 
withstanding his  hypotheses,  which  were  frequently  un- 
fortunate, his  rigid  insistence  on  a  mechanical  explanation 
of  nature  marks  a  distinct  advance,  and  his  labors  inspired 
a  vigorous  movement  in  the  department  of  natural  science. 
His  spiritualism  and  his  attempt  to  combine  theology  and 
science  developed  a  sympathetic  attitude  towards  religion, 
notwithstanding  the  fact  that  many  theologians,  to  whom 
a  criticism  of  scholasticism  was  identical  with  a  challenge 
of  faith,  were  fanatically  opposed  to  him.    The  clearness 
with  which  he  expressed  his  views  admitted  of  easy  popu- 
larization, and,  after  the  first  opposition  subsided,  he  ac- 
quired a  large  following  in  France,  Holland  and  Germany. 
Descartes  however  bequeathed  profound  problems  to 
his  successors.    How  can  the  existence  of  an  absolute 
|\  Substance  be  reconciled  with  the  independent  existence  of 
[particular  things  (souls  and  bodies)?    And  how  shall  we 
conceive  the  interaction  of  spirit  and  matter  if  both  are 
to  be  regarded  as  independent  beings  (Substance),  and 
this  moreover  if  the  principle  of  the  persistence  of  motion 
is  likewise  to  be  maintained! 

Occasionalism,  so  called,  which  had  a  tendency  to  refer 
all  true  causality  to  the  absolute  essence,  so  that  the  states 
of  finite  beings  merely  furnished  the  "Occasions"  for  God 
to  interpose,  was  the  logical  result  of  these  problems.  This 
principle  was  at  first  only  applied  to  the  relation  of  spint 


and  matter:  what  takes  place  in  the  body  furnishes  God 
the  occasion  to  permit  a  change  to  take  place  in  the  soul 
and  vice  versa.    It  soon  became  evident  however  that  if 
there  is  an  absolute  substance,  it  is  impossible  for  a  finite 
being  to  be  a  caiise  at  aU.    How  can  anything  produce  an 
effect  beyond  its  own  being  in  some  other  thing?    Not 
only  the  interaction  between  spirit  and  matter  but  aU 
interaction  between  finite  beings  is  impossible,  and  divine 
causahty  alone  remains  possible.    In  this  way  first  the 
psycho-physical  problem  and  then  the  problem  of  causahty 
conceived  as  a  whole  came  to  be  regarded  as  insoluble  and 
philosophy  resolved  itself  into  theology 

After  a  number  of  Cartesians  had  prepared  the  way  for 
this  conception,  it  was  cleariy  and  definitely  elaborated  by 
Arnold  Geultncx  (1623-1660)  and  Nicholas  Malebrancke 
(1648-1 715). 

Geulincx,  originally  a  Catholic  (he  was  bom  at  Louvain) 
but  later  a  convert  to  Protestantism,  experienced  a  vigor- 
ous opposition  both  from  Protestant  as  well  as  from 
Cathohc  scholasticism  on  account  of  his  Cartesianism 
Dunng  his  latter  years  he  occupied  the  chair  of  philosophy 
at  the  university  of  Leyden.    His  most  characteristic  work 
IS  his  ethics  (166s,  complete  1675).    In  order  to  do  right 
man  must  learn  to  understand  his  position  in  the  world- 
self-exammation  (inspectio  sui)  is  therefore  the  foundation 
of  ethics     It  reveals  the  fact  that  intellect  and  will  are  all 

ian^r  "^  ^  fft  *°  ""^  ^^^-     ^y  ^y  °°  ^^^  other 
hand  IS  a  part  of  the  material  univei^e  where  I  can  accom- 

phsh  nothing.  For  I  am  only  responsible  for  the  things 
of  which  I  can  know  the  origin,  and  this  knowledge  is  lim- 
ited to  my  inteUect  and  will.  My  activity  cannot  tran- 
scend my  essential  nature  (i.  e.  my  inteUect  and  will)  It 
IS  utterly  impossible  for  a  thing  to  produce  changes  be- 


BRXn  I 


S6 


THE  GREAT  SYSTEMS 


GLANVIL 


57 


yond  itself  and  its  own  states.  If  the  changes  of  one  being 
(e.  g.  the  soul)  correspond  to  the  changes  in  another  being 
(e.  g.  the  body),  it  can  only  be  explained  by  the  fact  that 
their  common  author  forever  adapts  them  to  ^ch 
other— like  two  clocks  which  a  clockmaker  is  con- 
stantly regulating  in  successive  order  (a  figure  used 
already  by  the  Cartesian  Cordemoy), — ^The  ethical 
system  which  Geulincx  elaborates  on  this  foundation 
consistently  assimies  the  character  of  resignation,  and 
its  chief  virtue  is  humility.  For,  where  I  am  unable  to 
do  anything,  it  is  sheer  folly  that  I  should  desire  {uhi 
nihil  vales,  nihil  velisl), 

Mdehranche,  a  member  of  the  Oratory,  gives  the  mystic 
phase  of  occasionaHsm  still  greater  prominence.  His 
philosophic  inspiration  came  from  one  of  Descartes'  books, 
and  it  permeated  his  entire  Hfe,  which  was  spent  in  the 
cloister.  The  senses — ^as  appears  in  his  Recherche  de  la 
verite  (i674ff) — are  given  us  for  practical  purposes  and  they 
are  unable  to  discover  the  real  nature  of  things.  The 
senses  deceive  us  every  time  we  are  misled  into  ascribing 
sensible  qualities  to  things  themselves.  Whence  there- 
fore do  we  get  knowledge  of  things?  The  understanding 
is  quite  as  incapable  as  sensibility  to  teach  us  anything 
about  things  which  exist  independently  of  us.  Neither 
we  ourselves  nor  things  can  produce  knowledge,  for  no 
finite  being  can  create  anything  new.  Causation  is  a 
divine  thing,  and  it  is  pagan  to  ascribe  causality  to  finite 
beings.  Finite  beings  forever  remain  simply  causes  oc- 
casionelles.  We  can  neither  regard  the  motions  of  matter 
nor  the  thoughts  of  men  as  causes.  God  could  not  even 
give  a  finite  being  the  power  to  be  a  cause,  for  God  cannot 
create  gods.  Chir  knowledge  is  entirely  the  work  of  God; 
we  see  everything  in  Him.    It  is  only  through  his  inter- 


position that  we  get  ideas  of  material  things.    Each  idea 
is  reaUy  a  Hmitation  of  the  idea  of  God 

Joseph  Glanvil  (1636-1680),  of  England,  had  even  prior 
to  this  defined  the  problem  of  causality  in  his  Scepsis 
SaenHfica  (1665)  a  book  which  was  influenced  Sthe 
philosophy  and  the  natural  science  of  Descartes  tZ 
greater  the  difference  between  cause  and  effect  the  less 

tZ::t:iT^^  Causa^y  canno 

as  a  matter  of  fact  be  conceived  at  all  (causality  itself  is 

tact  that  two  things  succeed  each  other 

Hul^r\T^  *'''  ^'''"'^"'"^i'^^  are  the  antecedents  of 
Hunte  There  are  two  additional  thinkers  who  are 
strongly  influenced  by  Descartes,  who  however,  each  in  Ss 
own  way,  are  radicaUy  opposed  to  him,  and  L  fact  chS! 
enge  every  attempt  to  solve  ultimate  problems  with  the 
aid  of  reason.  ^ 

maise  Pascal  (1623-166.)  is  closely  related  to  Descartes 
m  h,s  conception  of  scientific  method,  and  he  likewise  ac 
cepts  his  concise  distinction  between  mind  and  matter 
He  makes  frequent  reference  to  these  ideas  in  his  Pens^es. 

fcTj^f'^^r^-  "^^  V°*  ""^""y  "^'^^y  ^°^-  His  heart 
longed  for  a  living  God,  finaUy  even  for  a  God  of  flesh  and 

bbod  despite  the  fact  that  faith  in  such  a  God  was  repnl- 
tw!  .  the^nderstanding.  He  required  such  a  faith  as 
this  to  subdue  the  fear  which  the  thought  of  the  eternity 

tTlTV'f^"'^'^  ^'^^  ""»•  The  ideas  of  Bruno 
and  BohmetaAed  to  give  him  peace.  Knowledge  is  un- 
cert^n,  and  the  learned  are  at  variance.  Reason  refutes 
the  dogmatic  philosophers,  nature  the  sceptical  philos- 
ophers. As  a  matter  of  fact  in  the  last  analysis  the  seep- 
tics  are  right;  otherwise  were  revelation  unnecessary.  In 
reply  to  those  who  find  it  difficult  to  subordinate  reason 


A 


:|, 


S8 


THE   GREAT   SYSTEMS 


HOBBES 


59 


to  faith,  Pascal  applies  the  Cartesian  psychology  and  says: 
We  are  machines  as  well  as  mind;  begin  with  the  machine, 
accustom  yourself  to  the  ceremonies,  and  your  mind  will  also 
finally  yield. 

Pierre  Bayle  (i 647-1 706)  was  rather  a  man  of  letters 
than  a  philosopher.  His  interest  consisted  in  explaining 
and  interpreting  literary  productions  and  speculative 
opinions  in  their  manifold  variety.  But  his  desire  for 
clearness  impelled  him  to  distinguish  sharply  between 
the  various  standpoints  and  to  emphasize  the  crux  of  the 
problems  rather  than  any  illusory  solution.  {Dictionnaire 
historique  et  critique,  1 6gs  ff.)  He  was  particularly  opposed 
to  all  efforts  to  reconcile  faith  and  knowledge,  theology 
and  philosophy.  He  regarded  the  problem  of  evil  as  the 
great  rock  of  offense.  If  we  resolutely  follow  reason,  it  is 
impossible  to  reconcile  the  reality  of  evil  with  the  omnipo- 
tence and  goodness  of  God,  and  the  only  consistent  solu- 
tion that  remains  is  the  Manichaean  assumption  of  two 
world  principles,  one  evil,  the  other  good.  We  are  obliged 
to  choose  between  reason  and  faith.  (Dictionnaire  Art, 
Manicheisme. — Response  aux  questions  d^un  provincial.) 
He  nevertheless  believes  in  a  natural  basis  for  ethics,  and, 
furthermore,  because  the  actions  of  men  are  determined 
more  by  their  nature  than  by  their  reHgious  opinions,  he 
was  in  position  to  defend  toleration  and  religious  freedom 
with  great  zeal.     {Pensees  diverses  a  V occasion  de  la  comkte.) 

2.  Thomas  Ilohhes  (i 588-1679)  made  the  first  indepen- 
dent attempt  to  treat  the  new  mechanical  theory  of  nature 
as  the  only  science,  to  maintain  its  viewpoints  as  the  only 
ones  from  which  reality  is  to  be  conceived.  Energetic  as 
a  thinker  and  controversialist,  mild  and  timid  in  his  mode 
of  life,  Hobbes,  like  Descartes,  was  dissatisfied  with  his 
scholastic  training,  and  hence  devoted  himself  to  literary 


pursuits,— e.  g.  he  published  a  translation  of  Thucydides 
The  unsettled  conditions  in  England  aroused  his  interest  iii 
pohtical  and  ethical  questions,  which  soon  led,  especiaUy 
after  he  became  acquainted  with  the  new  viewpoints  of 
natural  science,-  to  general  philosophical  investigations 
For  a  while  he  was  private  tutor  and  afterwards  an  inti- 
mate  fnend  of  the  noble  family  Cavendish.    While  travel- 
ling in  Italy  he  made  the  acquaintance  of  Galileo,  and  in 
France  he  became  a  friend  of  Pierre  Gassendi  (1592-16??) 
hkewise  an  admirer  of  Galileo,  who,  having  resigned  his 
clencal  position,  was  then  living  in  Paris  as  professor 
of  mathematics.     In  his  philosophical  thought  Gassendi 
reveals  a  philosophical  tendency  simUar  to  that  of  Sobbes 
{Opera  Omnia,  Lugd.,  1658).  His  revival  of  the  Epicurean 
atomic  theory  became  a  matter  of  signal  importance,  for 
It  was  from  the  writings  of  Gassendi  that  Newton  became 
acquamted  with  this  doctrine,  and  Dalton,  the  chemist 
afterwards  received  it  from  the  writings  of  Newton  and 
adapted  it  to  chemistry.    Gassendi  insisted  that  aU  the 
changes  m  nature  must  be  explained  by  the  motions  of 
atoms.    Following  Galileo,  Gassendi  teaches  (what  Des- 
cartes had  overlooked)  that  energy  (impetus)  is  not  dis- 
sipated by  actual  motion. 

Nevertheless,  Hobbes  seems  to  have  arrived  at  the  con- 
elusion  that  aU  change  is  motion. independently.    It  was 
during  a  discussion  with  several  friends  of  what  con- 
stitutes sensation  that  the  thought  occurred  to  him  that 
if  everything  in  nature  were  motionless  or  in  uniform  mo- 
tion there  would  be  no  sensation.    A  change  of  motion 
(dtversttas  motuum)  is  therefore  the  condition  of  sensation 
i-or  sensing  unceasingly  one  and  the  same  thing  and 
sensing  nothing  at  all  amounts  to  the  same  thing.    This  • 
pnnaple,  which  Hobbes  makes  the  basis  of  his  psychology 


6o 


■1 


THE   GREAT  SYSTEMS 


HOBBES 


6i 


occurred  to  him  early  in  life,  and  the  conviction  that  all 
change  consists  of  motion,  and  that  sense-quaHties  are 
purely  subjective,  probably  occurred  about  the  same  time 
(ca.  1630),  at  any  rate  before  his  acquaintance  with 
Galileo  and  Gassendi, 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  revolution  Hobbes  left  England 
and  spent  a  number  of  years  in  France,  where  for  a  time 
he  was  tutor  to  the  fugitive  king  Charles  II,  He  retiuned 
imder  Cromwell ^  devoting  hin- -elf  privately  to  literary 
purstdts,  occupied  with  studies  and  polemics  imtil  his 
death  at  the  venerable  age  of  ninety-one  years.  The 
series  of  articles  and  the  splendid  volume  in  Fromann^s 
Philosopische  Klassiker  by  Ferdinand  Tonnies  have  con- 
tributed much  towards  a  clear  understanding  of  Hobbes^ 
development  and  his  philosophical  significance. 

Hobbes^  chief  works  are:  Elements  of  Law  (1640),  De 
cive  (1642),  Leviathan  (1651),  De  corpore  (1655),  De 
homine  (1658). 

a.  Hobbes^  first  concern  in  the  systematic  presentation 
of  his  theory  given  in  the  De  corpore  is  to  establish  the 
fundamental  principles  of  investigation.  He  is  certain 
that  these  principles  must  be  discovered  by  a  process  of 
analytical  regression  from  the  given  to  that  which  ex- 
plains it  {a  sensum  ad  inventionem  principiorum) ,  just  as 
he  had  previously  in  fact  arrived  at  the  doctrine  of  mo- 
tion by  a  similar  regression  from  sensation.  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  he  strongly  emphasized  the  fact  that  the  as- 
sumption of  principles  is  pxirely  an  arbitrary  matter,  and 
must  necessarily  consist  of  a  choice.  He  does  not  there- 
fore regard  such  an  analysis  as  a  demonstration;  deduction 
is  the  only  method  of  demonstration,  and  this  is  impossible 
in  the  case  of  first  principles. — Hobbes  described  the  arbi- 
trary act  with  which  science  begins  more  precisely  as  an 


apt^niaining.  But  this  act  is  subject  to  certain  condi- 
tions  even  from  its  very  beginning;  it  is  not  permissible 
therefore  to  give  two  contradictory  names  to  one  and  the 
same  thing. 

That  all  change  consists  of  motion  (mutationem  in  motu 
conststereUs  therefore  the  most  general  principle  of  science. 
Hobbes  thinks  that,  if  we  should  only  rid  ourselves  of  aU 
prejudices,  the  proof  of  this  principle  is  wholly  superfluous 
He  assumes  several  other,  purely  dogmatic,  principles, 
without  inquiring  more  closely  into  their  respective  con- 
ditions;  the  law  of  causation,  the  principle  of  inertia,  the 
pnnaple  that  only  motion  can  be_the  cause^f  motion  and 
that  only  motion  can  be  the  result,  and  the  principle  of 
the  persistence  of  matter. 

If  these  principles  are  to  explain  aU  existence,  then/ 
everything  must  be  motion.    The  classifications  of  the 
system  are  therefore  based  on  a  classification  of  motion 
l^irst  m  order  comes  the  theory  concerning  the  Corpus 
(body  m  general);  here  he  treats  of  the  geometrical, 
mechamcal  and  physical  laws  of  motion.    The  second 
part  contains  the  theory  of  the  Homo,  i.  e.  the  motions 
which  take  place  jn  Man;  here  the  physiological  and  psy- 
cholopcal  motions  are  treated.     The  third  part  is  the 
doctnne  of  the  Gives,  i.  e.  of  the  motions  in  men  which  con- 
dition  their  mutual  relations  and  their  association. 

Hobbes  was  unable  to  complete  his  system  by  purely  , 
deductive  processes.  He  was  forced  to  concede  the  neces- 
sity of  mtroduang  new  presuppositions  at  a  number  of 
points.  Thus,  e.  g.  when  we  pass  from  geometry  to  me- 
chamcs:  Hobbes  grants,  that  a  pure  geometrical  explana- 
Y  rests  on  an  abstraction,  and  that  we  must  assume  the 
colicept  of  energy  (conatus,  impetus)  at  the  beginning  of 
mijchamcs.    The  same  is  true  when  we  pass  from  mechan- 


// 
I  > 


63 


THE   GREAT   SYSTEMS 


ics  to  physics:  the  sensible  attributes  of  body  (color,  tone, 
etc.)  are  discovered  only  by  means  of  sense  perception, 
which  involves  a  new  inductive  beginning  at  this  point. 
And  the  last  two  main  divisions  of  the  system,  the  theories 
of  the  Homo  and  the  Gives,  we  can  establish  by  direct 
(psychological  and  historical)  experience,  without  going 
through  the  first  main  division.  Hobbes  also  wrote  his 
psychological  and  political  works  {Elements  of  Law,  De 
cive,  Leviathan)  before  he  had  completed  his  theory  of  the 
Corpus. 

If  everything  is  motion,  all  reality  must  be  corporeal. 
An  incorporeal  thing  is  a  chimera  (Unding).  It  follows 
therefore  that  science  can  only  investigate  finite  things, 
since  only  finite  things  can  be  in  motion.  It  is  impos- 
sible to  have  any  knowledge  of  the  universe  as  a  complete 
whole.  All  questions  concerning  the  universe  as  a  totality 
lead  into  the  inconceivable  and  can  only  be  determined  by 
faith,  not  by  knowledge.  Science  can  tell  us  nothing 
concerning  either  the  origin,  extent  or  destiny  of  the  uni- 
verse. The  highest  science,  the  firstlings  of  wisdom 
(primitia  sapientice),  Hobbes  remarks  ironically,  are  re- 
served to  the  theologians,  just  as  in  Israel  the  firstlings  of 
the  harvest  were  sacrificed  to  the  priests. 

b.  Hobbes  started  with  sensation;  from  it  he  derived  the 
principle  of  change,  and  thence  the  principle  of  motion. 
If  everything  is  motion,  therefore,  sensation  must  likewise 
be  motion.  "Sensation  is  nothing  more  than  a  motion 
among  the  particles  of  the  sensing  body."  And  this  ap- 
plies to  consciousness  in  general.  In  his  criticism  of 
Descartes*  Meditations  Hobbes  says  "Consciousness 
(mens)  is  nothing  more  than  a  motion  in  certain  parts  rof 
an  organic  body."  Motion  is  the  reality,  consciousnesa  is 
only  the  form  tmder  which  it  becomes  apparent  (appf 


HOBBES  55 

tion).  The  feeling  of  pleasure,  e.  g.,  is  really  only  a  motion 
in  the  h^art,  thought  only  a  motion  in  the  head.  The 
psychology  of  Hobbes  is  therefore  merely  a  part  of  his 
general  theory  of  motion.  His  materialistic  tendency 
which  IS  apparent  at  this  point  is  modified  by  his  clear  in- 
sight into  the  subjective  conditions  of  knowledge.  In  a 
remarkable  passage  {De  cor  pore,  xxv,  i)  he  says:  "The  very 
fact  that  anything  can  become  a  phenomenon  {id  ipsum) 
{TO  (pazvefftpai)  is  indeed  the  most  wonderful  of  all  phe- 
nomena."  The  fact  that  motion  can  be  conceived,  sensed, 
known,  is  therefore  more  wonderful  than  that  it  exists. 
The  conception,  the  "apparition,"  then  cannot  itself  be 
motion,  but  must  be  an  evidence  that  there  is  still  some- 
thmg  else  in  the  universe  besides  motion. 

Sensation,  memory  and  comparison  are  intimately  re- 
lated to  each  other.    If  the  sensory  stimulus  vanishes, 
instantly,  there  is  in  fact  no  sensation  {sensio),  but  only  a 
vague  impression  {phantasma).    Real  sensation  presup- 
poses a  distinction  and  comparison  of  such  impressions. 
The  sensory  stimuli  must  therefore  vary,  in  order  to  make 
sensation  possible.— Memories  follow  certain  laws:  they 
reappear  in  the  same  order  of  sequence  as  the  original  sen- 
sations, unless  disarranged  by  the  feelings  and  impulses. 
All  order  and  every  definite  relation  governing  our  ideas 
(except  our  temporal  order  of  sequence)  are  conditioned 
by  the  fact  that  we  are  actuated  by  a  purpose  and  seek  • 
the  means  for  the  realization  of  that  purpose.     The  con-  i 
stant  fixation  of  our  purpose  {frequens  adfinem  respectio) 
brings  system  into  our  thoughts.    The  capriciousness  of 
dream-ideas  is  explained  by  the  absence  of  a  constant  pur- 
pose during  sleep. 

He  derives  all  individual  feelings  and  volitional  experi- 
ences from  the  impulse  of  self-preservation.    Pleasure  and 


^  ^ 


64 


THE  GREAT  SYSTEMS 


pain  arise  according  as  our  organic  life  is  fostered  or  sup- 
pressed. Every  movement  and  every  idea  which  is  favor- 
able to  the  persistence  and  advancement  of  life  is  con- 
served; detrimental  motions  and  ideas  are  suppressed. 
Here  again  we  are  confronted  with  the  idea  of  change  as  a 
condition  of  soul-Hfe.  There  can  be  no  feeling  and  no 
will  without  distinctions  in  experience.  An  absolute  goal, 
attainable  once  for  all,  is  imthinkable.  If  it  were  at- 
tained, the  possibility  of  a  wish  or  of  effort  wotdd  no  longer 
exist  and  feeling  would  likewise  be  impossible.  The 
greatest  good  can  consist  only  in  an  imhindered  progress 
towards  ever  higher  goals. 

The  various  forms  of  feeling  and  of  desire  appear  as 
expressions  of  a  feeling  of  power  or  of  weakness.  That  is 
to  say  whether  I  feel  pleastire  or  pain  depends  upon 
whether  I  am  conscious  of  having  the  means  of  continued 
existence,  development  and  satisfaction,  and,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  it  is  through  a  consciousness  of  this  sort  that  the 
feeling  of  power  is  conditioned  by  its  opposite,  the  feeling 
of  weakness  (which  can  also  be  a  dependence  upon  re- 
ceiving help  from  friends  or  from  God).  Here  the  com- 
parison with  other  men  plays  an  important  part,  for  my 
self-preservation  is  quite  frequently  favored  as  well  as 
hindered  by  others  (and  their  impulse  to  self-preserva- 
tion). Life  is  a  great  race.  Whenever  we  surpass  others 
we  rejoice,  but  we  feel  humbled  when  we  fall  behind; 
while  we  are  making  the  best  progress  we  are  filled  with 
hope,  but  doubt  as  we  grow  weary;  we  become  angry  when 
we  see  an  unexpected  obstacle,  but  we  are  proud  when  we 
have  surmounted  a  serious  difficulty;  we  laugh  when  we 
see  another  fall,  but  weep  when  we  fall  otu"selves;  we  have 
a  sense  of  sympathy  when  some  one  whom  we  wish  well 
falls  behind,  indignation  when  some  one  whom  we  wish  ill 


HOBBES  5- 

succeeds;  love  when  we  can  assist  another  in  the  race 
happiness  when  we  are  constantly  overtaking  those  ahead 
of  us,  unhappmess  when  we  are  constantly  falHng  behind. 
And  the  race  ends^only  in  death. 

c.    The  human  impulses  of  self-preservation  are  not 
pnmanly  m  mutual  harmony:  this  is  clearly  manifested 
m  the^  expenences  of  the  great   world-struggle.    Strife 
wm  arise,  and  encroachments  are  always  to  be  feared    ' 
The  state  of  nature,  i.  e.  the  state  of  human  life  as  it  would 
be  without  state  control,  is  a  war  of  aU  against  all  (bellum 
ommum  contra  omnes).     The  sole  governing  principle  at 
this  stage  IS  the  unrestrained  impulse  and  power  of  the 
individual,  and  fear,  hatred,  and  the  restless  human  pas- 
sions  are  supreme.    But  in  calmer  moments  {sedato  animo)   . 
men  perceive  that  greater  advantage  can  be  attained  by  ■ 
cooperation  and  association  than  by  strife.    This  gives 
nse  to  the  moral  principle:  Strive  for  peace,  but  if  peace  is    ^ 
impossible,  warfare  must  be  organized!    This  principle 
gives  nse  to  the  special  virtues  and  duties;  fidehty,  grati- 
tude,  complaisance,  forbearance,  justice  and  self-control 
are  necessary  if  peace  and  society  are  to  be  possible. 
Hence  the  general  rule,  that  one  must  not  do  to  others  what 
he^  would  not  suffer  from  them,  likewise  follows  from  this 
pnnciple.    But  Hobbes  likewise  suggests  that  to  be  just 
towards  others  and  to  be  able  to  give  them  aid  (animi 
mgm  opus  proprium  est  auxUiari)  is  a  sign  of  strength  and 
I  magnanimity. 

But  the  efficient  execution  and  maintenance  of  these 
laws  and  rules  require  a  strong  political  organization. 
Ihe  freedom  of  the  state  of  nature  must  be  surrendered. ' 
ihis  IS  accomplished  either  by  an  expressed  or  tacit  con- 
tract,  by  which  each  individual  at  once  renounces  the 
nght  of  his  unconditioned  impulse  to  self -preservation 


i 


\ 


66 


THE  GREAT  SYSTEMS 


and  pledges  unqualified  obedience  to  an  established  au- 
thority (a  prince  or  a  convention)  .—-Whilst  Althusius  and 
Gfoiius  made  a  distinction  between  the  contract  through 
which  society  originates  and  that  upon  which  the  author- 
ity of  the  state  is  foimded,  with  Hobbes  both  coincide.  He 
believes  that,  if  the  war  of  all  against  all  is  to  be  brought 
under  control,  the  opposition  between  the  governing  power 
and  the  individual  must  be  absolute,  and  he  cannot  there- 
fore imagine  that  a  people  could  exist  without  govern- 
ment. The  governing  power  must  therefore  originally 
proceed  from  a  decision  of  the  people.    Hobbes  is  the 

ir  ^^  nattu-alistic  exponent  of  absolute  sovereignty.  Every 
limitation  (by  class,  parliament  or  church)  would  involve 
a  division  of  power,  and  consequent  retrogression  to  the 
State  of  nature.  The  will  of  the  sovereign  executes  the  will 
of  the  people  and  he  alone  (to  whom  indeed  the  natural  rights 
of  every  individual  are  transferred  in  the  original  contract), 

1^  ^  The  sovereign  must  decide  all  questions  touching  re- 
Kgion  and  morality.  He  shall  above  all  determine  the 
manner  in  which  God  shall  be  worshipped:  otherwise  the 
worship  of  one  would  be  blasphemy  to  another,  resulting 
in  a  som-ce  of  constant  strife  and  disintegration.  For  the 
same  reason,  the  ultimate  definitions  of  good  and  evil  must 
be  fixed  by  the  decree  of  the  sovereign.  The  first  prin- 
ciples of  ethics  and  politics  rest  upon  arbitrary  enactment 
(in  this  case  by  the  authority  of  the  state). 

Theoretically  Hobbes  anticipates  the  rationalistic  des- 
potism of  the  eighteenth  century.  He  opposes  hierarchy 
and  class  government  and  bases  the  hope  of  an  enlightened 
political  authority,  through  which  the  will  of  the  intelligent 
public  will  receive  recognition,  on  the  prospect  of  a  pro- 
gressive educational  development  of  the  people  (paulatim 
erudUur  vulgisf). 


f. 


SPINOZA 


67 


3.  Baruch  Spinoza's  (163  2-1 67 7)  chief  work  {Ethica 
or  dine  geometrico  demonstrata,  1677)  represents  the  most 
profound  effort  of  this  period  to  elaborate  the  fvmdamental 
principles  of  the  new  conception  of  nature  into  a  general 
world  theory.  .This  work,  despite  its  abstract  form,  is 
by  no  means  impersonal  and  purely  theoretical.  With 
Spinoza,  thought  and  life  are  identical.  Clear  thinking 
was  for  him  the  way  to  spiritual  freedom,  the  highest  form  x  ! 
of  personal  life.  He  aims  to  regard  all  the  various  aspects 
and  forms  of  existence  from  the  viewpoint  of  internal  har- 
mony. The  majesty  of  his  thought  consists,  first  of  all,  in 
the  resolute  consistency  with  which  he  elaborates  the  vari- 
ous intellectual  processes,  each  of  which,  in  itself,  expresses 
an  essential  characteristic  of  reality;  every  essential  view- 
point must  receive  due  recognition,  without  prejudice  and 
without  compromise;  and,  secondly,  in  the  proof  that  every 
system  of  thought  which  is  inherently  self-consistent  and 
complete  nevertheless  signifies  nothing  more  than  a  single 
aspect  or  form  of  infinite  Being.  In  this  way  he  seeks  to 
maintain  luiity  and  multiplicity,  mind  and  matter,  eternity 
and  time,  value  and  reality  in  their  inner  identity.  Each 
of  these  fimdamental  concepts  is  in  itself  an  expression  of 
the  total  reality  and  can  therefore  be  carried  out  ab- 
solutely. 

In  his  chief  work,  mentioned  above,  he  elaborates  this 
theory  deductively  or  synthetically.  Beginning  with  defi- 
nitions and  axioms  we  advance  through  a  series  of  doc-''^"^ 
trinal  propositions.  Owing  to  this  method  of  treatment  ^'^ 
Spinoza  failed  to  give  his  own  ideas  their  true  force.  Their 
content  is  not  adapted  to  this  mode  of  treatment,  and  his 
proofs  are  therefore  frequently  untenable.  Nor  does  the 
method  pursued  in  his  treatment  correspond  with  the 
method  by  which  he  discovered  his  theory.    The  unfin- 


I; 


I 


II 


68 


THE  CKEAT  SYSTEUS 


■\ 


'i 


i  tl^-jttv 


ished  treatise  De  etnendatiqne  inUllectus  is  the  chief  souroe 
of  information  concerning  this  method.  Here  he  begins 
autobiographically  after  the  manner  of  Descartes  in  his 
Discours.  Experience  has  taught  him  that  neither  enjoy- 
3  X  ment,  nor  wealth,  nor  honor  can  be  the  highest  good.  He 
finds  it,  on  the  contrary,  in  the  knowledge  of  the  relation 
existing  between  our  mind  and  nature  as  a  whole.  The 
pleasures  of  knowledge  became  his  highest  and  strongest 
ambition,  his  ruling  passion,  and  the  glory  conferred  on 
existence  through  the  possibility  of  participating  in  this 
joy  is  what  made  life  worth  living  to  him.  It  is  for  this 
very  reason  however  that  he  institutes  the  inquiry  as  to 
the  possibility  of  realizing  this  end,  and  he  then  indicates 
how  he  arrived  at  the  definitions  and  axioms  with  which 
the  "Ethics"  begins. 

Spinoza,  the  son  of  a  Jewish  merchant  of  Amsterdam, 
began  his  career  as  a  Jewish  theologian,  inspiring  great 
hopes  among  his  brethren  in  the  faith.  He  however  grad- 
ually became  increasingly  critical  of  the  ancestral  ideas  of 
fx  faith  and  was  finally  ceremom'ally  excommunicated  from 
the  sjmagogue.  Thereafter  he  lived  in  the  country  for 
a  while,  moving  thence  to  Rhynsberg,  in  the  vicinity  of 
Leyden,  and  finally  to  The  Hague,  occupied  with  study 
and  the  writing  of  his  books.  He  provided  a  scanty  living 
by  grinding  lenses.  He  enjoyed  the  active  intellectual 
fellowship  of  a  circle  of  yotmg  friends  who  studied  his 
ethics,  even  while  it  only  existed  in  manuscript.  His  life 
is  a  splendid  example  of  happy  resignation  and  inner  de- 
votion to  intellectual  labor. 

The  essay.  Von  Gott,  Menschen  und  dessen  Gliick,  written 
in  his  youth,  is  Spinoza^ s  first  attempt  to  bring  what  he 
regarded  as  essential  in  religious  ideas  into  inner  harmony 
with  the  scientific  conception  of  nature.    Later  on  he 


SPINOZA 


69 


wrote  an  exposition  of  the  Cartesian  philosophy  for  one  of 
his  pupils;  tdthough  strongly  influenced  by  the  writings  of 
Descartes  (together  with  Jewish  theology  and  the  works  of 
scholasticism,  and  perhaps  also  by  the  works  of  Bruno)  he 
was  never  a  Cartesian.  He  likewise  studied  and  used  the 
works  of  Bacon  and  Hobbes. — In  his  Tractatus  theologico- 
politicus  (1670)  he  advocates  religious  Hberty  and  makes 
some  interesting  contributions,  to  the  historical  criticism  of 
the  various  books  of  the  Bible. 

a.  Otu*  knowledge  originates  in  incidental  experience 
(experientia  vaga).  On  this  plane  we  arrange  phenomena 
according  to  laws  which  are  apparently  mechanical,  and 
we  are  satisfied  so  long  as  there  is  no  exception.  Science 
(ratio)  however  institutes  exact  comparisons  of  the  given 
phenomena.  It  begins  with  experience,  and  then  seeks 
to  discover  what  belongs  to  nature  as  a  whole  as  well  as 
to  its  various  parts — the  universal  laws,  which  prevail 
everywhere.  Spinoza  illustrates  this  by  reference  to  the 
laws  of  motion  in  the  realm  of  matter  and  the  laws  of  the 
association  of  ideas  in  the  realm  of  mind.  It  is  only  in 
these  laws  that  our  thought  processes  culminate,  whilst 
the  series  of  particular  phenomena  continue  to  infinity, 
because  that  which  is  cause  in  one  relation  is  effect  in 
another  relation  and  vice  versa.  The  only  absolute  which 
can  satisfy  intellect  is  the  law  which  governs  the  causal 
series,  not  its  supposed  beginning  or  end.  Spinoza  calls 
this  absolute  Substance;  that  which  exists  in  itself  and  is  to 
be  understood  through  itself,  so  that  its  concept  presupposes 
no  other  concepts.  Spinoza's  Substance,  the  terminus  oiy^^' 
all  thought,  is  therefore  the  principle  of  the  uniformity  of 
Nature. 

Spinoza's  discussion  of  the  validity  of  knowledge  is 
somewhat  vacillating.    At  times  he  seems  to  hold  the 


il 


!i 


) 


70 


THE   GREAT   SYSTEMS 


SPINOZA 


71 


poptilar  and  scholastic  definition  of  truth  as  the  agreement 
of  thought  with  its  object.  But  when  he  examines  the 
pre '  lem  more  closely  he  concludes  that  the  perfection  of 
knowledge  consists  of  complete  elaboration  and  internal 
consistency.  He  always  regards  error  as  negative,  as  due 
to  the  limitation  of  oiu*  experience  and  thought.    Error 

,  is  resolved  by  observing  strict  logical  consistency ;  we  even- 
tually discover  that  we  were  regarding  a  part  for  the  whole. 
Thus  error  finds  its  explanation  in  the  truth:  Veritas  est 

'  norma  sui  et  falsi.  Hence  the  norm  of  truth  lies  in  the 
very  nature  of  our  thought,  not  in  its  relation  to  something 
external. 

Knowledge  of  the  laws  of  nature  is  however  not  the 
highest  kind  of  knowledge.  Spinoza  places  intuition 
above  experientia  vaga  and  reason.  The  former  appre- 
hends particular  events  and  the  latter  discovers  general 
principles,  but  in  intuitive  knowledge  {scientia  intuitiva) 
the  particvdar  phenomenon  is  immediately  apprehended 
as  a  characteristic  member  of  the  whole  system  of  nature, 
the  particular  being  in  its  relation  to  the  whole  of  Sub- 
stance. This  higher  intuition  is  only  acquired  after  we 
have  passed  through  the  stages  of  experience  and  science. 
Spinoza  even  says  that  he  himself  understood  but  very 
little  in  this  highest  manner.  It  appears  to  be  more  like 
an  artificial  intuition  than  a  pure  scientific  conception. 

We  regard  things  from  the  standpoint  of  eternity  {suh 
specie  aterni)  in  the  second  as  well  as  in  the  third  form  of 
knowledge;  i.  e.  not  in  their  isolation  and  contingency, 
but  as  members  of  a  more  comprehensive  system. 

b.  Following  Descartes  and  Hohhes,  Spinoza  bases  his 
entire  philosophy  on  the  principle  of  causality,  the  validity 
of  which,  for  him  as  for  them,  is  self-evident.  In  his  ex- 
position of  the  law  of  causation  he  takes  special  pains  to 


emphasize  that  cause  and  effect  cannot  be  things  which 
differ  in  kind.    He  says,  e.  g.,  that  "If  two  things  have 
nothing  in  common,  the  one  cannot  be  the  cause  of  the 
other;  for  then  there  would  be  nothing  in  the  effect,  which 
had  also  been  in  the  cause,  and  everything  in  the  effect 
would  then  have  originated  from  nothing."    According 
to  Spinoza  the  fact  that  two  things  are  related  as  cause 
and  effect  signifies  that  the  concept  of  the  one  admits  of 
a  purely  logical  derivation  from  that  of  the  other.    He 
does  not  distinguish  between  cause  and  ground.    He  iden- 
tifies the  relation  of  cause  and  effect  with  the  relation  of 
premises  and  conclusion.    The  fact  that  cause  precedes    \ 
effect  in  time,  as  well  as  in  thought,  finds  no  place  in  his 
theory.     "From  the  standpoint  of  eternity"  time  dis- 
appears. 

The  cause  of  an  event  may  therefore  exist  in  the  event 
itself  or  in  something  else.    That  which  has  its  cause 
within  itself  is  Substance,     Substance  is  that  which  exists 
in  itself  and  is  understood  through  itself,  so  that  its  con-  ' 
cept  does  not  presuppose  any  other  concept.    We  have  . 
already  observed  that  Spinoza's  fundamental  principle  is 
revealed  in  the  uniformity  of  nature.    It  is  therefore  the 
fundamental  presupposition  of  all  existence  and  efficiency. 
It  foUows  from  his  definition,  that  it  exists  necessarily! 
it  contains  its  cause  within  itself,  and  hence  nothing  can 
prevent  its  existence!    Only  one  Substance  is  possible: 
for,  if  there  were  several,  they  would  limit  each  other,  in 
which  case  neither  one  could  be  understood  from  itself. 
It  is  Hkewise  self-evident  that  Substance  can  neither  have 
beginning  nor  come  to  an  end,  neither  be  divided  nor  lim- 
ited. 

This  concept,  which  is  Spinoza's  inner  terminus  of  all 
thought,  is  at  once  identical  with  the  concept  of  God  and 


II 


72 


THE   GREAT  SYSTEMS 


the  concept  of  Nature.  These  concepts  must  then  how- 
ever be  conceived  of  in  a  different  manner  than  usual. 
Nature  is  the  inherent  energy  which  is  active  in  every- 
thing which  exists  {natura  naturans),  not  the  mere  simi  of 
all  existence  (natura  naturata),  **I  have  an  opinion  about 
Cod  and  Nature"  says  Spinoza,  **  which  is  different  from 
that  commonly  held  by  modern  Christians,  I  hold  that  Cod 
is  the  internal,  not  the  external,  cause  of  all  things.  That  is, 
I  hold,  with  St,  Paul,  that  all  things  live  and  move  in  Cod," 
Another  divergence  from  the  ordinary  concept  of  God  is 
contained  in  the  fact  that  Spinoza  does  ggt  think  that  hu- 
I,..  ^man  attributes,  such  as  tmder§t^nding  and  wjll,  can  be 
ascribed  to  the  Deity;  for  understanding  presupposes  given 
experiences  which  shall  be  understood,  and  will  presup- 
poses that  there  are  ideals  which  are  as  yet  unrealized,  each 
of  which  would  contradict  the  absolute  perfection  of  God. 

Spinoza  calls  the  things  which  do  not  contain  their  cause 
'i"i^  within  themselves  Modi  (phenomena,  individual  things). 
The  Modus  is  caused  by  something  other  than  itself, 
through  which  alone  it  can  be  understood.  The  real 
cause  of  the  Modi  is  contained  in  Substance,  of  which  they 
are  the  particular  manifestations.  Externally  they  stand 
in  a  catisal  relation  to  each  other,  but  the  total  aggregate 
of  the  Modi,  the  total  series  of  causes  and  effects  given  in 
experience  (the  total  natura  nattu-ata),  is  a  revelation  of 
Substance,  which  constitutes  the  vital  relation  of  the  whole 
series  of  phenomena. 

c.  According  to  Spinoza  real  existence  can  only  be 
ascribed  to  Substance.  Phenomena  are  its  particular 
Forms.  Everything  which  exists  (Substance  and  its 
Modi),  therefore,  comes  into  experience  under  two  attri- 
butes (fundamental  characters  or  fundamental  forms): 
'^^^tibQu^.and  extension  (mind  and  matter).    As  an  infinite 


SPINOZA 


73 


and  perfect  being  Substance  must  have  an  infinite  number 
of  Attributes;  but  we  know  only  two,  because  experience 
reveals  no  more  to  us.  An  attribute  is  what  thought  con- 
ceives of  Substance  as  constituting  its  essence  {essentiam 
substantia  constituens).  This  definition  implies  that  the 
whole  natiu-e  of  Substance  must  be  present  in  every  At- 
tribute, in  every  fundamental  form;  each  individual  at- 
tribute must  therefore,  like  Substance  itself,  be  imderstood 
through  itself,  and  its  concept  cannot  be  derived  from  any 
other  concept.  Everything  which  pertains  to  a  given 
Attribute  must  be  explained  by  means  of  this  attribute 
alone,  without  reference  to  any  other  Attributes;  thoughts 
must  therefore  be  explained  only  by  means  of  thoughts,  ^  li 
material  phenoniena  only  by  means  of  material  phenom- 
ena. Not  only  Substance  as  such,  but  each  of  its  phe- 
nomena, each  Modus,  e.  g.  man,  can  be  regarded  and  ex- 
plained completely  imder  each  Attribute.  The  nature  of 
reality  is  revealed  in  the  realm  of  matter  as  well  as  in  the 
realm  of  mind,  and  the  one  form  of  manifestation  cannot  be 
derived  from  the  other.  Mind  and  matter  (sotd  and  body) 
are  one  and  the  same,  only  viewed  from  different  sides.^ 
Spinoza  holds,  in  opposition  to  Descartes,  that  two  irredu- 
cible attributes  do  not  necessarily  require  two  different 
natures,  but  that  they  can  very,  easily  pertain  to  one  and 
the  same  nattwe.  He  differs  from  Hobbes  in  that  he  does 
not  regard  mind  as  a  mere  effect  or  form  of  matter,  but  sees 
in  it  an  aspect  of  being  quite  as  distinctive  and  primary  as 
matter. — Qescartes,  Hobbes  and  Spinoza  represent  the 
three  leading  hjrpotheses  concerning  the  relation  of  mind 
and  matter. 

Spinoza  elaborates  his  theory  of  mind  and  matter 
(which  in  recent  times  has  frequently  been  described  by 
the  unfortvmate  term  parallelism,  or  the  identity  hy- 


n 


ri 


ii 


74 


THE   GREAT  SYSTEMS 


SPINOZA 


75 


iJSthesis)  according  to  the  deductive  method,  because  he 
derives  it  from  his  definitions  of  Substance,  Attribute  and 
Modi,  jj^  have  however  aheady  called  attention  to  the 
fact  th^^e  discovered  his  definitions  by  means  of  the 
analysis  of  experience  and  of  knowledge.  The  definition 
of  Attribute  presupposes  the  f imdamental  principle  of  the 
identity  of  cause  and  effect,  previously  mentioned;  from 
this  presupposition  the  relation  between  the  Attributes 
follows  in  the  same  manner  as  the  relation  between 
Substance  and  Modi.  That  everything  which  pertains 
to  a  given  Attribute  must  be  explained  by  reference  to 
that  attribute  is  really  nothing  more  than  a  metaphysical 
paraphrase  of  the  principle  that  material  phenomena  can 
only  be  explained  by  means  of  material  phenomena. 
Kepler's  vera  causa  makes  the  same  demand.  That  this 
is  really  what  Spinoza  meant  becomes  quite  apparent 
from  the  following  expression:  **If  any  one  should  say 
that  this  or  that  bodily  activity  proceeds  from  the  soul, 
he  knows  not  what  he  is  talking  about,  and  really  grants 
that  we  do  not  know  the  cause  of  such  activity." — He 
nevertheless  likewise  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  the 
development  of  the  soul  advances  proportionately  with 
the  development  of  the  body,  and  that  we  have  no  right 
to  set  arbitrary  limits  to  the  material  imiformity  of 
nature. 

Spinoza  does  not  regard  the  hjrpothesis  of  identity 
as  a  mere  psychophysical  theory.  He  likewise  gives  it 
an  epistemological  significance  in  that  he  speaks  of  an 
identity  of  thought  with  its  object.  Here  he  confuses 
the  relation  of  subject  and  object  with  the  relation  of 
soul  and  body.  This  is  the  more  remarkable,  since  he 
1 1  holds  that  the  validity  of  knowledge  depends  on  its 
i!  logical  consistency  rather  than  on  the  agreement  with  its 


objects.  But  he  is  also  somewhat  vacillating  on  this  last 
point,  which  is  an  after-eflEect  of  the  scholastic  studies  of 
his  youth. 

Criticism  of  this  most  .rationalistic  of  all  Systems  of  /'^ 
philosophy  must  first  of  all  be   directed   against  the 
central  proposition  of  the  homogeneity  (or  reaUy  identity) 
of   cause    and    effect.    Should    this    proposition   prove 
untenable  or  even  be  incapable  of  consistent  elaboration, 
it  must  foUow  that,  in  the  last  analysis.  Being  is  not,  as  / 
Spinoza  believed,  absolutely  rational.    We  shall  find  this  i 
problem  discussed  by  the  EngHsh  empiricists  and  by  the 
critical  philosophers. 

d.  Spinoza  teaches,  in  harmony  with  this  theory  of 
error,  that  every  idea  is  regarded  as  true,  so  long  as  it  is 
not  supplanted  by  another.  Our  theory  of  reality  is 
developed  through  the  rivahy  of  ideas.  The  most  com- 
prehensive  and  most  consistent  theory  is  the  truest. 

Spinoza's  elaboration  of  the  psychology  of  the  eniotions 
as  given  in  his  ^Ethics-  is  unsurpassed  in  its  exceUence. 
Like  Hobbes  he  starts    from  the  impulse  of  self-preser- 
vation.   But  he  bases  it  on  the  consistency  of  his  system. 
The  infinite  Substance  is  actively  present  in  every  indi- 
vidual being  (modus);    the  effort    towards   self -preser- 1 
vation  of  each  individual  being  is  therefore  a  part  of  the 
divine  activity.    Hence  whenever  effort  is  successful,  it 
produces  pleasure,  and  conversely  pain.    But  this  only 
occurs  in  case  of  a  transition  to  a  more  perfect  or  less  per- 
fect state;  an  absolutely  changeless  state   would  neither 
give  rise  to  pleasure  nor  pain.— The  various  emotional 
quaHties  result  from  the  association  of  ideas.    We  love ' 
^at  produces  pleasure,  and  hate  what   produces  pain. 
We  love  whatever  contributes  to  our  love,  and  hate  what 
constrains  it.    When  a  being  similar  to  ourselves  ex- 


76 


THE  GREAT  SYSTEMS 


SPINOZA 


77 


periences  pleasure  or  pain,  the  same  emotion  involun- 
tarily arises  in  us.  But  this  moreover  not  only  gives 
rise  to  sympathetic  joy  and  sorrow,  but  it  may  also 
inspire  envy  and  pleasure  at  the  ntiisfortune  of  others, 
i.  e.  if  we  ourselves  wish  to  enjoy  another's  pleasures, 
or  if  we  are  previously  filled  with  hatred  towards  the 
tmfortunate. — Just  as  pleasiu-e  becomes  love  by  means  of 
the  idea  of  its  cause,  so  mere  appetite  {appetitus,  co- 
natus)  becomes  desire  (cupiditas),  when  joined  with  the 
idea  of  its  object. 

In  Spinoza's  description  of  emotional  and  volitional 
?  life  we  discover  a  degree  of  vacillation  between  a  ptirely 
intellectuahstic  and  a  more  realistic  (or  voluntaristic) 
theory.  In  several  passages  he  describes  the  emotions 
as  confused  and  inadequate  ideas  {idecB  confused  et 
inadequate),  which  vanish  as  soon  as  the  idea  becomes 
perfectly  clear.  But  there  are  other  passages  in  which 
the  emotions  are  regarded  as  real,  positive  states,  which 
can  only  be  displaced  by  other  real  states.  The  same 
thing  occurs  with  the  concept  of  the  will.  In  several 
passages  voHtion  is  treated  as  one  with  the  activity  of 
thought;  will  and  understanding  are  identical.  But 
in  other  passages  the  will  is  identical  with  the  impulse 
of  self-preservation,  and  all  ideas  of  value  and  value- 
judgments  are  dependent  on  it;  ''We  seek,  choose, 
desire  and  wish  for  a  thing,  not  because  we  think  it  is 
good,  but,  inversely,  we  think  a  thing  is  good,  because 
we  seek,  choose,  desire  and  wish  for  it."  In  this  case 
therefore  he  asserts  the  priority  of  the  will. — This  vac- 
illation is  evidently  (in  agreement  with  F.  Tonnies  in 
Vierteljahrsschrift  fur  wissenschaftliche  Philosophies  VII) 
to  be  explained  from  the  fact  that,  during  the  prepara- 
tion of  the  Ethics,  Spinoza's  older,  intellectuahstic  con- 


ception  was  supplanted  by  a  more  reaUstic  conception 
under  the  influence  of  Hobbes  without  a  thoroughgoing 
apphcation  of  the  logical  consequences  of  the  new  con- 
ception. 

e.    Spinoza  bases  his  etHcs  on  the  instinct  of  self- 
preservation.-Man  is  conditioned  by  the  fact  of  being 
one  among  many  individual  beings,  and  obstacles  con- 
stantly thwart  his  instincts.    As  a  member  of  the  total 
senes  of  causes  and  effects  man  does  not  contain  his 
cause  within  himself,  he  is  not  active,  but  passive,  not 
free,  but  necessitated.    The  sense  of  dependence  enables 
man  to  strive  for  freedom  and  independence.    He  then  ^ 
miagines  an  ideal  of  human  life  {Uea  hominis,  tanquam 
natural  kumante  examplar),  as  it  would  be  under  con-  ! 
ditions    of    perfect    freedom    and    independence.    This  i 
furmshes  a  standard  of  judgment:   whatever  contributes ' 
towards  the  realization    of  that   ideal  is  good;    whatever  t 
pra,ents  tt  ts  evil.    The  predicates  "good"  and  "m/"  i 
which  are  meaningless  when  appUed  to  absolute  Being 
bubstance,  become  significant   from   the   viewpoint   of 
temporal  experience  and  finite  development.    Sub  specie 
(Bterm  there  is  no  ethics;  aU  antitheses  and  differences  ^ 
and  moreover  aJl   valuation,  disappear  when  so   con-- 
sidered. 

A  desire  can  be  subdued  only  by  another  desire,  and 
fience,  if  the  ideal  is  to  govern  our  life,  it  must  either  give  • 
nse  to  or  become  a  desire.    Duty  then  becomes  a  matter  :. 
Of  making  this  desire  as  strong  as  possible.    Social  life   !^ 
IS  a  means  to  this  end.    Men  can  make  better  provision 
tor  self-preservation  by  uniting  their  energies.    Spiritual 
goods    especiaUy  knowledge,  which  furnishes  the  only  ' 
possible  means  to  perfect  freedom  and  activity,  can  only 
be  acquired  under  conditions  which  guarantee  the  external 


78 


THE   GREAT  SYSTEMS 


means  of  subsistence  and  this  is  more  readily  obtained  m 
organized  society  than  otherwise.    Spiritual,  unlike  ma- 
terial, goods,  which  only  one  or  a  few  can  possess,  are  not 
the  occasion  of  strife;  they  are  rather  the  common  pos- 
session of  everyone,  and  here  the  individual  can  assist 
others  without  sustaining  any  loss  to  himself.    The  cour- 
'  ageous   instinct   of   self-preservation    {fortitudo),   which 
constitutes  virtue,  appears  therefore  not  only  in  the  form 
of  vital  energy  (animosUas),  i.e.  as  power  to  impress  the 
influence  of  one's  personality,   but  also  in   generosity 
(generositas) ,  i.  e.  power  to  lend  spiritual  and  material 
,  assistance  to  others.— But  the  acme  of  spiritual  freedom 
can  nevertheless  only  be  attained  through  a  perfect  under- 
V  standing  of  ourselves,  in  our  real  identity  with  that  which 
is  most  essential  and  highest  in  Being,  because  we  con- 
ceive our  own  energy  as  a  part  of  infinite  energy  and  we 
are  filled  with  an  intellectual  love  for  Deity  brought 
about  by  the  joy  of  knowledge  (amor  intellectualis  det). 
We  then  see  ourselves  sub  specie  (zternitatis. 

In  his   theory  of  the  state,  contained  partly  in  the 
Tractaius   theologico-politicus,   partly  in  the    imfinished 
v^  Tractatus  PoliticuSy  Spinoza,  like  Eohhes,  draws  a  sharp 
distinction  between  the  state  of  nature  and  life  within 
the  state  ;  but  he  likewise  holds  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
state  to  secure  a  greater  degree  of  freedom  and  indepen- 
dence than  wotdd  be  possible  in  a  state  of  nature.    The 
individual  does  not  surrender  his  liberty  when  he  becomes 
a  member  of  the  state.    The  state  is  not  supposed  to 
reduce  men  to  animals  or  machines,  but  to  provide  the 
conditions  for  the  development  of  man's  spiritual  and 
bodily    functions.    It    would    therefore    contradict    its 
.  office  if  it    failed  to  maintain  liberty  of  thought  and 
.  speech  and  to  guarantee  complete  religious  liberty. 


LEIBNITZ 


79 


4.    Gottfried   Wilhelm  Leibnitz   (1646-1716),  like  his 
three  predecessors,   Descartes,   Hobbes  and  Spinoza    is 
convmced  of  the  importance  of  the  mechanical  explanation 
of  nature.    His  three  predecessors  regarded  the  mechanical 
prmaples  as  self-evident  and  as  given  once  for  aU,  and 
assumed  the  task  of  interpreting  the  various  elements 
of  reality  m  harmony  with  the  principle  of  mechanical 
causahty.    Leibnitz  however  subjects  the  principle  of 
causality  to  a  profounder  analysis  by  inquiring  into  its 
presuppositions  and  seeking  to  refer  it  back  to  something 
stiU  more  fundamental.    It  is  only  after  he  ha^  succeeded 
m  this  that  he  proceeds  to  the  definition  of  the  relation 
between  matter  and  mind.    The  motive  for  this  investi- 
gation  was  m  part  purely  theoretical,  due  to  the  fact  that 
Leibmtz  discovered  gaps  and  inconsistencies  in  his  pre- 
decessors,  in  part  practical,  due  to  his  desire  to  bring  the 
modern  explanation  of  nature  into  more  perfect  harmony 
with  lus  reHgious  presuppositions.    He  attempted   to 
accomphsh  both  at  a  single  stroke,  by  means  of  a  single 
Idea,  the  idea  of  continuity. 

Even  as  a  boy,  in  the  Hbrary  of  his  father,  who  was  a 
professor  m  Leipzig,  Leibnitz  had  become  familiar  with 
the    wntings    of    Scholasticism.    When    he    afterwards 
became  acquainted  with  the  natural  science  and  philos- 
ophy of  his  own  day  he  felt  as  if  "transported  into  another 
world.      He  saw  that  the  new  ideas  could  not  be  refuted 
but  neither  could  he  surrender  the  conviction  that  nature 
IS  ultimately  regulated  by  prescience,  that  is  to  say 
tnat  the  mechanism  must  be  grounded  in  teleology.    His 
mathematical  ideas  were  influenced  profoundly  by  the 
physicist  Huygens  during  a  visit  in  Paris,  and  he  after- 
wards likewise  drew  personally  close  to  Spinoza.    From 
1676  onwards  he  Kved  at  Hannover  as  councillor  and 


W' 


80 


THE   GREAT   SYSTEMS 


LEIBNITZ 


81 


.  Hbrarian,  occupied  with  philosophy,  mathematics,  history 
and  jiirisprudence.  His  broadly  comprehensive  mind 
was  capable  of  engaging  productively  in  a  wide  range  of 
subjects  to  their  material  advancement.  He  was  every- 
where affected  by  the  controlling  idea  of  continuity, 
which  can  only  be  rigorously  carried  through  by  the 
continual  discovery  of  more  numerous  and  finer  distinc- 
tions and  nuances  of  thought. 

a.    Leibnitz  discovered  a  difficulty  in  Descartes'  and 
Spinoza's  theory  that  the  sum  total  of  motion  in  the 
universe  always  remains  constant,  namely,  that  it  fails 
to  explain  how  to  account  for  motion  and  rest  respectively 
in  the  various  parts  of  the   universe:    They  exist  as 
antithetical  states!    Continuity  can  be  established  only 
through  the  concept  of  Force  (or  tendency,^  conatus). 
If  motion  has  ceased  at  a  given  point  in  the  universe,  the 
Force  still  remains  and  can  be  revived  again.     Motion 
and  rest  are  only  relatively  opposed  to  each  other. 
Instead  of  the  persistence  of  motion  we  should  speak  of 
the  persistence  of  Force.    Force  is  the  factqr  in  any  given 
cu-cumstance  which  contains  the  possibility  of  future 
change.    We  first  discover  a  tuiiform  relation  between  two 
states  and  we  afterwards  call  the  factor  in  the  first  state 
which  makes   the   second   state    possible    Force.    The 
concept  of  Force  therefore  rests  on  the  concept  of  law, 
the  ultimate  presupposition  of  which  is  the  uniforai  con- 
sistency  of   changing   states.     Leibnitz   calls   this   pre- 
supposition the  principle  of  sufficient  reason. 

But  how  shall  we  accoimt  for  the  persistence  of  energy? 
According  to  Leibnitz  this  question  can  be  answered  only 
teleologically.  If  the  energy  of  a  cause  were  not  preserved 
in  the  effect,  nature  would  retrograde,  which  contradicts 
divine  wisdom.    Leibnitz  thus  finds  a  basis  for  his  faith 


in  prescience  in  the  corrected  basal  principle  of  mechanical 
natural  science.  In  explaining  particular  facts  he  would 
apply  the  strict  mechanical  method,  but  the  principle 
of  mechanism  itself  requires  the  principle  of  teleology 
for  its  explanation.  ^ 

b.    Leibnitz  carries  his  analysis  further  than  his  pre- 
decessors at  still  another  point.    They  had  regarded 
extension  as  a  fundamental  attribute  of  Being.    LeibnUz 
challenges  this  assumption.    Extended  things  are  always 
mamfold  and  complex,  and  the  true  realities  are  the 
elements    which    constitute    things.     If  there  were  no 
absolute  umts  (which  cannot  be  extended),  there  would  be 
no  real  existence.    It  is  only  these  ultimate  units  that 
can  be  regarded  bs  Substance  (in  its  strict  significance) 
Ina^uch  therefore  as  Force  persists,  it  follows  that  this 
persistent  Substance  must  likewi^  be  Force;    it  would 
be  utterly  impossible  for  activity  to  originate  from  Sub- 
stances in  a    state    of    absolute    rest.      LeibnUz    caUs 
these^  substantial  units,  whose  objective  manifestation 
constitutes  matter,  Monads.    Each  Monad  is  a  Httle 
universe;  its  nature  is  revealed  in  the  laws  which  govern 
its  inner  successive  changes. 

What  then,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  are  these    Monads? 
Leibmtz  answers:    Our  souls  alone  furnish  us  with  an 
nnmediate  example  of  a  unitary  being,  whose  inner  states 
foUow  a  umform  law.    We  must  think  of  all  Monads  after 
this  analogy,  because  we  presuppose  something  in  aU  of 
them  analogous  to  our  sensations  and  activities.    Since 
according  to  the  principle  of  continuity,  we  permit  no 
leaps  m  nature,  we  must  postulate  innumerable  grades 
and  degrees  of  soul  life  in  the  universe.    And  this  enables 
us  to  understand  the  origin  of  human  consciousness.    Here 
the  Cartesians,  just  as  in  the  case  of  the  transition  from 


!! 


82 


THE   GREAT  SYSTEMS 


rest  to  motion,  were  confronted  by  a  riddle;  for  con- 
sciousness  like  motion  cannot  come  into  being  all  at  once. 
The  relation  of  the  unconscious  to  consciousness  is 
analogous  to  the  relation  of  rest  and  motion.  In  order 
to  vindicate  the  continuity  of  soul-Hfe,  Leibnitz  directs 
attention  to  the  fine  nuances  and  changes  of  consciousness 
which  are  frequently  overiooked.  We  are  likewise 
obliged  to  postulate  such  minimal  elements  (petites  per- 
ceptions) in  the  unconscious. 

Leibnitz  first  elaborated  this,  his  so-called  theory  of 
Monads,  in  a  short  essay  in  1685  {Petit  discours  de  meta- 
physique)  and  in  his  correspondence  with  Arnaidd  during 
the  following  year,  but  not  until  he  had  prepared  the  way 
for  it  by  a  ntimber  of  earHer  essays.    He  afterwards 
pubHshed  several  expositions  of  the  theory  especially 
in  the  Syst^me  nouveau  (1695)  and  in  the  Monadologie 
(^^yi^), --Leibnitz  approaches  his  system  first  by   the 
method  of  analysis,  and  then  by  the  method  of  analogy. 
He  seeks  the  ultimate  presuppositions  of  science  and  then 
explains  these  presuppositions  by  means  of  analogy.    Here 
he  made  a  very  important  discovery,  in  showing  that 
analogy  is  the  only  method  by  which  to  construct  a 
positive   metaphysics.    Every  mythology,  reHgion  and 
metaphysical     system    had     used    this     method;    but 
Leibnitz  is  the  first  to  understand  the  principle  which 
forms  its  basis.    His  system,  the  first  attempt  at  a  meta- 
physical ideaHsm  (i.  e.  the  theory  that  the  fundamental 
principle  of  reality  is  spiritual)  since  Plato  and  the  pattern 
of  all  later  ideaHstic  attempts,  has,  to  say  nothing  of  its 
content,  a  permanent  interest  just  because  of  this  clear 
consciousness  of  its  source.    However  if  we  should  ask 
him  why  he  uses  the  principle  of  analogy  with  so  much 
assurance,  he  would  answer:    Because  its  help  ofiEers 


LEIBNITZ  g^ 

the  only  possibiHty  of  comprehending  reality  and  because 
reaUty-on  the  basis  of  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason 
—must  be  comprehensible. 

c.    It  was  Leibnitz'   intention   that  his  doctrine  of 
Monads  should  form  the  complete  antithesis  to  Spinozism 
Whilst  Spinoza  recognized  only  one  Substance,  Leibnitz 
postulated  an  infinite  number,  each  of  which  forms  a 
universe  of  its  own,  or,  to  invert  the  expression,  constitutes 
a  separate  view  of  the  universe.    Each  Monad  develops 
by  virtue  of  an  inner  necessity,  just  Hke  Spinoza's  Sub- 
stance.    Leibnitz'  theory  thus  appears  to  be  an  absolute 
pluralism  in  contrast  with  an  equaUy  absolute  monism. 
Leibnitz*  only  explanation  of  the  ultimate  correspondence 
and  harmony  of  the  Monads  however,  without  which 
they  could  not  constitute  a  universe,  involves  the  reference 
to  their  common  origin  in  God.    The  Monads  issue  or 
radiate  from  God,  in  a  manner  similar  to  the  way  in  which 
Substance,  according  to  Spinoza,  impelled  by  the  instinct 
of  self-preservation,  produced  the  Modes.    But  at  this 
point— the    conception    of    unity    and    multipHcity— 
Leibnitz  encounters  a  difficulty  which  is  even  greater  than 
that  of  Spinoza,  since  even  God— just  as  every  reality- 
must  likewise  be  a  Monad  together  with  the  other  Monads, 
whilst  Spinoza's  Substance  maintains  vital  relation  with 
the  Modes. 

Leibnitz  also  approaches  very  close  to  Spinoza  in  his 
conception  of  the  relation  of  mind  and  matter.  He 
insists  on  the  continuity  of  all  material  processes  and  can  ' 
therefore  neither  accept  any  transition  from  matter  to 
mind  nor  any  influence  of  mind  upon  matter.  Extension 
is  only  the  external  sensible  form  of  psychical  states:  that 
which  takes  place  in  the  soul  finds  its  material  expression 
in  the  body  and  vice  versa.     Leibnitz  therefore  defends 


84 


THE   GREAT   SYSTEMS 


LEIBNiTZ 


«s 


l^h 


the  hypothesis  of  identity  just  as  Spinoza  had  done.  He 
however  gives  it  an  idealistic  cast,  since  he  regarded  the 
absolute  reality  as  psychical,  and  denied  the  Spinozistic 
coordination  of  the  two  attributes. 

d.    A  perfect  continuity  pervades  the  separate  Monads, 
i.  e.  the  individual  life  of  the  soul,  just  as  the  Monads 
among  themselves  form  a  complete  continuous  series. 
Every  conceivable  degree  of  soul-life  exists,  unconscious 
as  well  as  conscious.     Leibnitz  developed  his  views  on 
psychology  and  the  theory  of  knowledge,  as  a  polemic 
directed  against  Locke,  in  his  Nouveaux  Essais  (which  only 
appeared  long  after  his  death) .     He  criticizes  the  assertion 
that  the  soul  is  originally  a  blank  tablet.    The  obscure 
impulses  of  the  soul  must  not  be  ignored.    Just  in  pro- 
portion as   the   distinction  and   contrast  between  our 
sensations  are  small,  the  less  a  single  element  is  distinguish- 
able from  the  remaining  content  of  the  soul,  or,  more 
briefly,  the  more  obscure  the  psychical  states  are,  so 
much  the  more  readily  is  their  existence  denied.    But 
there  are  no  absolute  divisions,  but  rather  every  possible 
degree  of  variation  between   obscurity   and   clearness. 
Leibnitz   calls  the    obscure  changes   within   ourselves, 
which  do  not  really  rise  to    consciousness,  perceptions; 
they  correspond  to  the  phantasmata  of  Hobbes,    The 
lowest  forms  of  being,  the  Monads  of  the  lowest  degree, 
never   rise   above   such   perceptions.    We   approach  a 
higher  level  when  perceptions  are  combined  with  memory 
and  consequently  possess  more  than  mere  momentary 
significance;    consciousness   is  then  present  (sentiment, 
of.  Hobbes'  sensio).    The  highest  degree  is  characterized 
by  attention  to  its  own   states;   here  Leibnitz  uses  the 
terms    apperception     and    conscience;     conscience    is 
connaissance  reflexive  de  I'etat  interieur,  i.  e.  self-conscious- 


ness, not  consciousness  in  general.    The  fact  that  thj^ 
Cartesians  attributed  psychical  life  to  human  b^gs 
alone  was   due,  according  to  Leibnitz,  to  their  failure 
to  observe  the  innimierable  gradations  of  psychical  life. 
Here,  even  as  in  material  nature,  the  clear  and  sensibly 
apparent  is  a  resultant,  an  integration  of  small  magni- 
tudes.   The  apparent    evanescence  of  psychical  life  is 
merely  a  transmutation  into  more  obscure,  more  element- 
ary forms.    The  minute  distinctions  escape  observation, 
and  yet  we  are  never  wholly  indifferent  to  them  (just  as 
in  material  nature  there  is  no  such  thing  as  absolute  rest). 
It  is  only  when  the  distinctions  become  great  and  sharp 
that  we  are  clearly  aware  of  ourselves  and  feel  the  contrast 
between  the  self  and  the  rest  of  the  universe. 

Leibnitz  applies  the  principle  of  continuity  consistently 
throughout,  both  in  psychology  and  in  the  philosophy  of 
nature,  on  the  basis  of  the  concept  of  minute  differentia. 
As  a  mathematician  the  same  thought  process  led  him  \ 
to  the  discovery  of  the  integral  calculus.  His  "differentials"  ' 
are  infinitely  small  magnitudes  (or  changes  of  magnitude), 
but  they  eventually  constitute  a  finite  magnitude  through 
summation  (integration).  His  great  mind  was  occupied 
with  problems  in  widely  different  fields  of  knowledge, 
but  the  general  type  of  his  thought  was  everywhere  the 
same. 

In  referring  all  the  distinctions  of  mental  life  to  dis- 
tinctions of  obscurity  and  clearness,  he  is  a  forerunner  of 
the  century  of  enlightenment.  But  we  must  not  over- 
look the  fact  that  the  obscure  states  have  an  infinite 
content,  for  each  Monad  is  a  mirror  of  the  whole  universe, 
even  though  it  is  conscious  of  only  a  part  of  it.  A  finite 
being  is  therefore  incapable  of  complete  and  perfect 
enlightenment;  its  sole  prospect  consists  of   continuous 


y ,' 


86 


THE  GRrCAT   SYSTEMS 


LEIBNITZ 


87 


effcm.  Leibnitz  likewise  discovers  a  tendency  (appetit- 
tendance)  in  the  soul,  to  pass  from  the  single  ''percep- 
tions" to  new  perceptions.  This  is  an  element  which 
presupposes  other  distinctions  than  obscurity  and  clear- 
ness. Both  Spinoza  and  Leibnitz  contain  suggestions 
of  a  profoxmder  theory  of  will,  which  is  suppressed  by 
their  intellectuaHstic  tendency. 

e.  Although  Leibnitz,  in  opposition  to  Locke,  maintains 
the  involimtary  and  unconscious  foundation  of  knowl- 
edge, and  objected  to  the  idea  of  a  tabula  rasa,  he 
is  still  in  agreement  with  Locke's  criticism  of  ''innate 
ideas"  in  requiring  a  proof  for  all  truths,  even  the  * '  innate," 
that  are  not  identical  propositions.  To  prove  a  prop- 
osition means  to  trace  it  hsicJL  to  an  identical  proposition. 
According  to  him  logic  culminates  in  the  principle  of 
identity  whilst  the  Aristotelians  and  Scholastics  base 
their  theory  on  the  principle  of  contradiction.  He -had 
sketched  an  outline  of  logic  in  which  each  judgment  is 
stated  in  the  form  of  an  identical  proposition.  But  this 
sketch  was  tmknown  tmtil  1840  (in  /.  E,  Erdmann^s 
Opera  phUosophica  Leibnitii),  and  the  logical  investi- 
gations of  Boole  and  Jevons,  which  reveal  a  similar 
tendency,  were  the  first  to  direct  attention  to  them. 

Just  as  the  principle  of  identity  is  the  criterion  of  truth 
in  the  realm  of  pure  thought,  so  is  the  principle  of  suffi- 
cient reason  in  the  reahn  of  experience.  Leibnitz  how- 
ever, even  as  Spinoza,  never  made  a  clear  distinction 
between  ground  and  cause  (ratio  and  causa).  He  re- 
garded this  principle  not  only  as  a  principle  of  scientific 
investigation,  but  as  a  tmiversal  law. — The  difference 
between  truths  of  experience  ("contingent"  truths) 
and  truths  of  pure  thought  ("necessary'*  truths)  is 
only  a  matter  of  degree:  the  former  can  be  reduced  to 


identical  propositions  by  a  finite,  the  latter  by  an  infinite 
analysis.  The  relation  is  similar  to  that  wHch  obS 
between  rational  and  irrational  numbers 

•  *;  J^^  Z^°^^  °^  ^^^  Leibnizian  philosophy  is  character- 
ized by  a  harmonizing  and  conciliatory  tendency.  He 
IS  especially  anxious  to  combine  mechanism  with  teleol- 
tSIi  !"t^°«t  """promising  the  integrity  of  either. 
Teleology  is  ^ply  to  be  another  way  of  construing 
mecha^sm  He  says  that  "ever^Wng  in  nature  can 
be  explamed  by  final  causes  (causa  finales)  quite  as  weU 
as  by  ;  .iiaent  causes  (causas  efficientes)." 

But  he  is  not  satisfied  to  stop  with  this  purely  philo- 
sophical theory,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  its  em- 
pirical verification  contained  an  abundance  of  problems 
He  was  also  anxious  to  effect  a  recondUation  between 
eccleaastical  theology  and  philosophy.    He  wrote  the 
Theoduee  m  refutation  of  Bayle,  just  as  he  had  written 
ae   Nouveaux  Essais  in    refutation    of   Locke.     Here 
he  employs  the  distinction    between  "necessary"  and 
conitngent"    truths:     nothing     can     contradict     the 
fonn«^  but   since  "contingent"  truths   can  never   be 
reduced  to  a  final  analysis,  such  as  the  principle  of  suffi- 
cient reason  requires,  we  are  compelled  to  go  beyond  the 
^nes   of   actual  causes  (extra  seriem)  and  postulate  a 
first  cause,  which  is  seK-caused.    The  universe,  actuaUy 
created  by  this  first  cause,  was  not  the  only  one  possible; 
-according  to  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason-it  must 
have  been  given  the  preference  only  because  it  was  the 
b^^ssible     Before  the  creation  of  the  world  the 
vmous  Possibihti^  presented  a  conflict  in  the  Divine 

T^ff  Ji'  ^°'^^  ^^  ^^^  ^^^  preference  because 
rt  offered  the  ^eatest  harmony  together  with  the  greatest 
multiphaty.    But  even  such  a  world  cannot  be  entirely 


88 


THE  GEEAT  SYSTEMS 


LEIBNITZ 


/ 


free  from  fault.  It  is  impossible  f  ^r  the  Ehvme  Nature 
to  reveal  itself  in  finite  nature  withc-^t  encountering  nu- 
merous obstacles  and  limitations.  Suffering  ("physical 
evfl")  and  sin  ("moral  evil")  are  consequences  of  these 
obstacles  ("metaphysical  evil").-This  reminds  us 
of  the  mythology  of  Jacob  Bohme.  Leibnitz  must  con- 
cede to  Bayle  that  the  world  is  governed  by  two  prm- 
dples,  with  this  modification,  namely,  that  he  ascnbes 
the  one  to  the  divine  will,  which  reduces  evil  to  aminimum, 
the  other  to  the  divine  understanding,  which  determmes 
the  various  possible  world  forms.  ,..,•!.•, 

■  But  these  are  not  the  only  arguments  which  Letbmtz 
adduces.    He  cites  the  infinitude  of  the  universe,  as 
admitting  the  possibiUty  that  the  evil  which  we  expen- 
ence  in  our  part  of  the  universe  (which  is  perhaps  the 
worst  part!)  may  be  insignificant  as  compared  with  the 
world  as  a  whole.    This  argument  is  new.    It  had  only 
become  possible  through  the  new  world-theory  of  Coper- 
nicus and  Bruno.    On  the  other  hand,  Leibnitz  employs 
an  old  argument  when  he  says  that  evil  and  sm  were 
necessary  in  order  that  the  good  and  the  beautiful  might 
be  rendered  conspicuous  by  contrast.    This  view  occurs 
already  in  Flotinus  and  Augustine.    It  is  rather  esthetic 
than  moral.    And  moreover  the  sacrifice  of  single  parts 
of  the  universe,  i.  e.  single  Monads,  for  the  good  of  others, 
conflicts  with  Leibnitz'  own  theory.  ,      ,      .       , 

Leibnitz  bases  his  ethical  ideas  on  the  longing  for 
perfection,  i.  e.  for  a  higher  degree  of  energy  and  greater 
^iritual  harmony.  The  sense  of  pleasure  is  correlated 
with  an  abundance  and  harmony  of  energies.  The 
individual  is  spontaneously  impeUed  to  strive  not  only 
for  Ws  own  happiness,  but  Ukewise  for  the  happme^ 
of  others.    In  the  controversy  between  Bossuet  and 


89 


a^^Z.^'^F  T*""«.''  "'^^terested  love,"  Leibnitz 

of^tve     f  ?  ""^"^  '^'  ^^i*y  ^d  th^  value 
ot  such  love  ;   he  however  emphasizes  the  fact  that  tZ 

ne  regards  justice,  conceived  as  the  harmonv  of  lov^  an^ 
Letbmtz  hmiself  referred  to  their  similarity. 


I 


v 


I 


LOCKE 


91 


n 


1 1 


THIRD    BOOK. 

ENGLISH  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

The   great  system  builders  did  indeed  begin  with 
analysis^it  the  foundations  upon  which  they  b,Mt  were 
conit^  and  presuppositions  just  the  same,  and  these 
wl   not   carefuUy  investigated.    This  is  speciaUy  tme 
of  the  principle  of  cau^tion  and  several  of  thepnnaples 
of  natural  science,  which  were  regarded  as  self  Went. 
The  method  of  using  presuppositions  without  mquinng  • 
into  their  validity  has,  since  the  time  of  Kant  b^n  called 
dogmatism.    It  is  the  great  merit  of  Enghsh  philosophy 
that  it  instituted  an  investigation  of  the  presuppositions 
of  knowledge.    It  investigates  the  psychological  processes 
which  give  rise  to  these  presuppositions,  as  well  as  the 
Ltho(£of  demonstrating  their  vaHdity.    The  problem  of 
psychology  and  the  theory  of  knowledge  thus  come  into 
S  foreground,  and  the   problem  of  bemg  gradually 
recedes  into  the  background. 

The  consequences  of  this  transposition  of  problems 
were  of  great  importance  in  other  departments  as  weU 
as  in  the  specific  domain  of  philosophy.    People  began  to 
demand  a  definite  account,  not  only  of  scientific  presui^ 
positions,  but  also  of  the  principles  winch  were  regarded 
ksfundamental  in  pohtics,  religion  and  education     Au- 
thorities, which  had  hitherto  been  accepted  without  hea- 
tation,  must  now  give  an  account  of  their  origin  and  thar 
trustworthiness.    Stated    in    philosophical    terms    tto 
means  that  the  problem  of  evaluation  now  became  more 
prominent  than  formerly.    This  is  a  matter  that  m 
neither  be  solved  by  an  appeal  to  authority  nor  by  a  mere 

90 


deduction  from  theoretical  principles,  but  requires  a 

oTSfcsrr^"^*^"^^^^*^^-^'  ThefoSion 
of  ethics  likewise  receives  independent  treatment  mo^ 
frequently  than  Utherto.  ^^em  more 

I.    John  Locke  (1632-1704)  devotes  his  chief  work 

(690),  to  the  investigation  of  the  nature  and  validiti  / 
of  human  knowledge.    The  first  draft  of  this  T^Z 
work  was  brought  about  by  a  discussion  of  moST  aS 
rehi^ous  subjects     When  it  became  evident  how  « 
It  IS  to  amve  at  definite  conclusions,  the  thought  oc^ 
to  Locke  that  they  must  first  of  aU  examine'SeTSS 
of  knowledge,  m  order  to  see  what  subjects  it  is  (JS 
of  treatmg,  and  moreover  what  things  are  be^oTiS 
powers     In  the  first  book  Locke  criticizes  the^Sril  ' 
of  i^ate  Ideas,  especiaUy  in  the  form  in  which  it^SSS"'" 
by  Herbert  of  Cherlury;  in  the  second  boofhe  S  S 

Ideas  to  their  simple  elements;   in  the  thini  bodk  he 
mv^tigates  the  influence  of  language  on  though?  and     ' 
m   the    fourth    he    examines    the    different   Knds^f 
knowledge  and  defines  its  limits  ' 

father     He  pays  a  beautiful  tribute  to  his  father   in 
his  splendid  essay  On  Education  (1692).    Butl^ffo^ 

Z^ST'^Jtf::  -^'-''^  scLLtict;tt 

received  at  school  and  the  university  were  repulsive  to 
ton  as  philosophical  development  was  Sbl^ 
cbefly  by  the  study  of  Descartes,  Gassendi  an7SS 
Bemg  unable  to  subscribe  to  the  xa  Art,vi»c  u  ^  j 
relinquish  his  original  plan  of  b^g^itgitn  h^ 
a^tarw^dssl^died  medicine,  but  soon  enter3r^;rv£ 
Of  the  Earl  of  SUftesUry,  with  whose  family  h  i^SS 


02  ENGLISH  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

connected  for  two  generations,  as  taitor,  ^e^et^  ^d 
Mend  At  the  faU  of  the  Earl,  Locke  went  to  HoUand 
where  he  composed  his  most  important  works  and 
likewise  participated  inthe  preparations  for  thetevolutam. 
He  returned  to  England  with  WiUiam  of  Orange,  and  helped 
to  formulate  the  poUcies  of  the  new  admmistration.  He 
spent  his  last  years  in  rural  soUtude. 

a     In  Locke's  terminology  (Mea  represents  evwythmg 
with  which  we  are  occupied  WESi  engaged  in  thought. 
Some  have  supposed  that  certain  ideas,  espeaally  the  idea 
of  God  and  the  logical  and  moral  principles,  are  innate,  but 
experience  shows  that  children,  primitive  races  and  the 
illiterate  possess  nothing  more  than  partkular  and  sen- 
sible ideas.    There  are  men  who  have  no  idea  of  God  and 
no  real  ideas  of  morahty.    Some  of  our  ideas  are  natural, 
i  e    such  as  have  been  acquired  through  experience  by 
means  of  our  native  faculty,    but  even    these  ^e  not 
iimate.    Locke  attributes  the  doctrine  of  immte  ideas  to 
human  indolence,  which  shrinks  from  the  labor  mvolved 
in  exploring  the  origin  of  ideas. 

,  All  ideas,  all  the  elements  of  consciousness  ongmate 
'  from  two  sources:  external  experience  (sensation)  and 
i  internal  experience  (reflection).  In  external  experience 
.  a  physical  impression  produces  a  sensation  (perception) 
in  the  soul;  in  internal  experience  we  observe  the  activity 
of  our  own  mind  in  elaborating  the  sensations  received 

from  without.  .  .  , 

In  the  acquisition  of  simple  ideas  consciousness  is  for 

!  the  most  part  passive.    Simple  external  ideas  are  of  two 

i  kinds:    ideas    of  primary  'and  of  secondary  qualities. 

The  primary  quaUties  can  be  attributed  to  the  external 

objects  themselves  ;   such  are  soUdity,  extension,  figure, 

mobihty.    Secondary  quahties  belong  only  to  our  ideas. 


LOCKE 

they  are  not  attributes  of  the  things  themselves-  t3 
are  the  results  of  the  influences  of  primary  qSes  on 
^    Such  secondary  idea,  are  Hght,  souS^  S  If 

GMeo,  Descartes  and  Hobbes.    Locke  adopteS^lrfrom 
Boyle,  the  noted  chemist,  who  is  the  autSr  o^e  t^ 
primary  and  secondary  qualities  " 
Whilst  we  are  largely  passive  in  acquiring  simple  ideas 
we  are  active  in  forming  from  them,kt,  Lp£  dS  ^ 
second.  Ideas  of  relations,  third  and  finally  abstS  dS' ' 
Hence  there  are  three  fornis  of   activity:   cTS^tS^"! 
a^ciation  and  abstraction.    We  combine  Z^eX^\ 
mto  a  single  Idea  whenever  we  fonn  ideas  of  at  riiuS 
(mod^),  such  as  space  and  time,  energy  and  mot^ 
The  Ideas  of  such  attributes  as  sensati.^  m^o^S 

mSs     fit  W  °'  ''^''f "''''-'  ^y  "^"^^^S  ideas  of 
modes.    But  here  a  mystery  confronts  us.    We  know  th^ 
•^ngk  modes  by  themselves,  but  we  are  unable  to  tS^ 
^t  substance,  which  presumably  supports  the  m^de " 
reaUy  is.-We  may  hkewise  place  two  ideas  in  iuxtaoo<rf 
tion,  without  fonning  a  compound  idea.    We  ^^7'    ' 
peases  of  ideas  of  relation,  such  as  cau^and  SU 
tune  and  space    relations,    identity    and    differjj^ 

we  torm  an  idea  of  a  color  m  general,  or  the  idea  of  space 
without  reference  to  its  content  ^ 

thte  Srtf  no*'  '"f  «-.°^<&^ty.  ^-*«  holds  that 

oecause  they  are  the  direct  eflfect  of  external  obiects 
Even  secondary  qualities,  which  do  not  repreSnt  SS' 
are  nevertheless  the  direct  results  of  o^^e^rtZ. 


ENGUSH  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

.Tie  matter  stands  quite  differently  however  when  we  come 
to  consider  the  validity  of  the  ideas  which  we  ourselves 
produce  (in  the  three  ways  noted  above) !     They  cannot 
v;  of  course  be  copies  or  impressions!     We  use  them  however 
as  archetypes,  or  patterns,  with  which  to  make  comparisons. 
In  this  case,  therefore,  we  estimate  objects  from  the 
viewpoint  of  their  agreement  or  disagreement  with  the 
patterns    of    our    own    construction.    But   compound, 
I  relative  and  abstract  ideas  furnish  no  information  what- 
ever as  to  the  real  nature  of  tHngs.    It  is  in  this  sense 
that  we  use  figures  in  mathematics,  and  moral  ideals  in 
ethics.    The  proofs  of  mathematics  and  moral  philos- 
ophy are  wholly  independent  of  the    existence   of  the 
things  to  which  they  refer.    But  such  is  not  the  case 
with  the  idea  of  substance,  which  is  expressly  intended 
to  indicate  an  external  object.    The  validity  of  ideas- 
of  this  kind  can  only  be  estabUshed  therefore  on  the 
basis  of  a  complex  of  attributes  given  in  experience,  or 
if,  as  in  the  case  of  the  idea  of  God,  we  are  in  position  to 
offer  a  separate  proof  for  its  validity. 

In    agreement    with    Descartes,    Locke    distinguishes 

between  intuition  and  demonstration.     Intuition   merely 

furnishes  us  knowledge  of  self  and  of  the  simplest  relations 

between  our  ideas.    The   combination   of  a  series  of 

intuitions  results  in  demonstration.    These  two  kinds 

of  knowledge  aione  are  fully   certain;   sense  experience 

is  always  only  probable.— iocfee  proves  the  existence  of 

^  God  by  appealing  to  the  principle  of   causality:    The 

~^  world  must  have  a  cause,  and,   since  matter  cannot 

produce  spirit,  the  cause  of  the  universe  must  be  a  spiritual 

being.    He  regards  our  knowledge  of  the  causal  principle 

itself  as  an  intuition,  i.  e.  as  self-evident.    At  this  point 

he  agrees  with  the  dogmatic  systematizers.    Hence  he 


LOCKE 

9S 
likewise  employs  this  principle  com^iai^ntly '  both  in 

0%'r  i^T'''''  f  .^^P'^  '"^^  -'I  of  theexisSn  : 
of  God.  But  the  causal  idea  on  the  other  hand  belongs 
to  the  class  of  relative  ideas,  which  is  therefore  a  ^b! 
jective  construction  albeit  on  the  basis  of  sense-percep- 
tion Locke  IS  rather  ambiguous  at  this  point  (as  sL 
on  he  Idea  of  substance).  The  profound  probC 
involved  in  these  ideas  were  not  discovered  untj  Loc^s 
successors  (Berkeley  and  Hume)  came  upon  them. 

c.    In  the  philosophy  of  law,  Locke  (in  the  Essav  on 
Government    r68,)   makes  a  sharp  distinction  ttweS 

coSin"tL':!:rt^  '"*'°"^^-  ^^"^-'^^  -^^r^ 

consists  m  the  authonty  to  prescribe  laws,  to  enforce  the 

aws  which  are  prescribed,  and  to  protect  society  agai^t 

foreign  enemies.    Such  authority  can  be  establishel o"y 

by  unconstramed  agreement,   which  may  however^ 

liberty,  which,  m  a  state  of  nature,  is  constantly  in  dan  J 

t  wf   r    V"":  ^""™^"*  P--«  unLthi"  to 
Its  trust,  the  people  have  the  right  to  overthrow  it. 

In  his  philosophy  of   religion    (The  Reasonableness  of 

Chr^st^an^ty  as  Delivered  in  the  Scriptures,  rtJlocL 

conceiyes  revealed  religion  as  a  more  deve  oped   omrf 

must  be  decided  by  reason.    Revelation  is  necessaT 
however,  on  account  of  the  fact  that  man  has  nSTsS 

Z     Tr-ir.     f  ^^r*"  'y''^  °^  •^^^t"'^^  i^  «"neces- 
Ster?^1    ^  ^T'  ""f  '^'  P°°^'  ^^°^  ^^^  ^e  spent 

ti2  1~I     /7'f,    ^^««-*i"kers    (the    so-caUed 

myt  thlri  ^"t '   P^'^^P^y  °^  ^^«gion  more 
my  in  the  direction  of  a  more  pronounced  rationalism. 


■^m 


X 


96 


ENGLISH   EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


NEWTON 


97 


The  most  important  representative  of  this  tendency  was 
John  Toland  (1670-1720),  who  says,  in  his  Christianity 
Not  Mysterious  (1696),  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  Gospel 
which  either  transcends  or  conflicts  with  reason;  but 
that  priests  and  philosophers  had  transformed  Christian- 
ity into  a  mystery.  In  his  Fantheisticon  (1720)  he 
describes  pantheism  as  the  private  theory  of  a  society  of 
enlightened  gentlemen,  who  conceive  God  as  the  efficient 
energy  of  the  universe.  His  most  important  book  is 
the  Letters  to  Serena  (1704),  in  which  he  says,  against  the 
Cartesian  and  Spinozistic  conception  of  nature,  that 
motion  is  an  attribute  of  matter  which  is  equally  primary 
with  extension.  Motion  persists  everywhere  in  nature, 
and  all  rest  is  only  apparent. 

2.  Neither  Locke  nor  the  great  systematizers  of  the 
seventeenth  century  had  fully  accepted  the  sublime 
ideal  of  knowledge  proposed  by  Kepler  and  Galileo.  They 
still  regarded  experience  and  reason  as  mutually  exclusive. 
It  was  all  the  more  significant  therefore  that  Sir  Isaac 
Newton  (1642-1727),  in  his  Principia  Philosophie 
Naturalis  Mathematica  (1684),  should  ftimish  the  most 
famous  product  of  exact  empirical  science  by  means  of 
a  combination  of  induction  and  deduction.  This  work 
had  a  decisive  influence  on  the  further  development  of 
philosophy.  But  this  is  not  the  only  ground  for  making 
reference  to  Newton  in  the  history  of  philosophy.  He  is 
likewise  the  author  of  certain  characteristic  philosophic 

ideas. 

Starting  from  the  fact  that  weight  is  greater  in  the  valley 
than  on  the  mountain  tops,  and  that  all  bodies  which  are 
tossed  upward  drop  to  the  earth,  Newton  formulated 
the  hypothesis  that  the  heavenly  bodies  are  also  heavy 
and  that  they  deviate  from  the  directi^  implied  by  the 


deduces  the  mathematical  conseque;;  "f  Ss  SVlZ 
final  y  shows  that  the  results  of  this  deduction  a^^^th 
the  facts  as  actuaUy  observed     From  fi„v  u  '"S^ee  -mth 

.h«  the  „o.io„  of  L  w^y  ^iZ.:^:z 

maniiests  itself  m  this  law  attraction    Cattrartin^      w     / 

ne  means  only  an  energy  which  acts  according  to  th» 
wdl-known  law  of  faUing  bodies-which  Ssl  con 
stitutes  the  energy.-As  a  matter  of  fact  hell^  w 
inclined,  and  his  disciples  even  more  ^,'0^^:^::^^: 
as  an  o„g,,,   ^^^^gy  ^^^^^^^  ^^>        from  God 

The  expositions  of  Newton's  masterpLe  likewle  in 
volve  presuppositions  and  speculative  ideas  wSSTare  of" 

phj^osophxcahmportance.-HemakesadistinctiS^^^ 
absolute,  true,  and  mathematical  soace"  J^7    ^^' 
spaces.    Absolute  motion  occmTin^r  .  "'''"'^ 

because  it  contains  Zll^lacas  QoS""  '^°"?' 
,  places  which  are  at  once  places  S  tS  f "'"^^^' 
Relatione  ad  externum  quodvitTw^S^  roSeTthln^ 

regard  the  mathematicariod  ot in^^ratS;'^" 

b-ti:s^rd:ss,t;^  ^^ = 


qS 


ENGLISH  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


BERKELEY 


pecuUarly  revealed  in  the  simple  and  uniform  axrangenient 
S  the  solar  system.    He  asserts  most  emphatica^y  that 
the  wonderful  structure  (elegantissima  compages)  of  the 
solar  system-the  orbital  motions  of  the  planets  around 
7he  sZ,  which  are  concentric  with  the  orbit  o   the  sun 
and  he  ahnost  in  the  same  plane-is  inexphcable  on  the 
basis  of  natural  law.    The  orbital  motion  can  only  be  ex- 
plained by  reference  to  supernatural  energies.    Left  to 
Siemselves,  the  planets  would  faU  mto  the  ^}-^^ 
remarkable  structure,  the  organs  and  the  instincts  o 
animals  furnish  additional  evidence  of  the  ^upematui^d! 
(Besides  the  Scholium  generale  contained  m  the  Pnn- 
cipia  Newton  expressed   himself  on   these  matte,^  in 
l£ optics,  Queries  28-29,  and  in  his  lette^  to  BenUey) 
-But  Newton  did  not  think  that  the  mechamsm  of  the 
universe  was  finished  once  for  all.    God  must  mterpose 
as  an  active  regulator  from  time  to  tnne.    This  problem 
was  the  occasion  of  a  very  interesting  discussion  between 
Leibnitz  and  Clarke,  one  of  Newton's  disaples. 

,.    George  Berkeley  (1685-17S3)  occupies  a  place  in 
empirical  philosophy  simUar  to  that  of  LetbnUz  m  the 
gSt  of  systematizers.    He  represents  a  reaction  agains 
o  S  and  N<^to»  similar  to  that  of  Leibmtz  against 
Descarus,  HobUs  and  Spinoza,  and,  like  J^^ibnUz,My 
not  only  represents  a  reaction,  but  an  advan(^  and  furthe 
development.  "  He  aimed  to  refute  the  conclusions  of  th 
new  sdence  which  were  hostile  to  religion,  and  he  hoped  to 
..   accomplish  this  by  a  criticism  of  the  ab^*'"^ J  "J' 
and  by  a  return  to  immediate  expenence  and  intmton^ 
Child4e  piety  and  acute  critical  an^y^^^faf  ^^^S 
been  so  intimately  united  as  in  this  clear  """^i;  J^*  * 
University  of  DubUn  he  occupied  himself  with  the  study 
S  S.W  and  N^ton,  and  his  chief  works  were 


99 


composed  while  he  was  yet  but  a  young  man     IT. 

afterwards  entered  the  Anglican  church'and'pSpat^    ' 

m    the    controversy    against    the    Free-thL^s     H^ 

missionary  zeal   inspired   an   interest  in    Crica   a^H 

he  conceived  a  plan  of  founding  a  coUege  1^  SeiS 

The  sublime  ambition  to  which  he  aLJa  It  "    ' 

years  of  his  Ufe  comprehended  not  ontTco        '"* 

^  the  Indian,  but  likewise  the  ^..^^l^^Z:::. 

and  art  m  the  western  hemisDherP      w^  r      ^™® 

Amenca.    He  afterwards  served  as  Bishop  of  Clovt,^ 
in  ^eland,  equaUy  zealous  as  pastor,  philan'th^JpgTd 

^ectedparticularlya^gairilttL^^^T^^^^^^      , 

deas.    WecanfonnanideaofpartofanobjecfSolt 
Its  remaimng  parts,  but  we  are  unable  to  fo,^ 
separate  ideas  which  are  supposed  t^S^^^^ain  tSTwS 

general,  which  should  contain  that  which  is  common  Z 
red^een,  yellow,  &c.     If  I  wish  to  have  i  M^hich 

quaatatively  different,  I  must  either  use  a  sien    p   <r 

a  word,  or,  what  amounts  to  the  same  thing   Sa^d  a 

itT^T  of  the  series  as  representative';  "y^eal 

Stribute^    f  ''  "^^"^"^  *°  "^  *^  basis  of  sensible  , 
attnbutes.    Suppose  we  grant  that  secondary  attributes 
We  only  sub  active  dgnificance:   it  must  foSow  ttt 

a^StT"  But'.''  '""^'1  '^  ™^  «^  '^  ^^^ 
ttnbutes.    But  how  can  we  have  an  idea  whose  contS 


\. 


lOO 


ENGLISH  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


is  nothing  more  than  extension,  mobility,  divisibility  and 
soUdity?    The  objects  which  are  really  given  in  experience, 
and  which  we  are  able  to  perceive,  always  appear  under 
secondary  attributes,  they  can  beseen,heard,  touched  &c. 
The  primary  attributes  are  never  given  independent  of  the 
secondary  attributes.    And  moreover  an  investigation 
of  our  conception  of   space,  which    Berkeley   made  m 
his  Theory  of  Vision  (1709),  ^veals  the  fact  that  we 
form  our  ideas  of  space  in  part  by  means  of  the  sense  of 
vision,  and  in  part  by  means  of  the   sense   of   touch 
(with    which    Berkeley    also    includes    the    so-called 
sense  of  tM)tion).    Our  idea  of  space,  particularly  of 
distance  aii  magnitude,  is  formed  by  a  fixed  combination 
of  ideas  of  vision  and  touch,  because  the  visual  image 
invariably  suggests  a  certain  idea  of  touch.  We  discover 
that  we  can  also  touch  the  things  which  we  see,  on  the 
single  condition  that  we  perform  the  necessarymovements. 
Hence  we  suppose  that  we  sense  distance  and  size  im- 
mediately.   Space  as  such  cannot  be  perceived  any  more 
than  color  as  such.    Which  of  the  two  spaces  which  we 
actually  know— visual  or  touch  space-shall  we  regard 
as    "absolute"    space?    We    are    unable    to    form  an 
idea  of  anything  which  is  common  to  these  two  spaces.- 
And  matter,  being  chiefly  characterized  ,by  the  attnbute 
of  extension,  must  therefore  share  the  same  fate  as  space. 
By  this  radical  method  Berkeley  annihilates  materialism. 
But  he  denies  most  emphatically  that  this  abohshes  the 
distinction  between  illusion  and  reality  or  destroys  the 
possibility  of  natural  science.    Our  knowledge  of  reahty 
depends  on  distinguishing  sensation  from  imagination, 
and  the  criteria  for  this  distinction  are  very  definite; 
sensations  are  generally  more  intense  and  more  distinct 
than  images.    They  take  place  in  an  invariable  aad 


BERKELEY 

lOI 

uniform  order,  whilst  images  are  fitful  and  irregular-  and 

r^sXrTr  ^'r  'r^  P^°<^'^^^  theTens^rn' 
ourselves.    The   problem   of  natural   science   therefore 

consists  m  discovering  the  exact  unifonn  relation  "S 

obtains  between  our  sensations,  so  that  the  presen^7  of 

^r.r^z:'^^''^  "^  "^  ^""'^  <^*-  -'2-  we 

may   expect.    The   interpretation   of   nature   therefore 
simply  means  the  discovery  of  the  laws  which  govSJ/ 
the  relations  of  our  sensations.    With  matter  in  genlST/ 
that  mdefimte  something  which  is  supposed  to  undS 
heaU  sensations,  science  has  nothing  whatever  to  do 

Berkeley  nevertheless  thinks  that  sensatifcs  necessarilv 
require  a  cause  which  is  distinct  from  Turselv?  In 
attempting  to  formulate  an  idea  of  this  cause,  h7  starts 
from  an  analogy  with  our  own  activity.  Ouro;^facX 
of  produang  and  changing  ideas  is  the  only  ISiSt^S 
which  we  have  knowledge.  Berkeley  calls  twffa^tv 
he  wil  and  regards  the  will  as  the  essence  of  the  SS 
^e  ^ul  IS  the  will  (C.^^.,^;.,,  He  also  ^t 

Sr     n '  T"^  °^  °""  ^""^^^^°"^  ^fter  the  analogy  ^f 
tins  wJl:      hese  are  produced    immediately  by  ^o^ 
Thus_B..M.y,  philosophy  passes  over  into  thLogy 
This  m^mediate  relationship  with  God  satisfies  his  re 

sh^M      fl  '"^"''"  ^""^   '^^  °^dained   that  it 

should  influence  our  minds  as  unnecessarily  circuitouj 

tel^logy  of  phenomena  reveals  the  divine  prescience 

Berkeley  elaborates  his  philosophical  ideas  in  popSar 
form  and  m  polemical  controversy  against   the   Frer 
inkers  m  two  beautifuland  ingenious  diLgues  (DialoZ 
between  Hylas  and  PhUonous,  .^^,,  and  Afciphron,  zyf. 


I02 


ENGLISH  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


4.  Anthony  Ashley  Shaftesbury  (1671-1713)  introduced 
a  new  tendency  in  the  moral  philosophy  of  the  modem 
period.  During  the  period  of  reaction  agamst  the 
Middle  Ages  the  custom  of  basing  ethics  on  individuahsm 
—the  emphasis  of  the  rights  of  the  individual— was 
almost  universal.  Magnanimity  and  sublimity  of  thought 
were  regarded  as  the  highest  attributes  of  character. 
Such  was  the  case  with  Telesius,  Bruno,  Descartes,  Hobbes 
and  Spinoza,  Shaftesbury,  on  the  contrary,  emphasized 
spontaneous  emotion,  the  instinctive  impulse  to  complete 
devotion.— He  was  a  grandson  of  the  famous  statesman 
of  the  same  name,  the  patron  of  Locke,  and  Locke  had 
been  his  tutor.  But  he  had  also  been  introduced  to  the 
classical  languages  and  Hterature  at  an  early  age,  and  he 
was  profoundly  affected  by  the  ancient  ideas  of  harmony, 
especially  as  developed  in  later  stoicism.  Both  from 
taste  and  on  account  of  feeble  health  he  lived  quietly, 
devoting  himself  to  his  literary  pursuits,  or  to  travel.  ^ 

According  to  Shaftesbury  there  is  no  absolute  opposition 

between  nature  and  culture  or  between  self-assertion  and 

devotion  or  loyalty.    An  involuntary  impulse  unites  the 

individual  with  the  whole  race,  just  as  naturally  as  the 

instincts  lead  to  the  propagation  of  the  species  and  care 

for    the    young.— But    thought,    deliberate    reflection, 

however  is  not  superfluous  on  this  account.    It  is  through 

reflection  that  we  become  conscious  of  a  spontaneous 

impulse  and  as  a  matter  of  fact  this  is  the  only  way  in 

which  affections,  such  as  the  admiration  of  nobility  of 

character  and  contempt  for  the  ignoble,  can  possibly 

arise— affections    which   bear   a   close   relation   to  the 

appreciation  of  beauty  except  that  they  bear  more  of 

an  active  character.  But  such  an  affection  (reflex  affection, 

moral  sense)  is  nevertheless  natural  because  it  is  evolved 


SHAFTESBURY 

103 

from  natural  instincts.    The  conditions  of  human  life 
are  such  that  we  are  working  for  our  own  interests  when! 
ever  we  are  concerned  for  the  common  welfare,  and  the 
happtness  which  we  procure  for  others  retu;,s  utS^ 
ourselves.    The  problem   that   remains  is   the  furT^ 
development  of  this  harmony  between  self-assertion  and 
devotion.    Whatever  is   conducive  to   social   harmo^ 
Wcewise  produces  harmony  in  the  soul  of  the  individud 
and  th,s  subjective  beauty  has  an  inherent  value  which 
renders  egoistic  awards  and  theological  sanctions  super- 
fluous.   A  splendid  harmony  hkewise  pervades  the  uni- 
verse in  general,  but  due  to  our  limited  vision  we  some- 
times fail  to  discern  it.    Shaftesbury  collected  his  m^st 
important  writmgs  under  the  title  Characteristics  of  uTn 
Manners,  Op^n^ons  and  Times  (lyzx).    Rand  has  recently 
(1900)  pubhshed  one  of  Shaftesbury's  essays,  Philosopl 
ual  Reg^men  which  was  hitherto  unknown.    The  back- 
ground of  his  ethical  ideas,  fonned  by  his  faith  in  t^ 
harmony   of   the  universe,   receives  even  greate^^ 
phasis  m  this  than  in  his  other  writings 
The  ideas  advanced  by  Shaftesbury  received  a  more 

U&94-1747).    Hutcheson  was  professor  of  moral  philos 
ophy  at  the  University  of  Glasgow  and  his  ideas  w^i 
thus   introduced   into   the   Scottish    Universities     S 
too  places  the  chief  emphasis  upon  immediate  iuj 
Reason  IS  a  faculty  whose  function  it  is  to  discover  the 

tZTh  T-*':  '^^^"*'°"  °'  °"  P"^---    IndispelS: 
though  It  IS  to  the  moral  feelings,  if  these  are  not  to  act 

blindly.  It  IS  nevertheless  not  the  final  court  of  appeal  in 

matters  pertaimng  to  morality.    Experience  is  hkewise 

moTf^^  '°"f ""  '''  *^^  ^-^f"^  operation  o 
moral  feeling;  this  can  only  take  place  on  the  basis 


}S 


104 


ENGLISH  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


BUTLER 


of  clear  observations.  Nevertheless  moral  feeling  does 
not  therefore  proceed  entirely  from  experience.  But 
imder  the  guidance  of  reason  and  experience  it  ascribes 
the  highest  value  to  such  actions  as  produce  the  highest 
degree  of  happiness  to  the  greatest  number  of  men.  (The 
importance  of  the  personages  may  however  supplant 
the  mmiber.)  Thus  Eutcheson  was  the  first  to  propound 
(in  his  Inquiry  into  the  Ideas  of  Beauty  and  Virtue,  1725) 
the  famous  principle  of  ^Hhe  greatest  happiness  for  the 
greatest  number. ''  Like  Shaftesbury,  Eutcheson  was 
strongly  influenced  by  the  ethics  of  the  Greeks,  especially 
as  it  appears  in  the  later  Stoics.  This  whole  trend  in 
modem  ethics  is,  on  the  whole,  an  interesting  form  of  the 
renaissance  movement.  W.  R.  Scott's  recent  monograph 
on  Eutcheson  contains  a  suggestive  treatment  of  the 
whole  movement. 

According  to  Eutcheson,  moral  feeling  is  divinely  im- 
planted. But  its  operation  is  not  limited  to  those  who 
beheve  in  God.  Ethics  therefore  is  wholly  independent 
of  theology.— The  sense  of  duty  arises  when  moral  feeling 
is  momentarily  in  abeyance  but  we  are  at  the  same  time 
conscious  that  a  proposed  act  would  bring  us  into  con- 
flict with  human  love  and  thus  rob  us  of  inner  peace 
(serenity)  of  mind— Eutcheson' s  System  of  Moral  Philos- 
ophy contains  a  comprehensive  elaboration  of  his  ethical 

theories.  ^ 

Bishop  Joseph  Butler  (169 2-1 7 5 2),  indeliberate  oppo- 
sition to  the  optimism  and  theory  of  harmony  advocated 
by  Shaftesbury  and  Eutcheson,  emphasizes  the  distinction 
between  moral  feeling,  which  he  prefers  to  call  conscience, 
and  the  other  human  elements  and  impulses.  Conscience, 
as  a  matter  of  course,  acts  directly  and  is  combined  with 
a  sense  of  inner  satisfaction,  as  in  the  case  of  obedience 


105 


to  a  profound  impulse     We  mnniV^  «      i-  • 

(Sennons,  X7.6),  however,^ oX^  reS^ZlrfT 

questions   which   arise  in   our   0^^^^°^?  Wy,'! 

Shaftesbury  bases  his  optimism  on  Bein^^riV  . 

whole  and  assails  Christianity  on  aSnt  fr  "'"'  ^ 

ceivability  and  its  inhumanity,  ^X  "li^     '"T 

bSormuisidt?  ---ssr^at! 

instead  of  th^^ltrvi^^h?^r^T^  ^'^"^^ 
harmonv  and  fh^f  fV.^  ^  v  •  .  ^  ^  universal 

luny,  ana  tnat  the  cnticisms  charged  ajraincf  nu  • 

virtues  are  ot  no  benefit  whatever  either  frr^^  4.t,      • 
point  of  odture  or  the  general  w^Siofrdlt'ot 
the  contrary,  the  desire  for  pleasure    Z^v^'    ^ 
egoism  are  motives  which  ir^T^on'^^Z  L 
social  organization.     It  is   the   r1„+,,     V'  .  .  ^ 

strengthen   society  by  a  sMf„,   5  -     statesmen   to 
egoistic  interests  "of  men     W  teTtSSr.-^'  '"T 

desire  for  plZ^  wTZt^!!!  T""  T^  *^^ 
morality  and  culture.^Xg  to tetcl  ttaT^h-  frT""^ 
appa^ntly  supported  the  ^Lri^ oTl^^t^^^y 

rea  better  at  the  hands  of  ecclesiastical  polemics  than 
the   outspoken   pagan,   Shaftesbury.  ^ 


(IF 


/ 


/ 


/ 

io6 


ENGLISH  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


\ 


5.  David  Hume  (1711-1776)  brought  the  critical  anal- 
ysis of  the  process  of  human  knowledge  to  a  provisiprj^ 
conclusion,  especially  through  his  investigation  of  the 
two'concepts  which  had  played  such  an  important  part 
in  the   seventeenth-century    systems    of    thought,   the 
,v  concepts  of  substance  and  causality.    In  order  to  under- 
'^     stand  the  significance  of  his  criticism  we  must  remember 
that  the  concepts  just  named  are  the  presuppositions 
which  are  tacitly  understood  as  forming  the  basis  of 
natural  science,  of  religious  thought,  and  of  ordinary 
conversation.    Hume's  problem  strikes  at  the  root  of 
.    all  human  thought.    He  stated  a  problem  which  still 
\  continues  to  bid  for  solution  and  of  which  a  final  solution 
is  perhaps  impossible.    Hume  is  a  past  master  in  stating 
problems.    With  this  he  likewise  combines  a  profound 
psychological  talent  which  enables  him,  when  considering 
the  actual  evolution  of  ideas,  to  throw  light  on  those 
points  also  in  which  their  objective  vaHdity  remains 
problematical.    This  twofold  gift  is  valuable  to  Hume 
both  in  the  investigation  of  the  problem  of  knowledge, 
as  well  as  in  the  investigation  of  the  problems  of  ethics 

and  reHgion.  o      1     j 

Hume  was  the  son  of  a  landlord  in  southern  Scotland. 
His  zeal  and  aptness  for  learning  and  reflection  showed 
themselves  at  an  early  age.  After  several  vain  attempts 
to  enter  some  practical  vocation  he  withdrew  mto  retu-e- 
.  ment  and  wrote  his  chief  work,  the  Treatise  on  Human 
Nature,  during  a  residence  in  France  (i739-i74o).  A 
Httle  later  he  devoted  himself  to  historical  and  economic 
investigations  and  wrote  a  history  of  England,  one  of 
the  first  historical  works  which  takes  account  of  every 
phase  of  cultural  evolution.  His  Essays  (1748  ff.), 
besides  important  treatises  on  economic  subjects,  include 


HUME 


W        Ti*      .^^'^""■^   Concerning  Human  Under-   , 
standmg  and  Enquiry  Concerning  the  Principles  of  Moris)   ( 
m  which  the  most  important  problems  of  Ms  miSece 
are  presented  in  briefer  fonn.    He  treats  the  "rSS  3  / 
rehgion   from  the  historico-psychological   viewpoS   'n  ' 
Ins  NaturcU  mstory  of  Religion  (1757).    The  5ialog2 

imtil  after  his  death,  are  a  ciiticaJ  study  of  the  problem 
of  rehgion-Af ter  having  held  several  public  offices,  HuZ 

Whilst  Locke  made  a  shaip  distinction  between  the 
problem  concerning  the  origin  of  our  ideks  and  tit  of 

t7ZT%'  '"-^T  ''^  *-«  P-blems,  so  far  ^  th^y 
pertain  to  ideas  m  the  more  restricted  sense  (ideas  L 
distinguished  from  perceptions  or  impressions,  i.  e.  seS 
^tions),  are  identical.    He  starts  with  the  a  sui^pS 
hat  an.  Idea  can  be  vaUd  only  when  it  isbased  ona  ^. 
ton  perception,  impression);    He  makes  no  investigS^ 
into  tTie  ongm  of  sensations  because  this  problem  L  Z 
epistemological  significance:   the  question^SeX 
proceed  from  external  objects  or  from  God  or  from  the 
mnate  pow^  of  the  mind  has  no  bearing  on  the  probl^ 
0   theu:  validity     Hume  hkewise  excludes  that  Lsion/ 
of  knowledge  which  is  whoUy  confined  to  the  matter  of 
defimng  and  developing  the  relations  of  our  ideas-pure 
logic  and  mathematics-from  his  critical  investigations  ' 

LT  '•  J^'  f  t^"''^""  ^^  "^  investigations  S2 
o  the  validity  of  the  ideas  by  means  of  wHch  we  presurS 

to  be  justified  m  assuming  knowledge  beyond  what  is 
given  m  sense-perceptions.    The  problem  growing  out 
of  the  application  of  mathematics  to  empirical  science  ' 
was  not  fomiulated  until  later.     This  was  done  by  Kant 
on  the  basis  of  his  studies  of  Newton 


ENGLISH  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY  | 

The  concept  of  substance  (both  in  its  broader  and 
narrow    significance)    transcends   all    sense-perception. 
We  never  sense  anything  beyond  single  attributes  in 
varying  degrees  of  relationship  to  each  other;  but  things 
or  substances  are  never  sensed.    We  sense  color,  hardness, 
tone,  &c.,  but  sensation  never  gives  us  anything  possessing 
these  attributes.    We  perceive  within  ourselves  a  multi- 
tude of  ever-varying  sensations,  ideas   and  feelings,  but 
i  i  I  I  we  never  sense  a  soul  or  an  Ego.    That   is   to   say  we 
never   discover   a   constant   element   which   is    always 
present  and  to  which  we  are  justified  in  ascribing  the 
'  name  Ego.— The  concept  of  causaHty  presents  a  similar 
case.    We  perceive  distinct  phenomena  succeeding  each 
other  in  time;  but  we   do  not  sense  any  internal  nexus, 
any  necessary  connection.     Causality  is  not  an  object 
of  experience  or  of  perception.     {Hume  regards  the  con- 
cepts of  experience  and  perception  as  identical.)     It  is 
impossible  in  this  instance  to  appeal  to  immediate  certainty 
(intuition),  for  such   procedure   is   permissible   only  in 
cases  where  the*  simple  relation  of  equality  and  inequality 
can  be  shown  to  apply.    It  is  just  as  impossible,  further- 
more, to  demonstrate  causaHty  by  the  method  of  in- 
ference,   for   all    phenomena    and    occurrences    become 
matters  of  experience  in  the  form  of  independent  facts, 
and  it  is  never  possible  to  infer  from  the  concept  of  the 
given  fact  that  the  concept  of  another  fact  necessarily 
foUows.    The  motion  of  a  ball,  e.  g.,  is  something  alto- 
gether different  from  the  motion  of  another  ball;    the 
one  motion  can  very  readily  be  conceived  without  the 
other.— The  same  method  of  argument  applies  to  the 
concept  of  being  as  to  the  concepts  of  substance  and 
causality;  no  single  sensation  ever  gives  us  the  concept. 
To  take  thought  about  something  and  to  think  of  it  as 


HUME 


109 


existing  are  not  two  distinct  processes.    Things  acquire 
no  new  attribute  by  our   thinking   of  them  as  exisLt! 

b.    We  nevertheless  employ  aU  these  concepts-sub-  < 
stance  or    thing,  cause,  being!      Hume   undertakes  to  ' 
explain  how  this  happens,  by  means  of  three  distinct 
psychological  factors.-Consciousness  naturally  tends  to    . 
continue  the  processes  which  have  been  produced  by  an 
intense  unpression  even  after  the    impression    ceases. 
The  faculty  of  imagination  continues  to  be  active  even 
though  expenence  is  unable  to  follow.    This  gives  rise 
to  Ideal  representations,  e.  g.  representations  of  perfect 
similanty  and  perfectly  accurate  figures,  whilst  experience 
only    furmshes    suggestions   and    degrees    of  approach 
towards  the  perfect.    This  is  likewise  the  way  in  wWch 
the  representations  of  absolute  substances  and  absolute 

thTil^'  1-    ^^'  ''"^'^  ''  imagination  expands 

the  relative  constancy,  which  we  perceive,  into  absolute 
constancy.  ^^uvc 

Another  peculiarity  of  consciousness  is  the  tendency 
to  combine  representations  which-  have  frequently  been 
experienced  toother.    When  anything  happens  we  are 
accustomed  to  find  that  something  else  either  precedes 
or  foUows  ,t;   hence,  when  anything   occurs,  we  expect 
to  find  a      cause'  and  ^n  "effect."    But  this  is  notLg 
more  than  a  habit  which  has  become  instinctive.    It  is 
.mpossible  to  establish  the  vaHdity  of  the  causal  concept 
on  this  basis.    This  principle  of  association,  which  gives 
nse  to  this  habit,  is  hkewise  an  example  of  causality  and 
just  for  this  very  reason  Hume  says,  it,  too,  is  inexphcable. 
Observation  never  discovers  more  than  the  separate  ele- 
ments  of  the  content  of  consciousness,  never  any  "uniting 
pnnciple,   principle   of  connection."    The"  problem    of 
explaimng  the  permanent  connection  of  these  elements,   -^ 


no 


ENGLISH  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


HUME 


which  are  absolutely  distinct,  Hume  says,  is  a  difficulty 
which  transcends  the  powers  of  my  understanding. 

Consciousness,  in  the  third  place,  tends  to  regard  its 
own  states  as  external,  objective  phenomena.  This  is 
the  reason  for  our  regarding  sensory  qualities  as  objective 
attributes.  And  this  is  why  we  regard  the  mental  im- 
pulse to  pass  from  a  sensation  to  an  idea  associated  with 
it  as  due  to  an  objective  necessity.  We  are  here 
guided  by  instinct,  not  by  reason.— The  foimdation  of 
science  is  belief,  not  knowledge.  And  the  construction 
of  this  foundation  takes  place,  as  we  have  seen,  by 
virtue  of  the  expansive,  the  associative  and  the  objecti- 
fying tendencies  of  consciousness. 

c.  Hume  did  not  confine  himself  to  the  psychology  of 
knowledge.  He  has  likewise  treated  the  psychology  of 
the  passions  with  the  same  degree  of  thoroughness.  His 
exposition  in  many  respects  reminds  us  of  Spinoza.  He 
attaches  great  importance  to  the  manner  in  which  a 
passion  may  be  combined  with  another  passion  by  means 
of  the  association  of  the  ideas  of  their  respective  objects. 
He  asserts,  furthermore,  that  a  passion  can  only  be 
inhibited  by  another  passion,  not  by  pure  reason.  Reason 
is  the  faculty  of  comparison  and  reflection  and  it  can  only 
affect  the  course  of  the  passions  indirectly. 

Hume^s  psychology  of  the  passions  forms  the  basis  of 
his  ethics.  In  ethics  he  sympathizes  with  the  school  of 
Shaftesbury  and  Hutcheson. — Reason  cannot  furnish  the 
basis  of  ethics  because  it  establishes  only  relations  or 
facts.  But  good  and  evil  are  quaUties  which  are  ascribed 
to  human  actions  and  characters  according  to  their 
^  effect  upon  the  feelings.  The  fact  that  we  call  actions 
and  characters  good  which  are  of  no  benefit  to  us  proves 
that  the  passion  which  forms  the  basis  of  approbation 


III 


cannot  be  regarded  as  selfish.    In  cases  of  approbation 
or  reproach  our  viewpoint  is  social  rather  than  private 
If,  eg,  we  regard  justice  as  a  good  attribute,  it  must  be 
due  to  the  fact  that  we  take  a  sympathetic  Attitude  to! 

at  first  admire  justice  solely  on  account  of  interest  in  our 

the  appreaation  of  justice  in  aU  those  cases  which  beJ 
no  relation  to  our  private  welfare.    Sympathy  or  feU^ 

eilio^^^^^'^^^  *'^  ^"'^'— ^  -*^-  of  ^*^^ 

^«m.  likewise  opposes  the  inteUectualistic  conception 
m  the  phi  o«>phy  of  religion,  just  as  he  does  in  ethics 
He  instituted  a  twofold  investigation  into  the  problS 
of  knowledge  and  he  likewise  foUows  the  same  pl^  tZ 
matter  of  rehgion  ;  i.  e.  he  investigates  both  the  psycho! 
lo^^cal  ongm  of  religion  and  the  vaHdi'ty  of  ^^s 

mo^vlf  K  fr  ""f  °"^''^*'  ^'"""^  P"^^ly  intellectual 
motives,  but  from  fear  and  hope,  and  from  the  disposition 
to  tbnk  of  all  other  beings  after  human  analogy.  iS 
hve  man  represents  the  beings  to  which  he  tXs  refuge 
m  the  fearful  moments  of  his  life  in  very  imperfect  foi. 

fn  L-^'  r  ^^^'^^"^  to  «^Pand  and  ideahze  is  also 
m  evidence  here,  and  man  graduaUy  recognizes  that  his 
God  must  be  an  infinite  being  and  that  there  can  be  but 

has  the  effect  of  elevating  Deity  far  above  anytWng 

tr  "t  P'r^.H^-  -t  -  g^-t  distance  from  the 
fimte  world,  there  is  another  counter  tendency  which 

^tlZ.^  r^'""''^*  ""^'^^  ^^  '^^  ^*  hand,  present 
and   intuitively  perceivable,    and    religion    reveals    a 

constant  tendency  to  oscillate  between  these  two  extremes. 


112 


ENGLISH  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


Eume  investigates  the  validity  of  religious  ideas  in 
his  Dialogues,  which  is  a  very  important  document  in 
the  philosophy  of  reHgion  of  the  modern  period.    He 
adduces  several  different  viewpoints:  that  of    a  specu- 
^'  lative  Supematuralist,  a  rationaUstic  Deist  and  a  skep- 
tical NaturaHst.    Although  the  naturalist  finally  courte- 
ously withdraws,  it  is  neverthless  clear  that  Hume  regarded 
his  arguments  as  the  most  important  and  most  conclusive. 
He  denies  the  right  to  infer  the  existence  of  God  from  the 
order  and  teleology  of  the  universe:     Why  could  the 
teleology  (so  far  as  it  really  exists !)  not  have  arisen  from 
natural  causes  and  gradual  adaptation?    We  explain  the 
particular  phenomena  of  nature  by  referring  them  to 
nattiral  causes,  and  the  whole  series  is  explained  in  the 
explanation  of  its  several  parts.    At  any  rate  it  is  im- 
possible to  infer,  from  a  world  which  reveals  so  many 
imperfections  together  with  its  teleology,  the  existence 
'   of   an   absolutely   perfect   being.    Furthermore,    if   we 
should  wish  to  attribute  the  origin  of  the  universe  to  a 
divine  idea,  we  must  not  forget  that  this  idea  is  nowhere 
given  in  experience  except  as  a  phenomenon  combined 
with  other  phenomena:    with  what  right  therefore  can 
we  deduce  all  the  other  parts  from  this  single  part?— 
If  the  natiu-aHst  still  gets  no  farther  than  to  discover 
'  ^    difficulties  in  each  of  the  various  viewpoints,  it  is  certainly 
not  enough  that  we  regard  it  merely  as  a  matter  of  caution, 
but  rather  as  the  expression  of  Hume's  constant  effort 
to  state  the  problems  clearly  and  to  keep  them  open. 

6.  Hume's  clear  statement  of  the  problem  of  knowl- 
edge did  not  call  forth  any  profound  reply  immediately. 
England  has  not  even  furnished  such  a  reply. — On  the 
contrary  the  English  literature  of  the  latter  half  of  the 
1 8th  century  consists  of  a  series  of  philosophic  efforts 


SMITH 


113 


which  in  part  continue  and  supplement   and  in  part 
oppose  Eume,  ^ 

Adam  Smith  (1723-1790),  a  professor  at  Glasgow  and 
a  fnend  of  Hume,  elaborated  his  ethical  theory  more  fuUy 
In  his  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments  (1759)  he  describes  the 
moral  sense  m  its  evolution  from  the  mere  instinct  of  sym- 
pa  hy.    A  spontaneous  impulse  of  imitation  causes  us  to 
put  ourselves  m  the  place  of  others,  and  our  feehngs  and 
judgments  are  therefore  primarily  determined  by  environ- 
ment.   But  on  the  other  hand,  if  the  feehngs  and  judg- 
ments of  others  are  not  of  the  same  kind  and  intensity 
as  those  which  arise  in  our  own  minds  in  their  stead,  or 
would  naturally  arise,  we  then  experience  a  feeling  of 
disapprobation.    Again,  we  approve  their  feelings  and 
their  judgments   (as  weU  as  their  conduct)  whenever 
according  to  our  own  experience,  they  seem  to  stand  in 
a  fitting  relation  to  the  causes  which  give  rise  to  them  - 
and  whenever  our  sympathy  for  them,  for  the  objects 
0  their  judgments  and  conduct,  is  not  abnormal.    To 
lUustrate,  we  cease  to  approve  of  acts  of  revenge  whenever 
i'^  'r''^?  .^7^  t°  be  too  cruel  for  the  circumstances 
and  the  subject.    A  standard  is  thus  graduaUy  evolved 
which  IS  whoUy  free  from  any  reference  to  uti/ty    And 
TC  likewise  apply  this  standard  to  ourselves.    We  dis- 
cover that  we  are  criticized  by  others  and  not  only  criti- 
azmg  others  ourselves.    We  divide  ourselves,  so  to  speak, 
mto  two  persons,  of  whom  the  one  criticizes  the  other  in 
fte  capaaty  of  an  impartial  witness.    We  unconsciously 
Idealize  this  witness;  that  is  we  ascribe  to  him  a  far  more 
comprehensive  knowledge  than  it  is  possible  for  ma«  to 
I  attain. 

It  has  frequently  been  observed  that  Smith's  ethics 
radicaUy   contradicts   his   famous   work   in   economics, 


114 


ENGLISH  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


HARTLEY 


"5 


The  Wealth  of  Nations  (1776).  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  fact  that  both  works  were  originally  parts  of  one  and 
the  same  course  of  lectures  does  not  harmonize  with  this 
view.  Moreover  the  fact  has  been  overlooked,  that  in 
his  political  economy  Smith  assimies  the  attitude  of  an 
^^  impartial  witness^*  of  industrial  hfe:  his  demand  for 
imconditional  Hberty  in  commerce  and  industry  rests 
upon  the  principle  that  this  is  the  only  way  in  which 
capacity  can  be  properly  developed  and  the  best  methods 
and  instruments  of  production  and  of  trading  be  dis- 
covered. It  frequently  happens  that  the  individual 
serves  the  community  best  when  he  is  most  concerned 
about  his  own  interests;  he,  at  the  same  time,  serves  a 
purpose  which  he  has  not  proposed  as  if  guided  by  an 
unseen  hand.  Sympathy  with  human  life  in  every  phase 
forms  the  basis  of  Smithes  political  economy;  it  covers 
the  effort  of  laborers  to  sectire  better  wages,  as  well  as 
the  effort  of  employers  to  increase  production.  His 
ethics  is  therefore  in  internal  harmony  with  his  economics. 
It  is  admitted,  as  a  matter  of  course,  that  he  did  not 
fully  appreciate  the  social  problem  in  its  entire  scope. 
His  contention  was  directed  against  the  trusteeship  of  the 
reactionary  governments,  and  his  optimism  led  him  to 
expect  a  large  measure  of  social  harmony,  even  a 
harmony  between  ethics  and  economics,  if  we  should  only 
permit  evolution  to  have  free  course. 

The  association  of  ideas  had  a  profound  influence  on 
Hume's  theory  of  knowledge.  The  physician,  DavU 
Hartley  (i  705-1 757),  supplemented  his  theory  on  this 
point.  He  endeavored  to  explain  all  the  higher  mental 
phenomena  by  means  of  the  association  of  simple  sen- 
sations and  ideas.  According  to  Hartley,  the  laws  of 
association  are  the  highest  spiritual    laws    of   nature 


{Observation  on  Man,  1749).    The  physiological  correlate 
of  association  is  the  combination  of  various  osciUations 
of  particles  of  the  brain.    The  significance  of  association 
manifests  itself  in  three  specific  forms:  it  is  possible  for 
ideas  to  so  unite  intemaUy  as  to  form  a  new  idea  with 
new  attributes;   conscious  activities  may,  by  repetition, 
be  performed  entirely  automatically;  the  vividness  of  an 
idea  may  be  transferred  to  the  idea  which  is  associated 
with  It.    Consciousness  can  assume  an  entirely  different 
character  from  its  original   by  means  of  these  three 
processes.     The    most    radical  metamorphoses   become 
possible  in  this  way,  as  e.  g.  when  an  egoist  lapses  into 
complete  mystical  self-forgetfulness  through  a  series  of 
degrees.— These  theories  were  popularized  through  the 
writings  of  Joseph  Priestley  (i  733-1804),  the  noted  chemist. 
And  Erasmus  Darwin  (i 731-1802)    afterwards   went  a 
step  farther,  and  proposed  the  hypothesis  of  the  trans- 
missibility  of  such  acquired  characters  (Zoonomia,  1794). 
Hume  was  opposed  by  what  has  been  called,  in  the 
narrower  sense,  the  Scottish  School    These  thinkers  aim 
to  quit  theorizing  and  return  to  the  mere  description  of 
mental  phenomena.    As  against  the  results  of  analyt- 
ical philosophy  they  appeal  to  common  sense.     Thomas 
Retd  (1710-1796),  Professor  at  Aberdeen  and  Glasgow, 
IS  the  most  famous  representative  of  this  school.    His 
most  important  work.  Inquiry  into  the  Human  Mind  on  the 
Principles  of  Common  Sense  (1764),  was  written  against 
Hume,  whom  he  regarded  as  the  destroyer  of  all  science, 
religion  and  virtue. 

According  to  Reid,  there  are  certain  instinctive  pre- 
suppositions at  the  basis  of  all  knowledge,  which  are 
unassailable  by  doubt.  These  principles  of  common 
sense  are  older  than  philosophy  and  proceed  from  the 


ii6 


ENGLISH  EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


hand  of  God.  Thus,  e.  g.  every  sensation  by  natural 
suggestion  gives  rise  to  the  behef  in  an  external  object, 
as  also  in  an  ego  as  the  subject  of  the  sensation.  In  this 
way  the  causal  instinct  also  leads  us  to  the  presupposition 
that  the  combinations  of  phenomena  which  we  have  per- 
ceived will  likewise  take  place  in  the  same  way  in  the 
future.  We  likewise  have  such  intuitive  evidence  in 
the  sphere  of  morals;  we  judge  a  given  act  good,  another 
evil,  intuitively  and  spontaneously. — Reid  overlooked  the 
fact  that  Hume  had  expressly  recognized  common  sense; 
but  Hume  discovered  a  profound  problem  in  case  one 
should  wish  to  investigate  the  foundation  of  common 
sense.  Kant  afterwards  remarked  very  pertinently, 
that  instead  of  making  use  of  common  sense  as  authority, 
it  should  rather  be  used  in  refutation  of  objections. 


FOURTH  BOOK 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  O.   XHE  EKLIOHXE.MENX  IK    ..ANCE 

AND  GERMANY 

But  about  the^TIT^IXt'tht':  °^  *^"^^- 
was  made  to  popularize  tt,P  ill  Tl      ^''*'^  ^"^  effort 

mental  prindple,  thaTlu  t3^^pS"rd\tm'''  '""'" 
furnished  the  basis  for  criticizinrZ  ?■  ^^P^"«^^' 
things  both  in  Church  anrsSeTt  "^  "^^^  ^^ 

prevailed  that  man  had  attaL  J  J  diZxTeHf " 
ment  and  that  he  was  now  in  posseiionT  I  ^"^'S^*^" 
suppositions  for  the  final  solS TltJe  ^'^tr" 
or  to  dismiss  them  definitely  as  Itm^  a  ^  r' 
mat^sm  arose,  which  wa.  perhaS  nef  s^  iZ  T 
destroy  the  old  form  of  dogmatist  T??  ^^  *° 
popularization  of  the  J^ih^i^     T^  Germany  the 

dJ^ion  of  al?  ment^^tt^Xtr  d'V"^^'.  ^^  ^^- 
tween  obscurity  and  cleameT^^^ Z^^Sr."^; 
and  the  inference  was  drawn  thate^  SS  f  d  It ' 
;ng  but  enlightemnent,  is  the  one  ^^"e^,^  T: 
there  were  minds  both  in  France  and  in  k!!!  .     * 

thoughts  wf>rp  rv>„t^^  A      *^,      ^®  ^™  ™  Germany  whose 
of  mCl  uroTwl  f  °"  ?'  Profounder  presuppositions 

117 


ii8 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   ENLIGHTENMENT 


A.    The  French  Philosophy  of  the  Enlightenment 

AND  Rousseau 

I.    In  France  the  agitation  produced  by  the  enlighten- 
ment assumed  a  decidedly  revolutionary  character.    This 
was  due  more  particularly  to  the  fact  that  the  old  order  of 
things  had  here  reached  a  greater  degree  of  definiteness  and 
had  assumed  an  attitude  of  contempt  for  the  new  thought 
to  a  greater  extent  than  in  England  and  Germany,  and  that 
at  the  same  time  it  was  more  shallow  and  corrupt  than  in 
the  other  countries.     France  was  revolutionized  by  Eng- 
lish ideas.    The  visit  of  Voltaire  and  Montesquieu  to  Eng- 
land at  the  close  of  the  third  decade  of  the  century  became 
a  matter  of  epochal  importance.    It  was  not  until  then 
that  the  EngHsh  philosophical,  religious,  aesthetic  and 
poHtical  ideas  became  known  in  France  and  on  the  con- 
tinent generally.     Voltaire's  Lettres  sur  les  Anglais  (1734) 
marks  the  beginning  of  a  new  period  in  French  thought. 
Voltaire  (1694-1778)  was  not  an  original  thinker.    But 
he  possessed  the  happy  faculty  of  stating  scientific  ideas 
and  theories  with  brevity  and  clearness,  and  at  the  same 
time  aggressively.    He  pubHshed  a  most  excellent  exposi- 
tion of  Newton's  natural  philosophy,  and  he  used  Locke 
with  splendid  effect  in  his  philosophical  works.    With 
Locke's  principle,  that  all  our  ideas  proceed  from  experi- 
ence, and  Newton's  discovery  of  the  uniformity  of  nature 
as  his  basis,  he  criticized  the  theology  of  the  Church.    He 
does  not  confine  himself  in  the  controversy  to  logical  argu- 
ment, but  likewise  employs  sarcasm  and  ridicule  and— 
especially  when  attacking  spiritual  and  physical  oppression 
and  intolerance — profound  indignation. — The  following  are 
his  most  important  philosophical  works:  Dictionnaire  philo- 
sopkique  portatif  (1764)  and  Le  philosophe  ignorant  (1766). 


MONTESQUIEU 

«s  with  undemanding  .„  Se^d  tS'^^S  "■JT' 
the  limit  of  our  knowledS-  a^tV  T"''  '^^'^^^ 
of  CM  ■   S  ,^        "^  of  „.te  is  proof  of  the  easleS 

I  oeme  sur  le  desastre  de  Lisbonne)  makoc:  ,>  ;„,„      •. , 
believe  in  the  omnipotence  of  ri^  v  "^^^'^^^  *« 

our  belief  in  His  goo^nei     1£        ^^  ^'^  '"  '^'"^^ 

ligion,  but  opposer^^vlfed  ri£ZT"^  "'*'"^  ^^- 
means  (freouentlv  7^''^^'^  "^^  'S^o'i  by  every  available 
.  ^irequently  of  course  mdirectly  and  secretlvl 
Voltaire  now  applies  the  principle  of  simolid^v  f^?^^^' 
planationof  thesuoematiLl  ,-/+i:  ^'^P^'^^'ty  *»  the  ex- 
ers  of  tt,«  T?         supernatural  m  the  same  way  as  the  think- 

rS  evemr''"\'-r"^'' ''  *°  *^«  "^^^-^  --W  He 
of  the  Jupel'Sra^,  ^'S  ^^rZT^l'''^ 
^y  means  ot   their  superstition.     Thp   h^^Qf   ^«r  • 

"tf-?;;.r^-----of^Si^^^^^^^^ 

vocates  the  mutual  dependence  of  institttTois^n^  of  i" 
S  ut-  "^  ""^  "°^"'  ^"'^^tions  of  the  natbns     A 

nSf       T"*"*  ^^''■^^^^^  be  transferred  from  ont 
natxon  to  another  without  modification.    The  SnS 


A- 


120 


PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   ENLIGHTENMENT 


and  comparative  methods  enabled  Montesquieu  to  criticize 
the  existing  social  conditions  incisively  and  systematically. 
His  over-rapid  generalizations  however  are  unhistorical. 
He  proposes  an  ideal  form  of  the  EngHsh  constitution, 
without  observing  that  the  long  period  of  the  political 
development  of  the  English  people  by  means  of  self- 
government  in  smaller  groups  was  its  historical  presup- 
position. 

Condillac  (17 15-1780)  attempted  a  simplification  of 
Lockers  theory  of  knowledge  in  his  Traite  des  sensations 
(1754),  by  means  of  referring  the  whole  of  our  conscious 
experience  to  absolutely  passive  sensations.  Attention  is 
nothing  more  than  an  intense  sensation,  which  precludes 
the  possibility  of  another  sensation  arising;  memory  is 
simply  a  secondary  effect  of  sensation,  and  comparison  con- 
sists of  nothing  more  than  the  concomitant  appearance  of 
two  sensations.  The  comparison  of  pleasure  and  pain 
gives  rise  to  desires  and  imptdses. — Notwithstanding  his 
endeavor  to  eliminate  every  form  of  activity  from  psychol- 
ogy, Condillac  still  adheres  to  the  Cartesian  theory  of  the 
soul  and  the  body  as  two  distinct  entities.  Sensation 
cannot  be  identified  with  motion,  and  oiu*  ability  to  make 
comparisons  (i.  e.,  to  be  conscious  of  two  sensations  at  the 
same  moment)  definitely  proves  that  the  vehicle  of  sen- 
sations is  a  simple  substance.  Condillac,  who  was  a  Cath- 
olic ecclesiastic,  was  thus  able  to  harmonize  his  psychology 
with  his  theology.  But  the  spiritualistic  element  of  Con- 
dillac^ s  theory  was  devoid  of  influence.  His  followers  in- 
sisted on  reducing  all  psychical  phenomena  to  passive 
sensations. 

La  Mettrie  (1702-17 51),  a  physician,  had  even  before 
this  time  substituted  a  thorough-going  materialism  for  the 
Cartesian  dualism  in  his  famous  work,  Uhomme  machine 


VON  HOLBACH 

121 

^nttn^lTJ  temperature  under  the  influence  of 
enthuaaan  and  the  mental  agitation  produced  bv  fevers 
can  only  be  explained  on  the  theory  tlit  wha  we  c/uTh^ 

matter,  just  hke  extension  and  motion.  The  real  nat,,r« 
of  matter  however  transcends  the  power  of  S  Tde^ 
standmg.-Besides  these  materiahstk=  theories  ".£' 

evolution     ^"f 'P"*'«"%^"d  suggestions  of  a  theory  of 
evolution.    The  vanous  forms  of  life  evolve  from  eternal 

orgamc  germs  under  the  influence  of  environmer  S 
and  need  are  the  forms  of  energy  which  make  for  prog^eT 

and  be,ngs  without  needs  lack  the  attribute  of  S 
^tltS^f^  n^2  ''--'  ''  '^  — ^-  -  t^e 

P^rif  '^^f'!'V'^'^~'789),  a  German  baron  living  in 
Pans,  published  a  purely  dogmatic  and  systematic  elb 
oration  of  materialism.    In  his  System  de  la  «a/«t  (r to) 

pL'SrS  th  n  r  T"^'"  ^^  *^^  ^'^^  c^nsist^nt'g 
planation  of  the  facts  of  natural  science.    If  motion  is  a 

pnmary  property  of  matter  (as  Toland  had  affirmed)  and 
If  matenal  phenomena  are  only  explainable  brreference 
to  matenal  causes,  it  foUows  that  it  is  unneceiiy  to  a^ 
sume  either  one  or  many  minds  distinct  from  mattTr     Z 
appeal  to  mind  is  only  a  sign  of  ignorance.    Thought  o^ 
oonsaousness  is  simply  the  agitation  of  the  partSes  oi 
matter,  a  motion  which  is  similar  to  fennentaSn  whii' 
s  the  common  basis  of  all  nourishment  and  groXmo- 
^ons  which  are  indeed  imperceptible,  but  ZcTZeS- 
feired  from  what  is  evident  to  the  senses.    There  is  but 
one  science  physics,  i.  e.  the  theory  of  motion.    The  as 
jmption  of  two  kinds  of  nature,  spiritual  and  mltoiS. 
IS  not  only  unnecessary,  but  positively  hannful.     It  is 


/ 


122 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   ENLIGHTENMENT 


conducive  of  superstition  and  thereby  leads  back  again 
to  the  authority  of  priestcraft.  Even  the  so-called  natu- 
ral religion  is. dangerous;  for  religion,  no  matter  what  the 
form,  must  necessarily  have  a  form  of  worship,  and  the  in- 
stitution of  forms  of  worship  involves  submission  to  the 
authority  of  priests.  The  formation  of  the  concepts  of 
deity  is  the  product  of  a  profound  politics  on  the  part  of 
the  theologians,  those  fabricateurs  de  la  diviniW 

Hehetius'  (1715-1771)  theory  of  the  original  equality 
of  all  men,  as  respects  nature  and  talent,  is  in  a  certain 
sense  closely  related  to  Condillac's  doctrine  of  the  passivity 
of  all  psychic  life.  All  distinctions  are  due  to  external 
causes,  to  education  in  its  widest  sense,  i.  e.  to  all  the  in- 
fluences which  affect  us.  Education  is  responsible  for  the 
tendency  which  claims  our  interest  and"attention.  No 
two  men  ever  receive  precisely  the  same  kind  of  education. 
The  only  motive  is  self-interest,  and  whether  it  shall  be 
actuated  by  great  or  small  ideas  depends  entirely  upon 
education  {De  V esprit,  1758).  Helvetius'  posthtimous 
work  De  Vhomme  (1773)  is  a  polemic,  based  on  the  fore- 
going presuppositions,  against  the  distinction  between 
private  and  public  interests,  a  distinction  which  is  favored 
by  despotic  forms  of  government,  and  to  which  he  attrib- 
utes the  misfortune  of  his  native  land.  This  last  ob- 
servation is  of  fundamental  importance  for  the  under- 
standing of  Hehetius,  He  was  a  tender-hearted,  patriotic 
spirit,  who  devoted  his  vast  fortune,  acquired  as  Farmer- 
general,  to  the  service  of  literature  and  philanthropy. 

The  profoundest  thinker  of  this  whole  group  was  Denis 
Diderot  (1713-1784),  renowned  as  the  energetic  editor  of 
the  great  Encyclopedia  on  account  of  which  the  French 
philosophers  of  the  Enlightenment  were  called  Encyclo- 
pedists.    Diderot  covdd  only  express  his  own  ideas  in- 


ROUSSEAU  ,^v 

123 
f  2?  ^  *^'^  Encyclopedia.    In  the  InlerpretaHon  de 

those  of  La  MeUr^:'V:titlnZ;Zu^7 ^, 
Le^bn^lz,  especiaUy  in  the  matter  of  his  UZ^s^tZ 
conceptsof  continuity  and  force.    The  twoZo^  s  tnt 
ten  m  1769,  but  not  published  until  18-0  Zi^^     T 

mgenious  ideas.    In  direct  contradiction  of  La  Mettrie  and 
Holbach,  Djderot  denies  that  the  psycWcal  pro^ti  Sn 
be  adequately  explained  as  a  mere  effect  of  theSSLSn 
of  matenal  elements.    A  transposition  of  IITZ^^ 
produce  consciousness.    The  only  possibi  expLation  o 
the  ongm  of  psychic  life  is  on  the  presuppodtfon  of  ti 
^ence  of  germs  or  dispositions  in  the  lower  orders  wh^S 
can  be  developed  to  conscious  life  in  the  higher  ordeTfbv 
means  of  a  process  of  progressive  integraLn     S 
attributes  sensibility  to  everything  in  ni^e    wT 

ivt:  ^"^  '''^^  ^*-*^'l  -'i  -S  selS! 
ity  (enstbtbte  tnerte,  sensibilite  active).    He  likewise  Irn 

Phasizes  the  difficulty  of  conceiving  how  a  unfZ  Z" 

sciousness  could  be  constructed  from  a  great  va2tv  o^ 

psychical  elements.    He  does  not  solvfthe  Toblem 

oftoiiJSr  "f  r  *°  ^'^"^  ^  tenaciously  toTheS 
ekSr  '^'  '"'  "°  '"^"^  ^''  ^y  "^"^y  distinct 

associairw^^r  f "'''""  (^7x2-1778)  was  intimately 
assoaated  with  the  Encyclopedists  for  a  while     His  run 

UtSS  """^""^  '"^^'^^  ^^^^''^y  contributed  not  a 
just  as  Hume  s  problem  pertained  to  the  possibihty  of 


i!'     VH; 


'I 


124 


PHILOSOPHY  OF   THE   ENLIGHTENMENT 


i  i 


science,  so  Rousseau's  problem  raised  the  question  con- 
cerning the  value  of  civilization. 

Rousseau  was  bom  in  Geneva.  His  restless  spirit,  chaf- 
ing under  the  restraints  of  social  custom,  impelled  him  to 
a  life  of  romantic  travel  and  adventure,  turning  up  in  Paris 
in  the  year  1741,  where  he  became  a  friend  of  Diderot  and 
Holhach.  The  thought  of  the  contradiction  between  na- 
ture and  culture  (Kultur),  containing  the  principles  of 
far-reaching  consequences,  caused  him  to  leave  Paris  in 
order  that  he  might  Hve  in  the  country,  and  the  rupture 
with  his  Encyclopedist  friends  soon  followed.  His  writ- 
ings made  him  a  fugitive  and  vagabond.  He  was  not  even 
able  to  find  a  permanent  residence  in  Switzerland.  Dur- 
ing his  latter  years  his  suspicions  and  illusion  of  persecution 
developed  a  decidedly  morbid  character.  He  spent  his 
last  years  in  seclusion  in  France. 

a.  His  first  essays  {Discours  sur  les  sciences  et  les  arts, 
1750,  and  Discours  sur  Vorigine  et  les  fondements  de  Vin- 
egalite  parmi  les  hommes,  1755)  draw  a  sharp  contrast 
between  nature  and  culture.  Several  different  classes  of 
ideas  are  vaguely  combined  in  Rousseau's  earlier  theories 
of  nature,  but  his  ideas  are  gradually  clarified  by  constant 
reflection,  so  that  his  theory  of  natiu-e  as  it  appears  in  his 
masterpiece,  Emile  (1762),  is  very  clear.  In  the  third 
dialogue  of  the  remarkable  essay  entitled  Rousseau  juge 
de  Jean  Jacques  he  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  his 
works  form  a  connected  series,  which  leads  back  step  by 
step  to  certain  fimdamental  principles.  Whoever  would 
wish  to  read  him  synthetically,  he  says,  must  therefore 
begin  with  Emile.  His  object  in  the  first  essays  was  to 
criticize  the  existing  state  of  culture  and  to  remove  the 
obstacles  which  impede  natural  development.  The  direct 
and  positive  elaboration  of  his  principles  must  necessarily 


KOUSSEAU 

come  later     The  paradoxes  to  which  his  introductory 

theones  had  led  would  Hkewise  then  be  removed  by  tS 

positive  presentation.  ^  ^^® 

Three  distinct  classes  of  ideas  (as  may  be  seen  from  the 

f'T.  .''''.''""""  ''  ''^'^^'"^  -fl-enced  rZssII 
fmm  the  first  m  the  fonnation  of  his  theory  of  nat^e  a 
theological,  a  zoological  and  a  psychological.  Natoe'is 
a  divme  product,  but  civilization  is  a  human  produc 
The  state  of  nature  is  therefore  a  state  of  perfection  of 
''heavenly  and  majestic  simplicity.-  We  arrhere  r^ 
minded  of  the  Garden  of  Eden      ^,,f  rl  ^' 

sc^be  the  state  of  naturet^at;  of^pltLTf^^^^^^^^^ 

reflection    and    imagination    are    wholly    undevelooed 
Rousseau  passes  from  the  department  of  theolog^  S  S 
0  zoology  without  being  aware  of  it.     The  reaffole  o 

tt  ?Swf^'^^^^^^  AsTmal 

past   but  wl         'T'  '^^'"^^^  ^^^^^  ^^y  ^-^  distant 
past,  but  with  a  matter  which  he  was  able  to  discover 

t'tde^^^^^  '^N-ture^'consistsoftheimmedTte 

^resSlf  '"T."""^  development,  rather  than 

SSt      M  'T^^^^    ^^''^  '^'^-^^^^  so  readily 

seTfToT.  •  ^^^^f  ^^^^^^1  tendency  to  assert  hinC 
ious  ter^^^^  '"'''"'"  ""^  ^"P^^^^-    ^-d  this  sp^- 

s Trich  t^^^^^^^^^      '"  P"^^^^'  ^^^  ^^dden  source  of  life 

Zath^^  ''''''  '^  -^--^  -ntradicts 

sympathy,  or  resignation  and  self-denial.    The  individual 

wWch  r^i^t  ^  '''"''  ^'""^  ""''^  ^^t^'^ds  to  all  beings 
wmch  are  smiilarly  constituted  to  the  individual  himself- 

^ndness  and  love  are  therefore  natural.    Even  religious 
emotion-ni  the  fonn  of  gratitude,  adn^ation  JtriZ. 


li 


126 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE   ENLIGHTENMENT 


ROUSSEAU 


r 


127 


ence — ^is  a  natural  consequence  of  this  spontaneous  ex- 
pansion. 

However  when  the  distinction  between  individuals 
makes  itself  felt,  due  to  the  rise  of  comparative  reflection 
self-assertion  {amour  de  sot),  in  itself  free  and  noble,  be- 
comes egoism  {amour  pro  pre).  Dependence,  discontent, 
vanity,  envy  and  lust  for  power  manifest  themselves. 
And  to  this  must  be  added  the  division  of  labor  which  so- 
cial life  evolves.  Factdties  and  accomplishments  are 
specialized  and  the  perfect,  harmonious  and  all-round 
development  of  personality  is  suppressed.  Mental  life 
is  broken  to  pieces  and  rendered  artificial.  With  Rous- 
seau the  demand  to  return  to  nature  is  therefore  identical 
with  the  demand  that  man  shall  once  more  become  a  unit; 
Rendez  Vhomme  unl — This  sense  of  completeness  and  imity, 
experienced  in  the  freedom  of  nature  with  which  he  became 
so  well  acquainted  during  the  vagabond  journeys  of  his 
youth,  grew  upon  Rousseau  with  an  extraordinary  power 
and  freshness.  He  is  the  first  to  have  given  enthusiastic 
expression  to  the  genuine  joy  to  be  found  in  the  soHtude  of 
nature  and  in  the  appreciation  of  the  beauties  of  nature. 

The  more  profoundly  he  reflected  upon  his  ideas  the 
clearer  it  became  to  Rousseau  (as  had  also  been  the  case 
with  Shaftesbury  before  him)  that  the  contradiction  be- 
tween nature  and  culture  cotdd  be  only  a  matter  of  degree. 
When  he  declaims  against  science  and  art,  he  really  means 
only  the  science  and  art  of  his  own  age  which  was  so  utterly 
devoid  of  originality,  whilst  he  praised  the  great  investi- 
gators of  the  Renaissance  and  the  seventeenth  century. 
Even  genius  is  likewise  a  form  of  spontaneous  develop- 
ment, rather  than  the  product  of  imitation  or  discipline. 
Culture  is  a  good  thing  and  natural  in  itself,  so  long  as  it 
harmonizes  with  the  stage  of  htunan  development;  indeed 


It  then  even  becomes  a  means  to  the  proper  development 
of  natural  powers.    A  given  type  of  culture  however  can 
never  be  transferred  from  one  people  to  another  without 
modification.    There  is  no  culture  which  is  adapted  to  aU 
men,  to  aU  ages  and  in  aU  places.     Rousseau  vigorously 
opposes  the  opinion  that  the  Parisian  enlightenment  and 
culture  of  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century  should  be 
regarded  as  typical  of  culture  in  general;  and  it  was  ex- 
ceedingly vexatious  to  him  that  Voltaire  and  tlw  Encyclo- 
pedists  were  endeavoring  to  introduce  this  culture  into  his 
beloved  Switzerland.     (The  author  of  this  text-book  has 
endeavored  to  elaborate  this  conception  of  Rousseau^s 
theory  of  nature  more  fully  in  his  book  entitled  Rousseau 
una  seme  Fhilosophie.) 

b.    The  psychology  then  in  vogue  still  retained,  in  ad- 
herence to  Aristotle,  the  twofold  division  of  psychical  ele- 
ments into  inteUigence  and  will,  the  theoretical  and  the 
practical  faculties.    The  question  of  a  different  division 
of  the  mental  functions  was  agitated  to  a  certain  extent 
by  Sptnoza  and  the  English  psychologists  of  the  eighteenth 
century   {Shaftesbury  and  his  disciples).    But  the  real 
credit  for  securing  the  recognition  of  feeling  as  manifesting 
a  distinct  phase  of  psychic  Hfe  nevertheless  belongs  to 
Rousseau.    As  a  matter  of  fact,  feeling  possesses  the 
character  of  immediacy  and  expansion  which  Rousseau 
regards^  pecuHar  to  nature,  whilst  cognition  consists  of 
companson,  voHtion  of  preference  or  choice.    It  is  feeling 
turthermore,  according  to  Rousseau,  that  constitutes  the 
real  value  Qf  human  life.     It  is  almost  wholly  independent 
ot  knowledge;  in  its  climaxes,  when  it  rises  to  ecstasies,  it 
excludes  clear  ideas  entirely.    And  it  changes  less  rapidly 
than   knowledge.     (See,    besides    Emile:   Reveries   d^un 
promeneur  solitaire.) 


^ 


128 


PHILOSOPHY  OF   THE  ENLIGHTENMENT 


c.  Rousseau  makes  a  strong  defense  for  Nature  in  his 
pedagogy.    He  decidedly  prefers  to  leave  education  to 
nature,  because  he  has  implicit  confidence  in  the  growth 
and  the  natural  improvement  of  the  various  organs  and 
faculties.     The  fact  however  that  children  are  constantly 
exposed  to  external  social  influence  imposes  the  necessity 
of  protecting  them  against  harmful  impressions,  so  as  to 
give  free  course  to  nature.    Education  should  be  pre- 
dominantly negative,  i.  e.  it  should  rather  consist  in  the 
removal  of  obstacles  than  in  the  making  of  positive  im- 
pressions.    His   splendid   apology   for   Entile, — Lettre  a 
Beaumont,  archeveque  de  Paris, — contains  a  full  develop- 
ment of  this  idea  of  a  negative  pedagogy.     Its  supreme 
necessity  rests  upon  the  fact  that  we  are  utterly  ignorant 
of  the  nature  of  the  child  at  the  beginning  of  its  career. 
We  cannot  begin  positive  discipline  until  after  we  have 
become  acquainted  with  the  disposition  of  the  child  by- 
means  of  observation.    The  period  of  infancy  is  quite  as 
distinct  and  important  a  part  of  life  as  the  later  periods 
and  it  should  be  regarded  as  more  than  a  mere  preparation 
for  the  latter.    The  child  should  therefore  be  as  free  from 
restraint  as  possible,  giving  itself  to  the  joy  of  life  without 
reserve.     It  were  decidedly  the  best  if  the  child  could  ac- 
quire all  of  its  knowledge  independently,  discover  all  the 
established  truths  for  itself. 

The  negative  period  of  discipline  is  an  exceedingly  diffi- 
cult task.  It  requires  the  pedagogue  to  be  observant, 
alert,  inspiring  and  yet  reserved  and  self-denjdng,  all  at 
the  same  time:  tout  faire,  en  ne  faisant  rient — This  idea 
represents  one  of  the  most  important  modifications  in  the 
history  of  pedagogy. 

d.  In  his  attitude  towards  religion  Rousseau  presents 
a  very  pecuHar  contrast  to  Voltaire^  even  though  both 


ROUSSEAU 

129 

practically  agree  in  their  religious  idea<?  — f l,«  a 
"Natural  Religion."    In  agr«f  S  ZttTRoul 
seau  believes  m  a  personal  God,  who  is  good  h,?t      f 
mpotent;  and  he  likewise  explains  the  ffS^'ftS  and'"' 
by  reference  to  the  resistance  of  matter     iS^vu  ''° 
he  also  repudiates  the  mateiiali^  nf  V     S      ^^^'''''' 
Hdbach.    But  he  n^vtr^ T  ^  ^*  ^^«''*^  and 

antipathy  told:  vT^ZSTZ'i'  r^""^-^ 
of  religion  axe  to  be  found  .nlT:iJ:^T^^:^^^ 
emotions.    As  we  have  observed    it  c  .         *^^ 

yearning  ,s  capable  of  such  intensitv  «,  !*  ™*-  /^'^ 
possibility  of  satisfaction  by  iTfile^b  ect  T  '"^ 
daily  true  in  the  solitude  of  rXlt^t'J    '""^- 

<=,  ui.  dunuration,  of  superabundant  lifo     m«  -j 
IS  commensurate  with  relirioi^-  it  f~  I  °  '^^ 

'rr'  '""^^  -^  ^^  -  »y^  (Sit 

ne  aoes  not  believe  in  a  creation  out  ot  noHiii, 
Nothing  can  come  i„fc>  being  tht^gh  a  A^l^fZ. 


'J 


130 


PHILOSOPHY  OF   THE   ENLIGHTENMENT 


ROUSSEAU 


And  the  only  way  of  explaining  the  evil  and  the  sin  in  the 
world  is  on  the  assumption  of  a  constant  resistance  to  the 
divine  purposes;  i.  e.  the  eternity  of  matter. 

Rousseau  objects  to  the  positive  reHgions  on  the  ground 
that  they  set  up  authorities  and  books  between  man  and 
God,  and  that  they  detract  from  the  dignity  of  the  divine 
relationship  by  their  "clumsy  worship."  He  regards 
himself  a  Christian,  even  though  he  cannot  accept  the 
dogmas  and  miracles. 

Rousseau  elaborates  his  religious  ideas  in  fullest  detail 
in  the  Emile,  in  the  famous  section  entitled  "Profession 
de  foi  du  Vicaire  Savoyard."  He  would  postpone  religious 
instruction  until  the  adolescent  period,  because  children 
should  not  accept  ideas  which  are  incomprehensible  to 
them.  And  the  aim  of  rehgious  instruction  should  be 
above  all  else  to  satisfy  the  needs  of  the  heart.  "What 
does  it  matter  to  me  whether  the  world  is  eternal  or 
created?"  In  the  Contrat  Social  he  advocates  natural 
religion  as  the  state  reHgion.  Here,  speaking  from  the 
viewpoint  of  the  state,  he  takes  strong  ground  against 
Christianity,  because  it  regards  man's  highest  duty  and 
his  highest  aim  to  pertain  to  the  next  world  and  thus  para- 
lyzes the  energy  which  the  state  mi^t  require  of  its  citi- 
zens. 

e.  Rousseau  elaborated  his  political  ideas  in  the  Contrat 
Social  (1762).  He  advocates  popular  sovereignty  with  an 
enthusiasm  unknown  since  the  days  of  AUhusius,  The 
universal  will  (la  volente  generale,  rather  than  la  volente 
de  tous)  must  be  the  final  court  of  appeal.  It  represents 
the  inner  yearning,  the  governing  tendency  of  the  people 
which  is  concerned  for  the  common  interests,  the  welfare 
of  the  whole  as  well  as  the  individual  in  the  constantly 
changing  generations.    It  finds  expression  in  the  senti- 


131 


ment  of  patnotism  and  is  analogous  to  the  desire  for  self 
assertion  (amour  de  soi)  in  the  individual.    Subjection  fj 
It  does  not  mvolve  any  limitation  of  Hberty,  because   t 
combmes  the  wills  of  aU  the  individuals:  each  Sdu^ 
IS  membre  du  souverain  moiviaual 

Ml7:LtS7'^'''''  '''"^"  '^^  '^^  -'  '^-  state 
^ts  had  d^e    the^ovemment,  just  a.  Bodin  and  Altku^ 
sius  nad  done.    The  former  can  be  only  one  since  <^^r 
ereignty  always  belongs  to  the  people;  Lt  tl  fo^flf' 

frTS:  ::^r^^^^  ^'^'^  ^'  -^^-  and  the^L! 
acter  of  the  people.    Rousseau  had  a  decided  preference  • 
or  smaU  states,  for  the  simple  reason  that  in  thercustom 
^r^^r^n^  the  spontaneous  expression  ST^ 

cons^u^^^^^^  ^"  T''  "^  P^^^*^  P^^^^s  without 

consaous   mterference  and  without  formal  ledslation 

These  offer  the  most  favorable  conditions  for  thl'^^t 

ment  of  sympathy  and  humanity     Thev  fnm,'!     7 

degree  of  liberty  and  it  is  unneSssaX  thJ  ^    '^'' 

authority    sho^d    be    so    S        p^^^^^ 

freedom  I  ZJ         ^        ^''^^'''''    ^^^    maintain    its 
sSes  "^     "^^  '  ^"^  "^  ^  ^^ber  of  smaller 

J^i^^r'rt^^^^^  "^ ^'^^^ ^'  ^^'^-^-ntal  to  society 

^Mhi     ^l^^^^^f^^^^ which,  for  Rousseau^is  iden- 

t  cal  with  the  social  problem.    He  was  the  fir^f  f ^  f 

c  ear  conception  of  the  social  probl'^'T^l^frof 

proaucing  a  state  of  unnatural  dependence  on  others 

'uSfX  ad""''i^'^  'r^^^  *^'  <^'--  ^^^^ 

much  farther  advanced  m  the  cities,  and  the  country  Uke- 


'iiltj  i 


132 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  ENLIGHTENMENT 


wise  brings  one  closer  to  nature.  He  regards  the  country- 
folk as  really  constituting  the  nation  and  looks  with  grave 
apprehension  on  the  strong  drift  from  the  coimtry  to  the 
city. 

B.    The  German  Philosophy  of  the  Enlightenment 

AND  Lessing 

I.  Christian  Wolff  (1679-175 4)  was  the  first  to  give  a 
detailed  exposition  of  modem  philosophy  in  the  German 
language.  He  popularized  the  philosophy  of  Leibnitz. 
The  wide  range  of  his  systematic  writings  drove  scholasti- 
cism out  of  the  advanced  schools  of  Germany.  However, 
it  was  not  metaphysical  idealism  and  the  doctrine  of 
monads  that  was  prominent  in  his  system,  but  the  theo- 
logically more  acceptable  theory  of  preestablished  har- 
mony. But  even  this  doctrine  made  him  a  mart)^. 
King  Frederick  William  I  dismissed  him  from  his  professor- 
ship at  Halle  on  account  of  his  apparent  fatalism,  and  even 
drove  him  into  exile  on  the  short  notice  of  forty-eight 
hours.'  He  went  to  Marburg,  but  was  recalled  to  Halle 
during  the  first  year  of  Frederick  II, — His  Vernunftige 
Gedanken  von  Gott,  der  Welt,  der  Seek  der  Menschen,  auch 
alien  Dingen  Uberhaupt  (17 19)  contains  a  general  outline 
of  his  philosophy.  His  attempt  to  derive  the  principle  of 
sufficient  reason  from  the  principle  of  contradiction — 
because  he  thinks  that  origin  from  nothing  involves  a  con- 
tradiction— ^brings  the  dogmatico-rationalistic  philosophy 
to  its  culmination  in  him.  Many  of  his  disciples  never- 
theless tried  to  accord  due  recognition  to  experience.  This 
led  to  a  combination  of  the  Lockian  and  Wolffian  phi- 
losophies in  a  more  or  less  eclectic  fashion.  They  were 
especially  disposed  to  place  great  emphasis  on  empirical 
psychology  (in  which  indeed  Wolff  himself  was  a  famous 


MENDELSSOHN 

of  ideas  is  aU  th^lr;,?^*^^'^^™^^^^^  obscurity 

however,  like  ^./It^f  Enl?  T^  '"  ^^"^"^^ 
France.  Sulzer  (in  thelZ       ff  ^""^  ^'"''""'^  «  . 

1755)  held  that  the  sentkn2t  <t  ^"^Pfi^^ngen, 

^ntiment)  possess  anlSSJ!         -f  *^'  ^"*^^^*^ 
they  cannot  be  resolvJ^!!  ,    significance  and  that 

Kant  (in  his  ^^^I^^Tiyi  '^'^^'--^  ^'™t«- 

......  .;r;)t;^:::-  sfvf:-  - .... 

The  natural  s^ntim  SXi^^^^^  °5 --^ntality. 

as  the  natural  understanZ     S  ST  ^"'*  '^  "^" 
Pened  that  these  two  t^nZ    •'  '*  frequently  hap- 

each  other,  just  asTn  tS  "T"'  '^'"'  ^"*°  ^""^^^^  with 
period  of  £«  let:  the""  Th  -^  '''""'"  *« 
art  and  of  scienc;  w^ZZ^^^^-^'"'  P"""^"^*^  °^ 
On  the  other  hand,  howev^thf''  ""'"^"^  *°  P'""^^- 
pubgc  hte  there  atlimlA^'-^^'  ^^"i^*  P^^^^te 

the'?aiiious  anlhleSt      r  ^^'^    ^^^^^^ 
■•n  Prance.    Pro testrnt,'     l^f  ^  '^'"^^  '"  ^ennany  as 

batren  orthodoxy  SoS^th'  f'"'^  ^'^'^^  ^-^ 
adherents  to  rational  '"^^'"'^^  °^  P^'^"''  -"d 

church  itself .     MueS.r'/^'"  '°""^  ^'"^^  ^e 
^  Philosophy,  f^^tre'TTrn*^^^'^- 
characteristic  combination  Sh  p£tL        "^^'"'"^^  ^  ''' 
Moses  Mendelssohn  (1722-1,!^      t-  . 

for  clearness  and  elegani  of  sJvIe  ^/''''t  ^f^°'  "°*^ 

^        ot  style,  a  disciple  of  Wolff  and 


li'il 


Si 


134 


PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   ENLIGHTENMENT 


LESSING 


Locke,  who  defended  the  doctrine  of  immortality  {Phddon, 
1767)  and  the  existence  of  God  {Morgenstunden,  1786)  on 
rational  grounds,  exerted  a  profound  influence  on  the 
worldly  classes.     Mendelssohn  is  convinced  that  the  dog- 
matics of  Judaism  contain  nothing  which  transcends  natu- 
ral religion  {Jerusalem,  1783).    Many  Protestant  theolo- 
gians Hkewise  held  similar  views  with  reference  to  Chris- 
tianity.   It  was  only  in  exceptional  and  isolated  cases  that 
the  relation  between  natural  and  positive  reUgion  became 
more  hostile.   Thus,  for  example,  /.  Chr.  Edelmann  (1698- 
1767),  who  has  given  an  interesting  account  of  his  doc- 
trinal' evolution  in  his  Autobiography  (pubHshed  1849), 
passed  from  orthodoxy  to  pietism  and  finally  to  a  Spino- 
zistic  type  of  rationaHsm.    He  translated  "  Logos  "  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Gospel  of  John  ''Reason,''  and,  like 
Spinoza,  he  regarded  God  only  as  the  immanent,  not  as 
the  transcendent  cause  of  the  world.    The  only  way  in 
which  he  could  find  true  reHgiosity  in  the  bibHcal  writings 
was  by  historical  criticism  and  symboHc  interpretation. 
Professor  Reimarus  (1694-1768)  of  Hamburg,  the  author 
of  the  Woljenhuttel  Fragments  pubHshed  by  Lessing,  was 
unable  to  conceive  this  relation  so  simply  and  harmo- 
niously.   He  thinks  that  the  human  tinderstanding  and 
conscience  are  in  irreconcilable  conflict  with  the  content 
of  the  Scriptures.    Revelation  is  a  physical  and  moral 
impossibility.    The  only  possible  explanation  of  the  origin 
of  the  bibHcal  traditions  is  on  the  hypothesis  of  a  series  of 

self-deceptions. 

The  German  philosophy  of  the  enlightenment  did  not 
confine  itself  to  psychology  and  the  philosophy  of  reHgion, 
but  was  likewise  active  in  the  department  of  epistemology. 
C.  A.  Crusius  (1712-1775)  showed  that  the  distinction 
between  sense-perception  and  pure  thought  is  not  identical 


^35 


with  the  distmction  between  obscure  and  clear  connpnf 
sense-perception    can    likewise    be    vMy2T7' 
makes  a  sharp  distinction  between  the  gr^nd  oftl  v 
and  the  ground  of  reality,  and  oriXiciLTZf"^^^^^^ 
estabhsh   the  principle  of  causality   hyi^TT^  '^ 
methods.     He  also  exposes  the  eiror  at  tif.        .    f  f  ^ 
ontological  argument  (P.ir.    .f'^'"'^  ^^  ^^^  root  of  the 

wahrkSten,   .^7  ll^^^^^  ^  "^^?^^^^«  ^- W/- 

between  \it.n^£7j :^:^  ?'  ^?^^^  ^^^^-^^-- 
philosophy  {NeZ^'^l:^   ^TJTt  T^'f'  ^^ 

— rhese  three  mvestigators  are  Kn>^v.  •       ""J.^^^^anty. 
cesqor<=      T.t.  ''^^'ii'^rs  are  Kant  s  immediate  prede- 

-any  in^plications  wWch^l  cLSSS  doT*"" 
But  GoMold  Ephraim  Lessin,  ul'c^^^^f  T""^'- 
especially  as  the  thinker  of  the  Geman  ^r tf  '  °"* 
who  proiects  him^^if  u^      a  1^    '-'^rman  enhghtenment 

respects  character  and  talent,  hi^SHnlrSIr" 
of  thought  IS  nevertheless  analogous.  As  a  matter  of  facf 
h.  was  not  a  productive  writer  himself,  but  he  h^d  a  kSn 
Se^a?  ''"''  "  °"^"^'*^ '"  ^^"g'^t  -  weU  as  for  tSt 

tZii^        """I'T"^'^  ^""^  "^^^^  '^^  exhausted  n  the 
defimtely  expressed  forms  of  life.    His  attitude  towards 

Oh  wT-     V      I  theological  critic  he  appealed  to  primitive 
Chnstiamty  which  is  older  than  the  much  discusS  Ce 


i'if  I  »\'3 
M'W  (I  iq 


136 


PHILOSOPHY   or   THE  ENLIGHTENMENT 


(fiher  den  Beweis  des  Geistes  und  der  Kraft).  He  likewise 
places  the  everlasting  search  for  truth  upon  a  higher  plane 
than  the  slothful  possession  of  it  (Duplik).  The  continu- 
ity of  spiritual  evolution  does  not  consist  in  results  and 
dogmas,  but  in  the  inner  strivings  to  which  the  former 
owe  their  origin.— In  aesthetics  he  is  hkewise  guided  by  the 
sense  for  the  original  and  characteristic.  In  his  Hamburg- 
ischen  Dramaturgic— conirBxy  to  the  dominant  classicism 
^he  refers  to  Shakespeare  as  the  unrivalled  model  of  dra- 
matic poetry,  and  in  his  Laokoon  he  attempted  to  define 
the  sphere  of  sculpture  and  poetry. 

Lessing's  own  rehgious  attitude  is  best  described  by  the 
statement  that  it  is  impossible  to  base  our  knowledge  of  the 
eternal  uniformity  of  reality  upon  particular  historical 
events.  The  various  positive  reHgions  must  be  imder- 
stood  as  stages  of  human  spiritual  evolution,  or,  as  Lessing 
expresses  it  figuratively,  as  disciplinary  forces.  Revela- 
tion bears  a  relation  to  the  human  race  similar  to  that  of 
education  to  the  individual.  The  Old  and  New  Testa- 
ments are  "  the  primers  of  the  human  race,"  '  The  time  will 
come  when  such  books  will  be  unnecessary.  For  the 
present  it  is  important  that  the  pupil  should  regard  his 
Primer  as  the  highest  science,— but  the  third  kingdom,  the 
new  everlasting  Gospel  will  come  {Erziehung  des  Mensch- 
engeschlechtSy — Gesprdche  iibcr  die  Freimaurer). 

From  the  purely  philosophical  point  of  view  Lessing 
(according  to  JacohVs  account  in  his  Brief e  iiber  die  Lehre 
des  Spinoza)  is  closely  related  to  Spinoza;  if  he  were  to 
name  himself  after  anyone,  he  knows  of  no  one  else 
more  suitable.  He  wanted  a  purely  natural  theory 
of  the  universe  and  of  life,  free  from  any  transcen- 
dental leaps.  (Cf .  Chr.  Schrempf:  Lessing  als  Philosophy 
1906.) 


FIFTH  BOOK 

IMMANUEL    KANT    AND    THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY 

We  have  found  investigations  into  the  nature  of  knowl- 
edge as  early  as  the  philosophers  of  the  Renaissance  and 
m  the  great  system  builders.    But  they  were  nevertheless 
deadedly  under  the  speU  of  the  constructive  tendency 
As  a  result  of  the  English  empirical  philosophy  regarding 
the  investigation  of  knowledge  as  the  distinctive  problem 
of  philosophy,  we  have  the  extreme  statement  of  theprob- 
em  by  Hume,     It  was  this  statement  of  the  problem  that  ' 
furnished  the  occasion  which  led  Kant  to  undertake  a 
comprehensive  investigation  of  the  conditions  and  pre- 
suppositions  of  our  knowledge  and  of  our  mental  functions 
m  general.     SUch  an  investigation  constitutes  the  task  of 

lit      .    t  "^^^"^u^"  ^'^"^  PhUosophy,     The  critical  ' 
philosophy  has  nothing  to  do  with  a  theory  of  the  evolu- 
tion of  knowledge,  in  the  modem  sense  of  the  word.     Its. 
distinctive  task  is  to  discover  the  necessary  principles  . 
which  must  be  presupposed-howsoever  human  nature  ' 

wWT.     .f r '^^^'f ^--^^  ^  ^^^^^^  f^^-^ion,  no  matter 
whether  it  be  cogmtion,  aesthetic  or  ethical  evaluation,  or 
religious  trust,  is  to  attain  any  valid  results.     It  investi-  ^^ 
gates  the  conditions  of  the  validity^oi  knowledge,  not  those 
ot  Its  ongm.     The  success  of  and  the  purely  scientific 
element  contained  in  this  philosophy  consists  in  its  pene- 
tratmg  beneath  the  finished  products  and  results  of  the 
human  mmd  to  their  efficient  causes.    Just  as  we  can  only 
understand  a  man^s  real  nature  by  penetrating  beneath  his 
outward  acts  to  his  real  character,  so  Hkewise  the  only  way 

137 


If, 


138 


THE   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


KAST 


139 


to  understand  the  phenomena  of  mental  life  is  to  pene- 
trate to  its  original  sources. — By  founding  the  critical  phi- 
losophy, in  this  understanding  of  the  term,  Kant  defined 

•  the  problem  and  method  of  the  science  of  mind.  The 
entire  product  of  the  nineteenth  century  in  the  department 
of  the  mental  sciences  is  based  upon  the  view-points  which 
he  has  marked  out. 

<  According  to  Kant's  theory,  primitive  human  thought 
is  dogmatic.  Man  begins  with  an  implicit  confidence  in 
his  intellect  and  he  believes  himself  capable  of  solving  all 
problems.  He  wishes  to  comprehend  and  coordinate 
everything.     It  is  tliis  desire  that  leads  to  the  dogmatic 

V  systems,  which  proceed  from  the  demand  for  unity  so 
deeply  imbedded  in  human  nature.  But  eventually,  when 
disillusionment  supervenes,  and  the  systems  are  found  to 
contradict  each  other,  there  arises  a  tendency  towards 
sceptical  reflection.  The  third  step  however  is  the  specific 
investigation  of  knowledge  or  the  understanding,  i.  e. 
critical  reflection.  It  is  this  endeavor,  at  once  the  sign 
of  philosophic  maturity  and  self-limitation,  that  Kant 
wishes  to  introduce. 

The  life  of  the  thinker  who  bequeathed  this  profound 
thought  to  the  world  was  confined  within  narrow  circles, 
but  it  is  a  hfe  of  simple  majesty.  Immanuel  Kant  was 
bom  of  poor  artizan  parents  at  Konigsberg  on  the  2  2d  of 
April,  1724.  His  parents  were  moderate  pietists,  and  the 
mother  especially  exerted  a  profound  influence  upon  the 
son.  At  the  University  in  Konigsberg  he  studied  the 
Wolffian  philosophy  and  the  Newtonian  physics.  Through 
the  former  he  became  acquainted  with  the  dogmatic 
method  of  philosophy,  and  in  the  latter  he  discovered  a 
pattern  of  exact  empirical  science.  After  having  spent 
several  years  in  various  families  of  the  nobiHty  in  East 


Prussia  as  private  tutor,  he  habilitated  a^  Privatdozent  at 
the  University,  in  which  capacity  he  labored  for  a  long 
penod  with  pronounced  success.    Not  until  1770  did  he 
receive  an  ordinary  professorship.    He  never  left  his 
native  province  of  East  Prussia.    He  devoted  his  whole  ' 
life  to  the  elaboration  of  his  works  and  to  his  academic 
instruction.     Notwithstanding  this  however  he  partici-  . 
pated  actively  in  the  social  life  of  Konigsberg  and  had  the 
reputation  of  being  a  most  agreeable  companion.    He 
belongs  to  the  period  of  the  enlightenment,  but  he  regarded 
''enlightenment''  as  a  process,  a  problem,  rather  than  as  a 
fimshed  product.    And  finally,  when  his  critical  principle 
led  him  into  profound  depths,  unknown  to  the  ordinary 
enlightenment,  he  possessed  a  sense  for  the  sublime  in 
harmony  with  the  conception  of  the  aesthetic,  ethical  and 
rehgious  which  furnished  the  guiding  principle  of  his 
mental  life.    In  his  old  age,  under  the  clerical  reaction 
which  followed  the  death  of  Frederick  the  Great,  he  suffered 
persecution.     The  publication  of  an  essay  on  religious 
philosophy  in  1793  brought  forth  a  royal  rescript  against  ' 
him  with  a  threat  of  severer  measures  in  case  he  persisted 
in  the  same  tendency.     Kant  replied  with  the  declaration 
that  he  would  thenceforth  neither  speak  nor  write  any- 
thing  Whatsoever  on  religious  matters.    He  did  not  renew 
his  activities  in  the  philosophy  of  religion  until  the  begin- 
ning of  a  new  administration  when  he  published  the  whole 
of  the  controversial  proceeding  (in  the  preface  to  the  Streit 
der  Facultdten,  1 798).     His  last  years  present  a  case  of  the  • 
gradual  disintegration  of  a  mighty  spirit.     He  apparently  . 
became  a  victim  of  dementia  senilis.     Isolated  moments 
of   mental    brilliance    are    the    only   reminders    of   his 
former  greatness.    He  died  on  the  12th  of  February, 
1804. 


m 


m>  w 


I40 


1 1 


V. 


THE   CRITICAi.   PHILOSOPHY 


A,    The  Theoretical  Problem 


KANT 


141 


I.  Kant's  philosophical  reflections  matured  very 
slowly.  There  are  two  distinct  periods  of  development, 
in  his  theoretical  writings,  before  the  appearance  of  his 
masterpiece;  the  first  extends  from  1755  (the  year  of 
Kant's  habilitation)  to  1769,  the  second  from  1769  to  1781 
(in  which  latter  year  his  masterpiece  appeared). — In 
describing  the  historical  development  of  the  Kantian  phi- 
losophy (both  as  respects  the  theoretical  as  well  as  the 
practical  problems)  the  author  of  this  text  book  follows  his 
essay  on  Die  Kontinuitdt  im  pkilosophischen  Entwicklungs- 
gange  Kant's  (Archiv  fiir  Gesch.  der  Philos.,  VII,  1894). 

a.  The  dominant  characteristic  of  KanVs  first  period 
is  the  firm  nonviction  that  an  all-pervasive  uniformity  of 
nature  rigidly  determines  the  phenomenal  universe.  His 
famous  hypothesis  of  the  evolution  of  our  solar  system  is 
elaborated  in  his  Allgemeine  Naturgeschickte  und  Theorie 
des  Eimmels  (1755).  Newton  had  declared  that  a  scien- 
tific explanation  of  the  origin  of  the  solar  system  is  im- 
possible. But  Kant  now  shows  that  such  an  explanation 
is  possible.  He  starts  with  the  asstmiption  of  a  rotating 
nebulous  sphere,  and  then  deduces  the  logical  conse- 
quences according  to  the  known  laws  of  nature.  He  fur- 
thermore regards  the  denial  of  nature's  capacity  to  evolve 
order  and  purpose  from  its  own  inherent  laws  as  an  erro- 
neous presupposition.  He  discovers  the  proof  of  deity 
in  the  very  fact  of  the  uniformity  of  nature  itself. — Kant 
elaborated  this  theory  more  fully  in  the  essay  Einzig 
moglicher  Beweisgrund  einer  Demonstration  Gottes.  Whilst 
he  had  even  then  already  lost  confidence  in  the  validity  of 
the  traditional  ''proofs"  of  the  existence  of  God,  he  at  the 
same  time  found  a  basis  for  his  religious  conviction  in  the 


ultinate  postulate  of  aU  real  scienc^the  postulate  of  the 
umfoxtrnty  of  nature.  He  stood  quite  close  to  Spinolat 
this  respect  without  being  aware  of  it. 

Kant's  mind  was  likewise  occupied 'with  various  other 
probkms  during  this  period.  His  conclusion  conce^^g 
the  distinction  between  philosophy  and  mathematics"! 
noteworthy,  namely,  that  phUosophy  camiot  create  its 
concepts  as  mathematics  does.  It  derives  its  concepts 
from  expenence.  Hence,  inasmuch  as  experience  is  n^ 
universal,  philosophy  is  limited  to  imperfect  conc^pte 
The  concg^t  of^sul,  for  example,  is  an  imperfect  conSt 

substanc^.    In   the  mgenious   brochure,    Traume   eines 
Gnstersehers,  erlauteri  durch  Traume  der  Metaphysik  (i  766) 
Kant  shows,  partly  in  satire,  how  easy  it  is  to  cons  met  ' 
system  of  the  super^nsible  world.    The  only  reqSement 

Ind  final  "''''"*  ""^''""  "^  °"^  "^^^"^  ^  ^-^ 
The  concept  of  causality  is  another  example  of  an  in- 
complete concept.    How  can  the  analysis  of  a  given  phi 
nomenon  reved  the  necessity  of  another  phenomenon? 

Begnff  der  negahven  Grosse  in  die  Weltweisheit  cinzujuhren 
1762)  approaches  the  problem  of  causaUty  in  precisely 
the  same  fonn  in  which  it  had  been  stated  by  Sf 

hlr  "^-  T'^''  '"^^  ''  "^  '^^-■'^  ^«-^  tha^  roused 
tslT'      V  """^^^  '''^^^^^'  ^^*^  ^''  ^-'^^'  reference 

dicate  that  tlus  awakemng  took  place  as  eariy  as  1762 

Students  of  Kant  differ  widely  on  this  point  howevlr 

It  IS  mipossible  to  describe  the  years  in  which  Kant  was 

occupied   with   the  study  of  the   causal   concept   S 


i 


: 


142 


THE   CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 


KANT 


The   Dreams   of  a   Ghost-seer,    as    spent    in    "dogmatic 

slumber. '' 

b.  Kant  is  led  to  the  first  step  from  his  inquiring, 
sceptical  attitude  towards  criticism  by  the  discovery  that 
space  and_time,  with  which  the  exact  natural  sciences 
^perateV^re  not  real  objects  or  attributes  in  the  absolute 
sense;  but  schemata  (schemata  coordinandi)  which  are 
abstracted  from  the  forms  in  which  our  sensations  are  ar- 
ranged. Space,  which  Newton  regarded  a  divine  sense, 
thus  becomes  a  human  sense  {De  mundi  sensihilis  atque 
intelligihilis  forma  et  principiis,  1770).  He  makes  the 
discovery  that  many  propositions  which  we  regard  as  ob- 
jective only  express  the  conditions  imder  which  we  per- 
ceive or  conceive  the  objects.  For  the  time  being  he  ap- 
plies this  observation  only  to  space  and  time  as  the  forms  of 
sense-perception.  This  was  nevertheless  the  discovery 
of  the  fundamental  thought  of  the  critical  philosophy. 
Kant  had  thus  ah-eady  discovered  the  theoretical  method 
which  he  afterwards  called  the  Copemican  method.  Just 
as  our  perception  of  the  rotation  of  the  firmament  around 
the  earth  is  due  to  our  position  in  the  universe,  so,  accord- 
ing to  Kant  J  it  is  likewise  due  to  our  method  of  sense  per- 
ception that  we  apprehend  things  under  the  relations  of 
time  and  space.  This  explains  therefore — and  this  is  the 
essential  matter  so  far  as  Kant  is  concerned — ^how  it  hap- 
pens that  piu-e  mathematics,  which  is  after  all  a  ptu*ely 
intellectual  science,  can  be  valid  for  every  possible  sense- 
perception.  We  experience  everything  in  time  and  space, 
and  everything  must  therefore  conform  to  the  mathemat- 
ical laws  of  time  and  space. 

Kant  was  still  of  the  opinion  that  the  understanding 
could  grasp  the  absolute  nature  of  things.  But  he  soon 
saw  that  the  Copernican  principle  must  likewise  apply  to 


143 


the  understanc^ng.    His  letters  and  notes  enable  us  to 
follow  the  gradual  development  of  this  deeper  insight 
We  are  active  in  the  operations  of  our  own  thought  i  e* 
we  act  m  a  manner  peculiar  to  our  mind;  but  how  can  ihe 
products  of  our  own  mental  activity  retain  their  vaHditv 
when  applied  to  the  perceptions  which  are  objectively  pro- 
duced?~As  to  the  nature  of  this  mental  activity,  aa  in- 
vestigation  of  the  fundamental  concepts  of  our  under- 
standing,  especially  the  causal  concept,  reveals  the  fact 
that  the  understanding  is  likewise  a  uniting,  synthetizing 
acuity    like    sense-perception.    The    uniting    principle 
(Hume  s)   which  was  the  stumbling-block  of  Kant^s  En^- 
hsh  predecessor,  now  became  Kant^s  fundamental  pre- 
supposition  of  knowledge.     He  could  now   say  of  the 
fundamental  concepts  of  the  understanding  (categories), 
after  the  analogy  of  what  he  had  previously  said  of  the 
forms  of  intuition:  Knowledge  exists  only  when  what  is 
gtven  (the  matter)  in  the  forms  of  our  thought  is  united    The 
concept^of  synthesis  m  therefore  the  fundamental  concept 
of  all  know  edge   and  the  profoundest  thought  of  the 
Kantian  philosophy.    This  constitutes  KanVs  real  dis- 
covery, which  will  justify  its  value,  even  if  KanVs  par- 
ticular  theories  are  to  a  considerable  degree  subject  to 
criticism.    We  must  apply  his  own  method  in  the  study 
of  Kant    We  must  penetrate  the  finished  forms  in  which 

According  to  his  own  statement,  Kant  wrote  out  the 
results  of  his  reflections  covering  a  period  of  twelveyears 
quite  hastily.  His  chief  work,  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft 
(1781)  IS  therefore  a  very  difficult  book.-In  presenting 
Its  contents  we  shall  follow  a  clearer  order  than  that  given 
oy  Kant  himself. 


n 


<!iik 


144 


THE   CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 


KANT 


145 


2.  Kant  distinguishes  a  subjective  and  an  objective 
deduction  in  his  investigation  of  the  problem  of  knowl- 
edge. 

a.  It  is  the  business  of  subjective  deduction  to  discover 
the  forms  of  our  intuition  and  reflection.  These  forms 
represent  what  is  constant  and  universal, — that  which  is 
capable  of  maintaining  its  identity,  even  though  the  quali- 
tative content,  the  matter,  changes.  They  are  dis- 
covered by  a  psychological  analysis  which  distinguishes 
between  the  changeable  and  the  permanent.  In  this  way 
we  discover  extension  (space)  and  succession  (time)  as 
constant  elements  of  sensory  intuition,  magnitude  and 
causality  as  constant  elements  of  thought.  The  Forms 
of  intuition  are  forms  of  our  receptivity.  As  a  matter  of 
fact  they  too  are  a  kind  of  synthesis,  a  combining  together; 
but  at  this  stage  our  own  activity  does  not  yet  attain  the 
prominence  that  it  does  in  thought;  here  the  only  concern 
is  the  arrangement  of  the  sensations  in  immediate  intui- 
tion. We  develop  a  higher  level  of  activity  whenever  we 
place  these  intuitional  images  in  relation  to  each  other. 
This  function  is  more  fully  conscious  than  the  involuntary 
process  of  intuition.  Kant  calls  it  apperception.  When- 
ever we  pass  from  a  given  spacial  or  temporal  intuition  to 
another,  we  are  tr>4ng  to  affect  our  own  inner  unity,  in 
the  fact  that  we  combine  together  the  antecedent  and  con- 
sequent in  a  definite  manner.  Thus',  e.  g.  I  know  a  line 
only  when  I  draw  it,  i.  e.  when  I  combine  its  several  parts 
according  to  a  definite  law.  Or,  e.  g.  I  know  a  fact,  e.  g. 
the  freezing  of  water,  only  when  I  am  in  position  to  com- 
bine the  antecedent  state  (the  water  in  liquid  form)  with 
its  conseque.it  according  to  a  definite  law. 

Kant  believes  that  he  has  thus  discovered  a  method 
which  proves  the  necessity  of  a  certain  number  of  con- 


cepts  of  the  understanding  (categories).    He  savs  th^ 
function  of  the  understanding  is  judgment    eve^'  } 
ment  consists  of  a  combination  of  L^^.'  tZ  muS 

I  Wrr  tfT  ^''''''''  ''  ^'^^  -  ^"^« 
oi  juagments!— He  thus  discovers,  on  the  basi^  nf  fh^ 

seK),  twelve  categories,  neither  more  nor  less.  TMsZs 
certainly  a  profound  illusion.  For  the  customan.  clal? 
fication  of  judgments  is  logically  untenable,  it  Tat  elst 

s^^ttsr rcLSs^^  --  --  -  -- 

nught  be  regarded  as  representative  of  these  two  classes 
M  our  judgments  express  either  a  relation  of  maSde 

both  relations:  aU  ^^1^^ TntLrrfroL^ 
sm^^er  magnitudes,  and  cause  passes  .o.,^^XZ 

We  have  thus  far  discovered  two  grouos  of  fnrm..  fi, 

onns  of  intuition  and  of  the  categorierBuftl^^J^S 

a  thmi  group.    We  are  not  satisfied  with  simply  a^anSg 

sensations  m  space  and  time,  and  afterwards  arranSne 

he  intuitional  fonns  which  have  thus  arisen  acc^g  to 

.ii  tW   \^^'-^-  -d  cause.    The  sy^thet S 

rit^-e  Z"w       "^  ''"'^*^' ''  "^  '^^P'^^  ^'"bedded  in 
our  nature  that  we  are  constantly  in  search  of  higher  uni 

J.S  and  totalitie^and  finally  demand  an  absolutet^I" 

fe  anri   7'^'?,."'^°  ^««°Pt«  ^  conceive  absolute  uni- 
te and  totahties.    Kant  calls  the  ideational  faculTy 


)     'II 


146 


THE   CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 


KANT 


147 


reason  in  its  narrower  significance.  (In  its  broader  sig- 
nificance understanding  and  intuition  likewise  belong  to 
reason.)  Those  synthetic  impulses  together  with  these 
ideational  faculties  give  rise  to  the  dogmatic  systems 
which  deal  with  the  ideas  of  God  (as  the  absolute  being), 
the  soul  (as  substance)  and  the  world  (as  absolute  total- 
ity) .  Kant  attempts  to  prove,  by  a  very  artificial  method, 
that  these  three  are  the  only  ideas:  they  are  to  correspond 
with  the  three  forms  of  inference  of  the  traditional  logic. 

b.  Objective  deduction  investigates  the  right  of  apply- 
ing our  cognitive  forms  to  given  sensations.  The  fact 
that  we  are  able  to  become  conscious  of  the  content  of  our 
intuitions  and  concepts  does  not  constitute  the  problem. 
Neither  does  the  fact  that  we  can  deduce  new  content 
from  experience  constitute  a  problem.  But  Kant's  prob- 
lem rather  consists  in  this,  namely,  the  fact  that  we  are 
able  to  use  otir  intuitional  forms  and  categories  in  such  a 
way  as  to  form,  with  their  help,  valid  judgments  which  are 
not  found  in  experience*  He  expresses  it  in  his  own  lan- 
guage as  follows:  How  are  synthetic  judgments  a  priori 
possible?  By  analytical  propositions  we  become  aware 
of  the  content  of  our  intuitions  and  reflections;  by  syn- 
thetical propositions  a  posteriori  we  include  new  content 
derived  from  experience;  but  synthetic  propositions  a 
priori  extend  our  knowledge  independently  of  our  experi- 
ence. The  following  are  examples  of  such  propositions: 
every  perception  has  extensive  and  intensive  values,  and 
every  event  has  a  cause  (or  better:  every  change  takes 
place  according  to  the  law  of  the  connection  between 
cause  and  effect). 

According  to  Kant  the  validity  of  such  judgments  rests 
upon  the  fact  that  experience — ^in  the  sense  of  the  fixed  and 
necessary  relations  of  phenomena — ^is  possible  only  in 


case  the  mathematical  laws  and  the  concepts  of  magnitude 
and  causality  are  vaHd  for  all  perceptions.  Only  such  ab- 
stract propositions  as  formulate  the  very  conditions  of 
experience  are  synthetic  propositions  a  priori.  Whenever 
we  are  able  to  discover  and  express  the  conditions  of  ex- 
perience we  come  upon  propositions  which  are  propositions 
of  pure  reason,  because  they  are  based  on  the  pure  forms 
of  our  knowledge,  and  which  must  nevertheless  be  valid 
for  all  experience. 

The  whole  content  of  experience  is  conceived  in  space 
and  time.  Hence  since  pure  mathematics  really  does 
nothing  more  than  develop  the  laws  of  space  and  time,  it 
must  be  valid  for  every  possible  content  of  experience, 
every^  possible  perception.  But  this  demonstration  like- 
wise involves  a  limitation:  namely,  mathematics  is  valid 
only  for  phenomena,  i.  e.  only  for  things  as  we  conceive 
them,  not  for  things-in-themselves.  We  have  no  right 
to  make  the  conditions  of  our  conception  the  conditions 
of  things-in-themselves.  Time  and  space  can  be  con- 
ceived only  from  the  view-point  of  man. 

Experience  not  only  impHes  that  we  conceive  something 
in  space  and  time,  but  likewise  that  we  are  able  fj  comlnne 
what  is  given  in  space  and  time  in  a  definite  way,  1.  e.  as 
indicated  in  the  concepts  of  magnitude  and  causality. 
This  is  the  only  means  of  distinguishing  bet.\'cen  experi- 
ence and  mere  representation  or  imagination.  All  ex- 
tensive and  intensive  changes  must  proceed  continuously, 
i.  e.^  through  every  possible  degree  of  extension  and  in- 
tensity, otherwise  we  could  never  be  certain  of  having  any 
real  experience.  Gaps  and  breaks  must  be  impossible 
(non  datur  hiatus  non  datur  saltus).  The  cdgin  of  each 
particular  phenomenon  moreover  must  be  conditioned  by 
certain  other  phenomena, -analogous  to  the  way  in  which 


It 


ill' 


148 


THE   CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 


KANT 


149 


it 


the  conclusion  of  a  syllogism  is  conditioned  by  the  prem- 
ises. In  any  purely  subjective  representations  or  in 
dreams,  images  may  be  combined  in  every  variety  of  ways; 
we  have  experience  however  only  when  it  is  impossible  to 
permit  the  members  of  a  series  of  perceptions  to  exchange 
their  places  or  to  pass  from  one  perception  to  another  by 
means  of  a  leap.  In  my  mind  I  can  at  will,  e.  g.  conceive 
of  a  house  being  built  from  the  roof  downward  or  from  the 
foundation  upward;  but  in  the  case  of  the  actual  construc- 
tion of  a  house  there  is  but  a  single  possible  order  of  suc- 
cession. Wherever  there  appear  to  be  gaps  in  the  series 
of  perceptions  we  assume  that  further  investigation  will 
discover  the  intervening  members.  This  demonstration 
of  the  validity  of  the  categories  of  magnitude  and  causality 
likewise  involves  a  limitation:  The  validity  of  the  cate- 
gories can  only  be  affirmed  within  the  range  of  possible 
expenctice;  they  cannot  be  applied  to  things  which  from 
their  ver\'  nature  cannot  become  objects  of  experience. 
Exper'-^ce  i?;  the  empirical  synthesis  which  furnishes  valid- 
ity to  every  other  synthesis. 

The  principles  of  demonstration  by  which  we  obtain  our 
results  when  dealing  with  the  forms  of  intuition  and  the 
categories  are  inapplicable  to  the  realm  of  ideas.  The 
ideas  denia.id  an  uncoiiditionality,  a  totality,  finality;  but 
experience,  vhlch  is  always  limited,  never  furnishes  any 
such  thing.  Neither  God,  nor  the  soul  (as  substance),  nor 
the  universe  (as  an  absolute  whole)  can  be  given  in  experi- 
ence. There  is  here  no  posstbilHy  of  an  objective  deduc- 
tion.    It  is  impossible  to  construct  a  science  of  ideas. 

When  Kant  bases  the  real  ^.igniiicance  of  the  rational 
sciences  upc  n  an  analysis  of  the  conditions  of  experience, 
it  must  of  course  be  remembered  that  h^^  uses  the  concept 
of  experience  in  its  strict  sense.    Experience  consists  of 


the  fixed  and  necessary  relation  of  perceptions.  But  in 
this  sense  experience  is  an  idea  (in  Kant's  meaning  of  the 
term)  or  an  ideal.  We  can  approach  this  ideal  to  infinity, 
but  it  was  a  piece  of  dogmatism  when  Ka7tt  here  failed  to 
distinguish  between  the  ideal  and  reality.  Kant  had  not, 
as  he  believed,  solved  the  problem  propounded  by  Hume; 
for  the  thing  concerning  which  Hume  was  skeptical  was 
just  the  matter  as  to  whether  any  experience  in  the  strict 
sense  of  the  term  really  exists. — This  dogmatic  tendency 
is  peculiarly  prominent  in  Kant's  special  works,  especially 
in  his  Metaphysische  Anfangsgrunden  der  Naturwissen- 
schaft  (1786). — Kant's  chief  merit  consists  in  referring  all 
knowledge  to  synthesis  and  continuity.  These  funda- 
mental principles  enable  us  to  anticipate  experience.  But 
all  anticipations  are  only  hypotheses. 

3.  As  we  have  observed,  the  demonstration  of  the  real 
validity  of  abstract  knowledge  (of  pure  reason)  is  closely 
related  to  the  limitation  of  this  validity.  Kant  states  this 
as  follows:  We  know  only  experiences,  but  not  things-in- 
themselves.  Whenever  he  expresses  himself  concisely,  he 
calls  the  concept  of  the  thing-in-itself  an  ultimate  concept 
or  a  negative  concept.  In  this  way  he  gives  expression  to 
the  permanently  irrational  element  of  knowledge.  Speak- 
ing exactly,  the  concept  of  the  thing-in-itself  indicates  that 
we  cannot  deduce  the  matter  of  our  knowledge  from  its 
form.  For  Kant  however  the  concept  of  the  thing-in-itself 
imperceptibly  assumes  a  positive  character.  The  thing-in- 
itself  is  regarded  as  the  cause  of  phenomena  (especially  in 
reference  to  the  matter,  but  likewise  also  in  reference  to 
the  form).  Here  (as  F.  H.  Jacohi  was  the  first  to  show) 
Kant  falls  into  a  peculiar  contradiction;  he  has  limited  the 
real  validity  of  the  concept  of  causality  to  the  realm  of 
experience  (in  which  the  thing-in-itself  can  never  be  pres- 


i 


ISO 


THE  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


h 


IfX:. 


ent)  and  then  conceives  the  thing-in-itself  as  cause! — 
Here  again  we  discover  a  remnant  of  dogmatism  in  KatU. 
4.  KatU  proves  the  impossibility  of  constructing  a 
.17  )^  science  of  ** Ideas,**  both  by  the  fact  that  ideas  contain 
none  of  the  conditions  of  experience  (as  is  the  case  with  the 
forms  of  intuition  and  the  categories),  and  by  means  of  a 
criticism  of  the  attempts  which  have  been  made  to  estab* 
lish  such  a  science. 

a.  Criiicistn  of  speculative  (spiritualistic)  psychology. 
There  is  no  justification  for  concluding  from  the  imity  of 
psychic  life,  which  manifests  itself  in  synthesis,  the  ftmda- 
mental  form  of  consciousness,  that  the  soul  is  a  being  which 
is  distinct  from  the  body  or  a  substance.  Synthesis  is 
only  a  form,  which  we  are  not  permitted  to  regard  as  a 
separate  substance.  It  is  impossible  for  psychology  to 
be  more  than  a  science  of  experience.  There  is  no  ground 
for  interpreting  the  distinction  between  psychical  and 
ph3rsical  phenomena  as  a  distinction  between  two  en- 
tities: It  is  possible  indeed  that  one  and  the  same  essence 
should  form  the  basis  of  both  kinds  of  phenomena. 

b.  Criticism  of  speculative  cosmology.  Every  attempt 
at  a  scientific  theory  of  the  imiverse  conceived  as  a  totality 
is  ever  and  anon  confronted  with  contradictions.    Our 

.Q  y^  thought  here  culminates  in  antinomies;  the  imi verse  must 
have  a  beginning  (in  space  and  time),  else  it  were  not  a 
totality.  But  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  the  beginning 
or  the  end  of  space  and  of  time,  because  every  place  (in 
space  and  in  time)  is  thought  in  relation  to  other  places. — 
Furthermore  the  world  must  consist  of  parts  (atoms  or 
monads)  which  are  not  further  divisible,  otherwise  the 
summation  of  the  parts  could  never  be  complete.  But 
everything  conceivable  is  divisible;  we  can  think  of  every 
body  as  divided  into  smaller  bodies. — ^The  series  of  causes 


KANT 


ISI 


must  have  a  first  member  if  the  universe  is  to  be  regarded 
as  a  complete  system,  and  if  a  complete  causal  explanation 
of  particular  phenomena  shall  be  possible.  But  the  as- 
sumption of  a  first  cause  is  in  conflict  with  the  law  of 
causality,  for  this  cause  would  itself  have  no  cause,  and  at 
what  moment  should  it  begin  its  operation? 

According  to  Kant  the  only  way  to  avoid  these  antin- 
omies is  to  distinguish  between  phenomenon  and  the 
thing-in-itself  and  limit  the  validity  of  our  knowledge  to 
phenomena.  We  meet  with  contradictions  the  moment 
we  attempt  to  apply  our  concepts  to  the  things  which 
transcend  our  circumscribed  experience.  Kant  therefore 
regards  the  antinomies  as  a  demonstration  of  his  theory 
of  knowledge. 

c.  Criticism  of  speculative  theology.  Reflective  thought 
aims  to  find  in  the  concept  of  God  an  absolute  resting- 
place  for  all  its  effort.  This  concept  is  supposed  to  con- 
tain the  ground  of  the  concepts  of  soul  and  universe.  In 
it  knowledge  would  attain  its  ideal:  all  ideas  would  be  re- 
ferred to  a  single  idea  which  in  tiuii  contains  the  groimd 
of  its  existence  within  itself  and  hence  implies  nothing  be- 
yond it!  According  to  Kant  the  concept  of  God  is  fully 
justified  as  an  ideal;  but  we  must  not  confuse  an  ideal  of^ 
knowledge  with  knowledge  actually  attained.  The  tradi- 
tional arguments  for  the  existence  of  God  however  rest 
upon  such  a  confusion  of  terms. 

The  most  popular  argument  rests  upon  the  adaptation 
of  natiu^  and  thence  infers  the  existence  of  an  all-wise,  . 
all-loving  and  all-powerful  Creator  (the  physico-theological 
argument), — ^But  by  what  right  do  we  presuppose  that  the 
order  and  adaptation  of  nature  should  not  be  explainable 
as  the  effects  of  natural  causes  operating  according  to  natu- 
ral  laws?    And  at  any  rate  this  argument  can  only  lead  to 


xo 


IS2 


THE  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


2.-X 


7-3 


M- 


li 


the  assumption  of  an  architect  or  governor  of  the  universe, 
not  to  that  of  a  creator. 

The  cosmohgical  argument  goes  into  the  matter  more 
profoundly:  the  tmiverse  must  have  a  cause  (both  as  to  its 
niatter  as  well  as  to  its  plan). — But  the  law  of  causality 
leads  only  from  one  member  of  the  causal  series  to  another 
— it  only  furnishes  causes  which  are  in  ttim  conditioned, 
i.  e.  effects,  and  hence  never  establishes  the  assumption 
of  an  unconditioned,  necessary  being.  In  the  case  of  every 
existing  thing,  even  the  highest,  it  always  remains  not  only 
possible  but  necessary  to  inquire:  Whence  doth  it  come? 
The  ontological  argument,  if  it  were  tenable,  is  the  only 
one  that  would  lead  to  the  desired  goal.  It  is  also  the 
tacit  presupposition  of  all  the  other  arguments.  This 
argument  proceeds  as  follows:  to  think  of  God  as  non- 

"^existent  were  a  contradiction,  because  He  is  the  perfect 
being  and  existence  belongs  to  perfection! — But  existence 
or  being  is  a  predicate  which  differs  from  all  other  predi- 
cates. The  concept  of  a  thing  does  not  change  because 
the  particular  thing  does  not  exist.    My  concept  of  a  htm- 

^dred  dollars  is  the  same,  no  matter  whether  I  possess  them 
or  only  think  of  them.  The  problem  of  existence  is  inde- 
pendent of  the  problem  of  the  perfection  of  the  concept. 
And,  as  the  investigation  of  th^  categories  has  shown,  we 
have  but  a  single  criterion  of  existence  or  reality:  namely, 
the  systematic  uniformity  of  experience. 

B.    The  Ethico-Religious  Problem 

I.  There  is  a  sense  in  which  KanVs  ethical  ideas  de- 
velop along  parallel  lines  with  his  ideas  of  theoretical 
knowledge.  Rousseau's  influence  evidently  affected  him 
on  this  point  at  two  different  periods  with  telling  effect. 
Kant  declares,  in  an  interesting  fragment,  that  Rousseau 


KANT 


i' 


IS3 


taught  him  reverence  for  mankind,  to  ascribe  a  certain 
dignity  to  all  men  which  is  not  merely  based  on  the  degree 
of  their  intellectual  culture.  He  had  previously  been  an 
optimist  whose  basis  was  an  intellectual  and  spiritual  aris- 
tocracy. And  in  addition  to  Rousseau,  Shaftesbury,  Hume  ^ 
and  especially  Hutcheson  likewise  influenced  him  at  this'>^ 
period.  During  the  sixties  Kant  bases  his  ethics  on  the 
sentiment  of  beauty  and  the  dignity  of  human  nature. 
(Beobachtungen  uber  das  Gefiihl  des  Schonen  und  des 
Erhabenen,  1764.)  Even  here  Kant  already  emphasizes 
the  necessity  of  fundamental  principles  of  morahty;  they 
are  however  only  the  intellectual  expressions  of  the  con- 
tent of  the  sentiments:  "  The  fundamental  principles  are  not 
abstract  laws,  but  the  consciousness  of  an  afection  that  dwells 
in  every  human  breast  ,  .  ,  of  the  beauty  and  dignity  of 
human  nature,** 

Kant  afterwards  abandoned  this  identification  of  ethics 
with  the  psychology  of  the  affections.  In  his  Essay  of 
1770  he  declared  that  it  is  utterly  impossible  to  base  moral 
principles  on  sentiment,  i.  e.  empirically.  It  is  also  evi- 
dent, from  a  fragment  discovered  by  Reicke,  that  at  the 
period  during  which  he  was  engaged  with  the  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason  he  based  the  ethical  impulse  on  the  self- 
activity  which  we  exercise  in  our  striving  for  happiness. 
The  matter  of  happiness  is  empirical,  but  its  form  is  in- 
tellectual, and  the  only  possibility  of  realizing  our  freedom 
and  independence  rests  upon  maintaining  the  constant 
harmony  of  our  will  with  itself.  Morality  is  liberty  under  ^ 
a  universal  law  which  expresses  our  self-consistency. 
Even  here  Kant's  ethics  attains  that  purely  formal  char- 
acter which  is  so  peculiar  to  it.  In  ethics  as  in  epistemol- 
ogy  he  regards  the  form  as  the  constant  factor  in  contrast 
with  its  ever-varying  content. 


i< 


<  I  V 


154 


THE  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


But  in  the  fragment  just  cited  Kant's  ethics  was  still 
individualistic:  The  moral  law  demands  only  that  the  in- 
dividual be  in  harmony  with  himself.  The  specifically 
Kantian  ethics  springs  from  an  expansion  of  this  principle. 
He  elaborates  it  in  the  Grundlegung  zur  Metaphysik  der 
Sitten  (1785)  and  the  Kritik  der  praktischen  Vernunfl 
(1788).  Here  he  formulates  the  moral  law  as  follows: 
Act  according  to  the  maxim  that  you  could  at  the  same  time 
will  that  it  might  become  a  universal  law!— The  viewpoint  is 
therefore  no  longer  individualistic,  but  social.  His  elab- 
oration of  the  theory  of  knowledge  evidently  affected  his 
ethics  at  this  point.  The  fundamaital  moral  law  must  be 
quite  as  universal  and  objective  as  the  theoretical  funda- 
mental principles,  as  e.  g.  the  principle  of  causality!  But 
there  are  other  theoretical  motives  likewise  here  in  evi- 
dence. 

In  the  interval  between  the  fragment  just  cited  (1780) 
and  the  first  draft  of  the  ethics  (1785)  another  noteworthy 
essay  appeared,  namely,  Idee  zu  einer  allgemeinen  Ge- 
schichte  in  weltburgerlicher  Absicht  (1784),  in  which  Kant 
shows  that  the  only  viewpoint  from  which  history  is  com- 
prehensible and  of  any  value  is  from  that  of  the  human  race 
as  a  whole,  but  not  from  that  of  the  individual  citizen. 
Reason  is  an  evolutional  product  of  the  process  of  history. 
The  antagonism  of  interests  brings  the  capacities  of  man  to 
maturity,  until  he  finally  organizes  a  society  in  which  free- 
dom under  tmiversal  laws  is  possible.  And  it  is  only  then 
that  genuine  morality  becomes  possible!  Kant  observes 
that  Rousseau  was  not  wholly  in  error  in  preferring  the 
state  of  nature,  so  long  as  this  stage  has  not  been  reached. 
— It  is  evident  that,  from  the  viewpoint  of  history,  the 
moral  law  which  Kant  formulated  in  1785  contains  a  sub- 
lime anticipation.     The  individual  citizen  is  expected  to 


KANT 


IS5 


S?    n    t        \^^'^  ^^^  ^^^'  ^'^"^'^^y  ^'  ^  actions 
shall  finaUy  be  regulated  in  that  ideal  society.     MoraHtv 

like  history,  is  likewise  incomprehensible  from  the  view' 
point  of  the  individuaL-iTa.^/  returns  to  this  theory  two 
years  later  (1786  in  the  essay  on  Muthmasslicher  Anfanz 
der  MenschengescUchte).    Civilization  and  nature  are  con- 
tradictory  principles  (so  far  Rousseau  was  right)  "until 
perfect  art  becomes  nature  once  more,  which  is  the  final 
aim  of  the  moral  determination  of  the  human  race."    Kant 
therefore  arrived  at  this  definitive  ethical  theory  by  the 
historical  or  social-psychological  method,  and  Rousseau's 
conception  of ^  the  problem  of  civiHzation  influenced  him 
at  this  point  just  as  it  did  at  an  earlier  stage  of  his  ethical 
reflection.~But  m  the  mind  of  Kant  that  sublime  antici-  ' 
pation  appears  with  such  ideality  and  absoluteness  that 
he  regarded  the  fundamental  moral  laW  as  a  manifestation 
from  a  super-empirical  world  and  he  forgot  his  historical 
and  psychological  basis.     (Cf.  the  author's  essay:  Rous^ 
seaus  Etnfluss  auf  die  definitive  Form  der  KanVschen  Ethik 
m  Kantstudien,  II,  1898.)  ' 

2     In  the  first  draft  of  his  ethics  (1785)  Kant  discovers 
the  fundamental  moral  law  by  means  of  an  analysis  of  the 
practical  moral  consciousness.    That  action  alone  is  good 
which  spnngs  from  pure  regard  for  the  moral  law.  Neither 
authonty  nor  experience  can  be  the  source  of  this  sense. 
Moral  pnnciples  reveal  the  imnost,  supersensible  nature  of 
our  yolition,  and  neither  psychology  nor  theology  can  here 
furnish  the  basis.     The  fact  is  the  more  evident  in  that 
there  axe  elements  in  human  nature  which  impel  us  in 
directions  which  are  contrary  to  the  moral  law.    The 
moral  law  manifests  itself  in  opposition  to  these  empirical      ' 
and  egoistic  tendencies  in  the  foim  of  duty,  an  uncondi- 
tional command,  a  categorical  imperative.    The  distinc- 


I 


iS6 


THE   CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 


KANT 


157 


tively  moral  element  appears  most  clearly  in  cases  wh&re 
duty  and  incHnation  stand  out  in  sharp  contrast.  Kant 
even  says  in  a  certain  place  that  a  state  of  mind  in  which 
I  follow  duty  even  though  it  is  in  conflict  with  my  pur- 
poses is  the  only  one  which  is  really  good  in  itself. 

The  moral  law  must  be  purely  formal.    Every  real  con- 
tent, every  purpose  would  degrade  it  to  the  level  of  the 
empirical  and  hence  to  the  material.    The  moral  law  can 
do  nothing  more  than  indicate  the  form  of  the  fundamental 
principles  which  our  actions  are  intended  to  express,— 
that  is  to  say,  that  these  fundamental  principles  are 
capable  of  being  based  on  a  universal  principle  of  legisla- 
tion in  such  manner  as  to  enable  all  rational  beings  to  obey 
them  under  similar  circumstances.    I  must,  e.  g.  return 
borrowed  property  even  though  no  one  knows  that  it  does 
not  belong  to  me;  because  the  contrary  course  will  not 
admit  of  generahzation,  and  in  that  case  no  one  would  make 
a  loan  to  another.     Kant  however  here  clearly  presupposes 
that  man  is  a  member  of  society.    This  maxim  is  therefore 
not  purely  a  priori.    He  likewise  realizes  the  need  of  a 
more  realistic  formulation  of  the  maxim  and  the  necessity 
of  a  real  object  of  human  action.    The  highest  object  can 
be  given  only  through  the  moral  law,  and  Kant  discovers 
this  object  in  the  very  dignity  which  every  man  possesses 
in  the  fact  of  being  capable  of  becoming  consaous  of  the 
moral  law.    From  this  he  deduces  the  principle:  "Act  so 
as  to  treat  humanity,  in  thyself  or  any  other,  as  an  end  always, 
and  never  merely  as  a  means!" 

The  moral  law  is  not  objective,  but  deeply  imbedded  m 
the  nature  of  man  and  identical  with  the  essential  nature 
of  volition.  Law  and  liberty  are  not  separate  concepts. 
They  express  only  the  autonomy  of  man  viewed  from  op- 
posite sides.    As  an  empirical  being  man  is  subject  to 


psychological  laws,  but  as  a  rational  being  he  is  elevated 
above  all  empirical  conditions  and  capable  of  oriSS 
a  senes  of  changes  absolutely.  But  man  possesses  S 
capaa  y  only  as  an  "intelligible  character,"  as  a  "thing-S! 
Itself."  AndsincetWngs^n^n^selvescannev^ 
m  e^nce^is  ta^SisIEI^orlntaEiibS^^ 
empincal  nece^ity  ever  to  conflict  with  each  oTEir7^a«/ 
here  mtro-aSHiTa  positive  use^onhe  concept  of  the  thing- 

R.fhZ',^^^^'^.^^'^^  'P"'^^  P'"^^'^^  °f  ethics  in  his 
RecMslehre  and  his  Tugendlehre.    Both  works  appeared  in 

t?ilf  '^-J-^e -press  of  old  age.-Right,'ac<SSng 

thetm  o/the     ?  *5'  T''T  '''''''''^  ^^^^  -Wcf 
the  will  of  the  mdividual  can  be  united  with  the  will  of 

another  according  to  a  universal  principle  of  liberty  As 
a  matter  of  fact  man's  only  original  right  is  Hb  rty  i  e 
nrnnunity  from  the  arbitrary  demands  of  every  otW  in: 
dividual  m  so  far  as  it  can  obtain  together  with\e  Hberty 
of  others  according  to  a  universal  law.  Even  thoS 
^a«/  makes  a  sharp  distinction  between  the  RigS  andlhe 
Moral  (Legality  and  Morality),  he  nevertheless  "gaM 
Z  °'''^^"''°"  *°  ''^^'^  ^°«-ty  as  far  as  possible  acco  d 

reatatlom'/- ""  >  "%^'  ^""^^  ''''  ^^^^^  '^"^y  in  the 
realization  of  the  dignity  of  man,  which  is  based  on  auton- 

qualities.    To  be  useless  and  superfluous  is  to  dishonor 
hmnamty  m  our  own  person.    Besides  personal  perfect 

ani'^Tr"  °i  ''^'"  f  "  "^""^^  °f  f undamentai*  p  " 
tance.  The  perfection  of  others  on  the  other  hand  can  oX 

be  realized  through  their  own  efforts;  and  we  proi  for 

our  own  happiness  even  through  a  natural  instinct 


158 


THE  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


3.  Kant  aimed  to  establish  the  pure  autonomy  and 
spontaneity  of  the  moral  sense,  and  especially  as  inde- 
pendent of  all  theological  presuppositions.  But  he  was 
nevertheless  convinced  that  religion  and  morality  are 
vitally  related.  He  finds  the  transition  from  moraHty  to 
reHgion  to  rest  on  the  fact  that  man  is  destined  to  reahze 
the  imconditional  moral  law  in  the  empirical  world,  i.  e. 
in  the  world  of  finitude,  limitation  and  conditionality. 
Ideal  and  reaHty  here  appear  in  sharp  contrast  to  each 
other,  which  gives  rise  to  a  demand  for  harmony  between 
liberty  and  nature,  virtue  and  happiness,  and  it  is  just 
because  experience  offers  no  guarantee,  that  religious  pos- 
tulates, which  contain  the  conditions  of  such  a  harmony, 
are  formulated.  Besides  the  freedom  of  the  will  pre- 
viously cited,  there  are  according  to  Kant  two  additional 
postulates:  viz.  the  immortaUty  of  the  soul  and  the  exist- 
ence of  God.  Kant  is  convinced  that  these  postulates  re- 
veal a  universal  htmian  need.  Faith  is  the  natural  con- 
sequence of  the  sentiment  of  morality,  even  though  faith 

is  not  a  duty. 

The  possibility  of  faith  rests  upon  the  fact  that  knowl- 
edge is  limited  to  phenomena.  The  native  element  of  the 
dogmas  of  faith  is  the  thing-in-itself .  But  these  dogmas 
add  nothing  to  our  knowledge.  This  follows  even  from 
the  fact  that  our  intellectual  and  intuitional  forms  do  not 
pertain  to  the  thing-in-itself.  Religious  ideas  are  nothing 
more  than  analogies  or  figures  of  speech.  Kant  even  goes 
so  far  as  to  say  that  if  the  anthropomorphisms  are  care- 
fully discarded  from  the  psychological  attributes  ascribed 
to  God,  nothing  remains  but  the  empty  word. 

This  fact,  which  even  applies  to  the  ideas  of  natural 
reHgion,  is  still  mere  pertinent  to  the  ideas  of  positive  re- 
ligion.   In  his  treatise  on  Religion  inner halb  der  Grenzen  der 


KANT  ,59 

blossen  Vernunft  (1793)  Kant  shows  that  important  ethi- 
cal ideas  are  hidden  within  the  Christian  dogmas.     In  the 
dogma  concerning  sin  he  discovers  the  experience  of  an  in- 
clmation,  deeply  imbedded  in  human  nature,  which  strives 
agamst  the  moral  law;  which  he  calls  " radical  evil  "    Kant 
regards  the  Bible  story  of  the  Fall  as  a  subjective  experi- 
ence on  the  part  of  each  individual,  not  as  an  historical 
event.     So  is  the  Bible  story  of  the  suffering  Christ  like- 
wise experienced  by  every  serious  human  being;  regard  for 
the  moral  law  gives  rise  to  a  new  man  who  must  endure 
the  suffering  due  to  the  constant  opposition  of  the  old 
man  of  sensual  inclination.— The  significance  of  a  purely 
histoncal  or  ^^ statutory  ^^  faith  is  only  provisional;  but  we 
respect  "the  form  which  has  served  the  purpose  of  bring- 
ing a  doctrine,  the  acceptance  of  which  rests  on  tradition 
—which  IS  irrevocably  preserved  in  every  soul  and  re- 
qmres  no  miracle,— into  general  influence." 

4.     Kant  maintains  a  sharp  antithesis  between  the 
world  of  experience  and  things-in-themselves  both  in  his 
theory  of  knowledge  and  in  his  ethics.    In  fact,  his  whole 
philosophy  is  characterized  by  these  sharp  antitheses. 
This  was  necessary  to  his  purpose,  if  he  would  demonstrate 
the  validity  of  knowledge  and  the  unconditionality  of 
ethical  ideals.     But  the  question  must  naturally  arise- 
even  in  consequence  of  the  critical  philosophy— Must  not 
even  these  distinctions  and  antitheses  be  ascribed  to  the 
method  of  our  human  understanding?    The  fact  that  this 
point  also  occurred  to  his  mind  with  more  or  less  definite- 
ness  is  a  splendid  testimony  to  Kant's  profound  critical 
acumen.    He  felt  the  need  before  concluding  his  reflec- 
tions, of  investigating  whether  there  might  not  be  view- 
points which— more  directly  than  the  religious  postulates 
—would  transcend  these  profound  antitheses.    He  thus 


i6o 


THE   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


KANT 


l6l 


il' 


discovers  certain  facts  which  show  us  how  existence  by 
virtue  of  its  own  laws  and  even  our  ethical  ideals  become 
matters  of  our  knowledge.  There  are  two  such  facts:  the 
one  is  of  an  aesthetic  nature,  the  other  biological  {Kritik 
der  Urtheilskraftj  1790). 

In  the  phenomena  which  we  call  beautiful  and  sublime 
the  object  inspires  in  us  a  sense  of  disinterested  satisfac- 
tion. In  the  case  of  the  beautiful  this  rests  on  the  fact 
that  our  intuitional  faculty  or  our  understanding  is  in- 
duced to  harmonious  cooperation,  in  that  the  parts  of  a 
phenomenon  are  readily  and  naturally  combined  into  a 
single  imit.  Kant  places  special  emphasis  on  the  piu-e 
immediacy  and  involuntariness  of  the  impression  of 
^beauty, — ^what  he  calls  free  beauty  (e.  g.  the  beauty  of  a 
flower,  of  an  arabesque,  of  a  musical  fantasy).  He  does 
not  regard  the  "secondary"  beauty  presupposed  in  the 
concept  of  an  object  (e.  g.  the  beauty  of  man  as  such)  as 
real  beauty. — In  contemplating  the  sublime  our  faculty 
of  comprehension  is  overwhelmed  and  the  sense  of  self 
subdued  in  the  consciousness  of  being  confronted  by  the 
immensity,  the  immeasurable  in  content  and  energy;  but 
even  in  this  very  vanquishment,  the  consciousness  of  an 
energy  superior  to  all  sensible  limitations  arises  in  our  con- 
sciousness: the  consdousness  of  ideas  and  of  the  moral 
law  as  transcending  all  experience.  The  really  sublime, 
according  to  Kanty  is  not  the  object,  but  the  sentiment  to 
which  it  gives  rise. 

Just  as  we  behold  the  activity  of  Being  in  harmony  with 
our  spiritual  dispositions  in  the  beautiful  and  the  sublime, 
even  so  the  genius  acts  his  part  as  involuntarily  as  a  process 
of  nature,  and  nevertheless  produces  works  which  have  the 
value  of  patterns  or  types.  Genius  is  a  talent  by  means  of 
which  nature  furnishes  rules  of  art, — ^it  is  typical  originality. 


Organic  life  presents  an  analogy  to  the  beautiful,  the 
sublune,  and  the  mgenious.    Nature  employs  a  method 
m  the  orgamc  realm  for  which  we  reaUy  have  no  concept 
Here  we  do  not  discover  a  being  originated  by  the  mecW 
ical  articulatK,n  and  interaction  of  parts;  nor  have  wTthe 
nght,  saentxfically,  to  assume  an  antecedent  plan  Z^rl 
mg  to  which  the  parts  are  afterwards  combined  (as  in  Se 
case  of  human  architecture).    The  organism  is  therefore 
unexplamable  either  teleologically  or  mechanically     B^t 
perhaps  the  antithesis  between  the  mechanical  and  the 
teleo  ogical  explanations  of  nature  rests  merely  on  the 
peculiarity  of  our  knowledge.    Our  understanding  pro! 
c^^ds  discursively,  i.  e.  it  proceeds  from  the  parts  i  the 
whole,  and  If  the  parts  are  to  be  regarded  as  defined  from 
the  viewpoint  of  the  whole,  we  are  obliged  to  apply  th2 
anthropomorphic  analogy  with  human  purposes.    But  in 
pure  being  the  same  regulation  which  provides  for  the 

t^S^  i  tT^u  °^  '''^^'^'  ^°""^  ^^P^ble  of  adap- 
tation. It  might  be  that  the  principles  of  mechanism  and 
of  teleology  are  after  all  identical  in  the  unknown  grounS 

The  same  might  be  true  also  of  the  antithesis 
of  pure  reason  which  formulates  natural  laws,  and 
the  practical  reason  which  propounds  ethical  ideals 
Such  being  the  case  it  would  follow  that  it  is  one 
and  the  same  principle  which  is  revealed  in 
the^Jaws     of    nature    and     in     the     principles    of 

Here  Kant  reverts  at  the  conclusion  of  Ws  career  to  a 

^7l^Un"^  '"'if  ^'"  considerably  during  his 
TI  ^fsemetne   Naturgeschichte  und   Theorie  des 

mmmek.     Etnztg  moglicher  Beweisgrund) ,  and  which  cer- 


l62 


THE   CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 


HERDER 


tainly  had  never  left  him.  He  suggests  the  possibility  of 
a  monistic  theory,  which,  according  to  his  conviction,  was 
incapable  of  scientific  elaboration. 

C.    Opponents  and  First  Disciples 

If  Kant  himself  felt  that  the  stupendous  critical  task 
made  it  necessary  to  appeal  to  a  fundamental  unity  be- 
hind the  variety  of  distinctions,  such  demand  must  neces- 
sarily become  even  more  insistent  to  independent  thinkers 
who  asstmied  a  critical  attitude  to  his  own  investigations. 
Independent  disciples,  if  they  had  seriously  studied  the 
doctrines  of  the  master,  must  likewise  have  felt  the  need 
of  a  greater  imity  and  harmony.  The  difference  between 
the  opponents  and  the  disciples  consists  in  the  fact  that  the 
former  asstmied  a  purely  polemical  attitude,  whilst  the 
latter  endeavored  to  forge  ahead  to  new  viewpoints  on  the 
basis  of  the  critical  philosophy;  the  former  oppose  the 
necessary  totality  of  life  and  faith  to  philosophical  analy- 
sis, whilst  the  latter  seek  to  realize  a  new  idea  of  totality 
by  means  of  a  thorough  analysis. 

I.  Foremost  among  the  opponents,  stands  John 
George  Eamann  (i 730-1 788),  ^'The  Wise  Man  of  the 
North,*'  who  was  one  of  Kant's  personal  friends.  After 
a  restless  youth  he  settled  in  Konigsberg  in  the  office  of 
Superintendent  of  Customs.  His  external  circumstances 
were  poor  and  he  experienced  profound  mental  struggles. 
He  was  a  foe  to  every  kind  of  analysis  because  of  a  morbid 
demand  in  his  own  nature  for  a  complete,  vital  and  un- 
divided spiritual  reality.  He  finds  the  ground  of  religion 
in  our  total  being  and  it  is  far  more  comprehensive  than 
the  sphere  of  knowledge.  The  life  of  pure  thought  is  the 
most  abstract  form  of  existence.  Eamann  refers  to  Hume 
as  not  having  been  refuted  by  Kant  (the  Prussian  Hume). 


163 


In  harmony  with  Giordano  Bruno  he  thinks  existence 
consists  of  a  coincidence  of  opposites  (coincidentia  opposi- 
torum),  which  are  compatible  with  Hfe,  but  in  reflective 
thought  remain  forever  incompatible.  This  explains  the 
futility  of  analysis.  In  direct  antithesis  to  Kant  he  holds 
(m  the  posthumous  treatise  Metakritik  iiber  den  Furismus 
der  retnen  Vernunft)  that  reason,  apart  from  tradition 
faith  and  experience,  is  utteriy  helpless.  He  directs  Hs 
attack  more  particularly  against  Kant's  distinction  be- 
tween  matter  and  form,  intuition  and  reflection.  What 
nature  has  joined  together  man  must  not  put  asunder' 

John  Gottfried  Herder  (1744-1803)  likewise  emphasizes 
the  helplessness  of  reason:  It  is  a  product,  not  an  original 
pnnciple.  He  makes  the  racial  character  of  poetry  and 
religion  prominent,  regarding  them  as  the  immediate  prod- 
ucts of  the  human  mind,  in  contrast  to  clear  conception 
and  volitional  conduct.     He  extols  the  ages  in  which  the 

^^9^:^^?:^mrm¥^chwetTy,  philosophy  and  religion 
were  one.     He  aimed  to  penetrate  behind  the  division  of 
la^T^rtn  the  realm  of  mind.    During  the  sixties  he  was  an 
enthusra'slTc  student  6r Kant,  whom  he  attacks  rather  in- 
directly in  the  Ideen  zur  Fhilosophie  der  Geschichte  der 
Menschheit  (1784-1791),  which  is  his  most  important  work 
more  directly  in  his  later,  less  significant  treatises  {Meta- 
kntik,  1799,  Kalligone,  1800).    As  opposed  to  Kant   he 
demes  the  opposition  between  the  individual  and  society 
The  individual  is  identified  with  the  entire  race  by  in- 
numerable unconscious  influences,  and  his  inmost  being 
is  modified  by  historical  development.    On  the  other  hand 
the  goal  of  history  is  not  alone  determined  by  the  race  as 
a  whole  but  likewise  by  the  individual.    Herder  was  no 
less  opposed  to  the  distinction  between  mind  and  nature 


i64 


THE   CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 


God  and  the  world,  than  to  the  sharp  distinction  between 
the  individual  and  society,  or  between  the  conscious  and 
the  unconscious.  God  can  no  more  exist  apart  from  the 
world  than  the  world  can  exist  apart  from  God,  and,  Hke 
his  friend  Goethe,  he  was  an  admirer  and  exponent  of 
Spinoza  J  to  which  Lesnng  referred  in  the  famous  conver- 
sation with  Jacohi.  His  ecclesiastical  position  did  not  pre- 
vent him  from  expressing  his  thoughts  freely  and  coura- 
geously. {Gott,  1787.)  On  this  point  he  disagreed  with 
his  friends  Hamann  and  Jacohi,  notwithstanding  their 
common  emphasis  of  the  total  and  indivisible  life. 

Friedrich  Heinrich  Jacohi  (i 743-1819),  the  third  mem- 
ber of  this  group,  as  already  observed,  exposed  the  con- 
tradiction resulting  from  the  Kantian  theory  of  the 
*Hhing-in-itself"  {David  Hume  Hher  den  Glauhen,  oder 
Idealismus  und  Realismus,  1787).  Like  Hamann  and 
Herder,  he  likewise  fails  to  find  in  the  Kantian  philosophy, 
and  in  all  philosophy  for  that  matter,  the  complete,  total, 
undivided  unity  which  can  only  be  found  in  life  and  in 
unmediated  faith.  He  contends  that  philosophy,  if  it  is 
to  be  consistent,  must  annul  all  distinctions,  combine 
everything  into  a  single  series  of  causes  and  effects,  and 
thus  not  only  the  perfect  and  the  vital,  but  even  all  orig- 
inality and  individuality,  would  be  annulled.  He  used 
this  argument  in  his  Brief  en  iiher  Spinoza  (1785)  against 
the  philosophy  of  the  enlightenment.  In  his  David 
Hume  he  used  the  same  argument  against  Kant,  and 
later  he  made  similar  objections  to  Fichte  (Jakohi  an 
Fichte,  1799)  and  Schelling  {Von  den  gottlichen  Dingen, 
1811).  He  regards  even  direct  perception  a  miracle, 
since  it  is  utterly  impossible  to  furnish  any  demonstrative 
proof  of  the  reality  of  the  objective  world.  We  are  bom 
into  faith.    Jacohi  defends  the  rights  of  the  individual 


REINHOLD 

both  in  the  realm  of  morals  and  of  relidon  Tficr...^  ^1 
right  for  a  beautiful  soul  to  be  guS  b"  the  affe  w' 
even  though  it  should  thus  contradict  .d^^^^^Z^ 
2.  The  Kantian  philosophy  was  first  introduced  inl' 
;t  S)  tT'  Tr'-''^'  ^^-  '''  kantis^Pml 
Remhold  had  become  a  monk  in  his  early  yoSh    but 

^^^^^C:^S^  ^^  rationalistic  Xotpt' 

and  the  Cathohc  faith  became  too  strong,  he  fled  the  clois 
ter,  became  acquainted  with  the  Kani?;n  philos^  i" 
Weimar  and  was  shortly  afterwards  called  to  a  pXsor 

Mhe  inL^^^^^^^^  Jena  now  became  the  centi 

ot  the  philosophical  movement  inspired  by  Kant      ^n  ' 

contrast  to  KanVs  multiplicity  of  dis'tinctiJs  and  Us 

Re^nhold  ^ro^o^^^  the  derivation  of  everything  froTa 

X  J  X 1^  T\  :'  r  ""''"'^"  Vorstellungsver^ 
ti  Ihat  ?;  ^^/^^"^^^  "^^  P--ciple  from  the  pos- 
tulate that  every  idea  sustains  a  twofold  relation  to  a 
subject  as  well  as  to  an  object.     Consciousness,  as  a  mat' 

K    I   T'.  T'''''  ^^  ^^"^  ^  relationship.     That  whfch 
W  caUed  Form  is  that  element  of  an  idea  by  mea^s  of 
which  It  IS  related  to  the  subject.     It  is  necesLrtn 
same  a  thing-in-itself,  because  it  is  imp^LSS^^^^^^^^ 
ect  to  produce  the  object.     The  fact  that  he  conceiv^ 
he  thmg-m-itself  as  something  entirely  distinct  frorn^f 
tnhrf\"'^'"'''  ^,,,,,,,  ,,  ,  contradiction  six 
IS  in  gTT;-.  ™^  --^-^-tion  is  clearly  elab- 
orated m  G.  E.  Schultze's  Aenesidemus  (1792) 

The  clearest  exposition  of  the  error  resulting  from  pos 
s  bT/i'^  '^l^-^-^^f  as  a  positive  concept  howe've. 
IS  by  Salomon  Matmon  (1754-1800).     The  thing-in-itself 
IS  mtended  to  be  the  cause  of  the  matter  of  our  knowlSl 


i66 


THE  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


SCHILLER 


—but  we  never  discover  any  absolute,  i.  e.  entirely 
unformed  matter,  in  our  consciousness,  and  it  would 
therefore  be  impossible  even  to  inquire  concenung 
the  cause  of  the  matter!  The  pure  matter  (pure 
sensation)  is  an  "idea"  like  the  pure  form,  the  pure 

subject.  .  , 

Maimon,  the  Lithuanian  Jew,  foUowing  the  example  of 
Reinhold  in  quitting  the  Catholic  cloister,  abandoned  his 
native  village  with  its  Umitations  and  poverty,  m  order  to 
satisfy  his  inteUectual  hunger  in  Germany.  Kant  ad- 
mitted that  Maimon  was  the  man  who  best  understood 
him;  but  the  venerable  master  was  nevertheless  dissatis- 
fied'with  the  criticisms  and  corrections  offered  by  his 

brilliant  disciple.  '        ."*  ' 

Maimon  saw  clearly  that  the  mere  reference  to  the  con- 
ditions of  experience  is  not  the  solution  of  Hume's  prob- 
lem- for  what  Kant  calls  experience,  the  permanent,  neces- 
sary coherence  of  impressions,  is  the  very  thing  that  Hume 
denies  By  experience  Hume  understands  nothing  more 
than  impressions.  That  wMch  is  given  in  experience  is 
never  anything  more  than  a  succession  of  impressions,  and 
it  is  useless  to  appeal  to  the  categories,  for  they  are  nothing 
but  rules  or  ideas  used  in  our  investigations.  The 
concept  of  causality,  e,  g.,  enables  us  to  attain  the 
highest  possible  degree  of  continuity  in  the  series  of  our 

impressions. 

It  is  not  reason  that  impels  us  to  transcend  experience, 
but  the  imagination  and  the  desire  for  completeness. 
These  are  the  motives  that  give  rise  to  the  ideas  (m  the 
Kantian  sense),  to  which  we  afterwards  ascribe  objective 
reaUty.  It  is  not  the  objects  which  are  believed  to  exist 
on  these  grounds,  but  rather  the  constant  striving  after 
totaJity-which  is  the  source  of  faith-that  constitutes 


167 


the  highest  reality.  (Versuch  einer  TranscendentalphUos. 
ophte,  1790.  Philosophisches  Worterbuch,  ijoi.  Versuch 
etner  neuen  Logik,  1794.) 

There  is  a  close  analogy  between  Reinhold,  Maimon  and 
Fnednch  Schller  (1759-1805).    SchUler,  like  the  others 
ran  away  from  his  cramping  environment  (the  Militar^^ 
school  at  Stuttgart).    And  then,  after  the  writing  of  his 
first  sentunental  essays,  he  devoted  himself  more  thor- 
ougHy  to  the  I^ntian  literature.    He  greatly  admired 
Kant  s  indefatigable  research  and  the  exalted,  ideal  char- 
acter of  his  ethics.    But  from  his  point  of  view  Kant  had 
nevertheless  over-emphasized  the  antitheses  of  human 
nature,  and  severed  the  moral  nature  too  completely  from 
the  actual  development  and  ambitions  of  men.    Duty  an- 
peared  to  be  a  kind  of  compelling  force  which  man's  higher 
nature  exercises  over  his  lower  nature.    SchUler  therefore 
asserts  that  harmony  is  the  highest  criterion  in  life  as  well 
asm  art.  _  All  the  elements  in  the  nature  of  man  must 
cooperate  m  his  actions.   In  order  to  be  good,  an  act  must 
not  only  bear  the  badge  of  dignity,  but  likewise  of  grace- 
fulness.   Morality  is  slavish  as  long  as  it  consists  of  self- 
command    (Uber    Anmut    und    Wurde,    1793).    SchUler 
elaborates  this  theory  more  fully  in  his  Briefen  Uber 
aesthetische  Erziehung  (1795)  which  shows  a  decided  agree- 
ment with  Rousseau's  problem  of  civilization  (which  like- 
wise exerted  a  profound  influence  on  the  reflections  of 
Kant).    The  important  thing  is  to  surcharge  the  spon- 
tarieous  fullness  of  the  natural  Ufe  with  the  independence 
and    freedom    of    human    life,    the  devotion  to  ever- 
changing  circumstances  with  the  unity  of  personaUty, 
the     matter-impulse    with    the    form-impulse.      The 
solution  of  this   problem  is  found  in  play,  which  is 
the  beginning  and  prototype   of  art.     It  is  only  in 


i68 


THE  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


the  free  play  of  his  energies  that  man  acts  as  a 
totality.  The  aesthetic  state  is  therefore  the  highest 
perfection  of  culture:  it  is  at  once  the  end  and  the 
means  of  development,  which  transcends  all  coarseness 
and  all  harmony. 


SIXTH    BOOK. 

THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   ROMANTICISM. 

The  history  of  philosophy,  from  the  Renaissance  onward 
has  revealed  the  fact  that  philosophy  is  not  an  exclusive 
world.     It  was  in  fact  the  new  theory  of  nature  and  the 
new  methods  of  natural  science  that,  in  all  essential 
respects,  determined  the  problems  and  the  character  of 
modem  philosophy;    to  these  must  be  added  the  new 
humamstic  movements.    And  later  on  Kant  was  not 
only  influenced  by  the  opposition  between   Wolff  and 
Hume,  but  likewise  by  the  Newtonian  natural  science 
and  Rousseau's  problem  of  civilization.    The  develop 
ment  which  foUowed  during  the  first  decades  after  Kant 
furmshes  a  new  type  of  thought,-the  romantic  tendency 
of  thought  at  the  transition  to  the  nineteenth  century 
exerased  a  profound,  in  part  even  a  fatal,  influence  on 
philosophy     Philosophy  here  reveals  an  undue  suscepti- 
bility to  the  influences  of  other  departments  of  thought 
Otherwise  the  philosophy  of  Romanticism  would  have 
been  unable  to  supplant  the  critical  philosophy 

Kant  had  indeed  aroused  a  profound  enthusiasm,  and  he 
had  a  large  foUowing  in  his  own  age.    But  tHs  was  largely 
due  to  the  seriousness  and  the  depth  of  his  fundamental 
pnnaples  of  ethics.    The  new  age  was  consciously  op- 
posed to  the  eighteenth  century,  the  period  of  the  EnltRht- 
enment  to  which  Kant,  despite  his  profounder  conception 
nevertheless    belonged.     It    now    became  necessary  to 
institute  a  profound  investigation  of  nature  and  history 
directly.     Men  were  anxious  to  enjoy  spiritual  life  in  its 
unity  and  totahty.    Science,  poetry  and  religion  were 

169 


lyo 


THE  PHILOSOPHY   OF   ROMANTICISM 


FICHTE 


171 


no  longer  to  be   regarded  as  distinct  or  even  hostile 
forces,  but  merely  as  different  forms  of  a  single  life.     No- 
valis    proclaimed    this    gospel    with    fervent    zeal.    All 
antitheses    must    be    transcended.     Kanfs    philosophy 
abotmded  in  antitheses;  the  profound  antithesis  between 
thought  and  being  especially  now  became  a  rock  of 
offense.     Kant's  suggestion  of  a  unity  at  the  basis  of  all 
antitheses  was  taken  as  the  starting-point.    According  to 
Kant  this  conception  represented  one  of  the  boundaries 
of  thought;    but  now  this  was  to  furnish  the  starting- 
point  whence  all  else  is  derived.     Reinhold  had  aheady 
made  the  start.    He  proposed  the  ideal  of  knowledge 
assumed  by  Romanticism,    No  one  inquired  whether  such 
an  ideal  were  logically  tenable:  does  not  every  inference 
in  fact  presuppose  at  least  two  premises!    The  intensity 
of  their  enthusiasm  led  men  to  believe  that  they  could 
dispense  with  the  traditional  methods  of  thought  and 
of  science.    As  Goethe's  Faust  (this  work  appeared  just 
at  this  time  and  the  Romanticists  were  the  first  to  ap- 
plaud it),  dissatisfied  with  everything  which  previously 
passed  for  knowledge,  resorted  to  magic,  in  the  hope  of 
thus  attaining  an    explanation  of   *'the  secret  which 
maintains  the  universe  in  harmony,"  so  the  philosophers 
of  Romanticism  beUeved  it  possible  to  discover  a  new 
avenue  to  absolute  truth.    They  resorted  to  intellectual 
magic.    An  attempt  was  made  to  sever  the  relationship 
which  had  existed  between  natural  science  and  philos- 
ophy since  the   days  of  Bruno  and  Descartes,     Despite 
the  intense  enthusiasm,  the  sublime  sentiment  and  the 
profound  ideas  of  the  Romantic  school,  it  nevertheless 
represents  a  vain  attempt  to  discover  the  Philosopher's 
Stone.    But  just  as  the  ancient  Alchemists  were  not  only 
energetic  students,  but  in  their  effort  to  produce  gold 


Mcewise  acquired  important  idea^  and  experiences,  so 
the  significance  of  German  idealism  must  not  be  estimated 
alone  by  the  results  of  its  keen  speculation.  The  fact  is 
indeed  patent,  that  profoimd  ideas  neither  stand  nor 
fall  with  the  demonstration  which  men  seek  to  give  them 
The  kernel  may  persist  even  though  the  husk  decays. 
I  he  persistence  of  values  is  no  more  identical  with  the 
persistence  of  certain  special  f onns  in  the  reahn  of  thought 
than  m  the  reahn  of  energy. 

A.    The  Speculative  Systems. 
I.    John  Gottlieb   Fichte   (1762-1814),   the  son  of  a 
Saxon  peasant,   took    an  enthusiastic  interest,   during 
his  school  period,  in  the  spiritual  struggles  of  Lessin, 
and  later,  after  struggling  with  extreme  poverty  during 
his  umversity  life,  was  led  to  philosophy  by  the  writings 
of  Kant,    His  service  at  the  University  of  Jena  met  with 
great  success,  not  only  because  of  his  intellectual  keen- 
ness   and    his    eloquence,    but    likewise    on    account 
of   the    impression  made  by    Ms    moral    earnestness.  . 
Having   been    dismissed   on   account    of   his   religious 
views  he  went  to  Berlin,  where  he  afterwards  received  an 
appointment.    He  takes  first  rank  among  those  who, 
m  the  disastrous  period  following  the  battle  of  Jena 
labored  for  the  preservation  of  the  sentiment  of  patriot' 
ism   and   of  hope,  especially  by  his   Addresses   to  the 
German  Nation,  delivered  during  the  winter  of  1808-0 
while  Berlin  wa^  still  in  the  hands  of  the  French. 

^,    Fichte' s  philosophy  is  inspired  by  the  criticism  of 
the  Kantian  theory  of  the  thing-in-itself  in  which  Jacohi   - 
^chulze  and  Maimon  were  aheady  engaged.    The  motives 
at  the  root  of  Fichte' s  reflections  however  were  not  purely 
theoretical.    Action  constituted  his  profoundest  motive 


172 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   ROMANTICISM 


riCHTE 


173 


\\ 


from  the  very  beginning,  and  he  even  regarded  thought 
as  action.     It  was  perfectly  consistent  therefore  for  him 
to  say,  in  the  clearest  exposition  of  his  doctrine  which 
he  has  given  {Erste  Einleitung  in  die  Wissenschaftslehre, 
1797),  that  a  man's  philosophy  depends  primarily  on  his 
character,    Fichte  contends  that  there  are  two  funda- 
mental divisions  in  philosophy:    Idealism,  which  takes 
the  subject,  the  ego,  as  its  starting-point,  and  Dogmatism, 
which  takes  the  object,  the  non-ego,  as  its  starting-point. 
This  follows  from  the  nature  of  the  problem  of  philosophy, 
i.  e.  the  explanation  of  experience.    But  experience  con- 
sists of  the  knowledge  of  objects.    And  this  admits  of 
but  two  alternatives,  either  to  explain  objeqjts  (things) 
from  the  standpoint  of  knowledge  (the  ego),  or  knowl- 
edge (the  ego)  from  the  standpoint  of  objects  (things). 
Persons  of  an  active  and  independent  nature  will  be 
disposed  to  choose  the  former  method,  whilst  those  of 
a  passive   and  dependent  nature  will  adopt  the  latter 
method.    But    even    then    idealism,    from    the    purely 
theoretical  point  of  view,  has  the  advantage  of  dogmatism 
(which  is  liable,  either  as  MateriaHsm,  Spiritualism  or 
Spinozism,  in  all  three  cases  to  resolve  itself  into  a  theory 
of  substance  or  things).    Because  it  is  impossible  to 
deduce  knowledge,  thought,  the  ego,  from  things  (i.  e. 
regarded  either  as  material,  spiritual  or  neutral).    But 
'  idealism  makes  knowledge,  thought,  the  ego,  its  point  of 
departure  and  then  proceeds  to  show  how  experience, 
i.  e.   certain   definite   forms  of  knowledge,  arises.    The 
ego  can  contain  nothing  (known  or  thought)  which  is 
not  posited  by  the  activity  of  the  ego. 

In  his  chief  work  (Grundlage  der  gesammten  Wissen- 
r  schaftslehre,  1794)  Fichte  starts  with  the  activity  of  the 
,  ego.     The  non-ego  exists  for  us  only  by  virtue  of  an 


activity  of  the  ego;  but  the  ego  posits  itself.    Every  idea 
involves  this  presupposition  in  a  peculiar  and  special 
form.    But  the  only  method  of  discovering  it  is  by 
abstract  reflection,  for  immediate  consciousness  reveals 
nothing  more  than  its  products.     We  are  never  directly 
consaous  of  our  volitions  and  activities;   we  take  note 
of  our  limitations,  but  never  of  the  thing  which  is  thus 
limited.    Free,  unconstrained  activity,  which  transcends 
the  antitheses  between  subject  and  object,  can  only  be 
conceived    through   a   higher   order   of   comprehension 
through  intellectual  intuition.     That  is  to  say,  it  tran-  fr 
scends  every  concept  because  every  concept  presupposes 
an  antithesis. 

But  it  is  impossible  to  deduce  definite,  particular  ob- 
jects from  this  free  activity,  i.  e.  from  the  pure  ego.     In  '  ^^ 
addition  to  the  presupposition  of  self-activity  by  m'eans 
of  which  the  ego  posits  itself,  we  must  therefore  postulate 
a  second   presupposition:    The   ego   posits   a  non-ego.  ^^ 
Both   propositions,    notwithstanding    their    opposition  ' 
must  be  combined,  and  thus  by  thesis  and  antithesis  we 
amve  at  synthesis;  so  that  our  third  proposition  must  be 
stated  thus:    The  ego  posits  a  Hmited  ego  in  antithesis 
to    a    Hmited    non-ego.       This    finally    brings    us    to 
the  ^  level    of    experience.      The    limited    ego    is    the 
empuical  ego,  which  is  constantly  placed  in    antith-  ' 
esis  to  objects  and  must  constantly  overcome  limita- 
tions. 

Fichte  moreover  seeks  to  deduce  the  universal  forms  ■ 
of  expenence  (the  Kantian  intuitional  forms  and  cate- 
gones)  from  these  fundamental  principles.  Thus,  e.  g. 
time  is  a  necessary  form  whenever  several  acts  of  the  ego 
are  to  be  arranged  in  a  definite  order  with  reference  to 
each  other,  and  causality  comes  under  the  third  funda- 


174 


THE  PHILOSOPHY   OF   ROMANTICISM 


FICHTE 


175 


mental  principle  (concerning  the  mutual  limitation,  i.  e. 

the  reciprocity  between  the  ego  and  the  non-ego).    All 

r  such  forms  are  forms  of  the  activity  of  the  pure,  tm- 

limited  ego,  which  forms  the  basis  of  the  empirical 

v.antithesis  between  ego  and  non-ego,  but  which  can  never 

\  manifest  itself  in  experience.- 

But  how  is  it  possible  to  deduce  this  antithesis  of  an 

i  empirical  ego  and  a  non-ego  from  the  pure  ego?    How 

,  does  it  happen  that  this  unlimited  activity  is  resisted  and 

'  broken?— These  questions  are  theoretically  unanswerable 

according  to  Fichte.    Whence  this  opposition,  whence  this 

impetus  comes  we  do  not  know,  but  it  is  necessary  to  the 

explanation   of   actual    (empirical)    consciousness.    And 

the  limitation,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  does  not  even  concern 

us  theoretically,  it  pertains  only  to  the  practical  reason! 

**An  object  possesses  independent  reality  only  in  so  far 

as  it  refers  to  the  practical  capacity  of  the  ego."    The 

'  only  explanation  of  the  existence  of  a  world  of  non-egos 

.  is  that  we  are  intended  to  act:  activity  and  effort  as  a 

matter  of  fact  presuppose  opposition  (resistance)  and 

I  /  limitation.    Our  task  consists  in  realizing  our  liberty 

and  independence  through  the  successive  transcendence 

,  of  limitations.    But  the  ultimate  presupposition  forever 

^ '  remains  that  pure  activity  which  is  revealed  in  us  under 

;\  the  form  of  an  impulse  to  act  for  action's  sake.    This 

presupposition  furnishes  the  only  possible  explanation  of 

the  unqualified  obligation  which  Kant  expressed  m  the 

categorical  imperative. 

This  complete  subordination  of  the  theoretical  to  the 
practical  resulted  in  a  complete  refutation  of  fatalism. 
For  the  dependence  of  the  whole  system  of  our  ideas 
Tests  far  more  profoundly  on  our  volition  than  our 
activity  on  our  ideas. 


b.  ^  The  empirical  ego  is  dependent  even  as  limited.     It 
experiences  an  impulse  to  transcend  the  objects  in  order  to 
transform  them  into  means  of  pleasure.    Activity  reveals 
itself  at  first  as  mere  natural  impulse.    But  the  impulse 
to  act  for  action's  sake  can  never  be  satisfied  by  a  finite 
object,  and  hence  consciousness  will  forever  strive  to 
transcend  what  is  merely  given.     Man  gradually  learns  ^ 
to  regard  things  merely  as  means  towards  his  own  self-  ^ 
development.      It    follows    therefore    that    the    highest  ! 
moral  obligation  is  expressed  in  the  law:  realize  the  pure 
ego!    And  this  realization  comes  to  pass  by  virtue    of 
the  fact  that  each  particular  act  belongs  to  a  series  which  ' 
leads  to  perfect  spiritual  liberty.  {Sittenlehre,  1798.)         1, 

Radical  evil  consists  of  the  indolence  which  holds  fast 
to  existing  conditions  and  resists  progress.    And  more- 
over it  leads   to   cowardice  and  treachery.    The  first 
impulse  in  the  development  towards  liberty  comes  from 
men  in  whom  natural  impulse  and  liberty  are  in  equi- 
librium, and  who  are  consequently  regarded  as  types. 
The    spontaneous    respect    and    admiration    accorded 
to  such  typical  characters  is  the  primitive    form    of 
moral   affection.    The  man  who  is   stiU  incapable  of 
self-respect  may  nevertheless  perhaps  respect  superior 
natures.     Fichte    elaborated    this    idea    in    considerable 
detail  in  his  famous  Reden  an  die  deutsche  Nation  (1808) 
as  the  foundation  of  a  theory  of  national  education. 
The  spontaneous  adoption  or  creation  of  ideal  types 
forms  the  middle  term  between  passive  admiration  and 
perfect  liberty. 

According    to    Fichte   the    religious    consciousness   is  - 
really  implied  in  the  moral  consciousness.     For  the  very  . 
fact  that  I  strive  to  realize  my  highest  ideal  assumes  at 
the  same  time  that  the  realization  of  this  ideal  by  my 


176 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   ROMANTICISM 


SCHELLING 


177 


:  own  activity  is  possible.     I  must  therefore  presuppose  a 

';  world-order  in  which  conduct  based  on  moral  sentiment 
can  be  construed  consistently.  Religion  furnishes  an 
immediate  validation  of  the  confidence  in  such  a  world- 

'  order.  It  is  not  necessary  that  I  should  collect  the 
experiences  which  reveal  my  relation  to  this  world-order 
and  formulate  from  them  the  concept  of  that  unique 
being  which  I  call  God;  and  ascribing  sensible  attributes 
to  this  Being  and  making  Him  the  object  of  servile  and 
egoistic  reverence,  may  even  be  positively  harmful. 
This  were  indeed  real  and  actual  atheism.  The  fact  that 
I  conceive  of  God  as  a  particular  Being  is  a  consequence 
of  my  finitude.  The  act  of  conceiving  involves  limitation 
'  and  every  supposed  concept  of  a  God  is  the  concept  of 
an  idol!  {Vher  den  Grund  unseres  Glaubens  an  eine 
gottliche  Weltregierungy  1798.  Appellation  an  das  Publicum 
gegen  die  Anklage  des  Atheismus,  1799.) 

c.  Fichte  was  never  satisfied  with  the  expositions 
which  he  had  given  of  his  theory.  He  was  constantly 
trying  to  attain  greater  clearness  both  for  himself  and  for 
his  readers.  He  modified  his  theory  unconsciously  by 
these  repeated  restatements.  In  his  later  drafts  he 
discarded  the  scholastic  method  of  proof  which  he  had 
employed  in  the  first  exposition  of  the  Science  of  Knowl- 
edge, He  then  placed  more  stress  on  the  immediate 
states  and  facts  of  consciousness.     But  the  more  he 

I  delved  into  the  inexpressible  ideas  of  absolute  reality 
and  no  longer  conceived  this  reality  as  active  and  infinite, 

'  but  as  at  rest  and  superior  to  all  effort  and  activity,  the 

s  more  his  theory  likewise  assumed  a  mystical  character. 
His  religion  was  no  longer  mere  practical  confidence,  but 
it  now  became  a  matter  of  devotion,  of  absolute  self- 

■  surrender.    This  idea  is  quite  prominent  in  his  Anweis- 


ung  zum  seligen  Lehen  (1806).  Grundziige  des  ocgcn- 
wdrtigen  Zeitalters  (1800)  is  likewise  of  vast  importance  on 
account  of  the  incisive  polemics  against  the  eighteenth 
century  as  ''the  age  of  enlightenment  and  imp  over  ishmenr 
{Auf-und  Auskldrung).  Here  we  find  a  clear  statement 
of  the  antithesis  which  was  later  (in  the  school  of  St 
Simon)  described  as  the  antithesis  between  the  organic 
and  critical  age. 

2.     Friedrich    William    Schelling    (1775-1854)    is    the 
typical  philosopher  of  Romanticism.     Having  no  critical 
prejudices   whatever,   in  Jhis   youthful   treatises   which 
constitute  the  exclusive  basis  of  his  philosophical  signif- 
icance, he  proclaims  a  new  science  which  is  intended  to 
transcend  all  the  antitheses  still  confronting  the  traditional 
science.    He  labored  first  at  Jena,  afterwards  at  Stuttgart 
Munich  and  Erlangen.     His  youth  was  characterized  by 
great  productiveness,  which  was  however  foUowed  by 
a  remarkable  period  of  stagnation  in  his  productivity 
After  the  death  of  Hegel,  when  nearly  seventy,  he  was 
caUed  to  Berlin  by  Frederick  William  IV,  for  the  purpose 
of   counteracting  the  radical  tendencies  arising  from  the 
Hegelian  philosophy.     His  lectures  at  Berlin,  which  had 
aroused  great  anticipations,  were  however  a  complete 
disappointment. 

a.  Schelling  began  his  philosophical  career  as  a  col- 
laborator of  Fichte,  His  first  essays  constitute  a  further 
development  of  the  Fichtean  science  of  knowledge.  But 
he  could  not  accept  the  subordinate  position  ascribed 
•to  nature  in  Fichte's  philosophy  (as  mere  limitation 
and  means).  He  undertakes  to  show  in  his  Ideen  zu 
\etner  Philosophic  der  Natur  (1797)  and  in  various  essays 
m  natural  philosophy,  that  it  is  impossible  that  nature 
should  assume  such  a  mechanical  relation  to  mental  life 


178 


THE  PHILOSOPHY   OF   ROMANTICISM 


SCHELLING 


179 


He  States  his   problems  very    clearly;    the    romantic 
character  consists  in  the  treatment  and  the  solution. 
Whilst  the  natural  scientist  lives  in  the  midst  of  nature 
as  in  the  immediate  presence  of  reaHty,  the  philosopher  of 
nature  inquires  how  it  is  possible  to  know  nature:    ^  How 
nature  and  the  experience  of  it  is  possible,  this  is  the 
problem  with  which  philosophy  arose."    Or  as  it  has^  also 
been  expressed:    ''The  phenomenality  of  sensibility  is  the 
borderland   of  all   empirical   phenomena."     {Erster   Ent- 
wurf  eines  'Systems  der  Naturphilosophie,  1799.)      This 
setting  of  the  problem  recalls  the  observation  of  Hobbes, 
namely,  that  the  most  remarkablp.  of  all  phenomena  is 
the  fact  that  phenomena  do  exist.    The  realist  and  the 
/   romanticist  agree  in  the  statement  of  the  problem,  how- 
ever widely  they   differ   in   their   respective   solutions. 
-Schelling  wishes  to  explain  nature  from  the  viewpoint  of 
mind  and  thus  substitute  a  new  science  instead  of  the 
natural  science  founded  by  Galileo  and  Newton.    The 
natural  scientist   cannot    explain  how    nature   can  be 
known.     The  natural   philosopher  explains  it  by  con- 
struing  nature  as  unconscious  mind.    Fichte  had  even 
distinguished    a    twofold    tendency    in    consciousness: 
an      infinite,      unconditioned       activity      (the      pure 
ego)       and     Hmitation     (by     the     non-ego).      Hence 
if  there  is  to  be  any  possible  way  of  understanding  the 
origin  of  mind  from  the  forces  of  nature,  it  follows  that 
these  two  tendencies  must  akeady  be  manifest  in  nature, 
only  in  lower  degrees,  or,  as  Schelling  puts  it,  in  lower 
potentialities.    And  since  nature  differs  from  mind  only 
as  a  matter  of  degree,  in  which  the  tension  of  those  ten- 
dencies, the  polarity  of  opposites,  as  Schelling  calls  them, 
is  manifested,  it  follows  that  the  various  phenomena  of 
nature    likewise    show    only    quantitative    differences. 


Gravity,  light  and  the  organism  represent  the  various  levels 
through  which  nature  ascends  to  mind.    The  relation  of 
contraction    and    expansion    varies    on    the    different 
levels;  in  the  organism  they  coexist  in  inner  unity,  and 
as  a  matter  of  fact  we  are  then  likewise  ah-eady  at  the 
threshold  of  consciousness.    Whilst  mechanical  natural 
science,  with  its  atoms  and  laws  of  motion,  reveals  to  us 
only  the  external  aspect  of  nature,  as  lifeless  objectivity 
It  IS  the  business  of  natural  philosophy  to  explain  nature 
as  It  really  is  in  its  inmost  essence,  whereby  it  at  the  same 
time  appears  as  the  preliminary  step  to  mind.    On  the 
lower  levels  the  objective  element  predominates,  on  the 
higher  levels  the  subjective  element.    These  three  levels 
of  nature  correspond  to  knowledge,  action  and  art  in  the 
realm  of  mind  {System  des  transcendentalen  Idealismus, 
1800).    Art  portrays  directly  and  concretely  what  phi' 
losophy  can  describe  only  abstractly.    Here  therefore  the 
two  tendencies  of  being  manifest  themselves  in  perfect 
unity.    Schelling  could  no  longer  regard  the  Absolute 
as  pure  ego  because  the  relation  of  the  latter  to  the  non- 
ego  was  wholly  external.    The  distinction  between  the 
subjective  and  the  objective  vanishes  entirely  in  the 
Absolute;    it  is  pure  identity.     Antitheses  exist  only  for 
finite  mind. 

■  Schelling^ s  Philosophy  of  Nature  is  really  nothing  more 
than  a  symbolic  interpretation  of  nature,  not  an  expla- 
nation of  nature.  He  is  even  conscious  of  tliis  fact  him- 
self. In  one  of  his  best  essays  (Methode  des  akademis^ 
Chen  Studiums,  1803)  he  remarks:  '^Empiricism  con- 
templates  being  as  an  object  apart  from  its  meaning, 
because  the  nature  of  a  symbol  is  such  as  to  possess  its  own 
peculiar  life  within  itself.  In  this  isolation  it  can  ap- 
pear  only  as  a  finite  object,  in  an  absolute  negation  of 


i8o 


THE  PHILOSOPHY   OF   ROMANTICISM 


SCHELLING 


l8l 


the  infinite."  That  is  to  say  the  natural  scientists  are 
not  aware  of  the  fact  that  nature  is  a  symbol,  hut  they 
regard  it  as  a  thing-in-itself .  The  Philosopher  alone 
understands  (because  he  starts  from  within  or  from 
above)  the  symbolic  significance.  But  then  Schelling's 
phHosophy  Hkewise  really  amounts  to  nothing  more 
than  a  system  of  analogies  and  allegories  which  are 
very  arbitrarily  applied.  It  is  not  without  justification 
that  the  term  ''Philosophy  of  Nature''  has  acquired  a 
suspicious  sotmd  in  scientific  ears. 

Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  Schelling  speaks  of  levels 
and  transitions,  he  is  nevertheless  not  an  evolutionist 
in  the  modem  significance  of  the  term.  He  does  not 
accept  any  real  development  in  time,  but  regards 
nature  as  a  magnificent  system  which  reveals  at  once 
the  profound  antithesis  of  subjectivity  and  objectivity 
in  the  greatest  variety  of  nuances  and  degrees,  whilst 
none  of  these  differences  pertain  to  the  absolute  ground 
of  his  system.  Time  is  nothing  more  than  a  finite  form.— 
Schelling' s  ideas  have  nevertheless  contributed  much 
towards  producing  the  conviction  of  the  inner  identity 
of  the  forces  and  forms  of  nature. 

b.  Schelling' s  philosophy,  with  various  modifications 
which  we  cannot  here  discuss,  bore  the  character  of 
''Philosophy  of  Nature"  throughout  its  first  period 
(until  1803).  But  a  problem  now  arises  which  all  specu- 
lative philosophy  must  eventually  take  up:  namely,  if 
the  Absolute  is  to  be  regarded  as  an  absolute  unity  or 
indifference,  how  shall  we  explain  the  origin  of  differences, 
of  levels  or  (as  Schelling  likewise  remarks)  of  potencies? 
How  can  they  have  their  ground  in  an  absolute  unity? 
He  treats  this  problem  in  his  essay  on  Philosophie  und 
Religion  (1804),  which  forms  the  transition  from  Schelhng  s 


period  of  the  philosophy  of  nature  to  that  of  the  phi- 
losophy of  reHgion.  If  experience  reveals  not  only 
differences,  but  even  antitheses  which  cannot  be 
harmonized,  it  must  mean  that  a  faU  from  the 
eternal  harmony  must  have  taken  place.  Historical 
evolution  implies  the  mastery  of  disharmonies  and 
the  restoration  of  harmonious  unity.  Just  as  he  had  made 
nature  the  preliminary  of  mind  in  the  Philosophy  of 
Nature,  he  now  Hkewise  construes  history  as  a  series  of 
stages;  not  only  the  former  but  the  latter  is  Hkewise  an 
Odyssey  of  the  soul, 

Schelling  elaborated  this  idea  more  fully  in  the  treatise 
Philosophische     Untersuchungen    uher     das     Wesen     der 
menschlichen  Freiheit  und  die  damit  zusammenhdngenden 
Gegenstdnde  (1809).     Schelling' s  pHlosophy  of  reHgion 
was  considerably  influenced  by  the  writings  of  Jacob 
Bohme,  as  this  treatise  in  particular  shows.     Schelling 
seeks  to  prove    that  the  only  way  God  can  be  conceived 
as  a  personal  being  is  to  assume  in  Him  an  obscure 
pnnciple  of  nature  which  can  be  clarified  and  harmonized 
by  the  unfolding  of  the  divine  life.     The  infinite  person- 
ality must     contain     the     antithesis     within     itself, 
whilst  the  finite  personalities  discover  their  antitheses 
outside  themselves.     But  without  opposition  and  resist- 
ance there  can  be  no  life  and  no  personaHty.     Hence 
God  could  not  be  God  if  there  were  not  something  within 
him  which  is  not  yet  God. 

Just  as  Schelling  had  read  mind  into  nature  in  his 
PMlosophy  of  Nature,  so  he  reads  nature  into  the  absolute 
tnind  in  his  PhHosophy  of  ReHgion.  But  that  obscure 
principle  contains  the  possibiHty  of  evil,  according  to 
Schelling  even  as  for  Bohme.  That  which  was  merely 
intended  to  be  principle  and  matter  may  separate,  i.  e. 


l82 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   ROMANTICISM 


isolate  itself.  We  can  thus  understand  egoism,  the  sin 
and  evil  in  nature,  the  irrational  in  general,  which 
refuses  to  conform  with  ideas. 

Thus  Schelling  passes  into  mythical  mysticism.  He 
elaborated  his  philosophy  of  religion  in  greater  detail 
in  works  which  appeared  after  his  death,  and  which  con- 
stituted the  content  of  his  Berlin  lectures  {PhUosophie 
der  Mythologie  and  PhUosophie  der  Offenbarung),  He 
regarded  the  history  of  religion  as  a  great  struggle  with 
the  Titanic  elements  which  had  been  isolated  by  the  Fall. 
This  struggle  takes  place  in  the  religious  consciousness 
of  mankind,  which  ascends  through  the  various  mythol- 
ogies to  Christianity,  and  finally  through  the  development 
of  Christianity  to  the  religion  of  pure  spirit.— In  addition 
to  briUiant  ideas  and  points  of  view,  we  find  here  also, 
just  as  in  the  Philosophy  of  Nature,  a  large  measure  of 
fantasy  and  arbitrariness. 

3.  George  William  Frederick  Hegel  (1770-1831)  is  the 
systematizer  of  Romanticism,  just  as  Fichte  was  its  moralist 
and  Schelling  its  mystic.  He  too  labored  at  the  Univer- 
sity of  Jena  in  his  youth.  Later  on  he  went  to  Bavaria, 
first  as  an  editor  and  afterwards  as  the  director  of  a  gym- 
nasium. He  appeared  again  in  the  capacity  of  university 
professor  at  Heidelberg,  but  soon  accepted  a  call  to  Ber- 
lin where  he  founded  a  large  and  influential  school. 

a.  Hegel  undertook  to  construe  the  ideas  which,  ac- 
cording  to  his  conception,  express  the  essence  of  the  various 
phases  of  existence  in  a  progressive  series  based  on  logical 
necessity.  What  he  called  the  dialectical  method  con- 
sisted in  the  discovery  of  the  inherent  necessity  with  which 
one  concept  leads  on  to  another  concept  until  at  last  all 
the  concepts  constitute  one  great  system.  Notwith- 
standing this  however,  this  purely  logical  charagter,  which 


HEGEL  jg^ 

is  SO  prominent  because  of  the  severely  systematic  fonn  of . 
Hegel  s  works,  is  not  the  fundamental  characteristic  of 
Hegelian  thought.    Hegel  was  naturaUy  a  reahst     His 
supreme  ambition  consisted  in  penetrating  into  the  real 
forces  of  bemg,  and  abstract  ideas  were  intended  to  ex-  ^ 
press  only  theforms  of  this  content.  He  was  of  course  con- 
vmced  that  the  elements  of  reality  in  every  sphere  are 
essentially  related  to  each  other  in  the  same  way  as  ideas 
are  m  the  mmd.    In  this  way  the  twofold  character  of  his  .• 
philosophy  as  realistic  penetration  and  logical  system  be- 
comes  clear.    Epistemologically  tHs  might  be  stated  as 
Mows:  namely,  that  he  once  more  annuls  the  distinction 
between  ground  and  cause  {ratio  and  causa)  which  Hume  and 
Kant  had  tnsisted  on  so  strongly.    To  this  extent  he  returns  • 
to  pre-cntical  dogmatism. 

The  realistic  character  is  still  quite  dominant  in  HegePs 
earher  works,  with  which  we  are  acquainted  through  his 
manuscripts  which  have  been  used  by  a  number  of  in- 
vestigators.     During  his  youth  he  was  much  occupied  with 
histoncal  studies  and  reflections,  especially  those  of  a  reHe- 
lous  nature.    He  paid  high  tribute  of  praise  to  the  periods 
m  which  men  dwelt  in  natural  fellowship,  because  the  in- 
dmdual  stiU  constituted  an  actual  part  of  the  whole,  and 
had  not  yet  asserted  itself  with  subjective  reflection  and 
cntiasm  as  is  the  case  in  modem  times.    Even  Chris- 
tiamty  appeared  to  him  as  a  sign  of  disintegration  because 
It  was  a  matter  of  individual  concern,  whilst  on  the  other 
hand  he  regarded  classical  antiquity  as  fortunately  situ- 
ated  because  the  individual  Hved  and  wrought  completely 
and  spontaneously  within  the  whole.    Like  Fichte  (in  the 
C^rundzuge   des   gegenwdrtigen   Zeitalters)    Hegel   likewise 
experienced  a  profound  sense  of  antagonism  towards  the 
enhghtenment,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  he  too  be- 


1 84 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF   ROMANTICISM 


tt 


t » 


longed  to  this  period.  But  it  was  not  HegeVs  affair  to 
revel  in  ecstasies  over  the  ideals  of  the  past.  According 
to  him  ideal  and  reality,  reason  and  actuality,  are  not  real 

opposites. 

He  stood  quite  close  to  Schelling  for  a  considerable 
period,  during  which  time  they  pubUshed  a  paper  in  part- 
nership.   But  important  differences  gradually  arose  and 
Hegel  assails  his  former  colleague  openly  in  the  preface  to 
his  first  important  treatise,  Phdnomenologie  des  Geistes 
(1807).    He  admits  of  course  that  Schelling  understood 
that  the  problem  consists  in  discovering  the  harmony  be- 
tween the  antitheses.    But  he  operates  with  a  mere 
schema  (subject-object),  which  he  applies  to  everything 
mechanically,  instead  of  showing  how  the  one  member  of 
the  antithesis  effects  the  transition  to  the  other  by  an  in- 
herent necessity,  and  how  a  higher  unity  of  both  is  then 
formed.    The  absolute  cannot  be  an  immobile  indiffer- 
ence; it  is  process,  life,  mind.— He  showed,  even  in  this 
book,  how  ordinary,  practical  consciousness  rises  to  specu- 
lative consciousness  through  a  series  of  steps,  each  of 
which  leads  to  its  successor  by  means  of  the  contradictions 
discovered  within  itself.    The  reader  is  thus  brought  to 
the  point  from  which  he  may  grasp  the  pure  system  of 
ideas.    This  evolution  takes  place  in  the  individual  as 
well  as  in  the  human  race  as  a  whole;  the  Phenomenol- 
ogy is  both  a  psychology  and  a  history  of  civiHzation. 
The  same  law  pertains  to  both  reahns,  the  same  progres- 
sive dialectic. 

b.    According  to  Hegel  dialectic  is  not  only  character- 
istic of  thought,  but  it  is  likewise  a  fundamental  law  of 
being,   because  one  form  of  existence   always  implies 
'  another  and  things  are  members  of  one  grand  totality. 
No  single  idea  is  capable  of  expressing  the  totahty  of 


HEGEL  jg^ 

being.  Each  idea  leads  to  its  own  negative,  because  it 
reveals  itself  as  limited  and  to  that  extent  untrue.  Nega- 
tion then  brings  a  new  concept  into  existence.  But  since 
this  one  is  likewise  determined  by  the  first,  the  necessity 
of  a  higher  unity  is  evident,  a  unity  within  which  both  find 
their  explanation,  because  they  are  ''annulled''  in  a  two- 
fold significance,— namely,  negated  in  their  isolation  and 
at  the  same  time  affirmed  as  moments  of  the  higher  unity. 
Hence,  according  to  the  dialectical  method,  thought  pro- 
ceeds in  triads,  and  the  system  of  all  these  triads  constitutes 
truth.  Truth  can  never  be  particular,  hut  must  always  ber 
totality. 

The  fact  that  dialectic  constitutes  the  process  of  being 
is  revealed  by  the  fact  that  every  phenomenon  of  nature 
and  of  history  leads  beyond  itself  and  exists  only  as  an 
element  of  a  totality.     It  is  evident  that  Hegel  here  con- 
strues all  being  after  the  analogy  of  consciousness;  the 
things  which  constitute  the  universe  are  supposed  to  sus- 
tain the  same  relations  among  themselves  as  ideas  sustain 
in  our  minds.     But  he  likewise  makes  use  of  other  anal- 
ogies.   The  effects  of  contrast  show  how  the  antitheses 
may  oscillate  from  one  to  the  other.    And  organic  growth 
shows  how  it  is  possible  for  the  earlier  stages  to  determine 
the  later  and  to  continue  their  existence  in  them.     Hegel 
constructs  his  theory  of  universal  dialectic  upon  such  anal- 
ogies without  being  clearly  conscious  of  the  fact  himself. 
Everything  perishes  and  yet  there  is  nothing  lost.    The 
memory  of  the  universal  mind  preserves  everything.    And 
it  is  because  of 'its  inherent  identity  with  the  universal 
mind  that  the  human  intellect  is  capable  of  evolving  the 
pure  forms  of  the  universal  dialectic.     Kant's  doctrine  of 
the  categories  is  transformed  into  a  worid-system  {Wissen- 
schaft  der  Logik,  181 2-1 8 16). 


i86 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   ROMANTICISM 


HEGEL 


187 


Pure  logic  however  is  only  the  first  part  of  the  system. 
This  follows  from  the  fact  that  the  pure  forms  of  logic 
constitute  the  antithesis  to  real  nature.  We  are  led  from 
logic  to  the  philosophy  of  nature  (likewise  the  profoundest 
problem  in  HegeVs  system),  i.  e.  to  the  doctrine  of  the 
phenomena  which  occur  in  time  and  space,  by  a  dialectical 
necessity.  As  a  matter  of  fact  we  have  here  to  deal  with 
Schelling's ^^'YaXa,''  HegeVs  exposition  of  the  philosophy 
of  nature  is,  so  far  as  particulars  are  concerned,  quite  as 

.  arbitrary  and  fantastic  as  that  of  Schelling,  He  likewise 
regards  nature  as  a  series  of  levels:  we  approach  physics 
through  mechanics,  and  thence  to  the  organic  sciences,  but 
always  under  an  ^^  inherent  necessity, "  Hegel  has  no  more 
room  for  a  real  development  in  time  than  Schelling, — 
The  philosophy  of  nature  brings  us  to  the  philosophy  of 
mind,  the  "higher  unity"  of  the  first  two  parts  of  the  sys- 
tem. The  struggle  incident  to  the  objective  distraction  of 
space  and  time  matures  the  abstract  idea  and  it  now  re- 
turns within  itself.  Dialectic  likewise  leads  through  a 
series  of  steps  in  this  case.  Subjective  mind  (in  a  series 
of  steps  known  as  soul,  consciousness  and  reason),  the 
mental  life  of  the  particular  individual,  leads  to  objective 
mind,  which  is  manifested  in  the  triad  of  right,  individual 

.  morality  (conscience)  and  social  morality  (social  and 
pohtical  life).  The  higher  unity  of  subjective  and  object- 
ive mind  is  absolute  mind,  the  totality  of  mental  life,  in 
which  the  antithesis  of  subject  and  object  is  annulled. 
Absolute  mind  is  revealed  in  art,  religion  and  philosophy 
{Encyclopddie  der  philosophischen  Wissenschaften,  18 17). 
c.    We  shall  discuss  two  divisions  of  the  philosophy  of 

.  mind  somewhat  more  in  detail;  the  doctrine  of  objective 

*  mind,  which  Hegel  elaborated  in  his  Philosophie  des  Rechts 
(182 1),  and  the  Philosophy  of  Religion  as  treated  in  the 


Vorlesungen  uher  die  Philosophie  der  Religion,  published 
posthumously. 

Although  Hegel  no  longer  refers  to  the  ancient  charac- 
ter  of  the  state  with  the  same  romantic  fervor  that  char- 
acterized his  early  youth,  his  theory  of  the  state  neverthe- 
less  assumes   an   antique   character.    Actual   morality 
appears  in  the  life  of  the  family,  political  society  and  the 
state,  and  not  only  forms  an  antithesis  to  abstract  and  ob- 
jective right,  but  also  to  "morality,"  to  subjective  con- 
science in  its  isolation  from  the  historical  forms  of  society. 
The  good  exists  in  moral  association  and  does  not  depend 
upon  individual  caprice  and  contingency.    The  moral 
world  reveals  the  activity  of  something  which  is  superior 
to  the  consciousness  of  the  individual.    The  individual  can 
only  realize  the  highest  type  of  development  by  a  life  in 
and  for  society.     "  The  moral  substance  "  is  the  mind  which  i 
governs  the  family,  the  political  society,  and  above  all  the 
state.    The  state  is  the  complete  actuality  of  the  moral 
idea:  the  fact  that  the  state  exists  is  the  witness  of  God's 
course  in  the  worid.    The  constitution  of  the  state  is  a 
necessary  consequence  of  its  nature,  and  individual  con- 
struction is  here  quite  as  much  out  of  place  as  individual 
criticism.    The  modem  state  as  a  matter  of  fact  is  an 
organization  of  liberty;  but  this  does  not  imply  that  the 
individual  can  participate  in  the  government  accord- 
ing to  his  individual  caprice.    The  wise  shall  rule.    Gov- 
ernmental authority  belongs  to  the  enlightened,  the  scien- 
tifically educated  bureaucracy.    The  fact  that  the  system- 
atic development  of  the  Hegelian  philosophy  of  right 
shows  a  striking  correspondence  with  the  constitution  of 
Prussia  at  that  time  (as  far  as  it  may  be  called  a  constitu- 
tion) is  not  to  be  explained  as  a  mere  accommodation, 
but  it  was  rather  a  consequence  of  HegeVs  realism.    Hegd 


i88 


THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF  ROMANTICISM 


thinks  the  divine  idea  is  not  so  feeble  as  to  be  unable  to 
permeate  reality — of  the  state  as  well  as  of  nature — and 
it  is  not  the  business  of  philosophy  to  contrive  new  ideals, 
but  to  discover  the  ideality  of  the  vital  forms  realized 
hitherto. 
The  contrast  between  formalism  and  realism  in  the 

'  Hegelian  philosophy  appears  perhaps  most  clearly  in  the 
sphere  of  religion.    Here  too  it  is  HegeVs  sole  purpose  to 

.  penetrate  the  facts;  even  here  the  sole  business  of  philos- 
ophy consists  in  understanding  what  is  actually  given. 
He  was  convinced  that  philosophy  which  is  developed  to 
perfect  clearness  has  the  same  content  as  religion.  Philos- 
ophy indeed  seeks  the  unity  of  being  through  all  antitheses 
and  at  every  step, — and  religion  teaches  that  everything 
has  its  origin  in  the  One  God.    The  only  difference  is  this: 

'  that  what  philosophy  expresses  in  the  form  of  the  concept, 
religion  expresses  in  the  form  of  idea,  of  imagination.  Phi- 
losophy states  in  the  language  of  abstract  eternal  concepts 
what  religion  proclaims  concretely  and  enthusiastically  in 
sublime  symbols.  The  relation  (as  Hegel  remarks,  bor- 
rowing an  illustration  from  Hamann)  is  like  that  between 
the  closed  fist  and  the  open  palm.  Religion,  e.  g.,  speaks  of 
the  creation  of  the  world  as  a  definite  act  in  time,  accom- 
plished once  for  all,  whilst  philosophy  conceives  the  re- 

>  lation  between  God  and  the  world  as  eternal  and  timeless 
(like  that  of  ground  and  consequence).  In  the  religious 
doctrine  of  reconciliation  God  becomes  incarnate,  lives  as 
a  man,  suffers  and  dies  on  the  cross:  according  to  philos- 
ophy this  too  is  an  eternal  relationship :  the  incommensu- 
rability of  the  finite  and  the  infinite  which  must  constantly 
be  annulled  in  consequence  of  its  finite  form,  if  it  is  to  de- 
scribe an  infinite  result. — In  the  fervency  of  his  zeal  Hegel 
failed  to  see  that  this  distinction  of  form  might  be  of  de- 


SCHLEIERMACHER 


189 


cisive  importance.  He  describes  the  distinction  between 
two  world  theories— the  theory  of  monism  or  immanence 
and  the  theory  of  dualism  or  transcendence.  Hegel  re- 
veals his  romanticism  in  the  naive  conviction  that  values 
are  never  destroyed  by  transposition  into  new  forms.  The 
problem  which  he  thus  neglected,  as  we  shall  presently 
see,  was  very  clearly  defined  by  his  disciples. 

B.    Critical  Romanticists 

The  critical  philosophy  was  not  wholly  suppressed  dur- 
ing the  romantic  period.  There  were  certain  thinkers, 
who,  whilst  profoundly  affected  by  the  romantic  tendency' 
had  nevertheless  not  rejected  the  results  of  the  critical 
philosophy.  Although  critics  in  epistemology,  they  en- 
deavored at  the  same  time  by  various  methods  to  secure  a 
theory  of  life  which  would  transcend  the  limitations  of 
science.  Among  these  we  mention  Schleiermacher^Schopen- 
hauer  and  Kierkegaard, 

I.  Friedrich  Daniel  Ernst  Schleiermacher  (1768-1834) 
completed  his  first  courses  of  study  at  a  Moravian  institu- 
tion, and  even  there  ah-eady  laid  the  foundation  of  his  dis- 
tinctive theory  of  life.  The  desire  for  a  broader  and  more 
critical  training  took  him  to  the  imiversity  at  Halle,  where 
he  later,  after  serving  a  nimiber  of  years  in  a  pastorate, 
became  professor  of  theology.  After  the  battle  of  Jena 
he  went  to  Berlin,  where,  as  professor  and  preacher,  he 
labored  not  only  on  behalf  of  science  and  the  church,  but 
in  the  interest  of  public  questions  and  the  affairs  of  the 
nation. 

He  came  to  the  conclusion  early  in  life  that  the  real 
characteristic  feature  of  human  life,  its  real  nature,  has  its 
seat  in  the  affections,  and  that  in  them  alone  man  experi- 
ences the  totality  of  his  personal  self.    In  addition  to  this 


IQO 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  ROMANTICISM 


SCHLEIERMACHER 


191 


he  acquired,  both  by  independent  reflection  and  by  the 
study  of  the  works  of  Kanty  a  clear  insight  into  the  Hmits 
of  human  knowledge.    He  did  not  join  the  circle  of 
romanticists  until  later.     Dilthey  has  described  this  course 
of  the  development  of  the  critical  romanticist  in  his  Leben 
ScMeiermachers.     Schleiermacher's  position  in  the  history 
of  philosophy  is  characterized  by  the  fact  that  he  keeps  the 
spirit  of  the  critical  philosophy  aHve  within  the  ranks  of 
romanticism.  His  Socratic  personality,  in  which  the  capac- 
ity of  complete  inner  devotion  was  imited  with  a  remark- 
able degree  of  calm  discretion,  furnished  the  basis  for  the 
combination  of  romanticism  and  criticism.    According  to 
his  view  the  things  which  criticism  destroyed  and  would 
no  longer  regard  as  objectively  true  did  not  necessarily 
lose  their  religious  value  if  they  could  be  supported  as  the 
symbolic  expression  of  an  affective  personal  experience. 
ScMeiermacher  reveals  his  romanticism  especially  in  the 
fact  that  he  does  not  distinguish  sharply  between  symbol 
and  dogma.    He  failed  to  see  that  as  a  matter  of  fact  he 
assigned  to  religion  a  different  position  in  the  spiritual  life 
than  that  which  the  chxirch  could  accept.     In  his  Reden 
uher  die  Religion  an  die  Gehildeten  unter  ihren  Verdchtern 
(1799)  he  defined  immediate  intuition  and  feeling,  by 
which  man  is  enabled  to  experience  the  infinite  and  the 
eternal,  as  the  psychological  basis  of  religion.    Here  every 
antithesis  is  annulled,  whilst  knowledge  must  forever 
move  from  idea  to  idea  and  volition  from  task  to  task. 
The  only  method  by  which  intellectual,  aesthetic  and 
moral  culture  can  attain  their  completion  is  by  finally 
resting  on  subjective  concentration  such  as  is  given  in 
feeling  alone.    Hence  S Meier macher  defines  religion  from 
the  standpoint  of  human  nature,  not  vice  versa.    He  seeks 
to  show  the  value  of  religion  for  life. 


ScMeiermacher^ s  philosophical  labors  cover  the  depart 
ments  of  eptstemology,  ethics  and  the  phUosophy  of  religion 
.   t.    ^.^/^vff  gates  the  presuppositions  of  knowledge 
m  his  Dialechk  (which  was  published  only  after  his  death) 
Knowledge  exists  only  in  the  case  where  every  single  idea 
IS  not  only  necessarily  combined  with  all  other  ideas  but 
where  an  actual  reality  likewise  corresponds  to  the'par- 
ticular  Ideas.    The  relations  between  ideas  must  corre- 
spend  with  the  relations  between  things.    Particularly 
does  the  causal  relation  of  objective  reality  correspond  to 
the  combination  of  concepts  expressed  in  judgments. 
Here  Schleier macher  presents  a  mixture  of  criticism  and 
dogmatism.     He  forgets  that  the  only  knowledge  we  have 
of  reality  IS  by  means  of  our  thoughts,  and  furthennore 
to  reality  and  thought  forever  remain  incomparable. 
He  nevertheless  assumes  that  the  identity  of  thought  and 
being  IS  a  presupposition  of  knowledge,  but  not  in  itself 
biowledge.    He  thus  opposes  Schelling,  for  whom  in  fact 
that  v^rj  identity  constituted  the  highest  kind  of  knowl- 
edge.    But,  according  to  ScUeier macher,  Schelling  offers 
nothing  more  than  abstract  schemata.-The  pathway 
from  that  presupposition,  which  fornis  the  starting-point 
of  knowledge,  to  the  idea  of  a  complete  totality  of  all  exist- 
ence,  which  would  be  the  consummation  of  aU  knowledge- 
or,  as  It  may  likewise  be  expressed,  from  the  idea  of  God  to 
the  Idea  of  the  universe-is  a  long  one,  and  it  can  never  be 
compassed   by   human   knowledge.     Knowledge   is   only 
provmonal     We  are  always  somewhere  between  the  be- 
^nmng  and  the  end  of  knowledge  and  neither  the  one  nor 
the  other  can  be  transformed  into  actual  knowledge.    But 
beyond  the  confines  of  knowledge  the  unity  of  being  can 
be  directly  experienced  in  the  affections  and  expressed  in 
symbols.    Here  dialectic  justifies  every  symbol  which 


192 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   ROMANTICISM 


maintains  the  inseparability  of  the  beginning  and  the  end 
(God  and  the  world).  It  is  impossible  to  construe  either 
of  these  from  the  standpoint  of  the  other.  But  dialectic 
insists,  in  opposition  to  the  reHgious  method  of  represen- 
tation, on  the  symboHc  character  of  all  expressions  which 
are  supposed  to  describe  God,  the  world,  and  their  respec- 
tive relationship.  Thus,  e.  g.  the  term  ''person,''  when 
applied  to  God,  is  nothing  more  than  a  symbol. 

b.    Just  as  knowledge  presupposes  the  unity  of  thought 

and  being,  so  action  likewise  presupposes  the  unity  of  will 

and  being.    Action  would  be  impossible  if  the  will  were 

absolutely  foreign  and  isolated  in  the  world.    The  former 

presupposition  can  no  more  be  a  fact  of  knowledge  than 

the  latter.    We  are  thus  led  from  dialectics  to  ethics  (cf. 

a  series  of  essays  published  in  Complete  Works,  III,  2, 

and  Philosophische  Sittenlehre,  pubHshed  by  Schweizer, 

1835).    According  to  S Meier macher  ethics  is  a  theory  of 

development  in  which  reason  and  desire  cultivate  and 

govern  nature.    This  development  would  be  impossible 

if  reason  and  will  were  not  already  present  in  nature. 

Nature  is  a  kind  of  ethics  of  a  lower  order,  a  diminutive 

ethics.    Will  reveals  itself  by  degrees— in  the  inorganic 

forms,  in  the  life  of  plants  and  of  animals,  and  finally  in 

human  life.    There  is  no  absolute  beginning  of  ethical 

development.     Here  S  Meier  macher  in  direct  opposition  to 

Kant  and  FiMe  coordinates  ethics  with  nature  and  history. 

But  it  is  nevertheless  only  within  the  realm  of  humanity 

that  he  accepts  an  actual,  real  development. 

Ethical  capacity  consists  partly  of  organization,  i.  e.  of 
constructive  and  formative  power,  partly  symbolizing, 
i.  e.  expressive  and  descriptive  power.  Its  organizing 
activity  is  shown  in  material  culture  and  in  commercial 
and  legal  business.    In  its  symbolizing  activity  man  ob- 


SCHLEIERMACHER 

jectifies  his  itmer  experiences  in  art,  science  and  religion 
-Whilst  m  his  youth  Schleiermacher  {Monologe  SS 
was  impatient  with  the  prominence  ascibed  to  ma S 
culture  and  as  a  matter  of  fact  wanted  to  reco^^  "ht 
symbolizing"  activity  alone  as  ethical,  later  on^e  triS 
to^r.o^..e  both  foi^s  of  activity  in  th;ir  distin-ctt"^ 

He  disagreed  with  Kant  and  Fichte  not  only  in  the  mat- 
ter of  the  intimate  relation  of  ethics  to  nat^e,  but  Se- 
mse  m  Ins  strong  emphasis  on  individuality.    The  natoe 
of  he  mdividual  is  not  exhausted  in  the  u^versal  and  "! 
cal.    The  only  way  an  individual  can  possess  any  moral 
value  IS  by  n.eans  of  the  fact  that  he  expresses  S  is 
universal  m  human  nature  in  an  individual  way     hL 
acts  must  therefore  necessarily  contain  something  whkh 
codd  not  pertain  to  another  individual.    The  in^^S 
ould  not  have  been  fully  active  in  the  case  of  any  ret  5 
h.  which  lacked  the  distinguishing  marks  of  his  ISlS- 

/'  A  ?.?'  inception  of  religion  Schleiermacher  is  in- 
clined both  to  mteUectualism  and  to  moralism.    He  assies 

£rZ     T  rr  "'"^  *^^  ^^-'^  -'  the  mental  S! 

S^^t^'*.'"*^"^  '^*'"^'  '^^  -h-^  t^t  which  is 
mdividual  IS  just  m  process  of  differentiating  itself  from 

h  umvers^,  .Jhout  however  as  yet  having  attaTedTS 
antithesis  of  subject  aniobject.    This  point  is  riven  in 

die  Rehgton)  descnbed  as  a  sense  of  unity   later  on  rtn 
Derchristliche  Glauie,  x8.x)  rather  a^a  sen^  7i  de 
Pendence.    It  is  the  Urth-place  of  pZanal^     In  £l 

fta  Je^/"  '\rt  P"""^  -'^  'i^P-<ient'  it  i^  h^e 
that  we  acquire  the  basis  of  our  personality.  The  sense 
of  dependence  becomes  a  consciousness  of  (L  at  the  r^J 


194 


THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF  ROMANTICISM 


SCHOPENHAUEE 


I9S 


ment  when  reflection,  begins;  the  term  "God"  imphes 
"the  source  of  our  susceptible  and  independent  betng." 

Religious  ideas  and  concepts  are  aU  secondary.    They 
are  deduced  by  reflection  on  the  inmiediate  sUtes  of  feel- 
ing in  which  the  essence  of  religion  consists.    The  demand 
for  expression  and  communion  furnishes  the  impulse  to 
clothe  the  subjective  experiences  in  word  and  symbol. 
Such  words  and  symbols  constitute  dogmas,  i.  e.  symbol- 
ical expressions  of  religious  states  of  mind.    Each  separate 
dogma  must  bear  a  direct  relation  to  some  feehng,  and  the 
dogmatician  must  never  deduce  a  dogma  from  another 
dogma  by  purely  logical  processes.     Whenever  dogmatic 
statements  are  taken  literally,  dogmatics  becomes  mythology. 
This  appertains,  e.  g.  to  the  ideas  of  the  personahty  of 
God,  personal  immortality,  creation,  the  first  human  pair, 
etc.    It  likewise  applies  to  the  idea  of  miracle.    The  in- 
terests of  rehgion  can  never  place  God  and  the  world  in 
opposition  to  each  other.    The  Christian-religious  feeling 
is  characterized  by  the  fact  that  Christians  experience  a 
purifying  and  an  enlargement  of  their  own  circumscnbed 
feelings  through  the  type  expressed  in  the  congregation; 
in  this  way  they  experience  Christ  as  the  Redeemer. 

ScUeiermacher's  philosophy  marks  an  important  ad- 
vance, especiaUy  in  its  psychological  aspect.  But  he  is 
likewise  disposed  to  identify  symbolic  statement  and 
causal  explanation  in  the  same  way  as  he  identifies  dogma 
and  symbol.  On  these  points  the  philosophy  of  rehgion 
receives  further  development  at  the  hands  of  Strauss  and 

Feuerbach. 

2.  Arthur  Schopenhauer  (i 788-1860)  is  a  Kantian  in 
epistemology,  but  he  claims  to  have  discovered  a  direct 
revelation  of  the  thing-in-itself .  He  discovers  the  solution 
of  the  riddle  of  the  universe  with  romantic  precipitancy 


by  means  of  an  intuition  which  instantly  drops  aU  Umita- 
tions.  His  great  importance  rests  on  his  psychological 
views  and  on  his  philosophy  of  life  which  is  ba^ed  on  per- 
sonal experience. 

Schopenhauer,  the  son  of  a  wealthy  Dantzig  merchant 
enjoyed  a  well-rounded  education  and  became  acquainted 
with  the  world  early  in  life  by  means  of  travel  and  a  variety 
of  social  intercourse.    His  complete  independence  enabled 
him  to  devote  himself  entirely  to  his  studies  and  to  the 
elaboration  of  his  theory  of  life.    After  an  unsuccessful 
attempt  m  a  professorship  at  the  University  of  Berlin  he 
withdrew  into  private  life  at  FrankfortK)n-the-Main  where 
he  spent  the  rest  of  his  days.    From  his  own  inner  experi- 
ence he  had  very  early  become  acquainted  with  the  mys- 
tenous,  conflicting  energies  and  impulses  of  life;  and  the 
things  which  he  saw  around  him  at  times  aroused  his 
anger,  and  again  his  sympathy.    He  concluded  from  these 
expenences  that  the  beginning  of  philosophy  is  not  wonder 
but  confusion  and  despair,  and  he  endeavored  to  rise  above 
them  by  reflective  thought  and  artistic  contemplation 

a     Schopenhauer  elaborated  his  critical  theory  afready 
m  his  first  essay  (Uber  die  vierfachen  Wurzeln  des  Satzes 
vom  zureichenden  Grunde,  1813).     The  principle  of  suffi- 
cient reason  receives  its  four  different  forms  from  the  fact 
that  our  ideas  may  be  inter-related  in  four  different  ways: 
as  ground  and  consequence,  as  cause  and  effect,  in  space 
and  time,  and  as  motive  and  act.    Contemporaneously 
with  Hegel's  attempt  to  annul  the  distinction  between 
ground  and  cause,  emphasized  by  Hume  and  Kant,  Scho- 
penhauer shows  clearly  the  importance  of  this  distinction. 
Ihe  first  book  of  his  chief  work  {Die  Welt  als  Wille  und 
Vorslellung,  1819)  contains  his  theory  of  knowledge.    He 
differs  from  Kant  especiaUy  on  account  of  the  intimate 


196 


THE  PHILOSOPHY   OF  ROMANTICISM 


SCHOPENHAUER 


197 


relation  between  intuition  and  thought  which  he  main- 
tains. Sensation,  which  is  the  correlate  of  a  bodily 
change,  is  the  only  thing  which  is  directly  given.  But 
the  faculties  of  understanding  and  intuition  likewise  co- 
operate instinctively;  we  conceive  the  cause  of  sensation 
as  an  external  object,  distinct  from  our  body,  by  an  act 
which  reveals  the  theory  of  causality.  Space,  time  and 
causality  cooperate  in  this  projection.  Experience  never 
modifies  this  act,  which  indeed  even  forms  the  basis  of  the 
possibiHty  of  experience. 

Cognition  (sensation,  understanding,  intuition)  is  a 
product  of  our  physical  organization.  The  methods  of 
natural  science  never  get  beyond  materiaHsm.  Just  as 
we  discover  the  cause  of  a  sensation  in  a  physical  object 
distinct  from  our  body,  so  we  likewise  find  the  cause  of 
such  object,  as  well  as  its  states,  in  a  third  object,  etc.  The 
law  of  inertia  and  the  permanence  of  matter  are  the  direct 
impHcations  of  the  law  of  causahty.  The  insufficiency  of 
materialism  however  rests  upon  the  fact  that  the  principle 
of  sufficient  reason  pertains  only  to  the  objective  correlate 
of  the  idea;  matter  itself,  which  is  the  cause  of  the  sensa- 
tion and  of  the  idea,  is  present  only  as  the  object  of  the 
idea.  For  cognition  the  world  is  nothing  more  than  idea. 
We  are  not  concerned  with  anything  beyond  the  relations 
of  ideas  to  each  other.  It  is  impossible,  on  the  basis  of 
Ijheoretical  knowledge,  to  get  beyond  this  circle. 

But  what  is  being?  What  really  constitutes  the  aggre- 
gate of  these  objects  of  ideas?  Schopenhauer  believes  that 
he  has  discovered  a  method  of  unveiling  the  "thing-m- 
itself  "  The  principle  of  sufficient  reason  appertains  only 
to  us  as  cognizing  beings.  As  volitional  beings  we  ourselves 
are  thing-in-itself.  An  aspiration  and  yearning,  an  mi- 
pulse  towards  self-assertion,  is  active  in  the  profound 


depths  of  our  being,  beneath  every  idea,  which  is  manifest 
in  pleasure  and  in  pain,  hope  and  fear,  love  and  hate,— 
a  will,  which  constitutes  our  inmost  nature,  the  primary 
phenomenon!    We  understand  the  inmost  nature  of  the 
world  by  our  own  inmost  nature.    Thus,  with  the  help  of 
analogy,  an  analogy  whose  justification,  due  to  his  roman- 
tic temper,  he  never  questions,  he  makes  the  transition  to 
metaphysics.— The  fact  that  all  volition  is  a  temporal 
process  and  that  all  we  know  about  it  is  merely  phenom- 
enal, of  course  constitutes  a  real  difficulty.   {Herhart  called 
attention  to  this  difficulty  already  in  a  review  in  1820.) 
Schopenhauer  concedes  this  difficulty  in  the  second  volume 
of  his  chief  work  (which  appeared  twenty-five  years  later 
than  the  first),  but  thinks  that  volition  is  nevertheless  the 
phenomenon  with  which  we  are  really  identical.    But  in 
that  case  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason,  which  applies  to 
all  phenomena,  must  likewise  apply  to  volition,— and  then 
the  thing-in-itself  still  remains  undiscovered ! 

It  was  a  matter  of  profound  importance  for  the  develop- 
ment of  psychology  that  volitional  life  was  emphasized  so 
vigorously— and  in  its  details  frequently  so  ingeniously— 
in  contrast  to  the  Hegelian  intellectualism.— Beyond  this 
Schopenhauer  is  evidently  affected  by  Fichte,  not  only  in 
his  theory  of  will,  but  likewise  in  his  projection  theory 
which  forms  an  essential  part  of  his  theory  of  knowledge 
(especially  by  Fichte's  lectures  Uher  die  Thatsachen  des 
Bewusstseins) . 

Our  knowledge  of  will  does  not  rest  upon  direct  intro- 
spection alone.  It  likewise  possesses  phenomenal  form, 
because  our  whole  body  is  the  material  expression  of  will. 
Body  and  will  are  one.  Schopenhauer  could  therefore  call 
knowledge  (the  idea  and  its  object)  a  product  of  the  will 
quite  as  consistently  as  a  product  of  the  body.    The  body 


198 


THE  PHILOSOPHY   OF   ROMANTICISM 


SCHOPENHAUER 


i 


11! 


is  the  same  thing  seen  objectively  (physically)  as  the  wil 
seen  subjectively   (metaphysically).    The  operation  of 
will  is  manifest  throughout  the  whole  of  physical  nature- 
in  organic  growth,  in  the  functional  activity  of  muscles  and 
nerves  in  fact  in  all  the  forces  of  nature.    Schopenhauer 
endeavors  to  prove  this  in  detail  in  his  book,  Der  Wtlle  tn 
der  Natur  (1836),  and  in  the  second  volume  of  his  master- 
piece  because  here  he  Hkewise  operates  with  analogies. 
We  behold  the  operation  of  will  in  nature  through  a  series 
of  steps  (which  are  however  no  more  to  be  regarded  as 
temporal,  real  evolutional  steps  than  in  Schelhng  and 
Bezel)     The  steps  accordingly  vary  to  the  degree  of 
difference  between  cause  and  effect.    On  the  level  of 
mechanism  cause  and  effect  are  equivalent,  showing  a 
slight  degree  of  dissimilarity  ahready  in  chemism,  whilst 
in  the  organic  realm  the  cause  dwindles  to  a  mere  dis- 
charging  stimulus,   and  where   consciousness   enters  it 
simply  furnishes  the  motive.    The  dissimilarity  is  greatest 
when  we  come  to  the  last  step-and  here  indeed  the  causal 
relation  is  revealed  as  an  act  of  will! 

Will  manifests  itself  everywhere  as  the  will  to  live— tor 
the  mere  sake  of  living,  of  pure  existence.    Here  the  ques- 
tion, why,  no  longer  occurs;  the  prinaple  of  sufficient 
reason  does  not  apply  to  the  will  itself.    The  multiplicity 
of  forms  and  energies  in  nature,  the  movements  which 
are  forever  renewed,  and  the  everlasting  unrest  in  the 
world  reveal  the  presence  of  the  ever-active  energy  of  the 
impulse  of  self-assertion.    This  vague  impulse  involves 
us  in  the  illusion  that  Hfe  is  good  and  valuable.    The  will 
employs  this  illusion  as  the  inducement  for  us  to  maintain 
our  existence  at  any  cost.    Existence  understood  m  its 
real  nature,  just  because  it  consists  essentially  m  a  restless 
and  insatiable  hnpulse,  is  pain,  and  pleasure  or  satisfaction 


199 


only  arises  as  a  contrast-phenomenon,  namely,  when  this 
infernal  fire  is  momentarily  quenched.  All  pleasure  is 
illusory,  a  zero,  which  only  appears  to  have  positive  value 
by  contrast.  In  a  vivid  portrayal  of  human  and  animal 
life  Schopenhauer  describes  the  torture  of  existence,  "the 
rush  and  confusion,"  in  which  living  beings  fight  and 
destroy  each  other. 

The  vast  majority  are  under  the  illusion,  produced  by 
the  desire  to  live,  of  the  value  of  life.  Those  of  pro- 
founder  vision,  especially  the  geniuses,  lift  the  veil  of  the 
Maya  and  discover  the  profound  disharmonies.— The 
question  arises,  is  there  then  no  way  of  escape,  no  means 
by  which  we  can  rescue  ourselves  from  this  torture? 

b.    He  devotes  the  last  two  books  of  his  chief  work  to 
answering  these  questions.     Schopenhauer  finds  some  real 
difficulties  on  these  points:    for  if  will  is  everything, 
identical  with  the  "world,"  whence  shall  the  energy  pro- 
ceed by  which  the  will  itself  is  to  be  annulled?    And  if  the 
will  should  be  annulled,  would  it  not  follow  that  everything 
would  then  be  annihilated?    Schopenhauer  replies  that  the 
will  is  not  annihilated  by  some  cause  other  than  itself, 
but  that  it  simply  subsides  (in  such  a  manner  that  velle  is' 
supplanted  by  nolle).     And  the  state  which  supervenes 
is  merely  a  relative  nothing,  i.  e.  as  respects  our  idea;  in 
itself  it  may  quite  as  readily  be  a  positive  reality.    It  is 
the  Nirvana  of  the  Buddhists;  were  it  not  for  the  danger 
of  abuse  of  the  term,   Schopenhauer  would  not  have 
objected  to  apply  the  word  "God." 

There  are  three  ways  by  which  the  will-to-live  may  be 
sublated.  It  is  possible  to  assume  the  attitude  towards 
life  of  a  mere  spectator,  in  which  case  he  devotes  himself 
wholly  to  aesthetic  or  intellectual  contemplation.  If 
e.  g.  we  are  completely  absorbed  in  the  contemplation  of 


200 


THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF  ROMANTICISM 


SIBBERN 


20 1 


some  work  of  art,  the  will  is  subdued  and  we  forget  that 
we  are  denizens  of  the  world.  Art  everywhere  represents 
the  climax.  The  agony  of  Hfe  subsides  in  the  presence  of 
the  image  of  life. — This  is  the  course  taken  by  Schopen- 
hauer himself. — In  the  case  of  human  love,  which— be- 
cause all  Hfe  is  full  of  agony — ^necessarily  assumes  the  char- 
acter of  sympathy,  the  individual  will  vanishes  from  the 
fact  that  it  is  lost  in  its  identity  with  its  object.  This 
thought  forms  the  basis  of  Schopenhauer's  ethics  {Die 
heiden  Grundprohleme  der  Ethiky  1841). — It  is  after  all 
only  the  saints,  the  ascetics,  for  whom  every  motive  has 
vanished,  who  are  capable  of  an  absolute  suppression  of 
the  will.  Schopenhauer  finds  the  best  practical  solutions 
of  the  riddle  of  life  and  of  the  agony  of  Hfe  in  Buddhism, 
in  primitive  Christianity,  and  in  mysticism,  and  he  has 
the  most  profotmd  regard  for  the  chief  representatives  of 
asceticism, — the  more  so,  because  of  the  consciousness 
that  he  was  not  a  saint  himself. 

3.  The  romantic  philosophy  made  a  profound  impres- 
sion in  the  Scandinavian  North,  differing  according  to 
the  different  character  of  the  northern  peoples.— In 
Sweden  the  romantic  opposition  to  empirical  philosophy 
js  particularly  evident.  The  fundamental  principle  of 
the  philosophy  characteristic  of  Sweden  was  this,  namely, 
that  truth  must  be  a  perfect,  inherently  consistent 
totaHty,  and  since  experience  merely  presents  fragments, 
and  such  forsooth  as  are  constantly  undergoing  change,  a 
constant  antithesis  of  ideal  and  empirical  truth  must  fol- 
low. After  this  idea  had  been  elaborated  by  a  number  of 
thinkers,  the  most  noteworthy  of  whom  are  Benjamin 
Hoyer  and  Eric  Gustav  Geyer,  the  school  attained  its  sys- 
tematic culmination  in  the  philosophy  of  Christopher  Jacob 
Bostrom    (1797-1866),    professor    of    the  University   of 


Upsala,  according  to  whom  time,  change  and  evolution 
are  lUusions  of  the  senses,  whilst  true  reaHty  consists  of  a 
world  of  Ideas  which  differ  from  Platonism  by  the  fact 
that  the  ideas  are  construed  as  personal  beings.^Den- 
mark  reveals  the  influence  of  Schelling  and  Hegel  to  a 
marked  degree,  especially  among  the  writers  in  esthetics 
and  the  theologians.     The  more  independent  thinkers 
however  have  devoted  themselves  almost  exclusively  to 
the  problems  of  psychology,  ethics  and  epistemology  and 
assumed  an  attitude  of  decided  opposition  to  abstract 
speculation.     Frederick    Christian    Sibbern    (178C-1872) 
who  labored  at  Copenhagen  in  the  capacity  of  professor 
of  philosophy  for  more  than  fifty  years,-in  opposition  to 
Hegel  and  Bostrdm~p\^ced  great  stress  on  a  real  evolution 
m  time.     Experience  reveals  that  evolution  has  a  number 
of  starting-points,  and  the  contact  of  the  various  evolu- 
tional  senes  with  each  other  gives  rise  to  strife,  "a  stu- 
pendous  debate  of  everything  with  everything,^'  which  in 
turn  accounts  for  progress.     This  idea  of  sporadic  evolu- 
tion has  likewise  an  important  bearing  on  the  theory  of 
knowledge:  each  cognizing  being  has  the  viewpoint  of  one 
ot  these  beginnings  and  hence  cannot  survey  the  entire 
process      Sibbern  devoted  himself  more  particulariy  to 
psychology,  for  which  he  was  specially  adapted  by  his 
gift  of  observation  and  his  enthusiastic  interest  in  human 
life. 

We  shaU  consider  Soren  Kierkegaard  (1813-1855)  only 
as  a  philosopher,  leaving  out  of  account  his  esthetic  and 
religious  activities,  which  have  taken  such  deep  hold  on 
the  hfe  of  the  North.  The  author  of  this  text-book 
has  given  a  general  description  of  this  thinker  in  his 
book  Soren  Kierkegaard,  als  Philosoph  (in  Fronmann's 
•Klassiker). 


202 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   ROMANTICISM 


KIERKEGAARD 


Kierkegaard  is  a  "subjective  thinker"  in  the  sense  in 
which  he  used  that  word  (in  the  book  Unwissenschaft- 
liche  Nachschriftj  1846,  Kierkegaard^ s  chief  philosophical 
work).  The  ideas  of  the  subjective  thinker  are  deter- 
mined by  the  interplay  of  all  the  elements  of  psychic 
life, — ^by  emotion  and  reflection,  by  hope  and  fear,  by 
tragic  and  comic  moods.  And  this  thinking  takes  place  in 
the  midst  of  the  stream  0}  life,  whose  boundaries  we  cannot  see 
and  whose  direction  we  can  never  know,  at  least  not  in  the 
fantastical  and  impersonal  world  of  abstraction.  Kierke- 
gaard is  the  Danish  Pascal,  and  his  position  in  relation  to 
the  philosophy  of  his  age  possesses  a  certain  analogy  to 
PascaVs  relation  to  Cartesianism. — This  predominantly 
personal  character  of  his  thought  however  does  not  pre- 
clude the  possibility  of  his  making  valuable  contributions 
to  epistemology  and  ethics  (or  better,  to  a  comparative 
philosophy  of  life)  as  he  has  actually  done. 

Sibbern  had  already  observed  that  the  fruitful  ideas  of 
Kant  had  not  received  their  just  dues  at  the  hands  of  his 
successors.  Kierkegaard  renews  the  problem  of  knowledge 
with  still  greater  definiteness,  and  declares  that  Hegel  had 
not  solved  the  Kantian  problem.  We  can  arrange  our 
thoughts  in  logical  order  and  elaborate  a  consistent  sys- 
tem. It  is  possible  to  elaborate  a  logical  system,  but  a 
finite  thinker  will  never  be  able  to  realize  a  complete 
system  of  reality.  We  deduce  the  fundamental  ideas 
from  experience  and  experience  remains  forever  imperfect. 
We  understand  only  what  has  already  taken  place; 
knowledge  comes  after  experience.  We  cognize  towards  the 
past — but  we  live  towards  the  future.  This  opposition 
between  the  past  and  the  future  accounts  for  the  tension 
of  life  and  impresses  us  with  the  irrationality  of  being. 
The  denial  of  the  reality  of  time  by  abstract  speculation 


203 


is  the  thing  that  constitutes  the  thorn  in  the  problem  of 
knowledge. 

What  is  thus  true  of  scientific  thought  is  even  more  so 
in  the  reflections  on  the  problems  of  practical  life     In 
this  case  it  is  personal  truth  that  takes  first  rank  i  e  the 
important  matter  to  be  considered  here  is  the  fact  that 
the  individual  has  acquired  his  characteristic  ideas  by  his 
own  efforts,  and  that  they  constitute  an  actual  expression 
of  his  personality.    Subjectivity  constitutes  the  truth 
Whoever  prays  to  an  idol  with  his  whole  heart  and  soul' 
prays  to  the  true  God,  whilst  he  who  prays  to  the  true 
God  from  mere  force  of  habit  and  without  having  his 
heart  m  it,  is  reaUy  worshipping  an  idol.    Kierkegaard 
shows  -his  romanticism  in  the  fact  that  he  sharply  con- 
trasts the  heart  with  life  as  it  is  actually  experienced  and 
entirely  disregards  inteUectual  integrity,   which  is  an 
essential  condition,  if  personal  truth  is  to  escape  identifi- 
cation with  blindness. 

Kierkegaard  outlined  a  kind  of  comparative  theory  of 
life— partly  in  poetic  form  {Enlweder—Oder;  Stadien  auf 
dem  Lebensweg),  partly  in   philosophical   form  (in  his 
chief  philosophical  treatise  mentioned  above).    He  dis- 
tinguishes various  "Stadia,"  which  however  do  not  con- 
stitute stages  in  a  continuous  line  of  evolution    but 
sharply  severed  types.    The  transition  from  the  one  to  the 
other  does  not  foUow  with  logical  necessity,  nor  by  means 
of  an  evolution  explainable  by  psychological  processes, 
but  by  a  leap,  an  inexpHcable  act  of  will.    Kierkegaard 
maintains  the  qualitative  antitheses  of  life  in  sharp  con- 
trast to  the  quantitative  continuity  of  the  speculative 
systems. 

According  to  Kierkegaard  the  principle  of  evaluation  and 
construction  of  theories  of  life  consists  in  the  degree  of 


204 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   ROMANTICISM 


FRIES   AND   HERBART 


20S 


Opposition  which  spiritual  life  is  capable  of  comprehendini^. 
The  particular  moment  and  the  totality  of  life,  time  and 
eternity,  reality  and  the  ideal,  nature  and   Gk)d — con- 
stitute such  antitheses.     The  tension  of  life  increases  in 
direct  proportion  to  the  increasing  sharpness  of  the  man- 
ifestation of  these  antitheses,  and  the  energy  which  is 
supposed  to  constitute  life  must  therefore  likewise  be 
correspondingly  greater.     The  professional  artist  who  is 
absorbed  in  the  pleasure  of  the  moment  represents  the 
lowest  degree;  the  writer  of  irony  already  discerns  an 
element  of  the  inner  life  which  is  incapable  of  expression 
in  a  single  moment,  or  in  a  single  act;  the  moralist  develops 
this  inner  life  positively  by  real  influence  on  the  family 
and  in  the  state;  the  humorist  regards  all  the  vicissitudes 
of  life  as  evanescent  as   compared  with  eternity  and 
assimies  an  attitude  of  melancholy  resignation,  wHch  he 
preferably  makes  the  subject  of  jest;  the  devotees  of 
religion  regard  the  temporal  life  as  a  constant  pain 
because  finite  and  temporal  existence  is  incommensurable 
with  eternal  truth;  the  Christian  finally  regards  this  pain 
as  the  effect  of  his  own  sins,  and  the  antithesis  of  time  and 
eternity  can  only  be  annulled  by  the  fact  that  the  ever- 
lasting itself  is  revealed  in  time  and  apprehended  in  the 
paradox  of  faith. 

Kierkegaard  wanted  to  show  by  this  scale  how  compre- 
hensive an  ideal  of  life  was  possible  even  outside  of 
Christianity.  He  Hkewise  wanted  to  put  an  end  to  the 
amalgamation  of  Christianity  and  speculation  in  theology. 
But  the  anguish  occasioned  by  the  tension  finally  became 
his  standard  for  the  sublimity  of  life,  and  he  had  sufficient 
courage  of  consistency  to  draw  the  inference,  that  the 
sufferings  of  no  one  are  equal  to  those  endured  by  God!— 
This  brings  him  into  direct  conflict  with  the  romantic 


theory  of  the  reconciliation  of  all  antitheses  in  the  "higher 
unity,"  as  well  as  with  the  accepted  conception  of  Chris- 
tianity. This  furnished  the  motive  for  the  deplorable 
controversy  with  the  state  church,  which  occupied  the 
latter  years  of  his  life. 

C.    The  Undercurrents  of  Critical  Philosophy  in 

THE  Romantic  Period. 

It  is  important  for  the  continuity  of  the  history  of 
philosophy  that  there  were  philosophers,  even  in  the 
period  of  romanticism  and  speculation,  who  undertook  to 
carry  out  a  strictly  critical  and  empirical  treatment  of 
the  fundamental  concepts.  Two  of  Fichte's  students  at 
Jena  deserve  mention  in  this  connection  as  belonging  to 
the  first  rank.  These  men  soon  protested  that  the  method 
by  which  Fichte  and  his  disciples  were  trying  to  develop 
the  Kantian  philosophy  was  not  correct.  The  signifi- 
cance of  Fries  and  Herbart  however  does  not  depend  alone 
upon  the  fact  that  they  are  representatives  of  the  critical 
philosophy,  but  likewise  upon  their  scientific  method  of 
treating  the  problem  of  psychology.  This  latter  fcjt 
makes  them,  especially  Herbart,  the  forerunner  of  modem 
psychology.  Beneke,  who  had  been  considerably  affected 
by  the  English  school,  likewise  joins  them. 

I.  Jacob  Friedrich  Fries  (i 775-1843),  like  Schleier- 
macher,  was  educated  at  a  Moravian  college,  and,  despite 
the  fact  that  a  native  impulse  for  imtrammelled  science 
had  carried  him  far  beyond  the  ideas  of  his  early  teachers, 
he  nevertheless  continued  his  adherence  to  them  to  the 
end,  especially  in  the  matter  of  the  emphasis  which  he 
placed  on  the  emotions.  While  professor  at  Jena,  Fries 
participated  in  the  Wartburg  celebration,  on  accoimt  of 
which  he  was  forbidden  to  continue  his  lectures  in  philos- 


2o6 


THE  PHILOSOPHY   OF   ROMANTICISM 


FRIES 


207 


ophy.  The  fact  that  he  was  then  able  to  accept  a  pro- 
fessorship in  physics  was  a  tribute  to  the  breadth  of  his 
scholarship. 

According  to  Kant  the  critical  philosophy  must  consist 
of  self-knowledge;  Fries  deplored  the  lack  of  a  psycholog- 
ical foundation  for  such  knowledge.    According  to  him 
the  problem  of  psychology  consisted  in  discovering  and 
describing  the  spontaneous  forms  with  which  our  knowl- 
edge operates.    Those  fundamental  concepts  which  con- 
stitute the  scientific  expression  of  these  forms  must  then 
be  deduced  from  psychological  experience  by  the  method 
of   abstract   analysis.    Notwithstanding   the   fact   that 
Fries  clearly  saw  that  we  can  have  no  guarantee  that  the 
fundamental    concepts    discovered    by    this    empirico- 
analytic  method  are  adequate,  he  was  nevertheless  con- 
vinced that  Kant  had  succeeded  in  entmierating  all  of  the 
fundamental  concepts  (categories).    He  accepted  Kant's 
table  of  categories  and  of  ideas.— On  the  other  hand  how- 
ever he  departs  from   Kant  on  one  important  point, 
namely,   on   the  matter  of  establishing   the  objective 
validity  of  knowledge.     Here  he  agrees  with  Maimon 
that  Kant  had  failed  to  establish  the  right  to  apply  the 
categories.     Kant  only  answered  the  qucestio  facti,  not 
the  quastio  juri.    Truth  can  only  consist  in  the  agree- 
ment of  mediate  knowledge  (of  reason)  with  immediate 
(of  perception),  and  beyond  this  it  is  impossible  for  us  to 
transcend  the  subjective   demonstration  of  knowledge. 
Fries  regards  the  denial  of  this  situation  as  the  cause  of 
the    ultra-speculative    tendency    of    the    Romanticists 
{Neue  Kritik  der  Vernunft,  1806-7). 

According  to  Fries  the  real  problem  of  philosophy  con- 
sists in  the  application  of  the  regressive,  anal3rtical 
method,  which  seeks  to  discover  the  fimdamental  con- 


cepts, which  condition  all  understanding  from  the  facts 
of  experience.  The  method  is  more  important  than  the 
system.  This  analytic  method  demands  a  strictly  scien- 
tific treatment  of  the  problems  of  psychology.  Psy- 
chology must  be  a  strictly  causal  science,  whose  corre- 
late constitutes  an  exact  science  of  the  corporeal  side 
of  nature.  This  standpoint  of  Fries  is  Spinozistic. 
He  presumes,  by  way  of  analogy,  that  all  existence 
everywhere  possesses  an  inner,  spiritual  phase  as  weH 
as  an  external,  material  phase  (Psychische  Anthropolone 
1820-1).  ^     ^    ' 

Even  the  most  consistent  causal  method  only  leads 
from  the  finite  to  the  finite.  There  is  no  scientific  path 
to  the  infinite  and  the  eternal.  But  the  same  reality 
which  the  natural  sciences  regard  as  the  world  of  phe- 
nomena, faith  construes  as  supported  by  an  eternal 
pnnciple.  But  the  only  way  we  can  describe  this  prin- 
ciple is  negatively.  Whenever  faith  makes  use  of  positive 
expressions,  it  must  be  understood  that  these  can  only 
have  symbolical  significance.  Fries  carries  out  the  idea 
of  symbolism  far  more  purely  and  consistently  than  Kant 
and  Schleiermacher  {Handbuch  der  Philosophie  der  Re- 
ligion, 1832). 

2.  John  Friedrich  Eerhart  (1776-1841),  who  was  an 
instructor  in  the  universities  of  Konigsberg  and  Gottingen 
caUs  himself  a  "Kantian  of  1828."  He  thus  described 
both  his  relation  to  Kant  as  well  as  his  critical  advance 
beyond  him.  He  would  start  from  experience— but  he 
regards  it  impossible  to  remain  on  the  empirical  basis. 
For  experience  contains  contradictions  which— owing  to 
the  logical  principle  of  identity— must  be  corrected: 
things  change  but  they  are  nevertheless  supposed  to 
remain   the   same   things!    One   and   the   same   thing 


2o8 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   ROMANTICISM 


HERBART 


209 


possesses  a  variety  of  attributes!  And  the  concept  of  the 
ego,  which  Fichte  endeavored  to  make  the  basis  of  the 
speculative  philosophy,  contains  both  contradictions: 
the  ego  develops  and  is  nevertheless  supposed  to  remain 
identical  with  itself,  and  the  ego  is  supposed  to  be  a  imity, 
but  it  nevertheless  possesses  a  manifold  content! — The 
correction  of  contradictory  experience  should  however 
adhere  to  experience  as  closely  as  possible;  for  we  are 
obliged  to  maintain  the  principle:  every  phenomenon  con- 
tains its  proportionate  implication  of  reality!  {Haupt- 
punkte  der  Metaphysik,  1808).  The  contradictions  vanish 
whenever  we  assume  a  manifold  of  existing  entities 
(realities):  when  a  thing  changes  it  must  be  explained 
from  the  fact  that  it  is  being  observed  in  relation  to 
different  things  (different  reaHties)  than  before;  when  a 
thing  possesses  a  number  of  attributes  it  must  be  explained 
from  the  fact  that  is  being  observed  in  relation  to  different 
things  (realities).  Thus  experience  is  corrected  by  ^^the 
method  of  relations."  But  the  relations  do  not  pertain 
to  things  as  such;  they  are  wholly  contingent,  and  the 
method  of  relations  can  therefore  likewise  be  called  ^^the 
method  of  contingent  views."  Each  particular  Real  con- 
stitutes an  absolute  position,  independent  from  all  other 
Reals. — The  peculiarity  of  the  Herbartian  philosophy 
is  expressed  in  two  propositions:  i.  In  the  realm  of 
being  there  are  no  events.  2.  Every  continuum  is  excluded 
from  reality  {Allgemeine  Metaphysiky  1828). 

What  then  do  we  know  about  the  Reals?  Herbart,  in 
opposition  to  metaphysical  idealism,  holds  that,  if  it  is 
possible  to  form  an  idea  of  the  Real,  the  experiences  in  the 
realm  of  spiritual  nature  have  no  prerogatives  above  the 
experiences  in  the  realm  of  material  nature.  But  when  he 
calls  the  identity  of  a  Real  ^^self-preservation"  notwith- 


standing its  relation  to  other  Reals,  and  since  the  only 
example  of  self-preservation  of  which  we  can  have  any 
kTiowledge  is  contained  in  our  own  sensations,  he  never- 
theless likewise  really  makes  use  of  the  analogy  with  our 
psychical  experiences  in  the  same  manner  as  the  meta- 
physical idealists. 

Even  the  soul  is  Real.    Ideas  arise  in  the  soul  as  forms 
of   self-preservation   in   distinction    from   other   Reals. 
And  since,  according  to  Herbart,  the  Real  which  supports 
psychical  phenomena  must  be  different  from  the  Real 
which  supports  material  phenomena,  he  attains  a  spiritual- 
ism which  differs  from  the  Cartesian  by  the  fact  that  the 
interaction  does  not  take  place  between  dissimilar  entities, 
but  between  similars.     Herbart  therefore  partly  bases  his 
psychology  on  his  metaphysics  {Psychologic  als  Wissen- 
schaft,    neu   gegrundet    auf  Erfahrung,    Metaphysik    und 
Mathematik,    1824-5).     But   he   bases   the   necessity  of 
assuming  a  psychical  Real  largely  upon  the  fact  that  our 
ideas   present   a  mutual   interaction  and   combination. 
Sometimes  they  blend  (by  assimilation),  i.  e.  whett  they 
are   internally   related;   sometimes   they   combine   into 
groups  (aggregations),  i.  e.  when  they  are  heterogeneous 
(as  colors  and  tones)  but  still  occur  coincidently;  some- 
times they  inhibit  or  obscure  each  other,  i.  e.  when  they 
are  homogeneous  without  however  being  able  to  blend. 
That  which  we  call  our  ego  is  the  controlling  group  of 
ideas,  which  is  formed  by  assimilation  and  aggregatioi, 
and  upon  which  the  determination  of  what  shaU  have 
psychological  permanence  depends;  for  only  that  can 
persist  which  can  be  blended  with  the  controUing  ideas 
(i.  e.  be  apperceived).— ^erJar/  here  recaUs  the  Eng- 
lish  associational    psychology   founded  by   Hume   and 
Hartley, 


2IO 


THE  PHILOSOPHY   Or  ROMANTICISM 


BENEKE 


211 


But  Herbart  would  not  only  base  his  psychology  on 
metaphysics  and  experience,  but  likewise  upon  mathe- 
matics. He  discovered  the  possibility  of  this  in  the  fact 
of  inhibition.  Mathematical  psychology  aims  to  discover 
definite  laws  governing  the  reciprocal  inhibition  of  ideas. 
Psychical  energies  cannot  be  measured  by  movements  in 
space  like  those  of  physics;  but  Herbart  thought  it  possible 
to  start  from  the  fact  that,  inasmuch  as  all  ideas  strive 
to  preserve  themselves,  the  sum  of  inhibition  in  any 
given  moment  must  be  the  least  possible.  The  problem 
therefore  consists  in  determining  how  to  divide  the  inhibi- 
tion among  the  various  coincident  or  aspiring  ideas. — 
This  presupposition  rests  upon  Herbart's  metaphysical 
theories,  according  to  which  every  idea  is  a  self -preserva- 
tive act  of  the  psychical  Real.  Herbart  failed  to  attain 
clear  results  and  such  as  could  be  harmonized  with  experi- 
ence on  the  basis  of  this  presupposition  by  the  method 
of  calculation,  and  his  significance  as  a  psychologist  does 
not  rest  upon  this  attempt  to  reduce  psychology  to  an 
exact  science. 

Herbart  excludes  ethics — ^herehe  is  an  out-and-out  Kant- 
ian— completely  from  theoretical  philosophy.  He  is  of 
the  opinion  that  there  is  no  scientific  principle  which  can 
at  once  be  subsimied  as  the  explanation  of  reality  and  the 
guarantee  of  value. — Our  value  judgments  are  sponta- 
neously and  often  unconsciously  determined  by  certain 
practical  ideas.  Such  ideas  are  patterns  which  hover 
before  the  mind  whenever  we  judge  of  the  harmonic  or 
disharmonic  relation  between  the  conviction  and  the 
actions  of  a  man  or  between  the  strivings  of  a  number  of 
men  in  relation  to  one  another.  Whenever  we  discover 
disharmony  between  a  man's  conviction  and  the  trend  of 
his  actual  desires,  it  conflicts  with  the  idea  of  inner 


freedom;  whenever  the  conviction  or  its  practical  execu- 
tion is  too  feeble,  it  conflicts  with  the  idea  of  perfection. 
And  the  ideas  of  right,  of  equity,  and  of  benevolence  in 
the  mutual  relations  of  a  number  of  men  find  their  appH- 
cation  analogously.  We  discover  the  practical  ideas  by 
means  of  an  analysis  of  our  judgments  concerning  himian 
actions,  in  cases  where  the  relations  are  clearly  present 
and  where  irrelative  interests  are  in  abeyance.  Herbart 
even  refers  to  Adam  Smith's  ''disinterested  observer'* 
{Allgemeine  praktische  Philosophie,  1808). 

3.  Frederick  Edward  Beneke  (i  798-1 854)  quietly 
fought  a  hard  battle  at  the  University  of  Berlin  for  the 
empirical  philosophy  against  the  dominant  speculative 
philosophy.  For  a  while  he  was  even  deprived  of  the 
privilege  of  lecturing.  Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  he 
exercised  a  profound  influence  upon  the  development  of 
psychology  and  pedagogy,  he  nevertheless  regarded  his 
effort  as  useless,  and  discouragement  apparently  caused 
his  death. 

Beneke  is  especially  influenced  by  Fries  and  Schleier- 
macher.  He  would  base  his  philosophy  on  psychology, 
i.  e.  elaborate  a  psychologism.  Here  he  is  radically 
opposed  to  Herbart,  who  even  endeavored  to  partly  base 
psychology  on  metaphysics.  Beneke  approaches  closely 
to  the  EngHsh  school  and  even  calls  himself  a  disciple 
of  Locke.  His  psychology  has  a  biological  character. 
He  describes  the  development  of  consciousness  as  a 
growth  of  innate  germs  or  rudiments,  which  he  calls 
original  faculties;  these  are  the  faculties  of  sensation  and 
of  motion.  The  original  faculties  are  conjoined  with  a 
tendency;  the  objective  stuniili  through  which  the  original 
faculties  are  enabled  to  attain  a  complete  development 
are  sought  out  spontaneously.   The  experiences  which  are 


212 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   ROMANTICISM 


TRANSITION   TO   POSITIVISM 


213 


thus  acqtiired  leave  traces  or  dispositions  behind,  which 
furnish  the  possibility  of  the  origination  of  new,  derived 
facilities.  An  incessant  interaction  between  the  con- 
scious and  the  unconscious  is  therefore  in  constant 
progress. — Of  the  more  specific  psychical  phenomena 
Beneke  describes  especially  the  significance  of  the  relation 
of  contrast  for  the  emotions,  and  the  tendency  of  psy- 
chical elements  to  extend  their  impress  over  the  whole 
psychical  state  ("liquidation").  The  distinction  between 
the  higher  and  lower  levels  of  consciousness  is  to  be 
explained  by.  the  great  multiplicity  and  variety  of  the 
elements  and  processes  cooperating  in  the  development 
of  consciousness  (Psychologische  Skizzetij  1825-7;  Lehr- 
buch  der  Psychologie  als  Naturwissenschaft,  1833). 

Beneke  passes  deliberately  from  psychology  to  meta- 
physics by  means  of  an  analogy:  In  our  inner  experience 
we  become  acquainted  with  a  part  of  being  as  it  is  in 
itself,  and  we  afterwards  naturally  conceive  that  part  of 
being  which  we  only  know  as  external,  objective  bein^^ 
(material  nature),  after  the  analogy  of  our  own  self. 
But  this  analogy  does  not  mislead  him  into  the  substitu- 
tion of  an  idealistic  interpretation  for  the  mechanical 
explanation  of  nature  {Das  Verlzdltniss  von  Seek  und 
Leib,  1826). 

According  to  Beneke  ethical  judgments  arise  through 
reflection  concerning  the  kind  and  manner  in  which  our 
feelings  are  set  in  motion  by  human  actions.  This  view- 
point dominates  his  youthful  essay,  Physik  der  Sitten 
(1822).  Strongly  influenced  by  Bentham,  he  placed  greater 
emphasis  on  the  objective  side  of  ethics  later  on,  in  the 
fact  that  he  took  special  account  of  the  way  in  which  the 
actions  affect  the  welfare  of  Hving  beings  {Grundlinie  der 
Sitterdehre,  1837). 


D.    The  Transition  from  Romanticism  to  Positivism. 

I.  The  Dissolution  of  the  Hegelian  School.  The  pro- 
found influence  and  the  wide  dissemination  of  the  Hegelian 
philosophy  is  due  more  particularly  to  the  supposed 
successful  reconciliation  of  faith  and  knowledge,  of 
ideality  and  reaHty.  But  these  alleged  results  were  put 
to  the  test  shortly  after  HegeVs  death.  There  was  some 
doubt  whether  the  belief  in  a  personal  God  and  in  a 
personal  immortality  could  be  reconciled  with  Hegelian 
philosophy  {Fr.  Richter:  Die  Lehre  von  den  letzten  Dingen, 
1833).,  and  it  was  claimed  that  the  logical  consequence 
of  the  Hegelian  philosophy  of  religion  was  not  the  Chris- 
tology  of  the  church,  but  the  mythical  theory,  of  the 
Person  of  Christ  {D.  F,  Strauss:  Leben  Jesu,  kritisch 
bearbeitety  1835). 

The  Hegelians  divided  on  this  question,  and  we  soon 
hear  of  a  Hegelian  right  and  a  Hegelian  left.  Those  on 
the  right  (represented  particularly  by  Goschel,  Rosen- 
karanz  and  /.  E.  Erdman)  held  that  the  theory  of  the 
master,  properly  understood,  was  in  harmony  with  posi- 
tive faith  and  with  the  doctrine  of  the  Church.  Those  on 
the  left,  on  the  other  hand,  drew  most  radical  conclu- 
sions from  the  teaching  of  the  master  who  was  apparently 
so  very  conservative,  both  in  the  department  of  the  philos- 
ophy of  reHgion  (Strauss  and  Feuerbach)  and  in  that  of 
the  philosophy  of  law  and  society  {A.  Ruge,  Karl  Marx, 
Ferdinand  Lasalle). 

There  were  also  men  however  who  granted  to  the 
HegeHan  left  that  Hegelianism  was  incapable  of  defending 
theism,  but  who  at  the  same  time  thought  it  possible  to 
vindicate  theism  by  the  method  of  pure  thought.  They 
endeavored  to  show  that  all  fundamenta,!  ideas  (cate- 


214 


THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF  ROMANTICISM 


FEUERBACH 


2a-*t 


gories)  finally  combine  in  the  idea  of  personality,  and  that 
this  idea  must  be  accepted  as  the  expression  of  the  highest 
reality.  C.  H.  Weisse  (Das  philosophische  Problem  der 
Gegenwarty  1842)  and  /.  H.  Fichte,  the  son  of  /.  G.  Fichte 
(Grundzilge  zum  System  der  Philosophies  1 833-1 846)  were 
the  chief  representatives  of  this  tendency.  Lotze  and 
Fechner  joined  them  later  so  far  as  pertained  to  their  ideas 
on  the  philosophy  of  rehgion. — ^As  we  have  previously 
observed,  the  ideas  of  Schelling  had  been  moving  in  the 
same  direction  for  a  long  time  already. — We  find  a 
peculiar  combination  of  theistic  philosophy  of  religion 
and  himianistic  philosophy  of  law  in  the  voluminous 
writings  of  Ch.  Ft.  Krause,  of  which  we  can  only  mention 
Das  Urbild  der  Menschheit  (181 1). 

The  most  thorough  criticism  of  the  Hegelian  philosophy, 
which  is  at  the  same  time  an  important  positive  contribu- 
tion to  the  theory  of  knowledge,  is  from  the  pen  of  the 
judicious  and  profound  thinker,  Adolph  Trendelenburg, 
in  his  Logischen  Untersuchungen  (1840). 

2.  Ludwig  Feuerbach  (1804-1866),  under  the  influence 
of  Hegel,  gave  up  theology  for  philosophy.  After  serving 
in  the  capacity  of  Privatdocent  at  Erlangen  for  a  time, 
he  withdrew  to  the  soHtude  of  country  life  where  he 
developed  a  fruitful  activity  as  an  author.  In  his  latter 
years  he  struggled  with  poverty  and  sickness. 

Within  the  Hegelian  school  the  foremost  problem  was 
whether  rehgious  ideas  could  be  transformed  into  scien- 
tific concepts  without  losing  their  essential  meaning. 
Feuerbach,  on  the  other  hand,  as  soon  as  he  had  definitely 
renounced  the  school,  assumed  the  task  of  discovering  the 
soiu-ce  of  religious  ideas  in  human  affections  and  impulses, 
in  fear  and  hope,  in  yearning  and  wish.  He  aims  to 
explain  the  origin  of  dogmas  psychologically,  and  in  so 


doing  he  enters  upon  a  line  of  thought  in  which  Hume 
and— less  historically— iTaw/  and  S Meier macher  were  his 
forerunners.  He  appeals  from  the  official  documents  of 
religion  to  the  spiritual  Hfe  which  has  found  expression  in 
them.  His  most  important  work  in  the  sphere  of  the 
philosophy  of  religion  is  Das  Wesen  des  Christenthums 
»(i84i).  He  however  himself  attaches  more  importance 
to  the  Theogonie  which  appeared  in  1857. 

The    break    with    the    speculative    philosophy    gave 
Feuerbach  occasion  to  develop  an  entirely  new  conception 
of  philosophy.    After  he  had  even  insisted  on  an  "ana- 
lytico-genetic"  philosophy  in  his  elegant  treatise  on  Pierre 
Bayle  (1838),  he  announced  a  program  for  the  philosophy 
of  the  future  in  a  brief  essay  {Grundsatze  der  Philosophic 
der  Zukunft,   1843)  in  which  he  especially  emphasized 
the    concrete    distinction    of    every    particular    reaHty. 
The  subject-matter  of  philosophy  has  nothing  to  do  with 
the^  things   which    transcend    experience,    but    consists 
entirely  of  man  as  given  in  experience  and  nature  as 
furnishing  the  basis  of  his  existence.     He  seeks,  by  pains- 
taking studies  in  the  natural  sciences,  to  determine  the 
more  intimate  relation  between  man  and  nature.     In  his 
last  essay  (Gott,  Freiheit  und  Unsterblichkeit,   1866)  he 
elaborates  his  view  of  the  relation  of  the  spiritual  to  the 
material  universe.    He  was  occupied  during  his  last  years 
with  studies  in  ethics,  the  results  of  which  unfortunately 
exist  only  in  interesting  fragments.     Fr.  Jodl  has  pub- 
lished a  valuable  monograph  on  Feuerbach  (in  From- 
mann's  Klassikern  der  Philosophic), 

a.  According  to  Feuerbach  the  characteristic  phenom- 
ena of  rehgion  arise  from  the  fact  that  the  impassioned 
aspiration  towards  the  fulfillment  of  the  wishes  of  the 
heart  breaks  through  the  boundaries  fixed  by  reason. 


.ra 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   ROMANTICISM 


FEUERBACH 


217 


This  explains  the  anti-rational  character  which  religious 
phenomena  assume,  especially  those  of  the  most  exalted 
kind.    The  wish  is  the  fundamental  principle  of  theogony. 

At  the  beginning  man  has  no  grounds  upon  which  to 
impose  limits  on  his  wishes  and  the  ideas  conditioned  by 
such  wishes;  he  therefore  ascribes  unqualified  validity 
to  them.  It  is  in  the  very  nature  of  the  affections  to 
etemaHze  its  object  and  at  the  same  time  always  regard 
it  as  real.  Doubt  arises  only  after  man  has  come  to 
discover  his  limitations.  He  then  begins  to  distinguish 
between  the  subjective  and  the  objective. 

Religious  predicates  represent  the  contents  of  human 
wishes.  Heaven  and  the  attributes  of  the  gods  are 
evidences  of  the  things  which  have  occupied  the  human 
heart:  God  is  personal,  i.  e.  the  personal  life  is  valuable, 
"divine."  God  is  love,  i.  e.  love  is  valuable,  "divine." 
God  suffers,  i.  e.  suffering  is  valuable,  "divine."  Hence, 
in  order  to  understand  religion  we  must  transform  its 
predicates  into  subjects  and  its  subjects  into  predicates. 
This  is  most  clearly  apparent  in  Christianity.  Here 
affection  attains  an  inwardness  and  an  intensity,  and  at 
the  same  time  moreover  a  boundlessness,  wholly  unknown 
to  paganism.  Both  suffering  and  love  are  felt  more 
profoundly,  and  they  are  therefore  also  projected  with 
greater  fervency  and  greater  confidence  as  divine  things. 

But  no  sooner  has  man  transferred  everything  valuable 
to  heaven  than  he  begins  to  feel  the  more  his  own  empti- 
ness and  insignificance.  This  accounts  for  the  sense  of 
finitude  and  sinfulness.  As  long  as  we  hold  fast  to  its 
original  forms  we  find  that  religion  lives  and  moves  in 
these  sharp  contrasts.  The  theogonic  wish  is  at  its  best 
only  in  these  forms;  later  on  it  becomes  exhausted. 
Hence  we  must  make  a  distinction  especially  between 


primitive  Christianity  and  ''the  dissolute,  characterless, 
self-satisfied,  belletristlc,  coquettish,  Epicurean  Christianity 
of  the  modern  world  J' ^ 

There    is    an    inverse    relationship    existing    between 
religion  and  civiHzation.    They  represent  two  opposite 
methods  by  which  man  hopes  to  reaHze  his  purposes,  and 
just  in  proportion  as  he  confides  in  the  one  he  is  ready  to 
surrender  the  other.     The  relation  of  ethics  and  religion 
is  similar.    Just  in  proportion  as  the  distinction  between 
God  and  man  is  emphasized,  the  attributes  (love,  righteous- 
ness, etc.)  which  are  ascribed  to  God  are  accordingly  used 
in  an  entirely  different  sense  than  when  they  are  applied 
to  man,  and  man  must  then  surrender  his  natural  con- 
science and  his  natural  reason  in  order  to  obey  the  divine 
will  even  though  the  latter  should  command  something 
which  is  in  conflict  with  human  love  and  righteousness. 

No  real  values  are  ever  lost  by  the  surrender  of  religious 
faith.  The  projection  is  annulled,  notb'ng  more.  We 
retain  in  the  form  of  subject  what  was  predicate  in 
religion. 

b.  In  his  general  conception  of  philosophy  Feuerhach 
approaches  the  psychologism  of  Fries  and  Beneke,  His 
conception  has  likewise  certain  points  of  contact  with  the 
positivism  of  Comte.  He  does  not  as  a  matter  of  fact 
expressly  treat  of  the  problems  of  epistemology.  But 
notwithstanding  this  it  is  impossible  to  understand  his 
attitude  towards  materialism  without  the  epistemological 
presuppositions.  His  viewpoint  with  respect  to  material- 
ism is  analogous  to  that  which  he  assumed  towards 
theology.  Just  as  he  would  not  regard  man  as  a  creation 
of  God,  but  inversely  the  idea  of  God  as  a  creation  of 
man,  neither  would  he  regard  man  as  a  creation  of  matter, 
but  inversely  matter  as  a  concept  formed  by  man.     We 


2l8 


THE  PHILOSOPHY   OF  ROMANTICISM 


must,  SO  he  affirms,  start  with  man.  Life,  sensation, 
thought  is  something  absolutely  original,  ingenious,  in- 
capable of  being  copied  or  transferred!  Man  must  be 
conceived  of  as  being  at  once  spiritual  and  corporeal, 
and  the  resulting  problem  is  to  find  an  Archimedian 
point  between  spiritualism  and  materialism. 

c.  Feuerbach  had  forcefully  asserted  the  independence 
of  ethics  from  religion  already  in  his  Pierre  Bayle 
(1838).  In  The  Essence  of  Christianity  he  refers  to 
human  love  as  the  affection  in  which  the  imity  of  the 
race  reveals  itself  in  the  individual.  Later  on  he  empha- 
sized the  individual  desire  for  happiness,  not  however  as 
purpose,  but  as  fundamental  principle:  only  those  who 
know  from  personal  experience  what  it  is  to  suffer  need 
and  wrong  can  have  sympathy  with  others.  Ethics 
however  knows  of  no  striving  for  happiness  in  isolation. 
Nature  itself  has  solved  the  problem  of  the  transition 
from  the  egoistic  desire  for  happiness  to  the  recognition  of 
duties  towards  others  by  the  relation  of  the  sexes  to  each 
other.  The  feelings  of  community  and  fellowship  arise 
by  virtue  of  the  fact  that  the  existence  of  the  individual 
is  shown  to  stand  in  the  most  intimate  relation  to  the 
existence  of  other  individuals. 


SEVENTH  BOOK. 
A.    Positivism. 

The  two  great  intellectual  tendencies  of  the  nineteenth 
century   are   romanticism   and   positivism.     The   former 
starts  with  the  forms  and  ideals  of  the  intellect,  the  latter 
with  given  facts:   ''positive"  signifies  first  of  all  the 
''actual,  estabHshed,  given.''    Despite  their  wide  diver- 
gence, even  opposition,  they  both  nevertheless  indicate, 
each  in  its  own  way,  a  reaction  against  the  century  of  the 
enlightenment,  of  criticism,  of  revolution.     The  supreme 
aim  of  both  tendencies  is  to  attain  a  more  thorough 
mastery  of  the  profound  reaHties  of  nature  and  of  history. 
—Positivism   did   not   originate   as  a  reaction   against 
romanticism,  even  though  it  only  came  into  prominence 
just  as  the  prevalence  of  romanticism  began  to  decline. 
The  roots  of  both  tendencies  can  be  traced  back  histori- 
cally to  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

Whilst  Germany  is  the  home  of  the  romantic  philosophy, 
positivism  belongs  more  particularly  to  France  and  Eng- 
land. We  are  here  using  the  term  positivism  in  the 
broad  sense,  according  to  which  not  only  Comte,  but 
likewise  such  men  as  Mill,  Spencer,  Duhring  and  Ardigo 
are  positivists. 

I.  French  Philosophy  in  the  Nineteenth  Century 
before  Comte, 

At  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century  we  can  dis- 
tinguish three  philosophical  schools  in  France,  one  resting 
on  the  principle  of  authority,  another  psychological  (' ' ideo- 
logical"), and  a  third  sociological.     The  first  represents 

219 


"r^ 


220 


POSITIVISM 


DE   MAISTRE 


221 


a  radical  reaction  against  the  eighteenth  century;  the 
second  represents  a  continuation  and  correction  of  the 
French  enhghtenment;  the  third  represents  a  new  for- 
mation which  contains  the  germ  of  positivism. 

1.  Joseph  de  Maistre,  the  most  important  exponent 
of  the  principle  of  authority,  assails  both  philosophy  and 
natural  science,  the  moment  they  presume  to  under- 
take anything  beyond  wholly  specialized  investigations. 
And  yet  he  has  a  philosophy  of  his  own,  which  is 
closely  affiliated  with  that  of  Malebranche,  Whatever  is 
material  cannot  be  a  cause;  every  cause  is  essentially 
mental  and  the  type  of  all  causality  is  given  in  the  im- 
mediate consciousness  of  volition.  Our  world  theory  is 
not  to  be  determined  by  investigators  and  thinkers, 
but  by  the  authorities  instituted  by  God  in  state  and 
church.  Has  not  history  indeed  sufficiently  exposed  the 
impotence  of  human  reason!  The  philosophy  of  the 
eighteenth  century  was  indeed  a  veritable  conspiracy 
against  everything  sacred.  The  only  thing  which  can 
put  an  end  to  human  misfortune  and  establish  social 
peace  is  the  acknowledgment  of  the  infaUibiHty  of  the 
Pope  {Les  Soirees  de  St,  Peter sbourg,  written  1809,  not 
published  until  1821). 

2.  Amid  the  storms  of  the  revolution  there  was  a 
small  group  of  thinkers  who  remained  loyal  to  philosophi- 
cal investigation.  These  had  been  disciples  of  Condillac, 
but  they  introduced  important  corrections  into  his 
doctrine.  Thus,  for  example,  the  physician,  Cabanis, 
places  special  emphasis  on  the  influence  of  the  inner 
organic  states  upon  the  development  of  mind.  He  de- 
scribes vital  feeling  as  something  which  is  only  indirectly 
determined  by  external  impressions,  and  hence  forms  a 
basis  for  psychic  life  which  is  relatively  independent  of 


the  external  world.  The  instincts  which  presuppose  an 
original  motive  equipment  are  intimately  related  to 
vital  feeHng.  Hence  man  is  not  entirely  passive  in  the 
presence  of  the  objective  world  as  Condillac  had  taught 
{Rapport  du  physique  et  du  moral  de  Vhomme,  1802). 
There  are  a  number  of  separate  passages  in  which 
he  appears  to  approach  closely  to  materialism— as, 
e.  g.,  when  he  says  that  the  brain  secretes  thought 
like  the  Hver  bile.  But  it  was  not  his  intention  to 
furnish  a  metaphysics,  and  in  another  treatise,  posthu- 
mously pubHshed,  he  rather  expressed  himself  spirit- 
ualistically  {Lettre  sur  les  causes  premieres)  .—The  he- 
ments  d'  Ideologic  (1801)  of  Destutt  de  Tracy  shows  a 
tendency  similar  to  that  of  Cabanis,  By  the  term  ideol- 
ogy he  simply  means  the  theory  of  ideas.  Napoleon, 
who  found  the  men  of  this  school  the  pronounced 
opponents  of  his  despotism,  on  the  other  hand  used  the 
term  ''Ideology"  sarcastically  to  describe  a  visionary 
and  abstract  ideahsm.  Picavet  has  written  a  learned 
monograph  on  the  theoretical  and  practical  significance 
of  this  whole  movement  {Les  ideologues,  1891). 

Maine  de  Biran  (i 766-1824)  at  first  likewise  cooperated 
with  Cabanis  and  Tracy,  Biran  held  high  legislative 
and  administrative  positions  under  the  repubHc,  the  em- 
pire and  the  restoration;  but  his  talents  and  inclinations 
were  directed  towards  the  inner  life.  Introspection  and 
an;^lysis  gradually  led  him  to  ascribe  far  greater  importance 
to  qisychical  activity  than  Condillac  and  the  ideologists 
aad  done.  He  held  that  immediate  self-consciousness 
(apperception  immediate)  refutes  Condillac' s  theory  of 
passivity.  He  describes  the  antithesis  of  passive  states 
and  of  inner  activity  by  very  interesting  analyses.  His 
native  temperament  seems  to  have  been  peculiarly  adapted 


222 


POSITIVISM 


COUSIN 


223 


to  experiences  of  this  kind  {Journal  intime,  by  Naville; 
Maine  de  Biran,  sa  vie  et  ses  pensees,  1857. — Cf.  also 
Rapports  du  physique  et  du  moral  j  CEuvres  philos.,  IV). — 
Maine  de  Biran  takes  issue  with  de  Maistre  and  his 
school  as  well  as  with  Condillac,  According  to  them 
in  the  last  analysis  the  soul  is  likewise  passive,  because 
it  receives  everything  from  the  authorities  (just  as, 
according  to  Condillac j  from  external  objects). 

De  Biran  discovers  both  the  origin  of  the  categories 
(especially  causality)  and  the  basis  of  morality  in  the 
consciousness  of  volitional  activity. — Later  on  his 
psychologism  culminated  in  mysticism,  on  account  of 
the  fact  that  he — ^in  adherence  to  Kant's  distinction 
between  phenomena  and  thing-in-itself — ^regarded  *'la 
vie  de  Tesprit  "as  an  immediate  participation  in  something 
which  transcends  every  phenomenon,  and  places  this  *  *  life 
of  the  spirit"  above  **la  vie  humaine,"  the  active  life  of 
reason  and  of  will  (Nouveaux  essais  d* anthropologic j  1859). 

The  famous  physicist,  A.  M.  Ampbre  (i 775-1836), 
with  whose  philosophical  ideas  we  are  acquainted  more 
particularly  from  his  interesting  correspondence  with 
Biran  (published  by  Barthelemy  St.  Hilaire  in  Philos- 
ophic des  deux  Amperes) ,  was  led,  by  the  theory  of  his 
friend,  to  investigations  concerning  the  combinations  of 
sensations  and  ideas  which  are  independent  of  our  con- 
scious activity.  He  distinguishes  blending  (concretion)  amd 
association  of  independent  ideas  (commemoration) ;  to  lihe 
first  he  ascribes  immediate  recognition.  In  epistei;nol- 
ogy  he  departs  from  Biran  (and  Kant)  by  ascribing 
absolute  validity  to  the  relative  concepts  (causahty, 
ntimber,  time,  space)  and  discovers  in  them  a  br  dge  from 
phenomena  to  tliings-in-themselves  {Essai  sur  la  philos- 
ophie  des  sciences,  1834-43). 


The  so-called  eclecticism,  which  was  for  a  long  time 
regarded  as  the  official  philosophy  of  France,  started 
originally  with  the  psychological  school.  After  Royer 
Collard,  with  Reid's  philosophy  of  common  sense  as  his 
basis,  had  attacked  the  theory  of  Condillac  attheSorbonne, 
Victor  Cousin  (1792-1867)  began  his  brilliant  professional 
career,  in  which  he  first  undertook  to  combine  the  theories 
of  Reid  and  Biran,  and  later  offered  a  popular  and  rhetor- 
ical exposition  of  the  ideas  of  Schelling  and  Hegel.  He 
thought  it  possible  to  attain  to  a  point  by  psychological 
observation  where  universal  reason  would  be  evident 
and  truth  could  be  directly  conceived.  He  finds  it 
possible,  by  means  of  this  intuition,  to  abstract  the  true 
and  the  sound  elements  in  the  various  systems,  each  of 
which  is  one-sided  in  itself,  and  organize  them  into  a 
single  system  {Du  vrai,  du  beau  et  du  Men,  1838). 

3.  The  origin  of  positivism  must  be  sought  within 
the  sociological  school  founded  by  Saint  Simon  (1760- 
1825).  The  task  of  Saint  Simon  was  to  prepare  the  way 
for  a  social  reformation.  But  he  thought  that  the  only 
possibility  of  such  a  reformation  involved  the  founding  of 
a  new  world-theory  which  might  accompHsh  for  the  pres- 
ent age  what  Christianity  had  done  for  the  Middle  Ages. 
Such  a  new  world-theory,  in  the  opinion  of  Saint  Simon, 
must  be  constructed  on  the  foundation  of  an  encyclopedia 
of  the  positive  sciences.  This  is  all  the  more  true, 
because  it  must  now  transpire  that  men  shall  make 
common  cause  in  the  exploitation  of  nature  instead  of 
the  mutual  exploitation  of  each  other.  The  history  of 
the  sciences  reveals  the  fact  that  they  begin  with 
theological  presuppositions,  but  gradually  build  upon 
purely  natural  presuppositions.  As  soon  as  this  develop- 
ment is  completed  it  will  be  possible  to  establish  the 


224 


POSITIVISM 


COMTE 


225 


positive  philosophy  {Doctrine  de  Saint  Simon,  par  Hip- 
polyte  Carnotj  1829). — It  was  under  the  influence  of 
Saint  Simon  that  Augusts  Comte  produced  his  first  im- 
portant work:  Plan  des  travaux  scientifiques  pour  rear- 
ganiser  le  societe  (1822). 

B.      AUGUSTE   COMTE      (1798-1857). 

Comte  was  a  student  at  the  polytechnic  institute  in 
Paris.  But  when  this  was  closed  by  the  Bourbons  on 
account  of  the  revolutionary  ideas  still  prevalent  there, 
he  continued  his  studies  privately,  at  the  same  time 
giving  them  an  encyclopedic  character,  to  which  his  asso- 
ciation with  Saint  Simon  contributed.  This  association 
came  to  an  end  because,  according  to  Comte's  opinion, 
the  master  wanted  to  subordinate  science  too  completely 
to  his  reformatory  ideas.  Comte  then  carried  forward 
his  encyclopedic  exposition  of  positive  philosophy  with 
marvellous  energy  and  concentration.  During  the  latter 
years  of  his  life  his  reflections  assumed  a  more  sub- 
jective and  mystical  character,  so  that  he  regarded  him- 
self as  the  founder  of  a  religion  of  humanity  and  even 
instituted  a  kind  of  worship. 

a.  Our  modem  civilization  is  suffering, — and  on  this 
point  Saint  Simon  and  Comte  are  agreed, — from  an 
excess  of  the  critical  and  revolutionary  spirit.  There  is 
a  lack  of  fellowship  in  the  mode  of  thought  and  sentiment, 
and  hence  also  in  cooperation  towards  common  ends. 
Society,  under  the  old  order  of  things,  had  a  common 
foundation  in  theology.  Now  positive  science  is  the  only 
thing  which  can  serve  as  such  a  foundation.  There  must 
be  a  thought  structure  erected  which  can  speak  with  the 
same  authority  as  the  special  sciences  within  their  respec- 
tive spheres.    History  reveals  the  fact  that  there  is  an 


intimate  relation  between  the  evolutional  stages  of  soci- 
ety and  the  evolutional  stages  of  science.  It  is  this  there- 
fore that  accounts  for  the  tremendous  importance  of  the 
evolution  of  the  sciences  through  the  three  stages,  the 
theological,  the  metaphysical  and  the  positive.  In  his  chief 
work,  Coiirs  de  philosophie  positive  (1830-42),  Comte 
develops  the  law  of  the  three  stages  by  furnishing  both  a 
classification  of  the  sciences  and  an  encyclopedic  expo- 
sition of  the  positive  knowledge  of  his  age. 

At  the  theological  stage  human  knowledge  governs  but  a 
very  small  portion  of  experience,  and  hence  the  imagina- 
tion plays  an  important  part.  The  bond  which  at  this 
stage  unites  the  facts  for  the  human  mind  is  the  idea  of 
gods  and  spirits.  The  only  way  of  explaining  the  events 
which  transpire  in  the  universe  is  by  reference  to  these 
ideas,  and  the  importance  of  theology  in  the  history  of 
civilization  rests  upon  the  fact  that  it  was  the  intellectual 
bond  upon  this  primitive  stage  of  science.  It  was  like- 
wise of  practical  importance,  because  morality  was  essen- 
tially founded  on  religious  authority.  Within  the  theo- 
logical stage  the  transition  from  fetichism  to  polytheism 
is  especially  significant  because,  by  the  removal  of  divine 
beings  from  the  particular  phenomena  of  nature,  it 
became  possible  to  subject  these  phenomena  to  an  em- 
pirical investigation. 

At  the  metaphysical  stage  the  explanation  of  natural 
phenomena  is  no  longer  found  to  consist  of  personal 
beings,  but  in  universal  energies  or  ideas.  There  are 
just  as  many  distinct  energies  postulated  as  the  number 
of  distinct  groups  of  phenomena  require;  thus  we  speak  of 
a  chemical  energy,  a  vital  energy,  etc.,  and  finally  we 
postulate  the  idea  of  nature  (an  abstract  equivalent  of 
the  idea  of  God)  for  the  total  aggregate  of  phenomena. 


226 


POSITIVISM 


COMTE 


227 


Speculative  reflection  has  taken  the  place  of  religious 
imagination.  The  advance  consists  in  this,  namely,  that 
energies  or  ideas  indicate  a  greater  degree  of  uniformity 
and  invariability  than  was  to  be  expected  of  deities  and 
spirits.  But  the  metaphysical  stage  is  still  predorai- 
nantly  negative  and  critical.  It  destroys  the  authorities 
and  yet  fails  to  attain  to  a  new  basis  of  certitude.  It  is 
the  period  of  individualism. 

At  the  positive  stage  both  imagination  and  reflection  are 
subordinated  to  experience.  The  only  criterion  of  truth 
consists  of  the  agreement  with  the  facts.  Positivism  does 
not  however  permit  the  facts  to  remain  in  isolation;  it 
seeks  after  the  laws,  i.  e.,  the  constant  relations  of  the 
phenomena.  Science  builds  on  the  invariability  of 
natural  law,  which  was  anticipated  already  by  the 
Greeks,  but  clearly  expressed  in  modem  times  by  Bacon, 
Galileo  and  Descartes,  the  real  foimders  of  positive  philos- 
ophy.— It  is  impossible  to  refer  the  nimierous  laws  to  a 
single  law.  Our  knowledge  cannot  attain  objective 
unity, — ^unity  is  only  subjective.  Subjective  imity  con- 
sists in  the  fact  that  the  same  method — the  explanation  of 
facts  by  facts — ^is  consistently  appHed  everywhere. 
This  unity  of  method  furnishes  a  basis  for  the  fellowship 
of  minds,  which  has  not  existed  since  the  Middle  Ages. 

The  point  of  difference  between  these  stages  is  partly 
due  to  the  difference  in  the  range  of  experience,  partly 
to  the  different  viewpoints  which  are  postulattxl  in  the 
explanation  of  nature.  Before  this  explanation  could 
be  found  in  the  facts  themselves  it  was  necejwary  to 
postulate  imagination  and  spectdation  in  the  intcrprct^i- 
tion  of  nature. 

b.  The  classification  of  the  sciences  coincides  with  the 
theory  of  the  three  stages.    It  rests  first  of  all  upon  the 


serial  order  in  which  the  various  sciences  entered  the 
positive  stage.  Mathematics  comes  first,  which  had  even 
become  positive  already  among  the  Greeks,  then  succes- 
sively Astronomy,  Physics,  Chemistry,  Biology  and 
Sociology  (theory  of  society).  But  this  serial  order  like- 
wise presents  a  successive  passage  from  the  simplicity  of 
the  objects  considered  to  their  complexity:  the  simpler 
the  objects  of  a  given  science,  the  sooner  it  will  become 
positive.  The  serial  order  furthermore  reveals  a  constant 
passage  from  universality  to  particularity:  the  laws  of 
mathematics  are  valid  of  all  phenomena,  whilst  the 
astronomical,  physical,  chemical  and  biological  laws 
apply  to  an  increasingly  smaller  group,  and  those  of 
sociology  to  the  most  circumscribed  group  of  all.  Finally 
we  likewise  find  in  this  serial  or(kT  a  giBdual  passage 
from  the  predominance  of  the  deductive  metlxxl  to  the 
predominance  of  induction. — These  four  piinciplies  of 
classification,  as  may  be  readily  obGcrved^  are  clo««ly 
related. 

The  various  departments  of  experience  correR|>on<Hn^ 
to  the  dlfTcrent  sciimcuM;  arc  not  cocmected  in  a  single 
contitmum.  Di.scontinuity  inaTiift!t;t,s  iusdf  even  witJiin 
one  and  the  same  department,  as  e.  g.,  bet«H)cn  the 
various  i)hysical  energies,  between  the  oTiganic  spedes^ 
etc., — Comte  was  not  acquainted  with  the  law  of  the 
conservation  of  energy,  which  however  did  not  receive 
general  recognition  durinjj  his  lifetime,  asKl  he  did  not 
survive  the  appearance  of  Darwin. 

His  classification  omits  loj^jc  and  peycboJpgy^  of  which 
the  fomuT  should  be  placed  before  mathematics  and  the 
latter  between  biolo^^y  and  sociology. — In  his  later  >'earH 
Comte  himself  added  ethics  as  a  seventh  science.  Accord- 
ing to  his  conception,  ethics  is  moixj  specialized  tliaii 


228 


POSITIVISM 


COMTE 


229 


sociology,  because  it  goes  more  into  details,  especially  in 
the  fact  that  it  places  special  emphasis  on  the  affections, 
which  receive  but  little  attention  in  sociology. 

c.  Comte^s  positivism  is  not  empiricism.  As  a  matter 
of  fact  the  theory  of  stages  presupposes  that  the  facts 
must  always  be  combined;  the  only  question  is,  whence  is 
the  combining  instrument  to  be  derived.  In  the  positive 
stage  the  combination  can  be  effected  in  two  ways.  We 
associate  phenomena  which  are  given  simultaneously 
according  to  their  similarity  of  structiu-e  and  function. 
We  nat\irally  arrange  phenomena  which  follow  in  succes- 
sion in  a  temporal  series.  The  former  is  a  static  explana- 
tion {par  similitude) ;  the  latter  is  a  dynamic  explanation 
{par  filiation).  We  satisfy  oiu*  mind's  native  impulse  for 
unity  by  both  methods  and  thus  discover  the  constant  in 
the  midst  of  change  {Discours  sur  Vesprit  positif, 
1844). 

Of  this  combining  function  of  the  mind,  which  Comte 
here  presupposes,  he  made  no  ftuther  investigation.  His 
works  contain  no  epistemological  nor  pS3^chological 
analyses.  His  conception  of  knowledge  is  biological. 
Our  knowledge  is  determined  by  the  interaction  of  our 
organism  with  the  objective  world,  of  our  understanding 
with  the  milieu.  The  elaboration  of  the  impressions 
received  from  without  follows  the  laws  of  our  organiza- 
tion, and  all  knowledge  is  therefore  determined  by  a 
relation  of  subject  and  object.  Comte  is  of  the  opinion 
that  in  this  biological  theory  of  knowledge  he  is  a  fol- 
lower of  Kant  and  Aristotle, — In  his  later  years  he  came  to 
emphasize  the  subjective  character  of  our  knowledge 
more  and  more,  until  he  finally  proposed  a  subjective 
system  instead  of  the  objective  system  given  in  the 
Cours  de  philosophie  positive. 


d.  The  term  sociology  was  formulated  by  Comte  and, 
despite  its  philological  indefiniteness,  it  has  gradually 
come  to  mean  the  rights  of  citizenship  in  scientific  ter- 
minology. In  Comic's  sense,  the  term  sociology  covers 
what  has  generally  been  called  the  philosophy  of  history, 
and  in  addition  thereto,  political  economy,  ethics  and  the 
major  portion  of  psychology.  Just  as  in  other  depart- 
ments of  science,  so  likewise  in  sociology  we  must  dis- 
tinguish between  statics  and  dynamics. 

Social  statics  includes  the  doctrine  of  the  reciprocal 
relation  of  the  factors  of  society,  e.  g.,  ideas,  customs  and 
institutions.  The  business  of  institutions  is  simply  to 
regulate  whatever  has  been  evolved  in  the  course  of 
unconstrained  cooperation.  As  compared  with  spon- 
taneous development,  law  and  the  state  are  of  subor- 
dinate importance,  and  the  concept  of  law  is  subordinate 
to  the  concept  of  duty.  The  concept  of  duty  originates 
from  the  individual's  consciousness  of  being  a  member  of 
the  social  whole.  And  this  consciousness  arises  at  the 
moment  when  the  soHdarity  of  the  himian  race  is  first  felt 
and  recognized.  Mankind  spontaneously  follows  the 
social  impulse,  and  only  later  discovers  the  advantages 
which  thus  accrue.  On  this  point  Comte  regards  Hume 
and  Adam  Smith  as  his  predecessors.  He  discovers  the 
first  germs  of  solidarity  in  biology:  in  the  sexual  instinct 
and  in  the  instinct  to  care  for  offspring.  In  the  realm  of 
mankind  there  is  a  constant  progressive  discipline  towards 
altruism  (which  term  was  likewise  formidated  by  Comte), 
The  individual,  considered  by  himself  and  in  isolation,  is  a 
mere  abstraction.  The  family  is  the  social  unit;  here  we 
have  more  than  a  mere  association,  it  is  a  complete 
union.  In  larger  societies  the  cooperation  of  individuals 
towards  common  ends  and  imder  the  inspiration  of  com- 


230 


POSITIVISM 


PHILOSOPHY   BEFORE   MILL 


231 


mon  ideas  is  of  pectdiar  importance.  The  supreme  idea 
is  the  idea  of  hiimanity,  to  which  all  individual  and  social 
development  should  be  subservient. — Cotnte  challenges 
the  distinction  between  private  and  public  functions. 
This  distinction  belongs  to  modem  thought;  it  was  un- 
known to  the  Greeks  and  to  the  Middle  Ages.  It  is  the 
duty  of  positive  philosophy  to  develop  a  sentiment  by 
means  of  which  all  should  be  enabled  to  regard  them- 
selves as  co-laborers  of  the  one  great  body  of  humanity. 
It  is  especially  important  to  incorporate  the  proletariat, 
which  has  arisen  since  the  abolition  of  slavery,  into  the 
social  system. 

The  law  of  the  three  stages,  with  which  we  are  already 
acquainted,  belongs  to  social  dynamics.  The  various 
stages  of  intellectual  development  correspond  to  definite 
stages  of  social  and  political  development.  Militarism 
corresponds  with  the  theological  stage.  This  is  the  period 
of  regulative  authority.  The  control  of  the  jurists 
("legislators")  corresponds  with  the  metaphysical  stage; 
their  specific  task  consists  in  regulating  the  rights  of  the 
various  classes,  partictdarly  the  rights  of  the  middle  class, 
of  the  miHtary  and  of  the  clergy.  Industrialism  corre- 
sponds with  the  positive  stage;  the  distribution  of  power 
is  now  determined  by  productive  capacity,  and  social 
problems  take  the  place  of  the  political  problems. 

e.  In  a  later  work  (Politique  positive j  185 1-4)  Comte 
imdertook  to  lay  the  fotmdation  of  a  new  religion,  the 
Religion  of  Himianity.  (The  complete  title  therefore 
reads  as  follows:  Politique  positive j  ou  traite  de  sociologie 
instituant  la  religion  de  Vhumanite.)  Whilst  in  his 
Cours  he  made  the  world  or  nature  his  starting-point 
and  aimed  to  attain  an  understanding  of  man  on  the  basis 
of  the  knowledge  of  nature,  he  would  now  replace  this 


objective  method  by  a  subjective  method.  Nature  as  a 
whole  must  be  construed  from  the  himian  standpoint  and 
humanity  described  as  the  highest  being  (le  grand  etre). 
The  affections  and  not  merely  the  imderstanding  are 
now  to  be  the  final  arbiter,  and  synthesis,  i.  e.,  the  con- 
ception of  unity,  is  to  be  regarded  as  superior  to  analysis 
and  specialization.  The  new  religion  is  to  be  a  worship 
of  humanity,  of  which  we  are  all  members, — those  now 
living  as  well  as  those  who  have  died  and  those  as  yet 
unborn.  Every  thought  and  action  is  to  be  directed 
towards  the  development  of  this  Grand  etre.  The 
constitution  of  the  future  is  to  be  a  Sociocracy,  a  social 
community  without  fixed  institutions.  The  patricians 
direct  production,  whilst  the  proletariat  represent  the 
dynamic,  the  philosophers  the  reason,  and  the  women  the 
affections  of  the  social  body.  Public  opinion  and  the  right 
of  refusal  to  cooperate  will  furnish  an  adequate  check 
against  any  misuse  of  power  on  the  part  of  the  spiritual 
or  temporal  authorities. — ^Thus  the  foimder  of  positivism 
ends  up  as  a  Utopian  romanticist.  His  school  divides  on 
this  point,  several  of  them  (as  e.  g.  Littre)  maintaining  the 
theory  of  the  Cours,  whilst  others  (such  as  Lafitte  and 
Rohinet)  regarded  the  Politique  positive  as  the  actual 
culmination  of  the  positive  philosophy. 

C.    English  Philosophy  in  the  Nineteenth 
Century  before  John  Stuart  Mill. 

Both  in  Germany  and  in  France  the  transition  from  the 
eighteenth  to  the  nineteenth  century  was  effected  by  a 
revolution — ^in  Germany  by  the  romantic  revolution 
in  the  sphere  of  thought,  in  France  by  the  political 
revolution.  In  England  on  the  other  hand  there  were 
a  number  of  energetic  philosophic  thinkers  who  endeav- 


232 


POSITIVISM 


BENTHAM 


^33 


ored  to  make  a  practical  application  of  the  principles  dis- 
covered by  the  eighteenth  century  to  the  problems  of  the 
nineteenth  centiiry.  The  EngHsh  philosophy  of  the 
nineteenth  centxiry  therefore,  in  its  chief  representatives, 
bears  the  stamp  of  radicalism  and  empiricism.  Jeremy 
Bentham  and  James  Mill,  pronounced  adherents  of  the 
radical  enlightenment,  produced  a  profotmd  impression 
on  the  first  decades  of  the  centxiry.  John  Stuart  Mill 
afterwards  undertook  on  the  one  hand  a  consistent 
development  of  their  principles,  and  on  the  other  to 
adapt  them  to  the  changed  setting  of  the  problem, — 
namely,  that  brought  about  by  the  romanticism 
represented  by  Coleridge  and  Carlyle  and  the  criticism 
represented  by  Hamilton  and  Whewell. 

I.  Jeremy  Bentham' s  (i  748-1832)  most  important 
philosophical  writings  had  appeared  already  in  the 
eighteenth  century  (^4  Fragment  on  Government,  1776; 
Principles  of  Morals  and  Legislation,  1789).  But  they 
did  not  make  much  of  an  impression  tmtil  after  the 
dawn  of  the  new  century.  Bentham,  who,  as  a  private 
scholar,  devoted  himself  uninterruptedly  to  his  efforts  for 
social  and  legislative  reform,  assumed  as  his  chief  task 
the  reform  of  English  legislation.  He  demanded  a 
codification  of  the  laws  (he  formulated  the  term  codifi- 
cation himself),  a  reduction  in  the  costs  of  legal  processes, 
prison  reform  and  an  extension  of  political  franchise. 
Theoretically  he  assumed  the  principle  of  the  greatest 
happiness  to  the  greatest  number,  previously  advocated 
by  Hutcheson,  as  the  fimdamental  principle  of  morality. 
This  principle,  which  to  his  mind  is  self-evident,  is  to 
govern  our  judgment  of  every  institution,  every  action, 
every  quaHty  and  every  motive.  Bentham  attacks  the 
so-called  natural  rights  as  well  as  the  morality  which  is 


founded  on  authority  and  tradition.  He  examines  the 
intensity,  persistence,  certainty,  intimacy,  purity  and 
fruitfulness  of  pleasurable  feelings  which  follow  our 
acts  and  which  condition  the  value  of  an  act.  He  investi- 
gates the  motives  of  action  in  order  to  discover  what 
motives  should  be  fostered  and  what  others  should  be 
restrained.  He  regards  self-interest,  properly  tmder- 
stood,  as  the  most  reliable  motive,  because  he  believed 
that  self-interests,  properly  understood,  are  harmonious, 
so  that  the  individual  must  necessarily  be  interested  in 
the  general  welfare  even  for  prudential  considerations. 
This  idea  is  expressed  very  one-sidely  and  harshly  in  a 
work  {Deontology)  that  was  published  posthumously, 
and  perhaps  interpolated  by  the  publisher. 

Bentham' s  friend,  James  Mill  (i 772-1836),  was  a 
zealous  exponent  of  the  radical  application  of  the  principle 
of  utility.  This  energetic  man,  whose  high  official 
position  in  the  East  India  Company  excluded  him  from 
Parliament,  acted  as  counsellor  of  the  radical  politicians 
who  were  working  for  parliamentary  reform,  and  above  all 
else  the  emancipation  of  the  middle  classes.  He  under- 
took the  theoretical  task  of  furnishing  a  psychological 
basis  for  Bentham' s  ethical  theory,  the  so-called  utili- 
tarianism.  He  discovered  such  a  basis  in  the  Asso- 
ciational  psychology  founded  by  Hume  and  Hartley, 
which  he  greatly  simplified  by  referring  all  combinations 
of  ideas  to  association  between  such  ideas  as  frequently 
take  place  together  (association  by  contiguity)  (Anal- 
ysis of  the  Human  Mind,  1829).  He  attaches  special 
importance  to  the  fact  that  the  association  may  be  so 
completely  subjective  that  an  entirely  new  totality  may 
arise,  without  containing  any  traces  of  the  original 
elements  whatever.    By  this  method  he  aims  to  show, 


234 


POSITIVISM 


CARLYLE 


235 


i.  e.  to  explain,  how  selfless  ("disinterested'')  feelings 
may  arise.  Such  feelings  are  secondary;  they  arise  from 
the  fact  that  something  which  is  at  first  capable  of 
exciting  pleasure  only  as  a  means  afterwards  becomes  an 
end  and  then  acts  as  a  pleasurable  stimulus  directly. 
This  is  the  psychological  explanation  of  the  immediacy 
of  conscience.  (The  best  exposition  of  this  theory  is  given 
by  James  Mill  in  appendix  B.  of  his  polemical  essay, 
Fragment  on  Mackintosh,  1835.) 

2.  Against  these  enthusiastic  advocates  of  empirical 
and  analytical  psychology  and  ethics  there  arose  a  roman- 
tic tendency,  under  German  influence,  whose  most  noted 
representatives  were  Coleridge  and  Carlyle. 

Samuel    Taylor   Coleridge    (i 772-1834)    in    his    early 
youth  was  an  ardent  disciple  of  the  associationist  psychol- 
ogy.   But  he  later  became  an  opponent  of  all  analysis 
and  of  every  effort  to  explain  mental  life  by  elementary 
principles,  and,  in  adherence  to  Schelling,  he  proclaimed 
the  awe-inspiring  totality  of  all  things  as  intuitively  appre- 
hended, in  opposition  to  the  empiricism  wliich  brwiks 
everything  to  pieces.    He  however  attaches  special  im- 
portance to  the  Kantian  antithesis  of  "undcrstandinK*^ 
and  "reason."    He  charged  all  rehgious  criticism  to  the 
account  of  the  pure  "understanding,'*  and  thtm  refuted  it 
by  an  appeal  to  the  higher  court  of  "re;i.wn, "  the  faculty 
of  ideas  and  the  theory  of  totality.    He  not  only  hurls  his 
polemics  against   the  free-thinkers,  but  likewise  against 
the  theology  which  has  degenerated  into  barren  dogmatic 
formulas.    His  great  work  which  was  inttiTuled  to  show 
the  agreement  of  Christianity  and  philosophy  was  never 
written.    We  gather  his  ideas  from  his  essays  on  Church 
and  State  (especially  the  appendix)  and  fn;m  his  Bio- 
graphia  Literaria  and  his  Table  Talk. 


Thomas  Carlyle  (1795-1881)  did  not  care  to  attain  any 
"higher"  knowledge.  He  satirized  Coleridge's  ''tran- 
scendental moonshine^  He  proposed  a  new  basis  of  faith 
and  for  the  guidance  of  life  to  which  he  was  led  by  the 
study  of  Goethe  and  the  romantic  philosophy.  His  effort 
was  directed  towards  securing  independence  from  the 
never-ending  investigations  of  science.  After  having 
extricated  himself  from  materialistic  theories  in  his  early 
youth,  he  cherished  a  romantic  aversion  towards  analysis 
and  criticism.  His  polemic  appHes  especially  to  the 
"philosophy  of  cause  and  effect"  and  the  utilitarian 
ethics.  In  his  profoundest  essay.  Sartor  Res artus  (1833), 
he  develops  a  ''philosophy  of  old  clothes,''  based  on  Kant's 
distinction  between  phenomenon  and  thing-in-itself :  The 
world  is  the  gamicnt  of  Deity;  natural  $ckiioc€3Kimii>estlie 
gamient  without  knowinj^  its  wearer.  Nature  is  a  mighty 
syrnlK)l,  a  revelation  of  ideas  wliidx  no  scientific  method  is 
capable  of  conceiving.  It  i.s  the  duty  of  philosopliy  evw 
and  anon  to  inspire  the  sense  of  the  mysterious  majesty  of 
l>dng  when  men  have  fallen  xslccp  through  familiarity. 
Even  our  ideas  of  belief  arc  garments  of  I>eily; — ^but  the 
garment  of  1  )city  must  be  woven  anew  from  time  to  time. 

Carlyle' s  practical  view  of  life  reveals  two  distiitct  char* 
acteristics. — Everything  great  takes  place  quietly»  in 
silence.  Great  deeds  are  accomplishod  without  any 
express  consciousness  of  the  fact.  A  full  and  clear  oon- 
sciousn(\*;.s  makes  everytlung  Kmall  and  mechanical. 
The  highest  truth,  so  far  as  man  is  cxmcemed,  can  only 
exist  in  the  form  of  a  symbol:  the  symbol  ^ithhoMs  and 
expresses,  obscures  and  revejil.s  at  one  and  the  same  time. — 
The  hi^he-st  revelation  consists  of  the  ^reat  men,  the 
heroes  {On  Heroes  and  Hero-worship,  184 1).  They  are 
the  guides  and  i)attcnis,  the  founders  of  e\'efytliing  that  is 


236 


POSITIVISM 


HAMILTON 


237 


■ 


good.  The  hero  may  appear  as  prophet,  poet  or  states- 
man; but  he  always  represents  great,  concentrated  energy 
of  life,  and  his  words  and  deeds  reveal  the  hidden  ideas  of 
the  movement  of  life.  Such  heroes  are  especially  neces- 
sary for  the  solution  of  the  social  problem.  Carlyle  was 
one  of  the  first  authors,  who — in  opposition  to  the  then 
dominant  school  of  political  economy — noted  the  exist- 
ence of  this  problem.  He  made  no  specific  investigations. 
Empirical  science  was  too  distasteful  to  him  for  that. 

3.  In  the  same  year  (1829)  that  James  Mill  published 
his  Analysis f  the  most  important  work  of  the  asso- 
ciationist  psychology,  William  Hamilton's  profound 
treatise  on  The  Philosophy  of  the  Unconditioned  likewise 
appeared,  in  which  he  severely  criticized  all  philosophy 
that  treated  the  unconditioned  as  an  object  of  knowledge. 
Hamilton  (i  788-1 856)  spent  a  ntunber  of  years  in  fruitful 
professorial  activity  at  the  university  of  Edinburgh. — 
Whatever  we  apprehend  and  conceive — ^by  the  very  fact 
of  its  apprehension  and  conception — ^is  related  to  some- 
thing else,  by  which  it  is  limited  and  conditioned.  To 
think  is  to  condition.  We  neither  conceive  an  absolute 
whole,  nor  an  absolute  part;  each  whole  is  a  part,  and 
each  part  is  a  whole.  We  only  know  the  conditioned 
finite.  We  define  whatever  we  know  in  terms  of  space, 
time  and  degree  (extensively,  protensively  and  intensively) 
and  even  the  law  of  causaHty  is  likewise  nothing  more  than 
a  special  form  of  the  law  of  relativity.  Hamiltonregaxds  the 
principle  of  causality  as  the  expression  of  otir  incapacity  to 
conceive  an  absolute  addition  of  reahty.  On  account  of 
this  incapacity  we  try  to  conceive  the  new  (as  effect)  as  a 
new  form  of  the  old  (as  cause).  If  cause  and  effect  should 
fail  to  fully  correspond  to  each  other,  we  should  be  com- 
pelled to  assume  an  absolute  beginning  of  the  new.  Hence, 


according  to  Hamilton  (like  Cusanus),  philosophy  ends  in  a 
docta  ignorantia.  Its  value  consists  in  its  constant  seeking, 
by  means  of  which  the  energies  of  the  mind  are  exercised. 

Hamilton  is  nevertheless  convinced  that  faith  in  the 
unconditioned  is  necessary  in  order  to  establish  oiir 
spiritual  existence.  The  more  refined  definitions  of 
unconditioned  being  can  only  be  secured  by  analogy  with 
human  personality. — ^This  argument  was  applied  to  the 
defense  of  the  orthodox  faith  by  Hamilton's  disciple, 
Henry  Mansel  {Limits  of  Religious  Thought^  1858). 

William  Whewell  (1795-1866),  professor  at  Cam- 
bridge, demonstrated  the  principles  of  the  critical  philos- 
ophy from  another  point  of  view.  He  endeavored  to 
verify  Kant's  fundamental  principles  as  the  necessary 
presuppositions  of  the  inductive  sciences  {History  of 
the  Inductive  Sciences ,  1837;  Philosophy  of  the  Inductive 
Sciences  J  founded  on  their  History  ^  1840).  Induction 
signifies  not  only  a  collection  of  facts,  but  their  arrange- 
ment according  to  some  governing  principle.  The  organ- 
ization of  the  facts  is  possible  only  in  case  the  investi- 
gator brings  such  a  principle  with  him  (as  e.  g.  Kepler 
brought  the  idea  of  the  ellipse  to  his  studies  of  the  planets). 
We  must  finally  go  back  to  the  fundamental  concepts 
which  express  the  very  principles  of  our  cognitive  faculty, 
principles  which  form  the  basis  of  all  sense  perception  and 
all  induction.  Such  fundamental  concepts  are:  time, 
space,  cause  (in  mechanics),  end  (in  biology),  and  duty  (in 
ethics).    These  cannot  be  analyzed  into  simpler  concepts. 

D.    John  Stuart  Mill  (1806-1873). 

John  Stuart  Mill,  the  son  of  James  Mill,  was  trained  in 
the  ideas  of  the  radical  enlightenment,  as  they  had  been 
developed  by  his  father  and  Bentham,  and  he  accepted 


238 


POSITIVISM 


MILL 


239 


them  as  a  veritable  gospel.    In  his  very  interesting  auto- 
biography he  describes  how  the  ideas  adopted  during  his 
childhood  and  youth  came  into  sharp  conflict  with  the 
ideas  and  moods  of  a  later  period  which  likewise  agitated 
his  very  soul,  and  how  he  was  then  compelled  to  struggle 
through  a  mental  crisis.    This  contradiction  not  only 
appears  in  his  life  but  likewise  in  his  works,  and  the 
inconsistencies  which,  despite  his  vigorous  intellectual 
effort,  his  theories  reveal,  are  partly  due  to  this  fact. 
There  likewise  exists  an  intimate  relation  between  his 
theoretical  views  and  his  efforts  for  social  reform.    The 
fact  that  in  philosophy  he  seeks  to  derive  everj^hing  from 
pure  experience  does  not  rest  upon  ptu-e  theoretical  con- 
viction alone,  but  he  likewise  regarded  it  as  a  weapon 
against  the  prejudices  which  impede  progress  (similar  to 
the  French  philosophers  of  the  eighteenth  century).— 
Like  his  father.  Mill  was  an  officer  of  the  India  Company; 
after  its  dissolution  he  was  a  member  of  Parliament  for  a 
short  time. 

a.  Stuart  MilVs  System  of  Logic  (1843)  contains  the 
answer  of  the  English  school  to  Kant's  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason  and  at  the  same  time  the  most  radical 
form  of  empirical  epistemology.  According  to  Kant's 
fimdamental  principle,  all  real  experience  contains  a  ra- 
tional element,  which  can  be  discovered  by  analysis.  Mill 
now  undertakes  to  show  not  only  that  all  knowledge 
proceeds  from  experience,  but  that  experience  itself 
involves  no  antecedent  presuppositions.  He  would  make 
experience  the  standard  of  experience.  ' '  We  make  ex- 
perience its  own  test!''— By  experience  (like  Hume)  he 
means  a  sum  of  impressions,  and  his  problem  consists  in 
showing  how  universal  principles  can  be  derived  from 
such  a  simi. 


Mill  bases  his  logical  investigations  partly  on  histor- 
ical and  partly  on  psychological  principles. 

In  matters  pertaining  to  the  history  of  thought,  as  he 
openly  acknowledged,  he  was  greatly  benefited  by 
WhewelVs  work  on  the  History  of  the  Inductive  Sciences, 
John  HerscheVs  book  On  the  Study  of  Natural  Philos- 
ophy (1831)  was  likewise  one  of  his  preparatory  studies. 
Mill's  problem  consisted  in  describing  the  fundamental 
methods  of  inductive  thought  by  an  analysis  of  the 
methods  of  the  empirical  sciences  as  these  had  been  de- 
veloped during  the  past  three  centuries,  and  then  to 
examine  what  presuppositions  underlie  this  thought. — 
He  discovers  foiu-  methods  of  induction.  The  method  of 
agreement  infers,  from  a  series  of  cases,  in  which  two 
circimistances  (A  and  B)  always  succeed  each  other, 
whilst  all  other  circumstances  vary,  a  causal  connection 
between  A  and  B.  But  this  inference  is  not  certain  imtil 
we  can  at  the  same  time  apply  the  method  of  difference 
because  it  shows  that  B  does  not  appear  whenever  A  is  ex- 
cluded, and  vice  versa.  This  is  the  chief  inductive  method. 
To  this  is  added  the  method  of  residues,  in  which  every- 
thing previously  explained  is  eliminated  and  an  inference 
is  then  drawn  concerning  the  relation  of  the  remaining 
circimistances,  and  the  method  of  proportional  variation, 
in  which  we  have  two  series  of  experiences  which  vary 
proportionally  between  each  other  and  infer  a  causal 
relation  between  them.  Mill  illustrates  these  methods 
by  striking  examples  from  the  history  of  the  sciences. 
He  attempted,  by  this  exposition,  to  substitute  a  system- 
atization  of  inductive  logic  for  the  Aristotelian  system- 
atization  of  deductive  logic;  his  logic  was  a  continuation 
of  Bacon's  work.  He  differs  from  Bacon  not  only  in 
the  wealth  and  quantity  of  the  examples  at  his  disposal 


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but  likewise  by  his  clearer  insight  into  the  necessity  of 
forming  hypothesis  and  by  the  interchange  of  induction 
and  deduction.  The  deductive  method  becomes  neces- 
sary especially  in  cases  where  there  are  large  numbers 
of  contributing  factors.  We  must  then  examine  each 
factor  separately  by  induction  and  then  test  by  deduction 
from  the  residts  of  these  separate  investigations  whether 
the  interplay  of  all  the  factors  is  explainable. 

The  final  analysis  of  thought  reveals  the  psychological 
basis  of  MiWs  logic.  According  to  Mill  every  deduction 
presupposes  an  induction.  For — ^in  his  opinion — deduc- 
tion starts  from  a  general  proposition;  but  whence  can 
this  proposition  be  derived,  if  not  from  experience? 
Every  general  proposition  implies  a  reference  to  a  number 
of  experiences.  We  ultimately  come  back  to  the  par- 
tictdar  impressions.  The  beginning  of  the  whole  knowl- 
edge-process consists  in  the  fact  that  two  phenomena  take 
place  coincidently.  Once  this  has  happened  frequently, 
the  presence  of  the  one  phenomenon  will  arouse  an  expec- 
tation of  the  other.  This  is  the  fundamental  form  of 
inference.  It  does  not  however  start  from  a  general 
proposition,  but  rather  proceeds  from  particulars  to 
particulars.  The  child  withdraws  its  hand  from  the 
burning  taper,  not  because  of  its  knowledge  of  the  general 
proposition,  that  contact  with  fire  is  painful,  but  because 
the  sight  of  fire  immediately  arouses  the  idea  of  pain. 
It  is  therefore  an  objective  association  (association  by 
contact)  that  forms  the  original  basis  of  all  inference: 
all  logical  principles  are  eliminated.  The  transition  from 
one  idea  to  another  takes  place  immediately ,  and,  according 
to  Mill,  this  means,  without  ground. — In  the  theory  of 
causality  Mill  would  likewise  eliminate  all  presupposi- 
tions.   Mill  concedes  however  that  the  inductive  methods 


are  demonstrable  only  on  the  presupposition  of  the 
causal  principle.  Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  B 
always  follows  A,  and  B  does  not  appear  in  the  absence  of 
A,  nevertheless  our  only  groimd  of  inference  to  a  causal 
relation  between  A  and  B  is  the  presupposition  that  B 
must  have  a  cause.  What  then  is  the  source  of  the  causal 
prindple?  Mill  answers:  the  same  as  all  general  prop- 
ositions, experience,  i.  e.,  induction. — ^The  circumlocution 
which  is  here  apparent  in  MilVs  argument  has  been 
clearly  exposed  by  Stanley  Jevons  (in  a  series  of  articles 
under  the  title,  Stuart  MilVs  Philosophy  Tested^iiSjj- 
1879) — ^reprinted  in  Pure  Logic  and  other  Minor  Works). 
Jevons  had  already  demonstrated  in  his  Principles  of 
Science  (1874)  that  the  principle  of  identity  is  presup- 
posed as  the  basis  of  all  inference,  because  of  the  fact 
that  the  proof  of  an  induction  always  consists  of  a  deduc- 
tion, which  carries  its  inference  back  from  a  hypothetical 
proposition  to  the  given  impressions. 

MiWs  attempt  therefore  to  fiunish  a  system  of  logic 
which  is  wholly  inductive  did  not  succeed.  This  attempt 
forms  the  coimterpart  to  HegeVs  attempt  to  invent  a  logic 
which  is  wholly  deductive.  Mill  tried  to  spin  the  forms 
of  thought  from  their  content,  Hegel  the  content  of 
thought  from  its  forms.  It  is  in  these  two  men  that  the 
contrast  between  romanticism  and  positivism  is  most 

sharply  drawn. 

b.  The  pyschological  presuppositions  at  the  basis  of 
MilVs  logic  come  from  James  MilVs  Analysis,  They 
were  the  presuppositions  of  the  ^^  Associational  Psy- 
chology:' When,  in  his  later  years  (1869),  Stuart  Mill 
pubhshed  a  new  edition  of  the  Analysis,  in  his  appended 
notes  he  modified  his  psychological  theory.  Following 
Alexander  Bain  (whose  chief  works  are  The  Senses  and  the 


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243 


Intellect,  1856,  and  The  Emotions  and  the  Will,  1859),  he 
here  shows  that  the  objective  association  (association  by 
contact)  constantly  presupposes  a  subjective  correlate 
(association  by  similarity).    He  had  even  before  that, 
in  his  Examination  of  Sir  William  Hamilton's  Philosophy 
(1865),  indicated  a  still  more  radical  change  in  the  funda- 
mentals of  his  psychology.    He   then   saw  that   such 
phenomena  as  anticipation  and  recollection  cannot  be 
accounted  for  by  the  theory  of  consciousness  imderl3dng 
the  '' Associational  Psychology''— viz,,  that  of  a  mere  sum 
of  elements.    The  phenomena  mentioned  prove — so  he 
thinks — that  the  bond  by  which  the  psychical  elements 
are  held  together  is  just  as  real  as  the  elements  them- 
selves, and  that  it  cannot  be  derived  from  these  elements. 
And  the  term  ''Ego''  appHes  to  this  bond  alone.     Mill 
therefore  once  more  revives  Hume's  ''uniting  principle," 
which  had  been  forgotten  in  the  "  Associational  Psychol- 
ogy," and  as  a  matter  of  fact  even  accorded  it  a  central 
position.    Had  he  then  been  able  to  revise  his  logic, 
the  possibilities  were  present  of  developing  the  prin- 
ciples of  knowledge  as  ideaHzed  psychical  tendencies.— 
The  modifications  and  even  the  inconsistencies  contained 
in  Mill's  theories  bear  witness  to  the  indefatigability  and 
candor  of  his  investigations. 

c.  In  ethics  even  as  in  psychology  Stuart  Mill  was  also 
originally  a  disciple  of  his  father;  here  he  was  Hkewise  a 
disciple  of  Bentham,  The  objectivity  and  onesideness  of 
Bentham's  utiHtarianism  had  however  been  brought  to 
his  attention  even  in  his  early  youth,  especially  through 
the  influence  of  Coleridge  and  Carlyle,  Nevertheless,  he 
never  surrendered  the  presupposition  that  the  ultimate 
criterion  for  the  evaluation  of  himian  actions  must  be 
sought  in  their  effects  on  human  happiness.    The  aim  is 


not  the  greatest  possible  happiness  for  the  actor  himself, 
but  the  greatest  possible  happiness  for  all  who  are  affected 
by  the  results  of  the  action.    Stuart  Mill  bases  this  prin- 
ciple, not  on  the  self-interest  of  the  actor  properly  under- 
stood as  Bentham  had  done,  but  on  the  psychological 
nature  of  the  moral  sentiment  {Utilitarianism,    1863). 
In  his  theory  of  this  sentiment  he  adopted  the  doctrine  of 
the  metamorphoses  of  sentiments'  as  developed  by  Hartley 
and  James  Mill    The  origin  of  the  moral  sentiment  is  due 
to  the  cooperation  of  a  large  number  of  elements:  sympa- 
thy, fear,  reverence,  experiences  of  the  effects  of  actions, 
self-esteem  and  the  desire  for  the  esteem  of  others.     It  is 
in  this  complex  nature  that  the  cause  of  the  mystical 
character  attaching  to  the  idea  of  moral  obHgation  is  to  be 
found.    The  complex  may  however  become  so  completely 
subjective  and  perfect   that   the   sentiment  itself  will 
appear  as  unitary.    Its  development  ordinarily  takes 
place  under  the  influence  of  social  life  by  which  individuals 
are  accustomed  to  regard  common  interests  and  to  enlist 
united  efforts.    In  this  way  a  sentiment  of  soHdarity  and 
unity  evolves  which  may  even  (as  in  the  case  of  Comte's 
religion  of  humanity)  assume  a  reHgious  character. 

But  Mill  not  only  modified  utilitarianism  by  the 
emphasis  which  he  placed  on  the  subjective  factor,  but 
likewise  by  the  assumption  of  the  qualitative  differences 
of  the  sentiments.  He  thinks  "happiness"  must  not  be 
estimated  according  to  quantity  alone,  but  likewise 
according  to  quality.  He  says,  like  Plato  (in  the  ninth 
book  of  the  Republic),  that  he  alone  who  knows  the 
various  qualities  of  happiness  from  personal  experience 
is  in  position  to  furnish  a  valid  estimate  of  their  different 
values.  A  Socrates  dissatisfied  is  better  than  a  satisfied 
idiot. 


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245 


These  modifications  reveal  the  fact  that  the  ethical 
problem  is  far  more  consequential  and  difficult  than  the 
older  utilitarians  ever  dreamed.  Henry  Sidgwick  (1838- 
1900),  who,  in  his  penetrating  work  The  Method  of  Ethics 
(1877),  distinguishes  definitely  between  two  distinct 
kinds  of  utilitarianism,  of  which  the  one  is  based  on  self- 
interest,  the  other  on  altruism,  saw  this  clearly.  He 
likewise  shows  that  the  practical  ethics  (the  morality  of 
common  sense)  which  prevails  at  the  present  time  rests 
imconsciously  upon  a  utiHtarian  presupposition. 

d.    Mill  produced  a  number  of  important  works  in 
the  department  of  social  ethics,  which  made  a  profound 
impression  upon  the  life  of  the  age.    Thus,  e.  g.,  in  his 
book  On  Liberty  (1859)  he  asserted  the  right  of  the  indi- 
vidual to  the  free  development  of  his  native  powers,  and 
endeavored  to  estabHsh   definite  limits   for  the  inter- 
position of  legislation  and  of  pubHc  opinion.    His  funda- 
mental principle  is  that  the  impulse  to  everything  noble 
and  great  proceeds  from  individual  geniuses,  who  are  the 
salt  of  the  earth.     In  his  Subjection  of  Women  (1869)  he 
makes  a  peculiar  application  of  the  principle  of  liberty 
to  the  position  of  woman.    He  likewise  holds  that  our 
ideas  of  the  *' nature*'  of  woman  have  been  derived  from 
the  subordinate  and  retiring  position  which  woman  has 
hitherto  occupied,  and  he  anticipates  splendid  contri- 
butions to  htmian  culture  after  women  are  enabled  to 
develop  their  faculties  just  as  freely  as  man  has  ahready 
done  for  ages.     In  his  Considerations  on  Representative 
Government  (1861)  he  regards  the  poHtical  issue  at  the 
present  time  as  a  conflict  between  democracy  and  bureau- 
cracy, which  must  be  brought  to  an  end  by  the  former 
enlisting  the  services  of  the  latter  and  only  retaining  a 
general  control.    He  likewise  recommends  a  proportionate 


franchise  in  order  to  guarantee  the  rights  of  the  minority. 
Mill's  future  ideal  however  went  beyond  a  political 
democracy.  He  is  convinced  that  personal  and  political 
liberty  cannot  be  secured  without  great  social  and  economic 
changes  {Principles  of  Political  Economy^  1849).  Here 
he  is  confronted  by  the  profotmd,  according  to  him, 
diametrical  antithesis  of  individualism  and  sociaHsm, 
and  he  frankly  acknowledges  that  he  is  at  a  loss  to  know 
how  to  reconcile  them.  He  holds  however  that  neither 
the  individualistic  nor  the  socialistic  fundamental  principle 
has  been  theoretically  and  practically  developed  in  its  best 
possible  form.  Hence,  e.  g.  the  right  of  private  property 
might  readily  be  maintained,  if  the  laws  would  take  even 
as  much  pains  to  reduce  its  difficulties  as  they  now  take 
in  order  to  increase  them.  Socialists  are  wrong  when  they 
make  competition  the  ground  of  social  evil.  The  cause 
lies  in  the  fact  that  labor  is  subject  to  capital,  and  Mill 
expects  great  things  from  the  trades  unions  and  producers 
unions,  especially  because  they  encourage  the  virtues  of 
independence — ^namely,  justice  and  self-control. 

e.  MilVs  religious  views  appear  only  by  way  of 
suggestion  in  the  works  published  by  himself.  He  holds, 
in  opposition  to  Comte  (in  his  book  on  Comte,  1865),  that 
theological  and  metaphysical  theories  are  not  necessarily 
destroyed  by  the  attainment  to  the  positive  stage  of 
science,  but  they  must  not  contradict  the  results  of 
scientific  investigation.  There  are  .some  open  questions! 
But  he  protested  vigorously  against  the  teaching  of 
Hamilton  and  Mansel  (especially  the  latter),  that  the 
concepts  (particularly  ethical  concepts)  must  be  treated 
as  having  an  entirely  different  content  when  applied  to 
deity  than  when  applied  to  man.  He  would  refuse  to 
call  any  being  good — even  if  that  being  were  able  to 


246 


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247 


condemn  him  eternally  for  so  doing — ^who  is  not  what 
we  mean  when  we  call  a  man  good. 

He  expresses  himself  more  fully  in  his  posthimious 
Essays  on  Religion  (1847).  He  denies  that  he  can  infer 
an  omniscient,  omnipotent,  and  absolutely  good  Creator 
from  the  facts  of  nature.  He  regards  it  possible  how- 
ever on  the  other  hand  to  believe  in  a  personal  God,  who, 
in  constant  conflict  with  uncreated  and  persistently 
resistant  matter,  is  seeking  to  bring  about  a  beneficent 
order  of  nature.  Man  can  therefore,  by  his  own  effort, 
be  a  co-laborer  with  God,  and,  according  to  Milly  the 
real  religious  attitude  consists  in  the  sentiment  aroused 
by  this  fellowship.  He  attaches  great  importance  to  the 
fact  that  such  thoughts  and  sentiments  elevate  man  above 
the  limitations  of  experience  and  the  prosiness  of  ordinary 
life. 

E.    The  Philosophy  of  Evolution. 

About  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  theory 
of  evolution  came  into  vogue  and  was  recognized  as  an 
essential  element  of  human  thought.  The  romantic 
philosophy  had  indeed  likewise  spoken  of  evolution,  but 
they  simply  meant  by  this  a  ptu-ely  logical  or  systematic 
relation  of  the  forms  and  types  of  being,  not  a  real  process, 
taking  place  in  time.  The  idea  of  evolution  had  already 
made  itself  felt  however  in  various  departments  of 
thought.  Thus,  e.  g.,  in  the  astronomical  hypothesis  of 
Kant  and  Laplace ^  in  the  theory  of  epigenesis  (i.  e.  the 
theory  of  the  gradual  evolution  of  the  embryo  from  a 
simple  rudiment)  as  formulated  by  the  anatomist,  Caspar 
Wolff  J  in  the  psychology  of  Spinoza^  Hartley  and  James 
Milly  in  the  eighteenth  century  belief  in  the  evolution  of 
history,  in  Comte's  theory  of  the  three  stages.    Lamarck 


finally  announced  the  theory  of  a  continuous  evolution  of 
organic  species  by  means  of  a  progressive  transformation 
of  the  organs  brought  about  through  the  constant  exercise 
of  its  powers.  But  the  evolutionary  theory  only  received 
general  recognition  as  a  fundamental  principle  in  wider 
circles  after  the  announcement  of  Darwin's  hypothesis  of 
the  origin  of  the  organic  species  by  the  process  of  natural 
selection,  Herbert  Spencer  at  the  same  time  undertook  to 
determine  the  fundamental  forms  of  evolution  by  analysis 
of  the  phenomena  in  the  various  departments  of  experi- 
ence, after  having  previously  shown  how  characters  which 
are  unexplainable  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  experience  of 
the  individual  may  be  explained  from  the  viewpoint  of 
race-experience. 

I.  The  great  naturalist,  Charles  Darwin  (i 809-1 881), 
deserves  a  place  in  the  history  of  philosophy,  because, 
like  Copernicus  J  Galileo  and  Newton  y  he  is  of  profound 
significance  in  the  treatment  of  philosophical  problems, 
not  only  on  accotmt  of  his  results,  but  likewise  on  account 
of  his  theory  of  science  and  its  sphere.  After  a  tour  of 
the  world  covering  three  years,  upon  which  he  collected 
his  large  supply  of  specimens  and  observations,  he  lived 
in  the  solitude  of  the  country  as  a  quiet  investigator. 

His  effort  to  explain  the  origin  of  the  species  was  in 
complete  harmony  with  the  spirit  of  positivism.  He 
referred  to  a  fact  which  was  actually  operative  in  nature: 
namely,  the  necessity  for  every  living  being  to  possess  the 
attributes  and  equipment  essential  to  the  preservation  of 
life,  or  as  he  expressed  it  figuratively,  the  struggle  for 
existence.  If  we  persist  in  saying  that  the  species  were 
created,  each  one  independently,  this,  in  the  eyes  of 
Darwiny  is  but  a  pious  way  of  expressing  our  ignorance. 
The  struggle  for  existence  however  is  not  the  whole 


M^l 


248 


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cause.  It  presupposes  that  individual  organisms  reveal 
variations  which  may  be  either  more  or  less  favorable  to 
their  preservation  or  to  the  preservation  of  the  species  to 
which  they  belong.  Those  individuals  which  show  favor- 
able variations  would  naturally  survive  in  the  struggle  for 
existence   {Origin  of  S pedes j  1858). 

Darwin  foimd  the  proof  of  his  theory  in  the  ^^intelligible 
thread'^  by  means  of  which  a  vast  array  of  facts  can  be 
combined.  He  did  not  regard  his  theory  as  a  dogma,  but 
rather  as  an  instrument  of  research.  He  always  insisted 
on  tracing  out  the  significance  which  a  given  character, 
function  or  organ  possessed  for  the  struggle  for  exist- 
ence.— He  regarded  the  problem  concerning  the  origin  of 
the  variations  by  virtue  of  which  natural  selection  takes 
place  as  a  weakness  in  his  hypothesis.  He  assumes  the 
fact  that  such  variations  exist,  and  for  the  time  being 
calls  them  ^^ chance-variations y^^  only  meaning  by  this 
however  that  their  causes  are  imknown.  He  takes  a 
similar  attitude  to  the  problem  of  life  in  general. 

Darwin^s  assimiption  that  very  small  variations  fur- 
nish a  real  advantage  in  the  struggle  for  existence  was 
perhaps  an  error.  Hugo  de  Vries  has  quite  recently 
undertaken  to  show  that  very  important  variational 
** leaps"  ("mutations")  may  take  place  and  that  a  new 
type  may  thus  arise  at  once,  which  must  then  establish 
itself  in  the  struggle  for  existence.  It  has  become  appar- 
ent, fiirthermore,  that  these  mutational  types  are  very 
tough.  The  contrast  between  the  types  and  variations 
consequently  becomes  even  sharper  than  Darwin^  and 
especially  the  Darwinians,  who  have  frequently  been  more 
dogmatic  than  their  master,  ever  supposed. 

Darwin  saw  no  reason  for  regarding  man  an  exception 
from  the  general  biological  laws.    In  his  opinion  the 


actual  value  and  the  actual  dignity  of  man  suffers  no 
diminution  by  regarding  him  as  having  evolved  from 
lower  forms.  For  the  theological  and  romantic  concep- 
tion, which  regarded  man  as  a  fallen  angel,  he  substituted 
the  realistic  conception  of  man  as  an  animal  which  has 
evolved  a  spiritual  nature  {The  Descent  of  Man,  1871). 

Darwin  elaborates  his  views  on  the  problems  of  moral 
philosophy  in  the  third  chapter  of  his  book  on  the  origin 
of  man.  He  sympathizes  with  the  view  represented  by 
Shaftesbury,  Hutcheson  and  Hume.  He  starts  with  the 
principle  that  a  group  of  animals  or  men  among  which  the 
idea  of  sympathy  and  mutual  helpfulness  prevails  would  be 
favorably  situated  in  the  struggle  for  existence.  He  thus 
discovers  a  biological  foundation  for  the  moral  sentiment. 
According  to  Darwin  this  sentiment  presupposes,  besides 
sociability  and  sympathy,  the  faculty  of  recollection  and 
comparison.  With  these  conditions  given  we  have  the 
basis  for  a  more  or  less  conscious  estimate  and  judgment 
of  actions.  After  the  faculty  of  language  has  been 
evolved  mutual  praise  and  blame  can  Hkewise  exert  its 
influence.  Public  opinion  can  then  take  form.  Habit 
and  exercise  in  efforts  for  the  common  welfare  would  also 
tend  to  give  permanence  and  strength  to  the  social 
motives  and  instincts.  The  characters  thus  acquired  may 
perhaps  likewise  be  transmitted  by  inheritance  (as 
Lamarck  had  assumed). 

Touching  reHgion  Darwin  was  still  a  believer  in  revela- 
tion when  he  returned  from  his  famous  tour.  His  views 
changed  gradually,  without  any  painful  rupture,  and  he 
finally  (in  1876,  and  published  in  Life  and  Letters  of 
Charles  Darwin,  1887),  adopting  a  form  of  expression 
introduced  by  Huxley,  declared  himself  an  agnostic,  i.  e. 
one  who  knows  that  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  being 


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is  beyond  our  powers.  That  is  to  say,  his  philosophy 
culminates  in  a  docta  ignorantia.  He  regarded  the  idea 
that  the  world  is  the  result  of  chance  (brute  force)  quite 
as  incredible  as  that  it  should  be  the  product  of  conscious 
design.  His  statement  of  the  problem  at  this  point 
reminds  us  of  that  given  by  Kant  in  the  Critique  of  Judg- 
ment. 

2.  Herbert  Spencer  (1820-1903)  gave  up  a  life  of  prac- 
tical affairs  in  order  to  devote  himself  to  philosophical 
investigations.  In  his  early  youth  he  was  an  engineer, 
but  soon  acquired  an  interest  in  social  problems  and  ideas 
which  in  turn  led  him  to  the  study  of  psychology  and 
biology.  He  was  a  self-made  man.  He  never  attended  a 
university  and  never  took  an  examination.  He  was 
peculiarly  gifted  in  observing  facts  which  might  serve  to 
illuminate  general  principles.  His  philosophy  sprang 
from  the  necessity  of  discovering  a  governing  principle 
which  would  serve  the  purpose  of  organizing  a  series  of 
studies  in  natural  science,  psychology  and  social  science 
into  a  system.  He  has  described  the  course  of  his  develop- 
ment in  his  A  utobiography  ( 1 904) .  He  remained  a  private 
citizen  all  his  life,  occupying  himself  with  his  studies  and 
his  writings. 

Spencer's  ideas  are  expressed  in  their  purest,  most 
original  form  in  a  series  of  essays,  published  in  three 
volumes  under  the  title:  Essays,  Scientific,  Political  and 
Speculative.  From  the  literary  point  of  view,  the  Essays 
form  the  most  valuable  portion  of  the  Spencerian  writings. 
— He  had  even  before  this,  in  his  Social  Statics  (1850), 
appHed  the  idea  of  evolution  to  social  life.  Following 
Coleridge  he  regarded  the  complete  unfolding  of  life  as  a 
divine  idea  which  is  to  be  realized  gradually.  Later  on 
he  regarded  this  conception  as  too  theological.    He  then 


began  to  search  for  a  concept  of  evolution  which  could 
be  appHed  to  every  sphere  of  experience. 

According   to   his   conception   philosophy   is  unitary 
knowledge.    Its  task  consists  in  the  discovery  of  general 
principles  under  which  the  particular  principles  postulated 
by   the   special   sciences   can  be  organized.    But   this 
unitary  knowledge  can  neither  be  attained  by  the  a 
priori,  deductive  method,  followed  by  Hegel,  nor  by  the 
simple,  encyclopedic  collation  of  facts,  as  Comte  thought. 
Spencer  seeks  to  discover  what  is  common  in  the  special 
principles  and  laws  by  means  of  the  comparative  method. 
During  the  course  of  thirty-six  years   (1860-1896)   he 
produced  a  detailed  exposition  of  his  Synthetic  Philos- 
ophy  filling    ten    large    volumes.      The   first   volume, 
containing    the   First  Principles   (1861),   furnishes    the 
fundamental  principles  of  his  worid-theory  and  defines 
the  concept  of  evolution  both  inductively  and  deductively 
as  the  fundamental  concept  of  all  science.    The  remaining 
volumes  apply"  the  special  forms  of  this  concept  to  the 
departments  of  biology,  psychology,  sociology  and  ethics. 
—Otto  Gaup  has  published  a  valuable  characterization 
and   exposition  of  Spencer's  philosophy    (Frommann's 
Klassiker,  Herbert  Spencer,  1897). 

a.  Spencer's  theory  of  knowledge  shows  the  influence 
of  both  Stuart  Mill  and  William  Hamilton  (and,  through 
the  latter,  Kant).  He  challenged  pure  empiricism,  on 
the  ground  of  the  fact  that  perceptions  require  elaboration 
before  knowledge  can  arise  and  this  elaboration  pre- 
supposes both  a  faculty  and  a  standard.  The  ultimate  ba- 
sis of  all  knowledge  consists  of  the  faculty  of  distinguish- 
ing the  like  from  the  unlike;  even  radical  skepticism  must 
presuppose  this  basal  principle.  The  ultimate  standard 
by  which  truth  and  error  are  distinguished  consists  of  the 


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principle  that  a  proposition  which  is  inherently  self -con- 
tradictory   cannot    be    true.     Truth   implies    a    perfect 
agreement  between  our  ideas  (representations  of  things) 
and  our  impressions    (presentations  of  things).     Every 
inference  and  every  postulate  assimies  the  truth  of  the 
criterion   contained   in   the   principle   of   contradiction. 
This  criterion  cannot  therefore  be   derived  from  mere 
experience:  it  is  a  priori.     Every  individual  must  possess 
the     innate    factdty    of    comparing    impressions    and 
drawing    inferences   from  impressions,  but  this  factdty 
cannot  be  derived   from    the    impressions    alone.     But 
the    a    priori     appertains     to     the    individual     alone. 
If    we    inquire    into    the    origin    of    this    faculty    we 
must  appeal  to  the   race    from    which    the  individual 
has    sprung.     Empiricism   is    in    error    only  in   so   far 
as    the    particular    individual     is     concerned,     not     as 
respects  the  whole  race.    The  experiences  acquired  by 
the  race  during  the  course  of  countless  generations,  the 
incessantly  recurring  influence  to  which  it  was  subjected, 
evolve  dispositions  which  form  the  basis  upon  which 
single   individuals   begin   their   course   of   development. 
That  is  to  say,  the  single  individual  possesses  in  his 
native  organization  the  clear  profit  of  the  experiences  of 
untold  generations.     That  which  is  a  priori  in  the  case  of 
the  individual  is  racially  a  posteriori. 

Even  in  the  first  edition  of  his  psychology  (1855) 
Spencer  J  who  had  early  become  an  evolutionist,  referred 
to  the  fact  that  the  things  which  are  inexplicable  on  the 
basis  of  individual  experience  might  be  explained  by 
race  experience.  He  imagined  that  this  amounted  to  a 
final  disposition  of  the  controversy  between  empiricism 
and  a  prforism.  He  nevertheless  perceives  that  in  the 
final  analysis  he  concedes  the  correctness  of  empiricism, 


and  declares  himself  a  disciple  of  Locke  rather  than  of 
Kant,  He  extends  the  scope  of  the  older  empiricism  by 
going  back  of  the  individual  to  the  race.  He  failed  to 
see  however  that  the  actual  problem  of  epistemology  is 
not  the  matter  of  the  factual  origin  of  knowledge,  but  its 
validity.  In  the  construction  of  his  own  theory  of  the 
factual  origin  of  knowledge  he,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  simply 
assumes  the  criterion  of  truth!  Furthermore,  the  dis- 
tinction between  the  race  and  the  individual  is  not 
fundamental,  because  the  race  at  any  given  time  is 
represented  by  definite  single  individuals.  Every  gener- 
ation, even  as  every  individual,  must  possess  its  own 

a  priori  faculty. 

Spencer  had  advanced  the  hypothesis  of  the  natural 
origin  of  the  species,  which  in  1885  he  applied  to  psychol- 
ogy, in  an  essay  even  as  early  as  1852.  Darwin  therefore 
regards  him  as  one  of  his  precursors.  At  that  time  how- 
ever he  stood  closer  to  Lamarck  than  to  Darwin,  because 
he  was  not  yet  acquainted  with  the  idea  of  the  struggle 
for  existence  in  its  bearing  on  the  theory  of  evolu- 
tion. It  was  impossible  for  him  therefore  to  con- 
strue knowledge  as  an  instrument  in  the  struggle  for 

existence. 

b.  According  to  Spencer  the  sphere  of  knowledge  is 
determined  by  the  fundamental  function  of  thought, 
which,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  consists  in  distinguishing  like 
from  unlike.  We  can  only  know  such  things  as  can  be 
compared  with  other  things,  i.  e.  related  to  other  things. 
Here  Spencer  adheres  closely  to  William  Hamilton,  except 
that  he  dropped  the  latter's  theological  viewpoints.^  The 
things  which  we  presume  to  know  must  necessarily  be 
relative,  i.  e.  they  must  bear  definite  relations  and  they 
must  therefore  be  limited.    The  absolute  and  uncondi- 


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tioned  cannot  be  related  to  anything  else,  neither  can  it 
be  defined  in  terms  of  likeness  or  unHkeness. 

The  absolute,  according  to  Spencer,  is  nevertheless  a 
positive  concept.  We  are  always  under  the  necessity  of 
assuming  something  which  can  be  defined,  marked  out, 
compared— something  which  is  independent  of  the  definite 
form  ascribed  to  it  by  our  thought.  We  represent  it  to 
ourselves,  after  the  analogy  of  our  own  energy,  as  a 
universal  energy  which  underhes  all  objective  and  sub- 
jective changes  and  forms  the  content  of  our  knowl- 
edge—but which  cannot  itself  be  expressed  by  any 
concept. 

Spencer  moreover  regards  this  as  offering  a  possible 
solution  of  the  controversy  between  religion  and  science. 
It  is  the  common  aim  of  all  religions  to  furnish  knowledge 
of  the  universal  energy.    But  it  is  still  only  in  its  most 
primitive  stages  that  religion  pretends  to  furnish  com- 
plete knowledge  of  the  absolute.    The  higher  the  develop- 
ment of  religion,  the  more  readily  it  concedes  the  exist- 
ence of  an  inexplicable  mystery.    When  the  evolution  of 
religion  has  once  been  perfected  religion  and  science  will 
join  hands  in  the  common  acknowledgment  that  the  real 
nature  of  things  is  unknowable,  and  religion  will  cease  to 
oppose  the  scientific  explanation  of  phenomena.— 5/>ewcer 
is  weU  aware  of  the  fact  that  men  are  loath  to  surrender 
the  well-defined  intuitive  ideas  of  the  various  religions. 
He  nevertheless  anticipates  a  progressive  development  in 
this  direction.    He  fondly  hopes  that  the  emotional  side  of 
religion,  its  musical  temper,  may  be  able  to  survive,  even 
though  its  dogmas  must  perish. 

Spencer  failed  to  overcome  the  discrepancy  between  the 
so-called  absolute  and  relative.  Even  though,  e.  g.,  he 
assumes  the  appHcabihty  of  the  concept  of  evolution  to 


every  sphere  of  phenomena,  he  nevertheless  denies  that 
this  concept  applies  to  "the  Absolute"  itself. 

c.  Philosophy,  as  imitary  knowledge,  is  in  search  of  a 
common  principle  or  a  general  type  of  all  phenomena. 
Spencer  discovers  such  a  principle  by  the  method  of 
induction  and  analysis,  which  he  afterwards  seeks  to 
deduce  from  a  general  principle. 

The  principle  which  philosophy  has  been  seeking  is  the 
principle  of  evolution.  Every  phenomenon  has  come  into 
being,  so  far  as  we  are  concerned,  by  a  process  of  evolution, 
and  we  understand  a  phenomenon  whenever  we  know 
its  evolution.  But  what  is  evolution?  There  are,  according 
to  Spencer,  three  characteristics  by  which  it  can  be  described. 

In  its  simplest  forms  evolution  consists  of  concentration, 
a  transition  from  a  more  attenuated  to  a  more  permanent 
state  of  coherence.  The  formation  of  a  pile  of  sand  on  the 
ocean  beach  is  a  simple  example.  The  evolution  of  the 
solar  system  (in  its  primitive  phase,  as  the  formation  of 
the  primeval  nebula)  and  the  earth  (by  its  asstmiing  the 
spherical  form  within  the  original  nebtda),  the  growth  of 
an  organism  by  means  of  assimilating  nourishment,  the 
origin  of  a  people  from  its  stems  and  groups,  etc.,  furnish 
examples  on  a  larger  scale. — Diferentiation  goes  hand  in 
hand  with  integration,  especially  on  the  higher  levels. 
There  follows  then  a  transition  from  a  state  of  greater  homo- 
geneity to  one  of  greater  heterogeneity.  It  is  not  the  whole, 
as  such,  that  differentiates  itself;  different  parts  within  the 
whole  differentiate  themselves  from  one  another  and 
assimie  definite  forms.  Thus  the  various  heavenly  bodies 
of  the  solar  system  have  taken  form,  and  each  of  the  heav- 
enly bodies  in  turn  develop  differences  between  the  respec- 
tive parts  of  their  surfaces  and  their  internal  structure 
as  well  as  between  the  parts  of  the  surfaces  themselves. 


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The  various  organs  are  developed  by  the  process  of  spe- 
cialization during  the  course  of  the  evolution  of  the 
organism.  Organic  Hfe  on  the  earth  divides  into  various 
species.  And  in  the  sphere  of  social  Hfe  we  have  an 
example  in  the  division  of  labor.— Whenever  differentia- 
tion proceeds  one-sidedly,  dissolution  quickly  follows.  A 
third  characteristic  of  evolution  must  therefore  be 
added,  namely,  that  it  consists  of  a  determination 
which  presupposes  a  definite  harmony  between  integra- 
tion and  differentiation. 

The  concept  of  evolution  just  described  appHes  to 
every  particular  phenomenon,  and  to  every  phenomenal 
sphere  (but  not,  as  some  have  misunderstood  Spencer, 
to  'Hhe  universe"  as  a  whole).     It  has  been  discovered 
by  induction,  but  it  must  also  be  verified  by  deduction. 
Here  Spencer  falls  back  on  a  principle  which  he  regards 
the  foundation  of  all  real  science:  the  principle  of  the 
persistence  of  energy.    With  Spencer  this  principle   (as 
with  Hamilton  and  even  Descartes  and  Spinoza)  is  really 
identical  with  the  principle  of    causaHty.    Every    ex- 
periment rests  upon  the  assumption  of  this  principle: 
for  if  energy  could  originate  or  be  lost  during  the  course 
of  an  experiment  it  would  be  impossible  to  draw  any 
inference.     It   follows   therefore   that   similar   elements 
must  be  similariy  affected  by  similar  energies,  which 
estabhshes    the    principle    of    integration.    It    follows 
further  that  similar  elements  must  be  differently  affected 
by  different  energies;  which  establishes  the  principle  of 
differentiation.     Proof   of    the   necessity   of    the    third 
characteristic  determination  is  lacking.     It  is  not  a  mere 
accident  that  Spencer  was  unable  to  estabhsh  this  principle. 
From  the  viewpoint  of  experience  it  is  impossible  to 
furnish  any  guarantee  for  the  harmony  of  integration 


and  differentiation,  whilst  the  hypothetical  conditions 
demand  the  presence  of  both  processes.  Notwithstanding 
his  sublime  optimism,  Spencer  was  therefore  unable  to 
furnish  a  proof  of  harmonious  evolution.  With  Hegel 
''the  higher  unity  was  a  logical  necessity;  but  a  final 
deduction  is  impossible  in  the  case  of  Spencer's  systematic 
positivism,  even  though  the  problem  which  here  arises 
did  not  clearly  occur  to  him. 

d.  The  series  of  works  which  ftimish  a  detailed 
development  of  the  theories  advanced  in  the  First 
Principles  contain  a  gap,  due  to  the  fact  that  Spencer 
failed  to  furnish  a  specific  treatise  on  evolution  in  the 
sphere  of  inorganic  phenomena.  On  the  other  hand  he 
demonstrates  the  general  forms  of  evolution  in  the  realms 
of  biology,  psychology,  sociology  and  ethics  in  detail. 

Life,  according  to  Spencer,  consists  of  an  adjustment  of 
internal  relations  to  external  relations.  Organisms  are 
not  only  directly  determined  by  external  factors,  but 
there  are  indirect  factors  likewise  developed  from  within 
by  means  of  which  they  are  enabled  to  adjust  themselves 
more  advantageously  to  future  conditions  than  in  the  past. 
That  is  to  say  these  influences  lead  to  a  transposition  of  the 
organic  elements;  the  structure  changes  under  the  influence 
of  function.  This  gives  rise  to  variations  which  then 
endeavor  to  survive  in  the  struggle  for  existence.  Spen- 
cer attaches  greater  importance  to  the  adaptation  resulting 
from  the  exercise  of  the  functions  than  to  that  resulting 
from  the  loss  and  death  of  such  forms  as  are  ill-adapted 
by  **  natural  selection"  (which  Spencer  prefers  to  call 
^Hhe  survival  of  the  fittest^'). 

Consciousness  is  likewise  a  form  of  adaptation.  As  soon 
as  the  number  of  objective  impressions  increases,  the 
corresponding  subjective  states  can  only  adjust  themselves 


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advantageously  by  arranging  them  in  serial  order,  and 
such  arrangement  is  the  characteristic  fimction  of  con- 
sciousness. 

Psychology  is  a  division  of  biology.  We  must  never- 
theless make  a  distinction  between  subjective  and  objec- 
tive psychology.  Objective  psychology  consists  of  the 
natural  science  of  the  material  processes  with  which  the 
phenomena  of  consciousness  are  ordinarily  associated. 
Subjective  psychology  rests  upon  introspection  and  forms 
the  correlate  of  all  the  other  sciences;  with  the  single 
difference,  that  it  treats  of  the  knowledge  process  as 
such,  whilst  all  others  treat  of  the  objects  of  knowl- 
edge. 

In  the  sphere  of  consciousness  we  again  discover  the 
general  characteristics  of  evolution:  concentration,  dif- 
ferentiation and  determination.  We  rise  by  gradual 
transitions  from  reflex  movement  through  instinct  and 
memory  to  reason  in  a  constantly  increasing  concentra- 
tion, and  likewise  from  the  simplest  sensory  discrimina- 
tions to  the  most  refined  distinctions  of  the  intellect. 
And  we  find  that  each  stage  is  modified  by  the  necessary 
correspondence  with  the  conditions  of  life  and  its  relations. 

Spencer  seems  to  be  somewhat  vacillating  on  the  prob- 
lem of  the  relation  existing  between  consciousness  and 
matter.  He  at  first  conceives  this  relation  as  a  case  of 
metamorphosis  of  natural  forces  according  to  which 
consciousness  bears  a  relation  to  the  brain  process  anal- 
ogous to  that  of  heat  to  motion.  Later  on  however  he 
regarded  mind  and  matter  as  two  irreducible  empirical 
forms  of  universal  energy.  This  theory  however  has  not 
been  consistently  carried  out  in  his  works.  The  task 
which  Spencer  had  set  for  himself  was  to  discover  the 
fundamental  principles  of  the  evolutionary  theory  in 


every  department  of  science,  and  for  this  purpose  it  was 
really  immaterial  what  psychological  theory  was  sub- 
sumed. He  says  however — ^in  harmony  with  his  attitude 
towards  subjective  psychology  as  compared  with  all  other 
sciences — ^that  if  he  were  to  choose  between  the  two 
alternatives  of  referring  psychical  phenomena  to  material 
processes  or  vice  versa,  he  would  regard  the  latter  solution 
as  the  most  acceptable. 

In  sociology  Spencer  lays  the  chief  stress  upon  its  direct 
bearing  upon  the  actual  problems  of  Hfe.  The  struggle 
for  existence  is  intended  to  develop  human  character,  and 
hence  no  social  ordinance  and  no  state  institution  dare  be 
interposed  between  the  individual  and  real  life.  Because 
of  the  fact  that  the  whole  matter  turns  on  the  develop- 
ment of  character,  evolution  progresses  slowly  and  Spencer  is 
far  less  sanguine  at  this  point  than  Comte  and  Mill, — His 
pedagogical  theory  is  governed  by  the  same  line  of  argtmient . 
The  child  is  to  acquire  independent  experiences  as  early 
as  possible  and  be  under  the  guidance  of  authority  and 
tradition  as  little  as  possible.  Otherwise  twofold  adjust- 
ment would  be  required,  namely,  first  to  the  authority  and 
then  to  the  actual  conditions  of  life  {Education^  1861). 

Concentration  prevails  during  the  earlier  stages  of 
social  evolution,  i.  e.  the  individual  is  subordinate  to  the 
whole.  It  is  conditioned  by  the  necessities  of  common 
protection.  It  is  here  that  militarism  enjoys  its  classic 
period.  Later  on — as  the  individual  forges  to  the  front — 
a  differentiation  takes  place.  Individuals  are  then  able  to 
realize  their  own  ends  according  to  their  pleastu-e,  and  they 
can  advance  their  mutual  interests  by  the  free  organiza- 
tion of  individual  energies.  The  struggle  between 
militarism  and  industriaHsm  is  still  in  full  sway.  But 
Spencer  anticipates  a  third  stage  in  which  labor  for  the 


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sheer  necessities  of  life  will  no  longer  occupy  the  central 
place,  but  in  which  devotion  to  occupations  which  are 
valuable  per  se  will  be  far  more  general  than  now. 

It  is  the  duty  of  ethics  to  develop  the  content  of  the 
highest  stages  of  social  life.  The  method  of  ethics  is 
essentially  constructive:  from  the  highest  principles  of 
evolutionary  theory  it  constructs  the  idea  of  the  perfect 
life  as  a  harmony  of  concentration  and  differentiation,  a 
complete  determination.  In  the  perfect  organic  type  the 
development  of  the  one  suffers  no  limitation  save  the 
recognition  of  the  corresponding  right  of  the  other  to 
development,  and  the  individual  is  not  coerced  to  tmder- 
take  occupations  which  offer  no  immediate  satisfaction. 
Altruism  on  the  contrary  furnishes  the  individual  oppor- 
tunity to  develop  faculties  and  dispositions  which  would 
otherwise  remain  fallow.  The  contrast  between  altruism 
and  egoism  is  thus  reconciled. — For  the  present  we  are 
still  far  removed  from  such  an  ideal  state.  For  this 
reason  we  can  only  have  a  relative  ethics,  not  an  absolute 
system;  but  the  absolute  ethics  can  nevertheless  be  for- 
mulated and  serve  as  a  guide  to  relative  ethics. 

Spencer  regards  the  utilitarianism  of  Bentham  and  Mill 
as  too  empirical.  The  highest  ethical  ideas  can  be  dis- 
covered only  by  the  theory  of  evolution.  But  in  his  ethics 
as  in  his  theory  of  knowledge,  he  still  differs  from  his  pre- 
cursors only  in  the  matter  of  having  extended  the  horizon. 

P.    Positivism  in  Germany  and  Italy. 

As  we  have  already  observed,  positivism  is  by  no  means 
to  be  conceived  merely  as  a  movement  which  is  opposed  to 
romanticism.  It  is  the  result  of  well-defined  intellectual 
motives  which  are  peculiar  to  it  alone.  Within  the  posi- 
tive school  (in  its  broader  sense)  we  have  seen  men  like 


Stuart  Mill  and  Spencer ,  each  taking  their  own  course. 
We  have  Hkewise  found  investigators  outside  of  France 
and  England,  who  have  become  positivists  independently. 
Among  these  we  wish  to  describe  Eugen  Duhring  of  Ger- 
many and  Roberto  Ardigo,  the  Italian. 

I.  Eugen  Duhring  (bom  1883),  despite  the  fact  that  he 
became  bhnd  early  in  life,  has  shown  a  remarkable  activity 
as  a  teacher  and  author.  His  external  misfortunes  were 
due  to  his  severe  opposition  to  and  distrust  of  academic 
authorities,  on  account  of  which  he  was  dismissed  from 
his  position  as  a  Privatdocent  at  the  University  of  Berlin. 
He  has  published  a  characteristic  autobiography  under 
the  title,  Sache,  Leben  und  Feinde  Als  Hauptwerk  und 
Schlussel  zu  seinen  sammtlichen  Werken  (1882). 

His  first  work  of  any  consequence  was  Natural  Dich 
lectic  (1865).  Here  he  is  still  in  close  touch  with  the 
critical  philosophy,  and  he  distinguishes  sharply  between 
formal  and  real  science.  The  intellect  is  constantly 
striving  to  discover  continuous  transitions  and  to  form 
infinite  series  (i.  e.  capable  of  continuation  according 
to  the  same  principle).  In  mathematics,  e.  g.  we  have 
the  concept  of  infinity  and  in  logic  the  principle  of  suffi- 
cient reason.  But  we  must  not  transfer  this  tendency 
to  continuity  to  the  sphere  of  real  being.  Here  the  prin- 
ciple of  definite  number  prevails,  as  experience  shows. 
Astronomy,  physics  and  chemistry  show  how  completely 
the  character  of  natural  processes  and  natural  elements 
are  governed  by  the  law  of  definite  proportions.  Each 
separate  series  of  causes  which  nature  reveals  consists 
of  a  finite  ntmiber  of  members. 

Duhring' s  theory  of  the  vital  relation  between  the  laws 
of  thought  and  being  presents  a  singidar  contrast  to  the 
above  distinction.    Thought  is  a  continuation  of  being. 


262 


POSITIVISM 


DUHRING 


263 


The  uniformity  revealed  in  nature  as  well  as  in  the 
interplay  of  nature's  forces  corresponds  to  the  combi- 
nations and  deductions  of  the  intellect;  the  identical 
natxire  of  particular  elements  under  varied  conditions 
corresponds  to  the  logical  principle  of  identity;  the  real 
relation  of  cause  and  effect  corresponds  to  the  logical 
relation  of  premise  and  conclusion,  etc.  The  fact  that 
man  is  capable  of  knowing  nature  rests  upon  the  fact  that 
the  laws  of  htmaan  consciousness  are  likewise  nature's 
laws. 

This  latter  view  is  decidedly  in  the  ascendent  in  Duh- 
ring  *5  later  writings,  where  he  indulges  in  vigorous  polemic 
against  the  critical  philosophy,  which  makes  a  distinction 
between  our  knowledge  of  things  and  the  things-in-them- 
selves.  Duhring  here  regards  this  distinction  as  an 
attempt  to  enlist  the  services  of  philosophy  in  the  defense 
of  transcendental  fancies.  His  positivism  vanquishes 
his  criticism  (Cursus  der  Philosophic,  i875^rewritten 
under  the  title  Wirklichkeitsphilosophie,  1895;  Logik 
und   Wissenchaftslehrey    1878). 

The  problem  of  the  philosophy  of  reality  consists  in 
formulating  a  * 'world-scheme,"  a  problem  which  must 
be  solved  by  the  systematization  of  experience.  It  is 
evident  that  the  forces  of  nature  constantly  act  in  a 
definite  way,  and  in  a  way  moreover  that  the  results  of 
their  cooperation  invariably  show  definite  totals.  This  pro- 
vides for  the  origin  of  beings  which  not  only  exist  and 
act,  but  which  are  likewise  conscious  of  their  existence 
and  action  and  the  enjoyment  which  it  produces.  The 
possibility  of  such  an  evolution  is  due  to  the  combination 
of  different  forces.  The  idea  of  an  everlasting  conflict 
of  forces  would  be  an  absurdity,  and  a  universe  wholly 
unconscious  would  represent  the  anomaly  of  a  half-done 


performance.  But  nature  contains  a  logic  of  its  own 
which  precludes  absurdity.  True,  the  antagonism  of 
forces  likewise  plays  an  important  part;  but  this  antag- 
onism is  the  very  condition  of  the  potential  discharges  of 
motion  and  experience.  The  value  of  life  and  the 
attainment  of  its  higher  planes  depend  wholly  upon  the 
differences  and  rhythms  of  nature.  The  profoimd  satis- 
faction which  life  furnishes  would  be  impossible  without 
the  cruel,  the  bitter  and  the  painful  {Das  Werth  des 
Lebens,  1865). 

Duhring,  like  Comte,  finds  the  germinal  principle  of  the 
moral  Hfe  in  the  instinct  of  sympathy.  The  sufferings  of 
others  have  a  direct  effect  upon  individual  feelings,  and 
its  influence  increases  with  civiHzation.  Moral  progress 
however  consists  both  in  individualization  and  social- 
ization. Crude  force  is  still  the  governing  principle 
in  existing  states,  but  in  the  free  organizations  of  the 
future  the  interest  of  the  individual  will  be  devoted 
directly  to  his  work,  not  merely  to  the  products  of  his 
work.  The  ideal  of  the  future  does  not  consist  in  social- 
istic concentration,  but  in  the  growth  of  free  industrial 
communities.  Duhring  anchors  his  hope  to  a  progressive 
evolution  by  the  progressive  unfolding  and  survival  of  the 
good,  and  he  strongly  opposes  Darwin's  struggle  for 
existence  and  Marx's  catastrophe  theory. — ^The  contem- 
plation of  the  majestic  order  of  the  universe,  which  has 
made  such  an  evolution  possible,  begets  a  universal 
affection,— the  eqmvalent  of  the  religious  sentiment  of 
the    past    {Ersatz    der    Religion    durch   Vollkommneres, 

1883). 

2.  In  Italy  a  period  of  depression  and  lassitude  fol- 
lowed the  promising  mental  activity  of  the  period  of  the 
Renaissance,  and  the  general  history  of  philosophy  has 


264 


POSITIVISM 


ARDIGO 


26S 


but  few  names  to  record  that  are  of  any  consequence  in 
the  general  trend  of  the  evolution  of  thought.  The 
nineteenth  century  produced  a  new  Renaissance,  which 
at  first  assumed  a  romantic  speculative  form.  During 
the  first  half  of  the  century  Rosmini  and  Gioherti  developed 
a  kind  of  Platonism  by  which  they  hoped  to  harmonize 
religion  and  science.  These  philosophical  efforts  were 
intimately  associated  with  poHtical  issues,  because  it 
was  generally  beHeved  that  the  head  of  the  church  would 
lead  the  movement  for  political  rehabilitation.  But  the 
hopes  of  Italy  were  to  be  reaHzed  by  an  entirely  different 
method.  The  harmony  of  reHgion  and  science  was 
broken — ^in  the  first  place  because  the  head  of  the  Catholic 
church  sanctioned  the  scholastic  philosophy  of  the  Middle 
Ages  as  the  only  one  permissible,  and,  secondly,  because 
philosophy  assimied  a  more  critical  and  positive  character. 
We  shall  here  treat  of  Roberto  Ardigo  (bom  1828),  a 
representative   of  the  latter  tendency. 

Ardigo  became  a  positivist  by  a  process  of  gradual 
development.  His  studies  in  natural  science  and  philos- 
ophy carried  him  step  by  step,  without  being  aware  of 
it  at  the  time,  away  from  the  scholasticism  which  he  had 
practiced  as  a  Catholic  ecclesiastic.  The  growth  of  his 
ideas  proceeded  so  smoothly,  that,  when  all  of  a  sudden 
the  veil  was  withdrawn,  he  thought  he  had  always  been 
a  positivist.  The  evolution  experienced  in  Ws  own 
intellectual  life  became  the  theme  of  his  philosophizing 
when  he  accepted  the  chair  of  philosophy  at  Pavia  after 
quitting  the  chiu-ch.  He  regarded  his  own  course  of 
development  as  a  type  which  reveals  the  general  character- 
istics of  all  development,  no  matter  in  what  department  it 
occurs.  Whilst  Spencer  really  started  from  the  analogy 
of  organic  evolution,   Ardigo  starts  from  the  analogy  of 


intellectual  evolution,— '^//^w  most  remarkable  of  all 
natural  formations^'  He  did  not  become  acquainted 
with  the  French-EngHsh  positivism  until  later.  He 
calls  himself  a  positivist,  but  at  the  same  time  emphasizes 
that  the  essential  element  of  positivism  consists  in  its 
empirical  starting-point,  rather  than  its  systematic 
conclusion.  He  says:  the  positivist  proceeds  step  by  step, 
with  a  constantly  widening  horizon. 

He  elaborated  his  theory  of  evolution  in  connection 
with  an  analysis  of  the  Kant-Laplace  theory  which  he 
regarded  a  typical  example  of  the  scientific  method  of 
explanation  {La  formazione  naturale  nel  fatto  del  sistema 
solare,   1877).    The  present  state  of  the  solar  system 
came  into  being  by  a  process  of  separation  (distinzione), 
in  which  smaller  bodies  (distinti)  were  formed  within 
larger  undifferentiated  bodies   (indistinto).    The  larger 
body  is  not  destroyed  by  this  process.    It  persists  and 
forms  the  basis  of  the  interaction  of  the  smaller  body. 
There  exists  therefore  an  inherent  continuity  between 
the  larger  body  and  the  smaller  bodies  which  constitute 
its  parts.    The  possibilities  potentially  contained  within 
each  of  these  indistinto  (as  *  'forze  latente  or  virtuale'')  can 
only  be  developed  by  interaction  with  other  objects !  Each 
indistinto  is  therefore  in  turn  a  part  of  a  more  comprehen- 
sive  whole,  so  that  the  distinction  between  indistinto  and 
distinti  is  merely  relative.    Science  is  here  confronted  by 
an  infinite  series  of  processes;  but  its  only  task  consists  in 
explaining  the  fundamental  relation  of  indistinto  and  dis- 
tinti in  each  particular  case,  because  it  assumes  that  all 
differences,  no  matter  where  they  occur,  proceed  from 
one  whole  and  are  forever  comprehended  within  it. 

The  theory  of  knowledge  is  but  a  special  case  of  the 
general  theory  of  evolution.    Every  explanation  consists 


266 


POSITIVISM 


ARDIGO 


267 


of  a  differentiation,  an  analysis;  there  is  nothing  under- 
stood which  is  not  differentiated  (indistinto).     The  theory 
has  a  certain  tendency  to   stop  with  finite  elements 
(distinti  finiti) ;  but  the  principle  that  every  particular  is 
part  of  a  whole  imposes  the  necessity  of  an  infinite 
continuimi.    Hence,  since  even  thought  is  simply  a  special 
case  of  the  nattiral  process,  it  is  impossible  to  deduce 
the  whole  process  of  nature  from  thought.    We  never 
attain  a  final  term.— There  is  a  problem  at  this  point 
which  Ardigo  failed  to  estimate  correctly,  in  that  knowl- 
edge is  nevertheless  the  natural  process  through  which 
alone  we  acquire  our  knowledge  of  all  other  processes  of 
nature.     On  the  other  hand  he  (especially  in  La  Ragione, 
1894)  describes  the  cognitive  functions  in  detail,  especially 
emphasizing  the  intimate  relationship  of  recollection  and 
judgment,  and  finding  once  more  the  relation  of  indistinto 
and  distinti  in  the  rhythm  of  synthesis  and  of  analysis. 
He  likewise  extols  the  services  of  Kant  to  the  morphol- 
ogy of  knowledge  in  this  work.    And   he   afterwards 
emphasized   Kant's   theory   of   the   sjmthetic   unity  of 
consciousness  in  his  chief  work  Vunita  delta  coscienza 
(1898)  in  still  stronger  terms.    Psychic  life  consists  of 
a  continuous  synthetic  process.    There  is  a  profound 
tendency  in  things  to  combine  all  elements  and  functions 
in  a  single  stream.    This  confluence  (confluenza  mentale) 
is  the  only  explanation  of  the  association  of  ideas.    It 
is  impossible  to  explain  this  unity  of  consciousness  as 
a  product  of  separate  elements,  because  the  only  way  we 
can  discover  the  elements  is  by  an  analytic  process  of 
thought    which    already    presupposes    a    given    whole. 
Ardigo' s  admiration  for  Kant,  whom  he  called  il  secondo 
Galilei  delta  filosofia  nei  tempi  modernij  does  not   pre- 
vent him  from  severely  criticizing  the  theory  of  the 


thing-in-itself    {V   idealismo   nella   vecchia    speculazione, 

1903) • 
Ardigo  likewise  applies  the  theory  of   the   indistinto 

and  of  the  distinti  to  the  problem  of  so\il  and  body.  The 
facts  given  in  experience  consist  of  the  psychophysical 
reality  in  its  undifferentiated  form.  But  our  investigations 
must  in  this  case  be  divided  into  psychology  and  physiol- 
ogy, each  of  which  is  obliged  to  deal  with  abstractions. 
The  psychical  and  the  physical  never  exist  in  reality 
apart  from  each  other;  one  and  the  same  reality  {reale 
indistinto)  underlies  both  {La  psicologia  come  scienza 
positiva).— As  a  psychologist  Ardigo  reveals  a  remarkable 
faculty  of  describing  both  the  continuity  as  well  as  the 
more  refined  nuances  of  psychical  phenomena. 

Ardigo' s  fundamental  viewpoint  likewise  has  a  striking 
application  to  ethics.  Each  individual  is  a  distinto 
whose  real  existence  is  in  an  indistinto,  i.  e.  in  a  society. 
Each  individual  is  evolved  within  a  social  body  (family, 
state,  etc.),  and  thus  learns  to  judge  human  actions  from 
the  viewpoint  of  the  whole,  which  provides  for  the 
evolution  of  an  anti-egoistic  tendency.  It  is  in  this  that 
what  Ardigo  calls  ''the  social  ideality"  consists.  This 
tendency  assumes  the  form  of  a  holy  affection  at  its 
culminating  points,  which  impels  to  sacrifice  and  begets 
a  faith  in  The  Eternal  despite  the  tragedy  of  human  life. 


MOLESCHOTT 


269 


EIGHTH  BOOK. 

New  Solutions  of  the  Problem  of  Being  on  the 

Basis  of  Realism. 

The  romantic  philosophy  believed  it  could  reform 
natural  science.  And  this  notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  at  the  very  time  of  the  origin  of  this  philosophy,  the 
closing  decades  of  the  eighteenth  century,  natural  science 
was  making  astounding  progress.  The  traditional  convic- 
1 1  tion  of  the  persistence  of  matter,  throughout  all  changes 

was  experimentally  demonstrated  by  Lavoisier,  by  means 
of  the  quantitative  method,--by  weighing,— and  the 
fundamental  laws  governing  the  material  changes  in- 
volved in  the  constitution  of  plant  and  animal  life  were 
discovered  by  a  number  of  investigators  {Priestley,  Saus- 
sure,  etc.),  and  organic  life  was  thus  incorporated  within 
the  majestic  cycle  of  material  processes. 

Natural  science  received  a  new  impetus  during  the 
forties   of   the   nineteenth   century,    due   especially   to 
Robert  Mayer's  discovery  of  the  principle  of  the  conser- 
vation of  energy  (1842).     Ideas  which  had  akeady  been 
suggested    by    Descartes,    Huyghens    and  Leibnitz   now 
received    their    empirical    authentication,    because    the 
demonstration  that  there  is  no  dissipation  of  force,  already 
established  in  pure  mechanics,  could  likewise  be  demon- 
strated in  the  interaction  of  the  particular  forces  of 
nature,  because  it  could  be  shown  that  a  definite  quanti- 
tative relation  exists  between  the  potential  value  (e.  g. 
motion)  which  vanishes  and  the  new  potential  value 
(e.  g.  heat)  which  arises. 

268 


In  addition  to  this  we  note  Darwin's  hypothesis  of  the 
origin  of  the  species  announced  during  the  fifties.  Natural 
science  thus  demonstrated  the  existence  of  a  profoimd 
vital  relationship,  where  man  had  previously  seen  nothing 
more  than  gaps  and  fragments,  in  a  brilliant  manner. 
The  only  question  was  as  to  what  would  be  the  bearing 
of  these  discoveries  on  the  treatment  of  philosophic 
problems.  The  appropriation  of  the  new  views  came 
most  natural  to  positivism,  and  we  have  akeady  seen 
how  Herbert  Spencer  endeavored  to  incorporate  them  in 
his  evolutional  system. 

The  new  impulse  of  natural  science  furnished  the 
occasion  for  a  large  German  literature  of  a  materialistic 
trend,  which  had  the  efEect  of  disseminating  the  ideas  and 
discoveries  of  natural  science  very  widely.  About  the 
middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  German  material- 
ists were  supported  in  their  opposition  to  dogmatics 
and  spiritualistic  speculation— as  had  been  the  case  with 
their  French  precursors  of  the  eighteenth  century— by 
an  idealistic  movement  based  upon  the  interests  of 
humanity  and  progress.  It  is  to  be  observed  that 
idealism  is  not  incongruous  with  theoretical  materialism: 
the  materialist  can  consistently  recognize  the  value  of 
mental  phenomena  and  efficiency,  even  though  he  does 
regard  them  as  due  to  mere  molecular  changes. 

The  most  noted  writer  in  this  movement  is  the  physiol- 
ogist, Jacob  Moleschott  (1822-1893),  who  was  bom  in 
Holland,  was  Docent  at  Heidelberg  in  his  youth,  and, 
after  being  dismissed  there  on  account  of  his  views,  went 
to  Zurich  and  later  to  Italy,  where  he  enjoyed  a  long  and 
successful  career  as  professor  of  physiology.  In  his  book, 
Kreislauf  des  Lebens  (1852),  he  extols  chemistry  as  the 
highest  science  because  it  shows  how  matter— and  to- 


2^o 


REALISM 


THE   NEW  IDEALISM  IN   GERMANY 


271 


m 


m 


gether  with  matter,  how  Hfe,  and  with  life  in  turn,  how 
thought— accomplishes  its  sublime  cycle.  He  expounds 
the  history  of  his  ideas  in  his  autobiography  {An  meine 
Freunde,  Reminiscences,  1895)  and  says  that  as  a  matter 
of  fact  his  only  contention  was  against  dualism,  and  that 
his  theory— on  account  of  the  inherent  relation  of  force, 
mind  and  matter-^might  quite  as  well  be  called  ideaHsm 
as  materialism! 

The  physician,  Louis  Buchner  (1824-1899),  whose  Kraft 
und  Stojff  (1855)  was  for  a  long  time  one  of  the  most 
widely  read  books  of  the  age,  similarly  goes  beyond  the 
specific  views  of  materialism,  only  less  cleariy,  and  this 
is  Hkewise  the  case  with  Heinrich  Czolbe   (1819-1873), 
who,  Hke  Buchner  and  Moleschott,  was  also  a  physician! 
Czolbe  directly  inverts  the  proposition  that  sensation  is 
motion,  and  consequently  attains  an  idealistic  theory 
{Die   Entstehung   des   Selbstbewusslseins,    1856).     In   his 
later  works  he  undertook  to  estabHsh  a  new  world  theory 
by  the  use  of  more  speculative  methods.     It  is  a  matter 
of  peculiar  interest  in  the  case  of  Czolbe  that  he  is  fully 
aware  of  assuming  certain  axiomatic  principles,  namely, 
the    theoretical    requirement    of    the    perspicuous    and 
intuitive  nature  of  thought,  and  the  ethical  requirement 
of  life  and  its  relations  in  the  present  worid-ordcr,  with 
complete  exclusion  of  everything  transcendent. 

A  Httle  later  the  famous  zoologist,  Ernst  Haeckel 
(bom  1834),  undertook  to  organize  the  latest  results 
and  hypotheses  of  natural  science  into  a  system  of  Mo- 
nism, The  first  work  specifically  devoted  to  this  purpose 
was  his  Generalle  Morphologie  (186  2-1 866),  which  was 
followed  by  his  more  vigorous  and  more  dogmatic  WeU 
trdtzel  (1899).  He  regards  everything  as  animated; 
atoms  and  cells  have  souls  as  well  as  tlio  bruin.    These 


souls  may  interpose  in  material  processes  on  the  one  hand 
just  as  material  processes  may  be  the  causes  of  psychical 
phenomena  on  the  other.  The  Monism  of  Eaeckel 
therefore  combines  spiritualistic  and  materialistic  ideas 
in  a  way  that  is  not  altogether  clear.  But  EaeckeVs 
significance,  who  in  this  respect  shows  an  affinity  to  the 
thinkers  of  the  Renaissance,  does  not  consist  in  his  logical 
consistency,  but  in  the  tremendous  enthusiasm  aroused 
by  his  ideas,  and  in  the  fanciful  vividness  of  his  expo- 
sitions. 

It  appears  therefore  that  dogmatic  materialism,  ac- 
cording to  the  testimony  of  the  materialistic  author 
himself,  is  no  longer  possible.  The  results  of  criticism 
have  therefore  not  been  in  vain. 

Another  group  of  thinkers  who  still  adhered  to  Uie 
fundamental  principles  of  romantictsm,  even  though 
they  clearly  saw  the  necessity  of  a  reooflistruction  o£  the 
foundation  and  a  restatement  of  d<jfinit5cm.n,  elaborated 
the  results  of  modem  science  in  an  esilirely  different  way 
from  the  investigators  just  mentioned. 

A.    The  New  Idealism  in  Germany. 

I.  Hermann  Lotze (1817-1881) Ix^Ran Ills scholastk  career 
as  a  scientist  and  as  a  philosopher  contemporaneously, 
but  eventually  devoted  himself  wholly  to  philosophy,  m 
wliich  capacity  ho  served  the  Um\TTsity  of  Gdttingeai  for 
a  number  of  ycrirs.  As  a  scieniust  he  mmod  to  twat 
medicine  and  physiology  as  pure  natural  sciences, 
without  reference  to  any  apixjal  to  a  icpecific  '*  vital 
force"  such  as  was  then  still  in  wRue.  He  construes  the 
phenomena  which  characterize  organisms  as  the  r»ilts 
of  the  codi)eration  of  material  eleanents  acoording  to  the 
laws  of  physics  and  chemistry  {AU^eauinc  FaikeUgie 


'272 


REALISM 


LOTZE 


273 


"«ef 


und  Therapie  als  mechanische  N aturwissenschaftefiy  1842; 
Allgemeine  Physiologie,  1851).  He  had  even  previous 
to  this  given  expression  to  his  philosophical  ideas  {Meta- 
physik,  1840)  which  were  more  fully  elaborated  later  on 
(Medicinische  Psychologie,  1852,  and  Mikrokosmus,  1864- 
1868),  and  brought  to  their  conclusion  in  the  Drei  Bucher 
der  Logik  (1874)  and  the  Drei  Bucher  der  Metaphysik 
(1879). 

Lotze's  reflections  have  a  twofold  starting-point,  the 
mechanical  view  of  modem  science,  the  application  of 
which  to  organic  life  he  insisted  on,  and  the  fundamental 
principles  of  romantic  idealism.  The  resulting  problem 
for  him  therefore  was  to  show  how  to  reconcile  these 
two  points  of  view.  He  was  firmly  convinced  that  being 
cannot  consist  of  a  mere  mechanism,  and  just  as  firmly 
that  the  highest  ideas  cannot  be  realized  except  by  the 
method  of  causal,  mechanical  processes.  He  then  seeks 
to  show,  by  the  analysis  of  the  conception  of  mechanism 
developed  by  the  modem  sciences,  how  we  are  led  to 
presuppositions  which  may  readily  be  reconciled  with 
idealistic  prindples. 

The  mechanical  theory  of  nature  regards  all  phenomena 
as  determined  by  the  interaction  of  atoms.  This  con- 
ception follows  as  the  inevitable  presupposition  of  the 
scientific  explanation  of  natural  phenomena.  But  it 
does  not  follow  from  this  that  mechanism  should  be  the 
last  word  of  reflective  thought.  There  are  two  points  at 
which  it  transcends  itself. 

The  atoms  of  natural  science  are  extended,  even  though 
their  extension  may  be  regarded  as  infinitely  small. 
But  whatever  is  extended  must  consist  of  parts  and  cannot 
therefore  be  regarded  as  absolutely  simple.  And  exten- 
sion is  an  attribute,  a  quality,  which,  like  all  other  quali- 


ties, demands  its  explanation,  an  explanation  which— 
according  to  the  principles  of  science  and  after  the 
analogy  of  the  explanation  of  colors  and  tones— can  be 
found  only  in  the  reciprocity  of  elements.  These  elements 
must  therefore  be  still  more  simple  than  the  atoms 
of  natural  science.  They  cannot  be  extended,  but  must 
be  centers  of  force  by  the  interactions  of  which  the 
phenomenon  which  we  call  extension  arises. 

But  this  interaction  woiild  be  inconceivable  if  the 
ultimate  elements  in  themselves  were  absolutely  inde- 
pendent. The  only  way  in  which  the  element  A  can 
affect  the  element  B  requires  that  A  and  B  are  not  abso- 
lutely different  entities;  their  respective  states  must  really 
be  the  states  of  one  and  the  same  principle  which  com- 
prehends them  both:  this  is  the  only  way  of  explaining 
the  possibility  of  an  inner  (immanent)  transition  from  a 
status  A  to  a  status  B.  We  are  thus  driven  to  the  ulti- 
mate concept  of  an  original  substance  (as  above  to  the 
ultimate  concept  of  centers  of  force).  Beyond  this  the 
analysis  of  the  concept  of  mechanism  cannot  go. 

But  there  is  likewise  another  source  of  information  on 
this  point.  Where  analysis  fails  we  must  resort  to 
analogy.  Lotze  saw  that  analogy  is  the  only  recourse  for 
the  authentication  of  metaphysical  idealism  with  a 
cleamess  nowhere  to  be  found  before  him  except  in 
Leibnitz,  Fries  and  Beneke,  Is  being  in  its  ultimate 
nature  spiritual  or  material?  Lotze  answers  this  question 
by  saying,  that  if  we  wish  to  explain  the  unknown  by 
reference  to  the  known,  we  must  inevitably  construe  every- 
thing material  as  the  eternal  manifestation  of  spiritual 
reality.  Matter  (or  better  materiality)  is  only  known  to 
us  as  objective,  whilst  we  know  the  spiritual  from  our  own 
subjectivity,  as  immediately  identical  with  "our  self." 


274 


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HARTMANN 


275 


The  only  way  of  obtaining  a  comprehensible  world-theory 
therefore  is  by  construing  the  material  universe  after  the 
analogy  of  the  spiritual.  In  which  case  we  construe  both 
the  elements  (centers  of  force)  and  the  primary  substance 
as  spiritual  realities,  the  former  representing  an  infinite 
variety  of  stages  of  development,  the  latter  as  an  infinite 
personality. 

Lotze's  psychology  is  likewise  affected  by  his  meta- 
physics. According  to  him  the  relation  of  soul  and  body 
is  but  a  single  example  of  interaction  in  general.  Just  as 
atoms  can  transmit  impulses  from  one  to  another,  so  can 
the  soul  and  an  atom  of  the  nervous  system  like- 
wise transmit  impulses  from  one  to  the  other.  Lotze 
sees  no  groimd  therefore  in  the  principle  of  the  conserva- 
tion of  energy  for  surrendering  the  common  (Cartesian) 
conception  of  the  interaction  of  soul  and  body.  He  makes 
a  thorough  study  of  the  difficult  problem  of  distinguishing 
between  such  mental  phenomena  as  find  their  causes 
within  the  soul  itself,  and  such  as  have  their  causes  in  the 
influences  of  the  nervous  system.  Among  the  former  are 
memory,  reflection,  the  aesthetic  and  moral  feehngs,  etc.; 
among  the  latter,  sensations,  which  merely  furnish  the 
materials  of  thought. — Of  Lotze^s  more  specifically 
psychological  theories  we  must  first  of  all  mention  his 
ingenious  doctrine  of  ^^ local  signs"  (i.  e.  the  specific  sensa- 
tions which  furnish  the  basis  of  the  construction  of  the 
theory  of  space),  and  then  also  his  fine  description  and 
analysis  of  the  relation  of  feeling  and  idea. 

Although  Lotze  means  to  defend  the  common  (Carte- 
sian) theory  of  the  interaction  of  soul  and  body,  in  his 
metaphysics,  based  on  analogy,  he  has  nevertheless  made 
some  important  modifications.  The  interaction  of  soul 
and  body  is  no  longer  (as  in  Descartes)  an  interaction  of 


different  essences,  but  an  interaction  of  elements  which 
are  all  of  a  psychical  nature.  And  now,  after  finding  that 
it  is  easier  to  conceive  the  interaction  of  soul  and  body, 
he  actually  grants  that  a  causal  relation  is  really  compre- 
hensible only  between  like  elements. 

Lotze's  theory  therefore  cuhninates  in  a  spiritualistic 
Monism.  He  likewise  places  increasing  emphasis  on  the 
immanence  of  the  elements  in  primary  substance.  ^  On 
this  latter  point  he  stands  much  closer  to  the  Spinozistic 

view  than  he  is  aware. 

2.    Edward  von  Hartmann  (1842-1906)  gave  his  chief 
work  {Die  Philosophic  des  Unhewussten,  1868)  the  sub- 
title.   Speculative    Resultate    nach    induktio-mssenschaft- 
licher    Methode,      After    his  military    career    was    cut 
short  by  a  fall  from  a  horse  in  which  he  sustained  a 
crippled  knee,  he  finally  decided,   after  some  mental 
struggle,  to  devote  himself  to  philosophy.     He  then  con- 
ceived the  plan  of  a  further  development  of  the  ideas  of 
Eegel  and  Schopenhauer  in  mutual  harmony,  and  then  to 
construe  these  romantic  theories  on  the  basis  of  empirical 
science.    His  program  reminds  us  of  Lotze.    But  whilst 
Lotze  accepts  the  mechanical  conception  of  nature  with 
frank  consistency,  and  inquires  only  concerning  its  pre- 
suppositions, Hartmann  seeks  to  prove  inductively  that 
this  conception  of  nature  is  inadequate,  and  that  it 
requires  the  supplement  of  a  spiritual  principle  which  he 
calls  ''The  Unconscious,''  to  prevent  its  being  construed 
anthropomorphically.     The  forces  ascribed  to  atoms  must  he 
conceived  as  wills  or  efforts:  they  must  have  an  unconscious 
idea  of  their  destiny  in  order  to  he  ahle  to  realize  it.     Matter 
therefore  consists  of  idea  and  will.    The  only  explanation 
of  the  organism  is  the  guidance  of  its  growth  by  an  uncon- 
scious will.    Between  growth  and  instinct  there  is  only  a 


276 


REALISM 


HARTMANN 


277 


difference  of  degree.  The  association  of  ideas  likewise 
presupposes  that  the  tinconscious  within  us  selects  the 
ideas  which  are  most  closely  related  or  possess  an  affinity 
for  the  stock  of  ideas  on  hand.  In  the  process  of  history 
the  unconscious  operates  in  such  a  way  that  individuals, 
whilst  seeming  to  themselves  to  be  striving  for  their  own 
conscious  ends,  serve  the  higher  purposes  of  the  universe 
as  a  whole. — The  activity  of  the  imconscious  is  thus 
everywhere  manifest — from  atom  to  world-process.  This 
principle  is  not  personal,  but  rather  super-personal. 
Eartmann  nevertheless  regards  himself  in  agreement, 
barring  several  modifications,  with  the  speculative  theism 
of  Schellingj  Weisse  and  Lotze, 

Hartmann's  philosophy  did  not  originate  from  pure 
induction.  It  rests  on  the  subsumption  of  a  psychologico- 
historical  apergu:  namely,  the  observation  on  the  one 
hand  of  the  prejudicial  view  of  mere  reflection  and 
analysis,  the  onesided  attitude  of  critidsm,  and  the 
tremendous  importance  of  the  immediate,  the  instinctive 
and  ingenious  on  the  other.  Consciousness,  according 
to  Eartmann,  is  predominantly  analytical,  critical  and 
negative;  it  is  only  the  unconscious  that  furnishes  the 
grand  total  and  provides  for  the  new  insertions.  Starting 
from  this  theoretical  motive,  suggesting  the  influence  of 
Rousseau,  and  Romanticism,  Eartmann  finally  ascribes  a 
mystic-metaphysical  character  to  the  unconscious  which 
is  active  everywhere  in  nature  and  in  history — and  which, 
in  Eartmann's  view,  explains  everything. 

Repljring  to  his  opponents,  in  an  anonymous  self- 
criticism  {Das  Unhewusste  vom  Standpunkte  der  Physiologic 
und  der  Descendendehre,  1872),  he  demonstrates  his 
mastery  of  the  methods  and  results  of  the  natural  sciences. 
He  had  the  satisfaction  of  seeing  this  work  regarded  as  the 


refutation  of  his  views.— But  it  is  the  more  remarkable 
therefore  that  he  could  still  adhere  to  his  romantic  method 

of  explanation. 

How  then  is  the  universe,  in  which  the  unconscious 
operates,    constituted?    According    to    Eartmann,    the 
"inductive  method"  shows  that  there  is  more  misery 
than  happiness  in  the  world.    The  recognition  of  the 
world's  wretchedness  is  of  course  not  yet  fully  developed, 
but  it  is  growing.    Men  at  first  expected  to  find  happiness 
in  this  present  earthly  life;  then  they  hoped  to  be  able  to 
attain  it  in  a  future,  immortal  life;  and  when  this  faith 
likewise  finally  vanished,  hope  was  centered  on  the  hap- 
piness of  future  generations  here  upon  earth.    The  illusion 
of  happiness  is  untenable  in  all  three  of  these  forms. 
But  if  this  is  the  case,  the  unconscious,  which  is  every- 
where active,  cannot  be  a  purely  rational  principle.^  The 
explanation  of  evil  and  misery  can  only  be  found  in  the 
fact  that  the  volitional  element  of  the  unconscious  has, 
.as  blind  impulse,  severed  all  relation  with  the  ideational 
element  and  instituted  the  world  process  as  the  sheer 
''will  to   live,''— Eartmann  is  here  using  the  ideas  of 
Bohme,  Schelling  and  Schopenhauer.    The  world-process 
consists  in  a  constant  strife  between  these  two  elements. 
Here  man  can  enter  the  lists  as  a  rival.    It  is  his  business 
to  attack  the  illusions,  not  only  directly,  but  likewise 
indirectly  in  his  efforts  towards  civilization.    The  greater 
the  advancement  in  civilization,  the  more  evident  the 
illusory  character  of  happiness  becomes,  for  civilization 
and  happiness  are  absolute  opposites.    The  highest  aim 
is  the  redemption  of  the  suffering  of  deity  by  the  consum- 
mation of   pessimism.    As  soon  as  the  will-to-Hve  is 
annulled,  the  world-process  introduced  by  the  Fall  within 
the  unconscious,  referred  to  above,  will  be  at  an  end. 


278 


REALISM 


FECHNER 


279 


But  this  lies  in  the  distant  future.  For  the  present 
therefore  pessimism  can  feel  quite  at  ease  and  at  home  in 
the  world! 

Besides  his  masterpiece,  Eartmann  has  written  a  num- 
ber of  important  works  in  the  departments  of  ethics,  the 
philosophy  of  religion  and  aesthetics,  as  he  was,  generally 
speaking,  a  rather  voluminous  author.  Arthur  Drews  has 
published  a  detailed  and  quite  sympathetic  exposition  of 
his  whole  activity  (Eartmann' s  Philosophical  System  in 
Outlines,  2d  ed.,  1906). 

3.  Gustav  Theodore  Fechner  (i 801-1887)  ^^^  originally 
a  physicist.  But  along  with  his  scientific  investigations 
his  mind  dwelt  on  a  world  of  speculation  and  poetic 
imagination  in  which  the  ideas  of  romanticism  are 
peculiarly  prominent, — ^this  was  especially  the  case  after 
the  objective  world  was  closed  to  him  through  failure  of 
eyesight.  By  the  method  of  the  most  daring  analogies, 
he  construed  the  imiverse  (in  the  highly  fanciful  book 
Zendavesta,  1851,  and  later  in  the  Seelenfrage,  1861)  as  an 
animated  whole  within  which  every  possible  degree  of 
psychic  life  is  manifest, — in  the  form  of  plant  and  animal 
souls,  human  souls,  the  souls  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  etc. 
When  Fechner  began  to  reflect  on  the  problem  of  the 
relation  of  the  psychical  side  of  the  universe  to  its  physical 
side  he  came  upon  the  fundamental  idea  of  his  masterpiece, 
Elemente  der  Psychophysik  (i860).  Like  Kepler ,  with 
whom  he  shows  a  striking  mental  sjrmpathy,  he  took 
fantastic  speculations  for  his  starting-point,  but  by 
diligent  reflection  he  finally  discovered  principles  which 
could  be  verified  in  experience.  He  was  convinced  from 
the  beginning  that  the  relation  of  spirit  and  matter  could 
not  be  objective,  as  if  they  were  different  entities.  Later 
on  he  defends  this  view  (in  the  fifth  chapter  of  the  Ele- 


mente der  Psychophysik)  by  appealing  to  the  principle  of 
the  conservation  of  physical  energy,  and  he  is  the  first 
to  have  applied  this  principle  to  the  relation  of  soul  and 
body.    He  thinks  that  the  brain  and  nervous  system, 
like  all  matter,  must  come  under  this  principle,  and  that 
the  ordinary  asstimption  of  a  real  interaction  of  spirit  and 
matter  cannot  therefore  be  correct,  because  in  that  case 
physical  energy  would  begin  and  cease.    The  relation  is 
rather  one  of  identity,  and  the  distinction  depends  on  the 
viewpoint  of  the  observer.    Just  as  the  observer  standing 
on  the  external  surface  of  a  sphere  sees  nothing  but  con- 
vexity, and  one  standing  on  the  internal  siurface  sees  only 
concavity,  so  the  materialist  sees  nothing  but  matter 
and  the  idealist  only  spirit— and  both  are  right,  each 
from  his  own  viewpoint.— The  resulting  problem  then  is, 
what  quantitative  relations  do  the  psychical  phenomena 
sustain    to    their    corresponding    material  phenomena? 
Fechner  thinks  that  this  relation  cannot  be  one  of  direct 
proportion,  but  that  it  must  be  logarithmic,  i.  e.  the 
psychical    changes    correspond    quantitatively    to    the 
relation  of  the  increase  of  its  corresponding  material 
process  and  the  process  already  present.    Fechner  thus 
assumes  that  the  relation  between  the  external  stimulus 
and  the  brain  process  to  which  it  gives  rise  is  directly 
proportional,  because  both  are  material  events,  but  the 
relation  between  the  psychical  process  of  sensation  and 
the  brain  process  on  the  other  hand  must  be  logarithmic. 
He  regarded  Weber's  Law  (so  called  in  honor  of  his  pre- 
cursor,  the  physiologist  E.  E.  Weber),  which  he  assumed 
and  verified  experimentally,  as  an  expression  of  the  rela- 
tion of  spirit  and  matter  in  general.    Upon  the  basis  of 
experiments  of  his  own  as  well  as  of  others,  on  the  relation 
of  sensation  and  stimulus,  he  found  that  his  law  appHed 


28o 


REALISM 


WUNDT 


281 


within  certain  limits.  This  problem  gave  rise  to  a  long 
cx)ntroversy.  Fechner  founded  experimental  psychology 
by  means  of  this  hypothesis.  He  participated  in  this 
controversy  with  a  number  of  articles  even  into  his  old 
age,  but  always  in  a  serious  and  chivalrous  spirit.  But  it 
has  become  more  and  more  apparent  that  Fechner^s  law, 
so  far  as  it  applies  at  aU,  expresses  the  relation  of  the 
psychical  process  (sensation)  and  the  external  stimulus, 
but  not  the  relation  of  the  psychical  process  and  the 
brain  process,  which  is  apparently  much  more  directly 
proportional.  This  conception  would  also  agree  better 
with  Fechner^s  hypothesis  of  identity  (and  with  his 
excellent  illustrations). 

In  addition  to  his  famous  masterpiece  Fechner  pro- 
duced  two  more  scientific  works  of  importance:  Uber  die 
physikalische  und  philosophische  Atomenlehre  (1855),  in 
which  he  assumes  a  position  similar  to  that  of  Lotze  with 
respect  to  the  atom-concept,  and  Vorschule  der  Msthetik 
(1876),  in  which  he  treats  a  number  of  aesthetic  problems 
empirically. 

W,  Wundt  has  written  an  excellent  essay  on  the  inherent 
consistency  of  Fechner^ s  intellectual  labors  {Gustav  Theo- 
dor  Fechner,  Rede  zur  Feier  seines  hundertjahrigen  Gehurts- 
siages,  1901). 

4.  William  Wundt  (bom  1832,  professor  of  physiology 
at  Heidelberg,  afterwards  professor  of  philosophy  at 
Zurich  and  since  then,  1874,  at  Leipzig)  passed  to 
philosophy  from  physiology,  induced  partly  by  psycho- 
logical and  partly  by  epistemological  motives.  After 
he  had  made  the  change,  new  motives  impressed  him, 
especially  the  effort  to  elaborate  a  theory  of  the  universe 
and  of  life  at  once  satisfying  to  the  affections  and  the 
intellect.    Wundt's  final  theory,  according  to  his  own 


conception,  is  closely  related  to  the  philosophy  of  roman- 
ticism. But  Wundt' s  idealism  has  been  attained  by  the 
method  of  scientific  investigation  even  to  a  greater  extent 
than  in  the  case  of  Lotze,  Hartmann  and  Fechner, 

The  psychological  motives  to  philosophizing  sprang 
from  Wundt's   investigations   of  the  physiology  of  the 
senses.    He  recognized  the  fact  that  the  theory  of  space 
covild  only  arise  from  primary  sensations  by  means  of  a 
creative  synthesis,  a  synthesis  whose  product  possesses 
other  attributes  than  the  elements,  considered  by  them- 
selves.   Afterwards,    while   investigating    the    temporal 
progress  of  ideas,  he  came  upon  the  problem  of  psychical 
integration  (which  he  later  called  Apperception),    This 
completed  the  foundation  for  the  fundamental  theories 
of  his  psychology.    His  Grundzuge  der  physiologischen 
Psychologie  (1874,  6th  ed.,  1908)  treats  the  psychological 
problems  which  can  be  elucidated  physiologically  and 
experimentally  with  great  thoroughness,  and  describes 
the  methods  and  instruments  of  experimentation.    Wundt 
assumes  the  parallelism  of  the  physical  and  the  psychical 
as  a  preliminary  hypothesis;  the  difference  is  only  a 
difference  of  viewpoint.    But  in  its  ultimate  analysis  he 
regards  the  psychical  viewpoint  as  fundamental.    And  in 
his  view  the  only  necessity  for  assuming  physiological 
correlates  is  due  to  the  individual  psychical  elements 
which  constitute  the  content  of  psychical  life,  not  for  the 
forms  or  the  combinations  of  the  elements,  nor  for  experi- 
ences of  value. 

Wundt  construes  psychical  life  as  pure  activity.  The 
assumption  of  a  psychical  "substance"  involves  the 
appHcation  of  materialistic  ideas  to  the  sphere  of  spiritual 
reality.  Psychical  activity  is  especially  evident  in  the 
form  of  apperception  in  its  function  of  attention,  associa- 


i 
^  1 


282 


REALISM 


tion,  feeling  and  volition.  Here  we  have  the  soul  as  an 
organized  whole;  the  whole  antecedent  history  of  con- 
sciousness expresses  itself  in  the  acts  of  apperception. — 
Wundt  places  increasing  emphasis  upon  this  activity  in 
his  later  writings,  and  the  concept  of  volition  becomes  his 
fundamental  psychological  concept  so  that  (borrowing  an 
expression  of  Paulsen's)  he  can  describe  his  theory  as 
voluntarism. 

The  epistemological  motive  which  induced  Wundt  to 
enter  the  field  of  philosophy  resulted  from  his  recognition 
of  the  fact  that  all  natural  science  rests  upon  certain  pre- 
suppositions which  condition  all  our  knowledge  {Die 
physikalischen  Axiome  und  ihre  Beziehung  zum  Kausal- 
prinzipj  1866).  Later  on  he  elaborated  his  theory  of 
knowledge  partly  in  his  Logik  (i  880-1 883)  and  partly  in 
his  System  der  Philosophie  (1887).  Knowledge  always 
begins  with  the  conviction  of  the  reality  of  otir  ideas. 
This  naive  realism  breaks  down  however  even  by  the 
necessity  of  distinguishing  between  sense  perception, 
memory  and  imagination,  and  still  more  by  scientific 
reflection,  until  it  graduaDy  yields  to  critical  realism 
which  substitutes  object  concepts  which  remain  constant 
for  the  changing  content  of  direct  perception.  In  the 
sphere  of  sense  perception  the  laws  of  space  and  time  are 
elaborated  as  the  expression  of  constant  forms;  in  the 
sphere  of  intellectual  knowledge  the  qualities  immediately 
given  are  replaced  by  the  concept  of  the  object  in  the 
form  of  quantitative  distinctions  alone  (spatial  and 
temporal),  whilst  the  psychical  processes  are  referred  to  a 
fundamental  spiritual  activity.  But  rational  knowledge, 
which  demands  a  completion  of  knowledge  by  the  idea 
of  totality,  carries  us  even  farther  than  this.  Such  con- 
clusion asstmies  the  character  of  materiaHsm  whenever 


WUNDT 


283 


the  ideas  of  natural  science  are  taken  into  account  alone, 
the  character  of  ideaHsm  whenever  the  psychological 
ideas  are  taken  alone.    It  is  possible  however  to  attain 
a  higher  view  by  combining  the  two  groups  of  ideas,  m 
which  case  being  is  construed  as  a  totality  of  striving  and 
wiUing  entities  whose  objective  phenomenal  form  con- 
stitutes material  nature.     Wundt  agrees  with  Lotze  that 
we  are  obliged  to  choose  between  a  material  and  a  spiritual 
unity  we  must  either  make  mind  the  basis  of  matter  or 
vice  versa;  there  is  no  third  alternative!    But  he  fails  to 
see  as  clearly  as  Lotze  that  our  only  recourse  at  this  point 
is  to  the  argument  from  analogy. 

In  his  ethics  {Ethik,  eine  Untersuchung  der  Tatsachen 
und  Gesetze  des   sittlichen   Lebens,    1886)    Wundt  shows 
marked  sympathy  with  German  speculation,  especially 
with  Hegel    He  construes  the  individual  will  as  an  ele- 
ment of  the  total  will  whence  both  its  motives  and  its 
ideals   arise.    The  isolated  individual   does   not   exist. 
And  the  highest  ends  are  only  found  in  the  total  wtlL 
Even  where  individuals  seem  to  be  laboring  for  their  own 
individual  ends,  they  may  still  produce  something  which 
will  extend  beyond  their  horizon  and  in  turn  give  nse  to 
new  motives.    This  shifting  process,  which  Wundt  caUs 
the  heterogeny  of  ends,  is  the  most  important  evolutional 
process  of  the  moral  consciousness.    But  this  likewise 
impHes  that  we  cannot  be  conscious  of  the  ultimate  ends 
of  the  whole  course  of  historical  evolution.    We  are  co- 
laborers  in  a  sublime  undertaking  whose  absolute  content 
we  can  never  know.    At  this  point  ethics  becomes  rebgion. 
Whilst  the  positive  religions  express  themselves  m  con- 
crete symbols,  philosophy  can  only  express  the  general 
principle  that  all  spiritual  products  possess  an  absolute 
or  imperishable  value. 


p 


284 


HEALISM 


BRADLEY 


285 


In  addition  to  the  works  mentioned  Wundt  has  published 
a  valuable  Eitdeitung  in  die  Philosophic  (1901),  and  he  is 
at  present  engaged  on  a  comprehensively  planned  Volker- 
psychologies  the  content  of  which  consists  of  investigations 
concerning  Language,  Myth  and  Custom. 

B.    Modern  Idealism  in  England  and  France. 

I.  Francis  Herbert  Bradley  (bom  1846,  Fellow  of 
Merton  College,  Oxford)  is  the  most  important  English 
representative  of  the  tendency  which  may  be  described  as 
the  New  Idealism,  He  is  particularly  influenced  by  Kant 
and  Hegel,  Coleridge,  Carlyle  and  Hamilton  were  already 
opposed  to  the  classical  English  school  as  it  appears  in  the 
line  of  thinkers  from  Locke  to  Spencer  and  Sidgwick. 
The  critical  ttu^n  which  Sidgwick  introduced  into  utilita- 
rianism and  the  broadening  of  the  horizon  of  empiricism 
by  Spencer  brought  the  old  school  to  a  point  which  re- 
quired new  instruments  of  thought.  Of  the  two  great 
English  tmiversities  Oxford  in  particular  represents  the 
opposition  to  the  classical  English  school.  The  ideas  of 
Kant  and  Hegel  have  affected  English  thought  particularly 
through  the  labors  of  T,  H,  Green  and  Edward  Caird, 
Against  the  tendency  of  the  older  school  to  reduce  psy- 
chical life  to  physical  atoms  and  thus  to  apply  the  concept 
of  mechanism  without  further  qualification  to  the  sphere 
of  mind  present-day  thinkers  propose  the  "organic" 
conception  and  the  idea  of  totahty.  This  conception  is 
keenly  apparent  in  Bradley^ s  Ethical  Studies  (1876). 
The  unity  of  consciousness  is  the  condition  without 
which  we  could  not  even  perceive  ourselves.  Bradley 
thus  takes  for  his  starting-point  (without  noting  the  fact) 
the  view  with  which  Stuart  Mill  concluded  in  the  later 
editions  of  his  Examination  of  Hamilton's  Philosophy. 


Bradley  makes  the  ethical  standard  consist  of  the  degree 
to  which  we  have  developed  the  unity  which  is  so  deeply 
imbedded  in  our  nature  so  as  to  combine  a  rich  content 
with  imier  harmony.  And  the  metaphysical  principle 
forms  an  analogy  with  the  psychological  and  ethical 
principles:    being  must  be  conceived  as  a  coherent  and 

consistent  whole, 

Bradley's  chief  work  bears  the  title  Appearance  and 
Reality  (1893).    It  consists  of  an  investigation  of  the 
criterion  by  which  we  are  enabled  to  distinguish  true 
reaUty  from  mere  appearance.    Although  Bradley  him- 
seH  (along  with  many  of  his  critics)  thinks  that  his 
position  is  closely  identical  with  Hegel,  and  notwith- 
standing the  fact  that  ''the  Absolute"  in  the  Spinozistic 
and  HegeHan  sense,  as  of  an  objective  final  statement, 
appears  in  the  background  of  his  thought,  his  reflections 
are  nevertheless  more  epistemological  than  metaphysical. 
Like  Kant,    he  makes  the  concept  of  experience  funda- 
mental.   True  reality  can  only  exist  where  complete 
and  perfect  experienc^-i.  e.  all-inclusive  perception— and 
an  absolutely  mutual  relation  of  the  contents  of  percep- 
tion—is present.    This  is  an  ideal  which  finite  bemgs  can 
approach  only  approximately.  Neither  the  natural  nor  the 
mental  sciences   satisfy  this  ideal.    Such   concepts  as 
matter,  space,  time,  and  energy  axe  appHcable  whenever 
it  is  necessary  to  express  the  relation  of  finite  appearances; 
they  are  working  ideas,-but  they  can  never  describe 
the  absolute  nature  of  being.    And  the  same  is  true  of 
the  psychological  concepts.    As  a  matter  of  course  we 
find  a  more  vital  relationship  between  unity  and  multi- 
plicity in  the  sphere  of    mind  than  in  physical  nature, 
and  psychological  experience  therefore  constitutes  our 

highest  experience.    But  antitheses    and   disharmomes 


I 


286 


REALISM 


FOUILLEE 


287 


take  place  within  the  psychical  processes;  the  sotd  is 
subject  to  changes  as  a  whole;  and  the  concept  of  the 
soul — like  its  correlative  concept,  the  body — ^is  formed 
only  by  abstraction.  Psychological  concepts  can  there- 
fore no  more  express  absolute  reality  than  the  concepts 
of  natural  science. 

When  Bradley  insists  on  the  idea  of  the  absolute,  even 
though  there  is  no  concept  that  can  give  it  adequate 
expression,  he  appears  at  once  as  a  mystic  and  a  sceptic. 
The  unifying  bond  of  these  two  sides  of  his  nature  lies 
in  the  idea  of  a  constant  striving  which  is  the  lot  of 
all  finite  beings.  Our  thought,  says  Bradley,  is  always 
striving  for  something  which  is  more  than  thought, — 
oiu*  personality  for  something  which  is  more  than  person- 
ality,— otu*  morality  for  something  which  is  more  than 
morality!  The  only  thing  which  philosophy  can  do  for 
us  is  to  furnish  us  a  criterion  to  serve  as  a  guide  whenever 
we  distingiiish  between  higher  and  lower  degrees  of 
reality.  Religion  can  do  no  more  at  this  point  than 
philosophy.  It  too  must  express  the  highest  by  means 
of  ideas  which  have  their  sotu-ce  in  the  sphere  of  the 
finite.  The  advantage  of  religion  consists  in  the  fact 
that  it  is  capable  of  allowing  the  recognition  of  a  highest 
reality  to  permeate  our  entire  being. 

Bradley  has  no  points  of  contact  with  the  special 
sciences,  as  is  the  case  with  Fechnery  Lotze  and  WundL 
He  has  no  interest  in  purely  empirical  considerations. 
He  is  completely  absorbed  in  the  idea  of  his  ideal  criterion. 
This  gives  energy  and  depth  to  his  mode  of  thought,  but 
it  likewise  frequently  makes  him  tmjust  towards  other 
viewpoints,  even  such  as  he  could  really  appropriate 
with  advantage.  When,  e.  g.,  he  calls  the  viewpoints  and 
hypotheses  of  the  special  sciences  ^^  useless  fictions^*  and 


''mere  practical  compromises ,"  he  is  inconsistent  with 
the  importance  which  he  ascribes  to  them  as ''working 
ideas, ''  As  a  matter  of  fact  according  to  his  conception 
every  finite  experience,  i.  e.  every  experience  which  it 
is  possible  for  us  to  have,  is  a  working  idea.  And, 
according  to  Bradley's  own  principles,  that  which  he  calls 
*'the  Absolute''  must  be  present  in  all  our  working  ideas, 
like  Spinoza's  Substance  in  all  the  Attributes  and  in  all 

the  Modes. 

2.     In  France  Alfred  Fouillee  (bom  1838,  professor  at 
Bordeaux,  afterwards  in  Paris,  now    (1906)    living  in 
southern  France)  assumes  a  position  which  may  justly 
be  described  as  idealism  on  a  realistic  basis.    Greek 
philosophy,  especially  Plato,  forms  the  subject-matter  of 
his  earliest  studies;  later  on  he  regarded  it  his  peculiar 
task  ''to  bring  back  the  ideas  of  Plato  from  heaven  to  earth 
and  thus  reconcile  idealism  and  naturalism,"    His  funda- 
mental principle  is  the  original  and  natural  relation  of 
thought  and  motion  {idee-force).    His  precursor  m  this 
view  is   Taine,  whose  De  V intelligence  (1870)   attaches 
great  importance   to  the   motive  tendencies  primarily 
combined  with  all  ideas  which  only  assume  the  purely 
theoretical  character  of  ideas  through  increasing  mental 
development.     Fouillee   constructs   his   concept  of  tdee- 
force  from  a  physiologico-psychological  fact,  which  he 
then  in  turn  discovers  by  the  method  of  analogy  in  the 
lower  stages  of  nature.     His  chief  work,  La  psychologic  des 
idSes-forces  (1893),  is  a  classic  in  voluntaristic  psychology. 
Psychical  phenomena  always  consist  of  the  manifestations 
of  an  impulse  or  desire  (appetition)  which  is  attended  by 
pleasure  or  pain  according  as  it  is  fostered  or  inhibited. 
Discernment  and  preference  are  primarily  one  and  the 
same  thing,  as  e.  g.  the  discernment  of  an  animal  between 


^'"  (II 


% 


288 


REALISM 


the  edible  and  the  non-edible.  Sensation  is  originally 
limited  to  such  things  as  are  of  practical  importance  in 
the  struggle  for  existence;  it  is  the  will  (in  the  broadest 
sense  of  the  term)  that  impels  the  sensations  to  new 
differentiations.  And  just  as  in  the  case  of  sensation 
so  it  is  with  knowledge  in  general.  Every  thought,  every 
idea  describes  a  more  or  less  conscious  and  definite 
tendency  of  life. 

Fouillee  regards  the  application  of  the  analogy  of  mental 
life,  the  most  immediate  experience  which  we  possess, 
as  furnishing  the  possibility  of  a  metaphysics.  Our 
knowledge  of  mental  Hfe  however  does  not  rest  upon 
psychology  alone,  but  likewise  upon  sociology;  the 
individual  and  the  social,  Hberty  and  solidarity  are 
inseparable.  This  theory  which  Fouillee  applied  to  the 
sphere  of  sociology  and  ethics  {La  science  sociale  contem- 
poraine,  1880;  Critique  des  systemes  de  morale  contetn- 
poraine,  1883)  likewise  acquires  cosmological  significance 
for  him.  The  universe  must  be  conceived  as  a  grand 
total,  a  commimity  of  striving  energies.  But  in  this 
sphere  we  cannot  attain  anything  more  than  a  hypo- 
thetical scheme,  for  the  synthesis  which  forms  the  com- 
pletion of  our  knowledge  cannot  be  carried  out  positively — 
as  in  the  cases  of  the  finite  synthesis  of  the  special  depart- 
ments of  phenomena.  But  this  nevertheless  furnishes 
us  a  criterion  by  which  to  judge  the  various  metaphysical 
systems:  such  a  system  is  complete  in  proportion  as  both 
multiplicity  as  well  as  unity,  analysis  as  well  as  synthe- 
sis, receive  due  recognition  {Uavenir  de  la  Metaphysique, 
1889). 


NINTH  BOOK. 

New  Theories  of  the  Problems  of  Knowledge 

AND  OF  Value. 

A.    The  Problem  of  Knowledge. 

I,    German  Neo-Kantianism. 

With  the  declining  influence  of  the  speculative  philoso- 
phy and  the  growing  demand  for  a  scientific  world  theory 
following  it  again  making  itself  felt,  partly  in  positivism, 
partly  in  materialism,  partly  in  the  new  ideaHsm,  it  was 
but  natural  that  the  problem  of  knowledge— as  was  the 
case  in  the  period  of  Hume  and  Zan^— should  again 
assume  a  position  of  prominence.     It  raised  the  inevitable 
question  of  the  ability  of  the  human  intellect,  from  its 
inherent  nature,  to  construct  such  a  world-theory,  and  of 
the  limitations  to  which  it  is  subject.     It  was  evident  that 
the  reaction  against  Kant,  in  both  its  positivistic  and  its 
romantic  aspects,  had  overreached  itself,  an.  ^  the  study . 
of  Kant  was  again  resumed  for  the  purpose  of  orientation. 
As  we  have  observed,  there  was  a  critical  undercurrent 
constantly  making  itself  felt  during  the  first  half  of  the 
century  (cf .  Fries  and  Beneke,  as  well  as  Herhart,  Schleier- 
macher    and    Schopenhauer),    This    now    becomes    the 
dominant  current  for  a  time,  supported  by  the  revival 
of  a  thorough  study  of  the  master  both  philologically  and 

historically. 

In  his  Geschichte  des  Materialismus  (1865)  Friederich 
Albert  Lange  (1828-1875),  who  was  professor  of  philosophy 
at  Zurich  and  later  at  Marburg,  opposes  the  epistemolog- 

289 


m 


290 


PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLEDGE 


LANGE 


291 


ical  method  to  both  the  romantic  speculation  and  the 
materialistic  conception  of  nature.  Like  Fechner,  he 
conceives  the  whole  of  material  nature — ^including  the 
brains  of  men  and  of  animals — ^as  explainable  by  means  of 
continuously  active  material  energies.  So  far  as  method 
is  concerned,  materialism  is  right.  But  the  phenomena 
of  consciousness  are  not  to  be  construed  as  members  of 
the  material  series;  they  are  subjective  experiences  whose 
objective  correlates  constitute  the  brain  processes. — 
That  is  to  say,  Lange,  like  Fechner  and  Wundt,  accepts  the 
Spinozistic  hypothesis.  He  furthermore  combines  with 
this  the  Kantian  point  of  view.  For  even  if  we  should 
assimie  that  our  sensations  and  ideas  are  products  of 
material  processes,  these  material  processes  themselves 
would  stiU  be  nothing  more  than  objects  of  consciousness, 
ideas  formed  by  us  according  to  the  laws  of  our  mind. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  may  readily  be  that  even  the  Kant- 
ian distinction  between  phenomenon  and  thing-in-itself 
is  a  product  of  our  mental  organization  {Lange  offers 
this  suggestion  in  a  letter  published  in  Ellisen's  Biographic 
Lange' s,  see  p.  258  ff.,  published  letters.) 

In  addition  to  natural  science  and  epistemology,  Lange 
likewise  finds  room  for  speculative  and  religious  ideas. 
But  he  does  not  regard  such  ideas  as  having  any  theoretical 
and  objective  significance.  They  are  subjective  supple- 
ments of  empirical  reality,  proceeding  from  the  needs  of 
the  spirit.  They  must  be  understood  from  the  view- 
point of  their  value  to  himian  Hfe,  and  not  from  the  view- 
point of  their  foundation  and  their  origin.  Lange  here 
combines  a  Hberal  practical  idealism  with  theoretical 
ideaHsm.  But  it  can  only  be  expressed  in  figtirative  or 
symbolical  form.  Lange  insists  that  criticism  shotdd 
place  more  stress  on  the  ideal  and  psychologically  valuable 


elements  of  positive  faith,  instead  of  directly  attacking 
the  dogmas  of  popular  reUgion.  In  this  way  the  general 
public  would  not  dissipate  its  energy  in  useless  dogmatic 
controversies. 

Lange  elaborated  his  ideal  and  critical  theory  of  the 
social  problem  in  his  essay  on  Die  Arbeiterfrage  (1865). 
The  central  thought  of  this  essay  is  this,  namely,  that  the 
chief  duty  of  human  society  consists  in  seeking  to  put  an 
end  to  the  struggle  for  existence. 

Lange  is  the  most  influential  of  the  German  Neo-Kant- 
ians.  His  masterly  work  affects  wide  circles  both  by  the 
excellence  of  its  form  as  by  the  richness  of  its  content 
and  its  profound  statement  of  the  problem.  He  was 
however  the  herald  of  a  new  school  which,  with  various 
nuances,  strove  to  renew  the  Kantian  theory  of  knowledge. 
Hermann  Cohen's  works  are  specifically  devoted  to  an 
elaboration  of  the  rationalistic  elements  in  Kant's  philos- 
ophy, whilst  Alois  Riehl  inclines  more  towards  positivism. 
Frederick  Paulsen,  whose  general  views  are  closely  related 
to  those  of  Fechner  and  Wundt,  in  his  exposition  of 
Kanty  has  directed  special  attention  to  Kanl's  metaphysi- 
cal asstmiptions  which  are  unaffected  by  the  Critique  of 
Reason,  Windelband  and  Rickert  conceive  genuine  crit- 
icism as  the  theory  of  eternal  values,  in  which  the  stand- 
ard of  the  true,  the  good  and  the  beautiful  is  found,  and 
they  lay  great  stress  on  the  distinction  between  the 
method  of  concept-formation  practiced  by  the  natural 
sciences  as  compared  with  that  of  the  historical  sciences, 
which  are  related  to  each  other  as  generalization  and 
individualization. 

Critidsm  has  become  a  vital  factor  both  in  the  state- 
ment and  in  the  treatment  of  the  problems  in  German 
thought  through  the  labors  of  this  group  of  scholars. 


^'1 


i.  1;, 


ii 


m 


292  problem  of  knowledge 

2.    French  Criticism  and  the  Philosophy 
OF  Discontinuity. 

In  France,  after  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
the  critical  school  is  represented  by  the  vigorous  thinker 
Charles  Renouvier  (181 5-1903),  who  in  the  name  of  logic 
and  ethics  attacks  all  idealistic  and  realistic  attempts  to 
construe  being  as  a  continuous  totality.  He  directed 
his  polemics  with  particular  force  against  the  concept  of 
actual  infinity,  which  he  regarded  as  a  logical  contradiction 
and  an  empirical  falsehood.  For  an  infinite  which  is  at 
the  same  time  regarded  as  a  determinate  whole  is  a  con- 
tradiction, and  experience  teaches  us  that  the  principle  of 
definite  nimiber  applies  to  everything.  With  actual 
infinity  continuity  is  likewise  destroyed, — for  continuity 
must  indeed  presuppose  infinitely  many  gradations,— 
and  with  continuity  necessity.  In  opposition  to  Kanfs 
attempt  to  prove  the  principle  of  causality,  Renouvier 
returns  to  Hume's  position  and  thus  attains  a  radical 
philosophy  of  discontinuity.  He  regards  every  distinc- 
tion as  a  discontinuity.  And  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  is  not 
only  in  our  knowledge  of  nature  that  we  are  constantly 
compelled  to  recognize  leaps.  The  first  principles  of  our 
knowledge  are  postulated  by  a  leap,  i.  e.  by  an  act  of 
choice.  Renouvier  was  profoundly  influenced  by  Kanfs 
antinomies;  it  is  his  opinion  however  that,  if  we  wish  to 
retain  the  principles  of  logic,  we  are  obliged  to  accept 
the  theses  and  reject  the  antitheses. 

Renouvier  has  published  a  sketch  of  his  philosoph- 
ical development  in  an  exceedingly  interesting  essay 
fotmd  in  Equisse  d'une  classification  des  systemes  philo- 
sophiques  (1885)  {Comment  je  suis  arrive  a  cette  con- 
clusion, ibid.,  II,  pp.  355-405). — For  the  various  phases 


renouvier 


293 


of  Renouvier's  philosophy  I  must  refer  the  reader  to 
Gabriel   Seailles:   La  philosophie  de   Charles   Renouvier, 

1905.  ^ 

The  choice  of  first  principles  determines  the  world- 
theory,  and  in  this  connection  Renouvier  in  his  latter 
years  {Les  dilemmes  de  la  metaphysique,  1901)  empha- 
sized more  and  more  the  antithesis  of  thing  and  personal- 
ity.   If  we  remember  that  things  always  exist  only  as 
objects  for  personalities,  our  worid-view  must  necessarily 
assume  the  character  of  monadology  or  of  personaHsm. 
(See  particularly  Renouvier' s  last  essay,  UPersonalisme, 
1903.)     In  this  way  he  passes  from  criticism  and  the 
theory   of   discontinuity   to   spiritualistic   metaphysics. 
As  a  critical  philosopher  he  seeks  to  show  that  the  universe 
must  have  a  beginning— because  of  the  principle  of 
definite  number— as  a  personalist  he  explains  this  begin- 
ning as  the  act  of  a  god  who  (on  account  of  the  existence 
of  evil)  is  not  however  to  be  regarded  as  absolute  or 
almighty.     Renouvier  constantly  insists  on  the  epistemo- 
logical  principle  of  relativity  {la  loi  de  relation):    our 
knowledge  aims  to  discover  the  relations  which  thmgs 
bear  to  each  other;  each  object  represents  to  us  a  systeni 
of  relations;  our  knowledge  itself  consists  of  a  relation  of 
things  to  us  and  hence  all  objects  are  only  phenomena. 
Religious  postulates  alone  can  transcend  phenomena— 
but  even  these  postulates,  as  acts  of  thought,  are  governed 
by  the  principle,  or,  more  correctly,  the  method  of  rela- 
tivity {la  methoj/dcs  relations). 

This  vigorous  and  profound  thinker  remained  busily 
occupied  with  his  philosophy  even  on  his  death-bed. 
He  experiepfcd  a  sense  of  incompleteness,  and  he  did  not 
wish  to  die  until  he  had  given  his  ideas  a  definite  form. 
A  close  friend  has  preserved  his  last  words  and  exposi- 


~'t  ;] 


■^ 


I         l| 


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BERGSON 


295 


tions   {Ch,  Renouvier:  Les  derniers  entretiens,      Recueit- 
lis  par  L.  Prat), 

The  philosophy  of  Emile  Boutroux  (bom  1845,  erst- 
while professor  at  the  Sorbonne,  now  directeur  de  la 
fondation  Thiers)  belongs  to  a  tendency  originating  from 
Maine  de  Biran,  In  his  criticism  of  the  principle  of 
causality  he  approaches  Renouvier;  but  it  is  not  so  much 
the  theory  of  continuity  that  he  opposes,  as  the  attempts 
to  conceive  everything  as  identical  or  homogeneous  and 
to  reduce  the  individual  to  the  universal  {De  la  contin- 
gence  des  lois  de  la  nature,  1875;  Z)e  Videe  de  la  loi  naturelle 
dans  la  science  et  la  philosophie  contemporaine,  1895). 
Like  Comte  he  insists  that  every  new  field  of  experience 
requires  new  principles  which  cannot  be  deduced  from  the 
principles  which  apply  to  other  fields.  The  more  con- 
crete principles  cannot  be  reduced  to  abstract  principles. 
The  more  we  enter  into  the  concrete,  so  much  the  more 
does  the  dynamic  gain  transcendence  over  the  mechanical, 
the  quaHtative  over  the  quantitative.  It  is  possible 
fiuthermore  for  new  beginnings  to  take  place  in  nature 
which  cannot  be  derived  from  their  antecedents.  As  a 
matter  of  fact  the  whole  uniform  system  of  nature 
revealed  to  us  by  science  is  nothing  more  than  the  river 
bed  which  is  formed  by  an  inherent  spontaneous  evolu- 
tion, and  which  may  be  changed  by  variations  of  this 
evolution.  The  spontaneous  variations  {les  variations 
contingentes)  bear  witness  to  the  freedom  which  con- 
stitutes the  inner  nature  of  things. — Epistemologically 
considered  the  so-called  laws  of  nature  are  nothing  more 
than  a  summary  of  the  methods  applied  in  the  effort  to 
understand  things  {assimiler  les  choses  a  notre  intelligence), 

Henri  Bergson  (bom  1859,  professor  at  the  College  de 
France)  carries  forward  the  movement  begun  by  Renou- 


vier and  Boutroux  in  a  manner  which  is  quite  unique  and 
characteristic.  He  regards  the  quantitative  method  of 
explanation  as  merely  the  technical  instnmient  employed 
by  us  for  the  purpose  of  understanding  what  is  actually 
and  immediately  given  in  experience,  which  is  always 
qualitative  and  continuous.  Even  language,  and  the 
scientific  method  of  explanation  stiU  more  so,  casts  our 
experiences  in  atomic  form,  as  if  they  sustained  the  same 
objective  relations  to  each  other  as  positions  in  space. 
The  inner  stream  of  spiritual  phenomena  are  thus  trans- 
formed into  a  mechanically  arranged  mass.  This  is  how 
it  happens  that  the  inner,  dynamic,  free  and  continuous 
activity  is  denied.  The  indeterminists  are  here  guilty 
of  the  same  error  as  the  determinists,  because  they  like- 
wise isolate  the  individual  moments  of  psychical  evolu- 
tion. The  whole  problem  of  freedom  has  arisen  through 
a  misunderstanding.  Spontaneous  evolution  has  its  origin 
in  the  soul  as  a  whole  and  there  is  no  analysis  that  can 
do  it  justice  {Les  donnees  immediates  de  la  conscience,  1888). 
Bergson  criticizes  the  fundamental  presupposition  of 
science.  It  is  only  by  a  process  of  analytic  and  dis- 
tinguishing definition  that  we  are  enabled  to  discover  the 
elements  between  which  the  laws  prevail.  It  is  a  matter 
of  profound  importance  that  the  difference  between  the 
given  continuity  and  the  scientific  distinctions  be  insisted 
on.  This  is  the  only  way  that  thought  can  conform  to 
life.  Bergson  hopes  however  to  realize  a  higher  sdence, 
a  metaphysics,  by  means  of  the  fact  that  he  reverts 
from  differentiation  to  integration,  from  analysis  to 
intuition — and  thus  to  true  empiricism  {Introduction  a  la 
Metaphysique,  Revue  de  la  Metaphysique  et  Morale, 
1903).  At  this  point  Bergson  reminds  us  of  Bradley. 
The  real  problem, would  be  whether  "metaphysics,"  or 


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PRAGNATISM 


297 


'j^B! 


even  any  intelligent  comprehension  of  the  world  whatever, 
is  possible  without  a  dissolution  of  the  intuitions.  Anal- 
ysis is  therefore  an  indispensable  instrument  of  thought, 
even  though,  as  Bergson  has  so  effectively  insisted,  it 
must  be  practiced  with  critical  precaution. 

Bergson  develops  his  concept  of  the  soul  as  consisting 
of  a  memory  synthesis  in  detail  in  his  book  Matiere  et 
Memoire  (1897).  It  is  only  sensation,  not  memory,  that 
requires  a  material  organ.  Bergson  thus  substitutes  a 
sort  of  duaHsm  of  sensation  and  memory  for  the  usual 
distinction  of  soul  and  body,  which  is  scarcely  recon- 
cilable with  his  theory  of  the  continuity  of  psychical 
life.  That  is  to  say,  he  ascribes  a  practical  significance  to 
sensations,  and  hence,  according  to  him,  the  whole  body 
of  natural  science  with  its  atomic  theories  and  its  similar 
spaces  and  times  constitutes  a  great  system  of  instru- 
ments by  means  of  which  we  are  enabled  to  assert  our 
mastery  over  material  nature. — 

Philosophical  discussion  in  France  has  in  recent  years 
been  quite  vigorous  and  significant.  The  Bulletin  de  la 
societe  frangaise  de  philosophie  furnishes  the  opportunity 
of  following  the  progress  of  the  refined  and  profound,  at 
once  personal  and  chivahous,  discussions  of  the  younger 
French  philosophers.  Adolphus  Levi:  V  indeierminismo 
nella  filosofia  francese  contemporanea  (1905),  furnishes  a 
valuable  comprehensive  treatment  of  the  whole  move- 
ment in  French  philosophy  in  its  relation  to  the  concepts 
of  causality  and  continuity. 

3.   The  Economico-biological  Theory  of  Knowledge. 

The  critical  philosophy  had  already  to  a  certain  degree 
regarded  knowledge  from  the  economico-biological  view- 
point.   Viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  -analytical  method, 


which  Kant  himself  applied  in  his  Prolegomenay  the 
problem  of  Kant^s  Critique  of  Reason  may  be  thus  for- 
mulated: What  presuppositions  must  I  postulate  in 
order  to  secure  an  exact  empirical  science? — Hence  all 
thought  is  to  be  regarded  as  means  to  an  end,  at  least  to 
the  intellectual  end  of  understanding.  We  are  confronted 
by  similar  lines  of  thought  in  recent  philosophical  litera- 
ture from  various  quarters. 

Noted  natural  scientists,  reflecting  upon  the  principles 
of  their  science,  have  observed  that  the  definitions  of  the 
concepts  and  the  presuppositions  of  science  must  seek 
their  justification  in  the  fact  that  they  furnish  the  possi- 
bility of  an  intellectual  elaboration  and  interpretation  of 
the  facts.  Their  necessity  rests  upon  this  fact  alone, 
which  however  is  not  apodictic  until  the  possibility  of 
other  concepts  and  presuppositions  than  those  now  in 
use,  serving  the  same  purpose  quite  as  well,  is  excluded. 
Maxwell  expressed  this  view  in  1885,  Ernst  Mach  in  1863. 

Avenarius,  from  1876  onward,  developed  his  natural 
history  of  the  problems  from  a  purely  psychological  view- 
point: because  of  the  fact  that  consciousness  does  not 
possess  an  infinite  ideational  capacity  it  is  obliged  to 
introduce  economy  into  its  thought,  which  gives  rise  to 
the  problem  of  construing  what  is  given  in  experience  with 
the  least  possible  subjective  addition. 

Pragmatism  so  called  shows  a  similar  tendency.  This 
term  was  first  introduced  by  the  American  mathema- 
tician and  philosopher  Peirce  (1878),  and  afterwards 
appropriated  by  his  fellow  countryman,  William  James 
(1898),  who  combines  it  with  a  whole  psychological  and 
philosophical  system.  Pragmatism  establishes  the  con- 
cepts and  presuppositions  by  the  practical  consequences 
involved  in  the  experiences  to  which  they  lead.    If  we 


1 


'4' 
:■!;■ 


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PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


MACH 


299 


were  wholly  indifferent  to  the  consequences  of  our  pre- 
suppositions we  would  not  postulate  them,  we  would  at 
least  draw  no  conclusion  from  them. 

I.    James    Clerk    Maxwell    (1831-1879),    the    noted 
physicist  who  was  a  professor  at  Cambridge,  was  a 
student  of  philosophy  under  William  Hamilton,  of  whom 
he  reminds  us  by  his  emphasis  of  the  dynamic  character 
of  knowledge.    He  regards  the  mind  as  an  organ,  whose 
use  may  be  valuable  in  itself,  even  though  its  practical 
significance  consists  in  the  results  of  its  functional  activity. 
The  progress  of  the  exact  sciences  rests  upon  the  fact  that 
we  are  able  to  elaborate  ideas,  in  which  all  particular 
facts  are  represented  and  from  which  exact,  mathe- 
matical conclusions  can  be  deduced.     In  this  respect  the 
formation  of  number  series  has  been  singularly  important: 
we  are  thus  enabled  to  conceive  physical  variations  after 
the  analogy  of  the  relations  in  the  ntimber  series,  accord- 
ing to  the  laws  of  numbers.    This  analogy  can  likewise 
be  carried  through  most  readily  in  its  application  to 
changes  of  position,  and  the  natural  science  of  the  last 
three  centuries  has  therefore  aimed  as  far  as  possible  to 
construe  all  phenomena  as  processes  of  motion.    The 
theory  of  atoms  rests  upon  a  comprehensive  analogy  be- 
tween the  qualitative  changes  of  matter  and  the  move- 
ments of  material  points  in  space.    As  a  matter  of  fact 
even  geometry  is  really  a  theory  of  motion:  a  geometrical 
line  is  the  path  of  a  motion  from  one  point  to  another.— 
The  justification  of  the  presuppositions  lies  in  the  fact 
that  they  lead  to  fruitful  tasks  and  problems.    Thus,  e.  g., 
the  principle  of  the  conservation  of  energy  raises  very 
definite  questions  in  connection  with  every  new  phenom- 
enon: whence  does  the  energy  here  expended  originate, 
and  into  what  new  form  is  it  transformed,  when  the 


phenomenon  ceases? — [MaxwelVs  epistemological  treatises 
are  found  in  the  second  volume  of  his  Scientific  Papers.) 

Ernst  Mach  (bom  1838,  professor  at  Vienna)  was  led  to 
the  problems  of  epistemology  by  the  study  of  the  history 
of  natural  science.  The  following  are  his  chief  works: 
Die  Mechanik  in  ihrer  Entwickelung  (4th  ed.,  1901),  Die 
Analyse  der  Empfindungen  (4th  ed.,  1903,  Erkenntniss  und 
Irrtum  (1905). 

Mach  made  an  attempt  early  in  life  to  discover  a  point 
of  view  which  he  would  not  be  obliged  to  surrender  when 
passing  from  the  subject  of  physics  to  that  of  psychology. 
He  found  such  a  viewpoint  in  the  priority  of  sensation  to 
all  concepts  of  atoms  and  souls.  The  concepts,  formu- 
lated by  scientific  thought,  are  conditioned  by  the  necessity 
of  an  adaptation  to  the  given.  Thought— both  in  its 
syntheses  as  well  as  in  its  analyses — ^is  a  case  of  biological 
adaptation.  Because  of  the  fact  then  that  quantitative 
arrangements  are  simpler  and  more  comprehensive  than 
qualitative  arrangements,  and  because  they  simplify  the 
view  of  large  groups  of  experiences,  we  apply  them 
wherever  possible,  and  to  this  end  such  concepts  as 
energy,  mass  and  atom  are  formulated;  concepts,  there- 
fore, which  have  no  metaphysical  significance.  The  en- 
tire mechanical  explanation  of  nature  rests  upon  a  sublime 
analogy  between  the  movements  of  masses  in  space  and 
the  qualitative  changes  of  things  (in  temperature,  electri- 
cal conditions,  etc.).  But  we  have  no  right  to  construe  the 
universe  as  a  pure  mechanism.  The  immediately  given 
consists  of  nothing  more  than  complexes  of  sensation, 
which  physics,  by  the  help  of  its  fruitful  analogies, 
interprets  as  movements. 

2.    Richard    Avenarius    (1843-1896),    a   professor   at 
Zurich,  was  prepared  for  his  later  theories  by  his  studies  of 


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AVENARIUS 


301 


^H^ 

^^B 


Spinoza  (Uber  die  beiden  ersten  Phasen  des  Spinozistischen 
Pantkeizmus,  1868),  for  the  theory  of  identity  is  a  splendid 
example  of  the  reduction  of  all  ideas  to  a  single  idea. 
The  title  of  a  later  treatise  {Philosopfiie  als  Denken  der 
Welt  nack  dent  Prinzip  des  kleinsten  Krafttnasses,  1876) 
gives  definite  expression  to  the  economic  theory,  and  his 
chief  work  (Kritik  der  reinen  Erfahrung,  1890)  consists  of 
an  investigation  of  the  physiological  and  psychological 
conditions  of  the  origin  and  the  evanescence  of  problems. 
In  his  last  essay  {Der  menschliche  Welthegrif,  1891)  he 
seeks  to  sift  out  the  last  vestige  of  animism,  the  reading  of 
subjective  elements  into  actual  experience,  completely. 

A  problem  presupposes  a  ''vital  diference/'  i.  e.  a  state 
of  tension  between  the  individual  and  the  environment. 
Such  a  state  of  tension  arises  whenever  the  stimuli  pro- 
ceeding from  the  objective  world  demand  a  greater  or 
smaller  expenditure  of  energy  than  the  individual  is 
capable  of  furnishing. 

Whenever  the  stimulus  (R)  and  the  energy  on  hand  (E) 
balance  eacn  other  (so  that  R=E),  we  have  a  vital  maxi- 
mimi  of  preservation:  Recognition  is  possible;  the  indi- 
vidual feels  at  home  and  has  confidence  in  his  ideas  and 

perceptions. 

But  if  a  greater  effort  is  required  than  the  individual 
is  capable  of  putting  forward  (i.  e.  R>E),  the  individual 
discovers  contradictions,  deviations  and  exceptions  in  the 
given;  it  appears  strange  and  recognition  is  impossible. 
Every  extension  of  the  circle  of  experience,  every 
enlargement  of  the  horizon,  is  liable  to  bring  with  it 
new  problems.     The   advance  of  civilization  increases 

the  problems. 

Conversely,  if  the  energy  is  greater  than  the  demand 
(so  that  R<E),  a  desire  to  transcend  the  given  will  arise. 


The  result  will  be  a  practical  idealism  or  a  romantic 

yearning. 

Avenarius  made  a  special  study  of  the  case  of  R>E. 
The  solution  involves  three  stages— need,  effort,  dis- 
charge—and the  problem  disappears.  Avenarius  regards 
these  three  stages  of  problematization  and  deproblemat- 
ization  essentially  as  symptoms  of  certain  physiological 
processes  in  the  brain.  His  theory  is  physiological  rather 
than  psychological— even  though  as  a  matter  of  fact  he 
constantly  deduces  the  correlative  physiological  processes 
from  the  psychological  "symptoms." 

The  result  of  the  process,  the  deproblematization,  does 
not  always  constitute  a  real  solution.  A  tentative  or 
purely  individual  viewpoint  may  be  attained,  without 
excluding  the  possibility  of  a  new  state  of  tension,  a  new 
problematization.  Deproblematization  is  definite  and 
tuiiversal  only  whenever  a  perfect  adaptation  has  taken 
place,  from  which  all  subjective  and  tentative  elements 
have  been  eliminated.  This  is  reaUzed  whenever  knowl- 
edge essentially  consists  in  a  quantitative  description, 
and  a  description  furthermore  in  which  the  consequent 
is  always  the  equivalent  of  the  antecedent.  We  have 
then  reaUzed  the  viewpoint  of  pure  experience, 

Avenarius  differs  from  Maxwell  and  Mach,  especially 
from  the  fact  that  he  failed  to  see  the  relation  between 
economy  and  symbolism  (analogizing),  as  he  underesti- 
mates the  significance  and  the  necessity  of  analogy  in 

general. 

3.  William  James  (bom  1842),  the  Harvard  professor, 
in  an  article  published  in  1898  {The  Pragmatic  Method, 
reprinted  in  The  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Psychology  and 
Scientific  Methods,  1904)  laid  the  foundation  of  a  theory 
of  knowledge  by  which  he  wished  at  once  to  review  and 


I 


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PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLEDGE 


JAMES 


303 


I 


I 


correct  the  classical  EngHsh  philosophy.  He  has  elabo- 
rated his  theory  more  fully  in  a  series  of  articles  which 
appeared  in  the  above-mentioned  periodical  during  the 
years  1904  and  1905.  He  had  already  placed  great  stress 
on  the  continuity  of  psychic  life  in  his  Principles  of  Psy- 
chology (1890),  by  insisting  that  what  is  actually  given  in 
psychical  experience  consists  of  an  incessant  *' stream  of 
thought y''  and  he  has  applied  this  conception  to  the  special 
problems  of  psychology  with  telling  effect.  He  calls  this 
original  flux  of  hfe  ''pure  experience''  (an  expression  which 
he  uses  more  consistently  than  Avenarius),  It  is  only  for 
practical  reasons  that  we  depart  from  the  original  flux  of 
life:  distinctions,  definitions,  and  axioms  are  postulated 
for  the  purpose  of  reahzing  certain  ends.  This  conception 
of  knowledge  is  what  constitutes  pragmatism^  whilst 
rationalism,  which  accords  the  highest  place  to  abstract 
thought,  regards  those  intellectual  instruments  of  thought 
as  immediate  revelations  of  the  absolute.  If  we  estabhsh 
the  elements,  which  we  carve  out  of  this  continuous 
stream  for  the  purposes  of  solving  our  problems  concep- 
tually, they  may  be  interchanged,  and  operations  with 
these  elements  enable  us  to  attain  results  similar  to  those 
of  actual  experience.  But  this  is  not  the  case  with  all 
the  elements  however.  There  is  more  discontinuity  in 
the  tmiverse  than  we  ordinarily  suppose  and  we  cannot 
always  combine  one  part  of  our  experience  with  another 
or  substitute  it  for  another. 

Just  as  pragmatism  leads  to  empiricism,  so,  according  to 
James,  does  empiricism  also  lead  to  pluralism.  James 
has  stated  this  clearly  in  his  preface  to  the  collection  of 
essays  published  tmder  the  title  The  Will  to  Believe 
(1897).  Pure  experience  really  presents  nothing  more 
than  factual  transitions,  no  "intellectual"  transitions. 


Our  knowledge  consists  of  combinations  made  by  con- 
tinuous transition,  we  know  no  absolute  and  rational 
unity.  In  addition  to  combinations  there  are  as  a  matter 
of  fact  disparate  phenomena:  new  facts  arise  in  the  world 
and  there  is  an  absolute  beginning.  The  vinity  of  nature 
is  a  matter  which  is  only  coming  to  pass  gradually,  i.  e. 
in  proportion  as  we  verify  our  ideas. — 

It  is  an  open  question  whether  such  a  radical  pliu-alism 
as  James  adopts  is  possible.  According  to  James  the 
combination  is  quite  as  much  a  matter  of  fact  as  the  mani- 
fold variety  of  phenomena,  and  the  unity  of  the  universe 
is  construed  as  in  process  of  realization.  In  addition  to 
this  James  asstmies  the  possibility  of  substitutions;  but 
these  presuppose  the  existence  of  something  more  than 
mere  differences.  (The  author  of  this  text -book  has 
developed  this  critical  suggestion  more  fully  in  an  article 
which  appeared  in  the  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Psychology 
and  Scientific  Methods  (1905)  imder  the  title  A  Philo- 
sophical Confession.) 

We  shall  have  occasion  to  refer  to  James'  philosophy  of 
religion  in  the  following  section. 

B.    The  Problem  of  Values. 

It  is  one  of  the  signs  of  the  times  that  the  problem  of 
values  occupies  such  a  prominent  place  in  philosophical 
discussion  at  present,  and  that,  as  compared  with  other 
problems,  it  is  coming  forward  with  greater  independence 
than  formerly.  There  is  a  growing  conviction  that  the 
final  word  on  the  value  of  existence  cannot  be  established 
purely  theoretically.  Here  however  there  will  always 
remain  at  least  a  philosophical  problem;  the  investigation 
of  the  psychological  basis  and  the  inherent  consistency 
of  efforts  at  evaluation. 


% 


'i 


304 


PROBLEM  OF  VALUES 


GUYAU 


305 


This  point  presents  three  types.— (7w3'aw  and  Nietzsche 
expect  new  forms  of  life  to  arise,  and  they  base  their 
expectation  upon  the  fact  that  the  overflowing  fullness  of 
vital  energy  in  our  present  experience  and  our  present 
conditions  of  hfe  cannot  find  an  adequate  outlet.     Like 
Rousseau  they  insist  on  the  right  of  spontaneous,  instinc- 
tive life   as  against  analytic  reflection.    The   formula 
R  <  E  finds  its  appHcation  here.— Rudolph  Eucken  likewise 
makes  the  contradiction  between  the  capacity  and  the 
actual  status  of  men  his  starting-point.    The   Hfe   of 
every-day  experience  is  incoherent,  without  any  center  of 
gravity,  and  suffers  from  the  contrast  between  nature  and 
value.    The  only  possibility  of  a  true  culture  is  through 
a  new  concentration  which  lays  hold  of  a  ''spiritual  sub- 
stance'' beyond  the  confines  of  experience,— "  a  spiritual 
existence''  in  which  what  has  been  already  acquired  is 
preserved  and  from  which  new  constructions  proceed.— 
William  James  treats  religious  problems  purely  psycho- 
logically.   He  seeks  to  examine  reUgion  as  it  manifests 
itself  at  first  hand  in  individual  men,— " personal  reUgion" 
(as  against  "institutional  reHgion"),  which  is  a  result  of 
the  individual's  life-experiences,  the  experiences  which 
determine  his  fundamental  attitude  and  his  method  of 
reacting  towards   the  fact  of  life.    This  fundamental 
attitude  or  this  reaction  constitutes  religion  whenever  on 
account  of  contrasts  and  conflicts  they  acquire  a  tran- 
scendent character. 

I.  Jean  Maria  Guyau  (1854-1888)  exemplifies  a  rare 
combination  of  subjective  emotion  with  indefatigable 
reflection.  He  feels  the  profound  difficulty  of  the  prob- 
lems and  the  illusion  of  the  majority  of  the  solutions, 
but  he  holds  that  the  illusions  are  valuable  if  only  they 
are  fruitful,  i.  e.  if  they  excite  the  activity  of  the  intellect 


and  the  will.  (See  the  poem,  Illusion  feconde,  in  Vers 
d'un  Philosophic.) — Guyau  enjoyed  a  home-life  which 
was  peculiarly  favorable  to  his  activity  as  a  student  and 
author.  Early  in  Hfe  however  he  fell  a  victim  to  an 
incurable  disease  of  the  chest,  but  this  did  not  suppress 
the  energy  of  his  intellect  and  his  vital  courage. 

His  first  Hterary  attempt  was  a  criticism  of  English 
utilitarianism  and  evolutionism  {La  morale  Anglaise 
contemporaine,  1879).  Here  he  takes  the  ground  that 
English  moral  philosophy  must  inevitably  lead  to  the 
uncertainty  and  illusoriness  of  the  moral  feelings  them- 
selves due  to  their  psychologico-genetic  explanation  of 
these  feelings:  i.  e.  if  conscience  is  evolved  from  more 
elementary  feelings  it  is  really  nothing  more  than  a  pure 
elementary  feeling  itself!  There  exists  an  immediate  im- 
pulse however  towards  self-development,  an  impulse 
which  may  assume  the  character  of  devotion,  of  altruism, 
without  the  assistance  of  any  association  of  ideas  and 
evolution! — In  his  own  theories  he  endeavors  to  avoid  the 
difficulties  which  he  charges  against  the  English  school 
(Esquisse  d'  une  morale  sans  obligation  ni  sanction y  1885). 
The  development  of  Hfe  is  the  goal  which  nature  has  set 
for  itself,  and  ethics  is  the  theory  of  the  ways  and  means 
by  which  the  highest  and  fullest  development  of  Hfe 
may  be  reaHzed.  It  is  necessary  to  maintain  and  develop 
both  the  subjective  and  the  objective  phases  of  Hfe,  and 
the  sympathetic  emotions  and  social  life  are  of  the  highest 
importance  for  both  phases,  because  isolation  and  egoism 
restrict  the  horizon  and  the  efficiency  of  the  individual. 
The  highest  virtue— the  attribute  of  character  which 
makes  for  the  highest  development  of  Hfe— is  therefore 
generosity.  Reflection  and  analysis  are  thus  not  con- 
strued as  hostile  powers  (as  imder  the  presuppositions  of 


m 


\ 


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PROBLEM  OF  VALUES 


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307 


^ 


the  English  school).    For  the  expansive  energy  which 
forms  the  basis  of  Hfe  begets  hope  and  courage  and 
makes  possible  what  would   otherwise  be  impossible. 
The  only  sanction  which  the  ethics  of  the  future  will 
require  is  that  of  the  subjective  satisfaction  which  cor- 
responds to  the  greatness  of  the  risk  {le  plaisir  de  risque). 
Guyau  Hkewise  bases  his  philosophy  of  religion  on  the 
impulse  of  expansion  {V  irreligion  de  Vavenir,  1887).    The 
day  of  religion  is  past.      Religion  consists  essentially 
of  man's  feeling  of  fellowship  with  the  personal  director 
of  the  course  of  the  universe.     It  finds  its  characteristic 
expression  in  the  mythological  explanation  of  nature,  in  a 
form  of  worship  with  magic  rites  and  in  a  body  of  dogmas 
which  are  regarded  as  absolute  truths.    Religion  is  in 
process  of  complete  dissolution  in  every  one  of  these 
directions.    What  is  best  in  religious  life  will  be  able  to 
survive;  the  imptdse  to  transcend  the  bare  facts  of 
experience  and  to  discover  a  higher  unity  will  not  vanish 
with  rehgion.    As  a  matter  of  fact  this  impulse  is  only  now 
finding  room  for  free  development,  since  the  rigid,  dog- 
matic forms  no  longer  impose  obstacles.    Everyone  will 
express  his  sense  of  fellowship  with  existence— the  ideal 
-  sociology  of  existence— in  his  own  way.    The  disharmo- 
nies of  the  universe  will  be  felt  more  profoundly  than 
before,  but  the  fundamental  note  will  asstmie  the  charac- 
ter of  subHmity,  and  the  world  will  be  one  of  hope  and  of 
courage  for  Hfe  and  for  death. 

2.  Friedrich  Nietzsche  (i  844-1 900)  builds  on  the  same 
fundamental  principle  as  Guyau,  only  that  in  him  the 
conflict  between  the  poet  and  the  philosopher  is  even 
more  pronounced  than  in  the  case  of  the  Frenchman. 
Both  Guyau  and  Nietzsche  oppose  an  emphatic  affirmative 
to  the  negations  of  pessimism.    But  whilst  Guyau  guards 


his  subjective  disposition  and  his  melancholy  resignation 
against  the  change  and  the  evanescence  of  values, 
Nietzsche  assimies  an  attitude  of  disdain  and  contempt 
for  both  past  and  present,  and  his  hope  for  a  glorious 
futtire  constantly  assumes  a  more  imtractable  and  spas- 
modic character. 

As  a  youth  Nietzsche,  along  with  philosophical  studies, 
devoted  himself  zealously  to  classical  philology,  and 
became  professor  in  this  department  at  Basle  at  the  age 
of  twenty-fotir.  Owing  to  ill-health  and  his  comprehen- 
sive Hterary  plans  he  afterwards  resigned  his  position 
and  thereafter  Hved  mostly  in  Engadine  and  Northern 
Italy,  until  insanity  made  it  necessary  for  him  to  return 
to  his  German  home  and  be  cared  for  by  his  mother  and 

sister. 

Nietzsche's  chief  aim  is  to  establish  a  new,  positive 
estimate  of  life  on  the  basis  of  the  historical  facts  of 
civilization.  The  clearest  statement  of  his  purpose  is 
found  in  the  essay  written  in  his  youth.  The  Birth  of 
Tragedy  (1872).  He  contrasts  the  tragic-poetic  view  of 
life,  symbolized  in  Dionysius  and  Apollo,  with  that  of 
the  intellectual  optimism  represented  by  Socrates.  It  is 
Nietzsche's  purpose,  as  he  said  later  on,  to  consider  science 
from  the  viewpoint  of  art,  and  art  from  the  viewpoint  of 
life.  Dionysius  is  consequently— i.  e.  the  superabundant 
life,  life  absorbing  and  vanquishing  pain  and  death- 
superior  to  Apollo,  and  Apollo  is  superior  to  Socrates. 

This  view  leads  to  a  severe  criticism  of  Strauss,  the 
optimistic  free-thinker,  and  a  glorification  of  Schopen- 
hauer and  Richard  Wagner,  given  in  Unzeitgemdssen 
Betrachtungen  (1873-1876).  He  soon  finds  however  that 
he  must  go  farther  than  both  these  "educators."  He 
famiHarizes  himself  with  the  latest  scientific  and  philo- 


U\ 


<    I 


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NIETZSCHE 


309 


sophical  theories,  and  thenceforward  we  find  a  struggle 
between  a  mqre  realistic  and  a  purely  subjective  ten- 
dency.   In  addition  to  this  he  was  horrified  at  pessimism, 
not  only  as  he  found  it  in  Schopenhauer,  but  likewise  as  he 
found  it  in  Richard  Wagner.     He  then  assailed  his  own 
old  deities.     Durmg  the  whole  of  the  remaining  period 
in  which  he  was  still  able  to  do  anything  he  labored 
towards  the  discovery  of  an  adequate,  decisive  expression 
of  his  opposition  to  every  form  of  pessimism,  to  every 
form  of  depreciation  of  Hfe,  to  all  levelling  processes. 
He  particularly  challenges  the  theories  of  morality  which 
have  been  prevalent  hitherto  and  insisted  on'' an  inversion 
of  all  values,"    The  most  characteristic  statements  of 
this    polemic  are  fotmd  in  Jenseits  von  Gut  und  Bose 
(1886)  and  in  the  Geneaologie  der  Moral  (1887).     Here 
he  develops  the  ideas  advanced  in  the  essays  of  his  youth 
more  rigidly,  and  the  fundamental  theory  becomes  a 
radical  aristocratism,  which  leads  to  a  social  duab'sm. 
The  goal  of  history  is  not  in  the  infinitely  distant  future, 
but  it  is  realized  in  the  worid's  great  men.    The  great 
mass  of  mankind  is  nothing  more  than  an  instrument, 
obstacle  or  copy.    A  higher,  ruhng  caste  is  necessary, 
which  exists  for  its  own  sake,— which  is  an  end  in  itself, 
not  at  the  same  time  an  instrument.    Corruption  begins 
just  as  soon  as  the  aristocracy  no  longer  believe  in  their 
right  to  Hve,  to  rule  and  to  treat  the  great  masses  as 
their  laboring  cyclops.    Aristocracy  must  show  the  value 
of  life  by  the  mere  fact  of  their  existence.     It  is  impos- 
sible to  develop  the  highest  virtues  among  the  great 
masses.     They  are  only  capable  of  religion  and  civic 
morality.    But,  as  history  proves,  the  great  masses  have 
repeatedly  been  able  to  claim  that  their  morality  is  the 
highest.    The  true  estimate  of  life,  as  the  sense  of  energy 


and  might  {Nietzsche  later  calls  it  Der  Wille  zur  Macht) 
has  frequently  been  overthrown  by  the  uprising  of  the 
moral  slaves — ^in  Buddhism,  in  Socrates,  in  Christianity, 
in  modem  humanism.  Even  the  tendency  of  natural 
science  is  in  this  direction:  it  even  makes  a  democracy  of 
nature  by  its  principle  of  general  uniformity! 

Nietzsche  frequently  expresses  himself  as  if  he  would 
abolish  all  morality.  But  he  really  demands  nothing 
more  than  an  inversion  which  has  been  necessitated  by 
the  domination  of  the  morality  of  slavery.  As  he  ob- 
serves in  one  of  his  essays  published  posthumously  (Der 
Wille  zur  Macht),  he  wishes  to  introduce  a  moral  natural- 
ism. He  must  however  also  have  a  standard  for  his 
"inversion."  He  discovers  such  a  standard  in  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  affirmation  of  life  and  of  the  increase  of  vital 
energy.  From  this  point  of  view  he  wanted  to  elaborate 
a  ^'number  and  measurement  scale  of  energy,"  by  which  all 
values  could  be  systematized  scientifically.  There  is  no 
kind  of  vital  energy  or  vital  pleasure  which  could  here  be 
excluded.  Here  Nietzsche  appears  as  a  utilitarian  of  the 
first  rank.  And  he  finally  renounces  his  social  dualism 
definitively,  and  then  proposes  as  the  end,  not  the  happi- 
ness of  the  individual  but  the  vigorous  development  of 
*'the  total  life." 

This  change  of  attitude  is  still  more  prominent  in  the 
poetic  elaboration  of  his  ideas.  The  real  tragedy  and 
contradiction  of  his  life  consisted  in  his  wasting  so  much 
time  and  energy  in  the  effort  to  set  forth  his  antipathy 
and  contempt  for  things  in  general,  whilst  he  failed  to 
describe  fully  and  clearly  the  tremendous  positive  con- 
ception of  life  which  constituted  his  central  idea.  The 
poetic-philosophic  treatise.  Also  sprach  Zarathusthra 
1883-1891),  was  left  imfinished.    Here  he  elaborates  his 


i' 


I 


'"! 


3IO 


PROBLEM  OF  VALUES 


EUCKEN 


ideas  on  the  super-man:  The  aim  of  the  present  struggle 
is  to  evolve  a  new  human  type,  related  to  the  man  of  the 
present  as  man  is  related  to  the  ape.    This  is  the  common 
aim  of  the  whole  human  race.    The  period  of  duahsm 
and  of  animosity  should  be  relegated  to  the  past     Zara- 
thusthra,  the  seer  and  guide,  hates  his  own  hatred.    And 
Nietzsche  paradoxically  advocates  the  affirmation  of  hfe 
in  the  strongest  terms,  life  of  every  form  and  on  every 
plane.    The  idea  that  the  cycle  of  the  umverse  must 
repeat  itself  became  a  controlling  idea  with  Inm.  Accord- 
inkto  his  view  the  universe  consists  of  a  fimte  sum  of 
elLents,  and  hence  the  number  of  combinations  of  these 
SS^ents  must  Hkewise  be  finite.    It  follows  tWore 
that  when  the  number  of  combinations  has  been  exhaust^ 
the  same  course  of  evolution  must  begin  anew     This 
dl  of  repetition  or  recurrence  at  first  horrified  metzsche 
and  he  h^  a  severe  struggle  before  he  could  reconcde 
himself  to  it.    Zarathusthra  reveals  to  man  the  blessed 
gospel  of  the  coming  of  the  super-man-but  on  the  con- 
dition  that  man  wishes  to  choose  and  emulate  life  despite 
£  repetition.    Just  as  all  mankind  yield  their  assent 
to  this  proposition,  Zarathusthra  dies  for  joy. 

In  tHs  way  according  to  Nietzsche  the  sublime  expan- 
sion of  the  vital  impulse  vanquishes  all  disharmomes  and 
all  doubt.  He  is  therefore  admitted  to  a  place  in  the 
history  of  philosophy,  not  because  of  his  saentific  treat- 
ment  of  its  problems,  but  because  of  his  experience 
of  the  pmfound  antitheses  of  life,  and  because  of 
his    effort    to    elaborate    these    experiences    m    idea^ 

and  symbols.  _        .4 

^  Rudolph  Eucken  (bom  1846),  professor  at  Jena,  the 
original  seat  of  metaphysical  idealism,  following  a  sen^  of 
prehminary  treatises  {Die  Einheit  des  Getsteslehens,  1888, 


3" 


Der  Kampf  urn  einen  geistigen  Lehensinhalt,  1896)  has 
elaborated  the  religious  problem  of  our  age  in  his  work  on 
Der  Wahrheitsgehalt  der  Religion  (1901). 

The  aim  of  this  work  is  to  show  that  religion  harmonizes 
with  the  innermost  ground  of  our  being.  If  this  is  true, 
it  must  follow  that  every  attack  and  every  criticism  will 
serve  only  to  bring  out  the  eternal  principle  of  religion 
with  increasing  clearness. 

The  civilization  of  the  ancients  over-estimated  the 
form  and  culminated  in  the  barrenness  of  plastic  art; 
the  civilization  introduced  by  the  renaissance  over-esti- 
mated the  energy  and  culminated  in  a  restless  striving 
without  any  absolute  aim.  The  Church,  as  a  matter  of 
course,  furnishes  a  total  view  of  the  useful  life  in  its 
perfection,  but  it  over-estimates  the  historical  forms,  in 
which  the  total  view  was  once  expressed,  and  it  therefore 
regards  all  truth  as  imitation  and  repetition,  whilst  on  the 
other  hand  it  isolates  the  highest  realities  from  actual, 
every-day  life.  Critical  philosophy  has  contrasted  the 
realm  of  value  with  the  realm  of  reality.  But  there  still 
remains  the  task  of  construing  the  valuable  as  the  most 
truly  real.  A  new  metaphysic  will  avail  nothing  at  this 
point.  The  only  way  to  attain  the  goal  is  through  living 
experience.  Eucken  applies  the  term  Noology  to  the 
effort  to  affirm  the  absolute  reality  of  the  spiritual  world, 
on  the  ground  that  it  would  otherwise  be  impossible  to 
maintain  the  absolute  obligations  and  the  superiority  of 
spiritual  values.  The  noological  view  would  direct  its 
attention  to  the  permanent,  the  free  and  the  rational,  as 
manifested  in  experience.  Particularly  in  the  case  of  the 
beginning  of  a  new  form  of  experience — organic,  psychical 
and  the  higher  spiritual  life, — ^noology  will  discover  pro- 
found motives.    The  noological  view  cannot  justify  itself 


312 


PROBLEM  OF   VALUES 


EUCKEN 


313 


It' 


I 


by  proofs;  its  basis  consists  of  a  spiritual  impulse,  which  is 
aroused  by  the  experience  of  the  disharmonies  of  Hfe,  and 
which  not  only  leads  to  indefinite  reUgious  ideas,  to  a 
^^  universal  religion^  but  at  its  cuhnination  can  lead  to  a 
^^characteristic  religion''  with  definitely  formed  general 
symbols.  The  great  symbols  formulated  by  the  founders 
of  the  positive  religions  bear  witness  to  the  presence  of  a 
divine  energy  in  spiritual  evolution.  Noology  therefore 
culminates  in  metaphysics.  ,    ,     .    1       a 

1  Whilst  Eucken  regards  a  purely  psychological  and 
epistemological  treatment  of  the  problem  of  rehgion 
inadequate,  this  method  of  treatment  has  nevertheless 
been  quite  prominent  in  recent  years.  A  number  o 
American  investigators  have  made  valuable  individual 
contributions  {Stanley  Ball,  Leuha,  Coe,  etc.).  James 
book  on  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience:  A  Study  oj 
Human  Nature  (1902)  here  takes  first  rank. 

According  to  James  the  study  of  religious  phenomena 
reveals  how  scant  a  portion  of  our  spiritual  life  can  be 
clearly  explained.    Consciousness  shades  off  through  a 
large  number  of  degrees  into  the  unconscious  or  subcon- 
scious,  and  it  frequently  happens  that  the  fundamental 
presuppositions  of  our  conscious  ideas  proceed  from  the 
"subUminal"    (or    "  submarginal ")    region.    Consaous 
arguments  frequently   affect   only   the   surface  of  our 
nature,  and  a  spontaneous  and  immediate  conviction  is 
the  deep  thing  in  us.    James  is  inclined  to  regard  the 
influences  which  issue  from  that  deeper  region  a^  the 
means  by  which  a  higher  order  of  things  works  in  us 
Every  attempt  to  define  this  order  more  precisely  is  ot 
course  an  interpretation;  any  single  experience  may  be 
the   subject   of  various  religious  interpretations.     lUe 
majority  of  people  are  lacking  in  critical  insight  and  care, 


not  in  faith;  they  are  too  prone  to  base  a  dogmatic 
belief  on  every  vivid  idea. 

Every  emotion  may,  under  given  circumstances,  ac- 
quire a  religious  character.  This  character  manifests 
itself  by  the  fact  that  man  sums  up  his  vital  experiences 
which  give  rise  to  a  total  attitude,  which  determine  his 
entire  attitude  towards  life.  Spiritual  life  thus  acquires  a 
unity  and  harmony  which  are  otherwise  sought  for  in  vain. 
In  some  natures  this  unity  of  Hfe  is  the  result  of  profound 
spiritual  struggles,  and  can  only  be  realized  by  a  crisis,  a 
** conversion" ;  in  other  natures  however  it  arises  by  suc- 
cessive growth  or  spontaneous  unfolding.  This  repre- 
sents the  difference  between  religious  leaders:  the  differ- 
ence between  the  healthy  and  the  sick  souls,  or,  better 
still,  between  the  once-born  and  the  twice-born.  But  in 
both  classes  the  goal  cannot  be  attained  without  the  inflow 
of  energy  from  unconscious  sources.  How  this  fact  shall 
be  interpreted  is  a  private  matter  for  each  individual. 
James  is  himself  convinced  of  the  fact  that  new  powers 
and  starting-points  may  proceed  from  those  dark  sources, 
and  he  thinks  that  in  academic  circles  we  dismiss  this 
possibility  all  too  quickly.  Religion  rests  upon  a  cosmo- 
logical  hypothesis,  which  cannot  however  be  formulated 
dogmatically.  The  religious  consciousness  can  never 
accept  the  tragedies  and  shipwrecks  of  life  as  the  final 
word  concerning  existence. 

Our  judgment  of  the  value  of  religion  must  likewise  be 
based  on  experience.  We  judge  religious  phenomena  by 
their  fruits,  and  as  a  matter  of  fact  this  has  always  been 
the  case.  The  principle  of  pragmatism  is  likewise 
applicable  here.  Reverence  for  deity  ceases  whenever 
it  fails  to  affect  the  heart,  and  whenever  it  conflicts,  in 
its  whole  character,  with  something  the  value  of  which  we 


iitii 


IN 


'M 


3M 


PROBLEM  OF  VALX7ES 


have  experienced  and  do  not  wish  to  deny.  Mankind 
retains  the  gods  which  it  can  use,  and  whose  command- 
ments substantiate  the  requirements  which  they  make  of 
themselves  and  of  others.  We  constantly  apply  htmian 
standards. 

James  assumes  a  sympathetic  attitude  towards  religion. 
He  is  convinced  that  the  best  fruits  of  religious  experience 
are  the  best  things  in  history.  The  inner  life  here  mani- 
fests a  fervor  and  an  energy,  a  subjectivity  and  a  concen- 
tration which  lifts  us  into  a  higher  atmosphere. — James 
does  not  discuss  the  intimate  relation  which  exists  be- 
tween "personal"  and  "institutional"  rebgion.  His 
treatise  however  suggests  points  of  view  which  are  very 
fruitftd  from  which  to  consider  the  problem  of  rehgion — 
or,  if  we  prefer,  the  problem  of  an  equivalent  of  rehgion. 


1440. 

1513. 
1516. 

1538. 
1540. 

1543- 
1554. 
1565- 
1577. 
1580. 

1581. 
1582. 

1584. 
1584. 

1584. 

1585. 
1591. 
1591. 

1597. 
1603. 
1609. 
1612. 
1620. 
1623. 

1623. 
1624. 
1625. 
1632. 

1637. 
1638. 

1640. 

1641. 


CHRONOLOGY  OP  THE  CHIEF  WORKS 
IN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Ctisanus:    De  docta  ignorantia. 
Machiavelli:    II  prindpe. 
Pomponazzi:    De  immortalitate  anims. 
Vives:    De  anima  et  vita. 
Melanchthon:    De  anima. 

Copernicus:    De  revolutionibus  orbium  coelestium. 
Ramus:    Institutiones  dialecticae. 
Telesio:     De  rerum  natura. 
Bodin:    La  rdpublique. 
Montaigne:    Essais. 
Sanchez:    Quod  nihil  scitur. 
Bruno:    De  tmibris  idearum. 
**         Cena  delle  ceneri. 

De  r  infinito  universo  et  mondi. 

De  la  causa,  principio,  et  uno. 

De  grheroici  furori. 

De  triplici  minimo. 

De  immenso. 
Kepler:    Mysterium  cosmographicum. 
Althusius:    Politica  methodice  digesta. 
Kepler:    Astronomia  nova. 
Bohme:    Aurora. 
Bacon:    Novum  Organum.     (Eng.  trans.) 

"         De  dignitate  et  augmentis  scientiarum. 
(Eng.  trans.) 
Galileo:     II  saggiatore. 
Cherbury:    De  veritate. 
Grotius:    De  jure  belli  et  pads. 

Galileo:    Dialogo  sopra  i  due  massimi  system!  del  mondo. 
Descartes:    Discours  de  la  m^thode. 
Galileo:    Discorsi. 
Hobbes:    Elements  of  Law. 
£>escartes:    Meditationes.     (Eng.  trans.) 


31S 


^«<^><94^^> 


3i6 

1642. 
1644. 
165 1. 

1655. 
1658. 

1658. 

1665. 

1669. 
1670. 
1674. 
1677. 
1685. 
1687. 
1689. 
1690. 

1695. 
1695. 

1695. 
1704. 

1705. 
1709. 
1 710. 
1 710. 
1711. 

1714. 
1720. 

1725. 
1726. 

1734. 

1739  ( 

1745. 

1748. 

1748. 

1748. 

1749. 

1750. 

1751. 

1754. 


i< 


«« 


it 


*i 


CHRONOLOGY 

Hobbes:    De  cive. 

Descartes:    Prmcipia  Philosophue.    (Eng.  trans.) 

Hobbes:    Leviathan. 
De  corpore. 
De  homine. 

Gassendi:    Opera  omnia. 

Geulincx:    De    virtute.    (VoUst&ndig    1675    unter    dem 
Titel  Ethica.) 

Pascal:    Pens^es.     (Eng.  trans.) 

Spinoza:    Tractatus  theologico-politicus.     (Eng.  trans.) 

Malebranche:    Recherche  de  la  v6nt6, 

Spinoza:    Ethica.     (Eng.  trans.) 

Leibnitz:    Petit  discours  m^taphysique.     (Eng.  trans.) 

Newton:    Principia. 

Locke:    On  Government. 

Essay  on  Human  Understanding. 
Reasonableness  of  Christianity. 

Leibnitz:    Syst^me  nouveau  de  la  nature  et  de  la  commiini* 
cation  des  substance. 

Bayle:    Dictionnaire  historique  et  critique. 

Toland:    Letters  to  Serena. 

Mandeville:    The  Fable  of  the  Bees. 
Berkeley:    Theory  of  Vision. 
Leibnitz:    Th^odic^. 
Berkeley:    Principles  of  Knowledge. 
Shaftesbury:    Characteristics  (I). 
Leibnitz:    Monadologie.     (Eng.  trans.) 
Wolff:    Vemunftige  Gedanken. 

Hutcheson:    Inquiry  into  the  Ideas  of  Beauty  and  Virtue. 
Butler:    Sermons. 
Voltaire:    Lettres  sur  les  Anglais. 
-1740).    Hume:    Treatise  on  Htmian  Nature. 
Crusius:    Entwurf  der  notwendigen  Vemunftwahrheiten. 
Montesquieu:     Esprit  des  lois.     (Eng.  trans.) 
La  Mettrie:    Lliomme  machine. 
Hartley:    Observations  on  Man. 
Hume:    Enquiry  concerning  the  Human  Understanding. 
Rousseau:    Discours  sur  les  sciences  et  les  arts. 
Hume:    Enquiry  concerning  the  Principles  of  Morals. 
Condillac:    Traits  des  sensations. 


CHRONOLOGY 


317 


I 


1754. 
1755. 

1755. 
1755. 
1757. 
1758. 
1762. 
1762. 
1762. 

1763. 
1764. 
1764. 

1765. 
1766. 

1766. 

1770. 

1770. 

1776. 

1777. 
1778. 

1779. 
1781. 

1783. 

1784. 
1784  (■ 

1785. 

1786. 
1786. 
1787. 

1788. 
1789. 

1789. 


Diderot:    Interpretation  de  la  nature. 

Rousseau:    Discours  sur  I'origine  de  Tin^galit^  parmi  les 

hommes. 
Mendelssohn:    Brief e  uber  die  Empfindungen. 
Kant:  Allgemeine  Naturgeschichte  undTheorie  des  Himmels. 
Hume:    Natural  History  of  Religion. 
Helvdtius:    De  I'esprit. 
Rousseau:    Emile.     (Eng.  trans.) 

"  Contrat  social. 

Kant:    Versuch  den  Begriff  der  negativen  Grdssen  in  die 

Weltweisheit  einzufuhren. 
Reid:    Inquiry  into  the  Human  Mind. 
Voltaire:    Dictionnaire  philosophique  portatif. 
Lambert:  .Neues  Organum. 
Leibnitz:    Nouveaux  essais.     (Eng.  trans.) 
Kant:    Traume  eines  Geistersehers.     (Eng.  trans.) 
Voltaire:    Le  philosophe  ignorant. 
Holbach:    Syst^me  de  la  nature. 
Kant:    De  mundi  sensibilis  atque  intelligibilis  forma  et 

principiis. 
Smith:    Wealth  of  Nations. 
Tetens:    Versuche  uber  die  menschliche  Natur. 
Lessing:    Duplik. 

Hume:    Dialogues  on  Natural  Religion. 
Kant:    Kritik  der  reinen  Vemunft.     (Eng.  trans.) 

Prolegomena  zu  jeder  kunftigen  Metaphysik.    (Eng. 

trans.) 

Idee  zu  einer  allgemeinen  Geschichte. 
-1 791).    Herder:    Ideen  zur  Philosophie  der  Geschichte  der 

Menschheit. 
Kant:    Grundlegung  zur  Metaphysik  der  Sitten.     (Eng. 

^  trans.) 
Kant:    Mutmasslicher  Anfang  des  Menschengeschlechts. 
Mendelssohn:    Morgenstunden. 
Jacobi:    David  Hume  uber  den  Glauben,  oder  Idealismus 

und  Realismus. 
Kant:    Kritik  der  praktischen  Vemunft.     (Eng.  trans.) 
Reinhold:    Versuch  einer  neuen  Theorie  des  menschlichen 

Vorstellungsverm6gens. 
Bentham:    Principles  of  Morals  and  Legislation. 


« 


«i 


3l8  CHRONOLOGY 

179a    Kant:    Kritik  der  Urtheilskraft.     (Eng.  trans.) 
179a    Maimon:    Versuch  uber  die  Transzendental  philosophie. 
1793.    Kant:    Religion  innerhalb  der  Grenzen  der  blossen  Ver- 
nunft.    (Eng.  trans.) 

1793.  Schiller:    Ueber  Anmuth  und  Wurde. 

1794.  Fichte:    Grundlage    der    gesammten    Wissenschaftslehre. 

(Eng.  trans.) 
1797.    Schelling:    Ideen  zu  einer  Philosophie  der  Natur.     (Eng. 

trans.) 
1799.    Schleiermacher:    Reden  uber  die  Religion.     (Eng.  trans.) 
1 803.    Cabanis :    Des  rapports  du  physique  et  du  moral  de  rhomme. 
1806.    Fichte:    Grundzuge  des  gegenwartigen  Zeitalters. 

1806.  Fries:    Neue  Kritik  der  Vemunft. 

1807.  Hegel:    Phanomenologie  des  Geistes.     (Eng.  trans.) 

1808.  Herbart:    Hauptpunkte  der  Metaphysik. 

1809.  de  Maistre:    Soirees  de  St.  Petersbourg. 
1809.    Schelling:    Ueber  den  Menschlichen  Willen. 

1812.  Hegel:    Wissenschaft  der  Logik.     (Eng.  trans.) 

1813.  Saint-Simon:    M^oire  sur  la  science  de  ITiomme. 

1813.    Schopenhauer:    Vierfache  Wurzel  des  Satzes  vom  Zurdch- 

enden  Grunde.     (Eng.  trans.) 
1817.    Hegel:    Enzyklopadie  der  philosophischen  Wissenschaften. 

1819.  Schopenhauer:    Die  Welt  als  Wille  und  Vorstellung.    (Eng. 

trans.) 

1820.  Fries:    Psychische  Anthropologic. 

182 1.  Hegel:    Philosophie  des  Rechts.     (Eng.  trans,  in  part.) 
1821.    Schleiermacher:    Der  christliche  Glaube. 

1824.    Herbart:    Psychologic  als  Wissenschaft.     (Eng.  trans.) 

1825  (-1827).    Beneke:    Psychologische  Skizzen. 

1829.    W.  Hamilton:    Philosophy  of  the  Unconditioned. 

1829.    James  Mill:    Analysis  of  the  Human  Mind. 

1830  (-1842).    A.  Comte:     Cours  de  philosophie  positive.    (Eng. 

trans.) 
1833.    Carlyle:    Sartor  Resartus. 
1835.  .  Strauss:    Leben  Jesu. 

1840.  Trendelenburg:    Logische  Untersuchungen. 

1841.  Schopenhauer:    Grundprobleme  der  Ethik. 

1841.  Feuerbach:    Das  Wesen  des  Christentums. 

1842.  Robert  Mayer:    Bemerkimgen  uber  die  Kr&fte  der  unbeleb- 

ten  Natur. 


CHRONOLOGY 


319 


1843.  Feuerbach:    Grundsatze  der  Philosophie  der  Zukunft. 

1843.  Stuart  Mill:    System  of  Logic. 

1843  (-1846).    Kierkegaard's  Hauptschriften. 

1844.  Schopenhauer:    Welt  als  Wille  und  Vorstellung.     (Eng. 

trans.) 

1851.  Lotze:    Allgemeine  Physiologic. 

1852.  Moleschott:    Der  Kreislauf  des  Lebens. 

1854  (-1864).    Renouvier:    Essais  de  critique  g^n^rale. 

1855.  Buchner:    Kraft  und  Stoff.     (Eng.  trans.) 

1855.  Spencer:    Principles  of  Psychology  (I). 

1856.  Lotze:    Mikrokosmus  (I).     (Eng.  trans.) 

1858.  Darwin:    Origin  of  Species. 

1859.  Stuart  Mill:    On  Liberty. 

i860.  Fechner:    Elen*ente  der  Psychophysik. 

1 861.  Spencer:    First  Principles. 

1864.  Jevons:    Pure  Logic,  or  the  Logic  of  Quality  apart  from 

Quantity. 

1865.  Diihring:    Naturliche  Dialektik. 

1865.  Lange:    Geschichte  des  Materialismus.     (Eng.  trans.) 

1866.  Wundt:    Die  physikalischen  Axiome. 

i869r  Hartmann:     Die    Philosophie    des     Unbewussten     (Eng. 

trans.) 

1871.  Darwin:    Descent  of  Man. 

1 87 1.  Cohen:    Kants  Theorie  der  Erfahrung. 

1872.  Nietzsche:    Die  Geburt  der  Tragddie. 

1874.  Wundt:    Grundzuge  der  physiologischen  Psychologic. 

1875.  Boutroux:    De  la  contingence  des  lois  de  la  nature. 

1876.  Bradley:    Ethical  Studies. 

1876.  Avenarius:    Philosophie  als  Denken  der  Welt. 

1876.  Riehl:    Der  philosophische  Kritizismus  (I).     (Eng.  trans.) 

1877.  Ardig6:    La  formazione  naturale. 

1879.  Guyau:    La  Morale  Anglaise  contemporaine. 

1882.  Duhring:    Sache,  Leben  und  Feinde. 

1883.  Nietzsche:    Also  sprach  Zarathustra  (I).     (Eng.  trans.) 

1884.  Windelband:    Praludien. 

1885.  Renouvier:    Classification  des  syst^mes  philosophiques. 

1885.  Guyau:    Esquisse  d*  une  morale. 

1886.  Mach:    Beitrage  zur  Analyse  der  Empfindungen.    (Eng. 

trans.) 

1886.  Nietzsche:    Jenseits  von  Gut  und  B6se.     (Eng.  trans.) 


320  CHRONOLOGY 

1887.    Wundt:    System  der  Philosophic. 

1887.  Guyau:    L'irreligion  de  I'avenir. 

1888.  Avenarius:    Kritik  der  reinen  Erfahrung  (I). 

1888.  Bergson:    Les  donn^es  imm^diates  de  la  consdenoe. 

1889.  Paulsen;    System  der  Ethik.     (Eng.  trans.) 

1890.  James:    Principles  of  Psychology. 

1892.  Paulsen:    Einleitung  in  die  Philosophic.     (Eng.  trans.) 

1893.  Pouill^:    La  psychologic  des  id^es-forces. 
1893.    Bradley:    Appearance  and  Reality. 

1896.  Rickert:    Die  Grenzen  der  naturwissenschaftlichen  Begriffs- 

bildung. 

1897.  James:    The  WiU  to  Believe. 

1898.  Ardig6:    L'unit^  della  coscienza. 
1898.    James:    The  Pragmatic  Method. 

1901.    Renouvier:    Les  dilemmes  de  la  m^taphysique  pure. 

1901.  Eucken:    Der  Wahrheitsgehalt  der  Religion.     (Eng.  trans.) 

1902.  James:    Varieties  of  Religious  Experience. 

1904.  Cohen:    Die  Ethik  des  reinen  Willens. 

1905.  Mach:    Erkenntnis  und  Irrtum. 


INDEX 


Abstraction,  93,  99. 

Agnostics,  250. 

Althusius,  9. 

Ampere,  222. 

Analogy,  18, 81  ff.,  loi,  180, 202, 

237, 275. 
Apperception,  84,  144. 
Ardig6,  219,  266. 
Associational  Psychology,  114  f., 

233,  242,  284  f. 
Atom,  34,  272. 
Attribute,  72. 
Avenarius,  297. 

Bacon,  17. 

Bain,  242. 

Bayle,  58,  87  £. 

Being,  Problem  of,  2,  44,  90, 

170,  246. 
Beneke,  211. 
Bentham,  232. 
Bergson,  294. 
Berkeley,  98. 
Bodin,  12,  13. 
B6hmc,  13,  181. 
Bostr6m,  200. 
Boutroux,  294. 
Boyle,  93. 
Bradley,  284. 
Bruno,  29. 
Buchner,  270. 
Burckhardt,  4, 
Butler,  104. 


Cabanis,  220. 
Caird,  284. 
Carlyle,  234,  236. 
Category,  143, 145, 147. 
Causality,  46,  55,  57,  71,  94, 

108, 142, 144,  240,  297. 
Cherbury,  12. 
Clarke,  98. 
Cohen,  291. 
Coleridge,  234,  236. 
Comte,  224,  230. 
C^ondillac,  120. 
Continuity,  79,  123,  135,   145. 

261. 
Copernicus,  27. 
Cosmological  problem,  2, 44,  90, 

170,  246. 
Cousin,  222. 
Critical  Philosophy,  137  £.,  189, 

205,  289. 
Crusius,  134. 
Culture,  Problem  of,  103,  124, 

I54»  167,  307. 
Cusanus,  22. 
Czolbe,  270. 

Darwin,  Charles,  247,  268. 
Darwin,  Erasmus,  115. 
Deduction,  37, 39,  51,  74, 185  f., 

239. 
Descartes,  144. 

Destutt  de  Tracy,  221. 

Dialectic,  185,  190  f. 

Diderot,  122. 


321 


IH*"*^*' 


••T.-tflfcft. 


322 


INDEX 


INDEX 


323 


Docta  ignorantia,  23,  36,  250, 

262,  267. 
Dogmatism,  44,  90,   117,   121, 

138,  171. 
Duhring,  219,  261. 

Eddmami,  134. 
Encyclopedists,  123. 
Energy,  Concept  of,  80. 
Energy,  Constancy  of,  80,  268. 
Energy,  Principle  of,  37,  50,  268. 
Enlightenment,  117,  140. 
Erdmann,  J.  E.,  213. 
Evolution,  51  f.,  121,  123,  140, 

246. 
Ethical   problem,  2,  90,  102  f., 

no,  153  flf.,  215,  248,  284  f. 
Eucken,  304,  310. 
Experience,  108, 146, 147  f.,  285. 

Fechner,  278. 
Feuerbach,  213,  214. 
Fichte,  J.  G.,  171. 
Fichte,  J.  H.,  214. 
Force,  Concept  of,  80. 
Fries,  205. 
Fouill6e,  287. 

Oalileo,  39. 

Gassendi,  59. 
Geijer,  200. 
Geulincx,  55. 
Gioberti,  264. 
Glanvil,  57. 
Goschel,  213. 
Green,  284. 
Grotius,  II. 
Guyau,  303  f. 


Haeckel,  270. 

Hamann,  162. 

Hamilton,  236,  256,  298. 

Hartley,  114. 

Hartmann,  275. 

Hegel,  182. 

Hegelian  school,  213,  284. 

Helvetius,  122. 

Herbart,  207. 

Herder,  163. 

Hobbes,  59. 

Hoijer,  200. 

Holbach,  121. 

Hume,  106. 

Hutcheson,  104. 

Idea,  33,  92,  144,  149,  150. 
Idealism,  81,  170,  171,  272,  284. 
Identity,  Principle  of,  85. 
Ideology,  224,  229. 
Idola  mentis,  17. 
Induction,  20,  39,  237,  238  f. 
Inertia,    Principle   of,   24,   37, 
39,  53. 

Jacobi,  149,  164  f. 
James,  301,  312. 
Jevons,  241. 

Kant,  132,  137. 

Kepler,  37. 

Kierkegaard,  201. 

ICnowledge,  Problem  of,  2,  90, 

105  f.,  138  ff.,  238  f.,  240  £., 

289. 
Krause,  214. 

Lambert,  135. 
LaMettrie,  120. 
Lange,  F.  A.,  289. 


Lasalle,  213. 
Lavoisier,  268. 
Leibnitz,  44,  83. 
Leonardo,  36. 
Lessing,  135. 
Locke,  91. 
Lotze,  272. 

Mach,  299. 

Machiavelli,  5. 

Maimon,  166. 

Maine  de  Biran,  221. 

Maistre,  220. 

Malebranche,  55  f. 

Mandeville,  105, 

Mansel,  237. 

Marx,  213. 

Materialism,  63,  120,  269. 

Matter,  37, 50,  72  f.,  81, 99  f. 

Maxwell,  298. 

Mayer,  Robert,  268. 

Mechanical  conception  of  na- 
ture, 41  f.,  43  f.,  49,  51,  59, 
83  ff.,  177  f.,  272  f.,  289,  298. 

Melanchthon,  8. 

Mendelssohn,  133,  134. 

Metaphysical  idealism,  82,  102, 
196,  212,  272  ff. 

Metaphysical  problem,  2,  44, 
90,  170,  246. 

Mill,  James,  232,  233. 

Mill,  John  Stuart,  224,  232,  237. 

Modus,  72. 

Monad,  3,  33,  81,  292. 

Monism,  32,  71  f.,  83,  270,  .'»75. 

Montaigne,  6. 

Montesquieu,  119.  . 

Motion,  Constancy  of,   50,  80. 

Mutation,  248. 


Natura  (naturans,  naturata)  7, 

47,  72. 
Natural  right,  9,  66,  95. 
Natural  religion,  12,  47,  95,  119. 
Nature  and  culture,  103,  124, 

154,  167,  307. 
Neo-Kantianism,  289. 
Newton,  64,  96. 
Nietzsche,  304,  306. 

Occasionalism,  54. 

Ontological  argument,  47,  109, 

134,  153. 
Optimism,  87  f.,  102, 113, 306  ff. 

Pantheism,  72,  95. 
Pascal,  57. 
Paulsen,  281,  292. 
Pessimism,  57,  105,  198  f.,  277. 
Pluralism,  83,  302. 
Pomponazzi,  4. 
Positivism,  224. 
Pragmatism,  297,  302. 
Priestley,  115. 

Primary  and  secondary  quali- 
ties, 92. 

Principle    of    sufficient    reason, 

81,82,87, 194  f. 
Problems,  1-3,  42  f. 
Psychological  problem,  i,  107  f., 

114  f.,  127  f.,  241,  284  f. 

Quality  and  quantity,    38    f., 
49  f,,  27?  f.,  294  f..  298  f. 

Ramus,  16. 
Reid,  115. 

Relmaius,  138.  ; 

Reinhoid,  165. 


» •  -     I  „ 


I  i  f 


j1 


'I 


324 


INDEX 


Relativity,  24,  27,  28,  62,  64, 
142  f.,  166,  236,  250  f.,  294. 

Religious  problem,  2, 12-14, 105, 
no  f.,  129,  158,  204,  214  f., 

245,  306,  3"  ff- 
Renouvier,  292. 
Richter,  213. 
Rickert,  292. 
Riehl,  292. 

Romanticism,  169,  219, 
Rosenkranz,  213. 
Rosmini,  264. 
Rousseau,  123. 
Royer  Collard,  222. 
Ruge,  219. 

Saint  Simon,  223. 
Sanchez,  16. 
Schelling,  177. 
Schiller,  167. 
Schleiermacher,  189. 
Schopenhauer,  194. 
Schultze,  165. 
Shaftesbury,  102. 
Sibbem,  200. 
Sidgwick,  244. 
Smith,  113 
Sociology,  228,  258. 
Spencer,  250. 
Spinoza,  67,  80. 
Spiritualism,  52,  121,  274  f. 
Strauss,  213. 

Subjectivity  of  qualities,  42, 
49  f.,  60,  92. 


Substance,  49,  52,  53,  69,  71, 

81,  93  f.,  109. 
Sufficient  reason,  Principle  of, 

81,  82,  87,  194  f. 
Sulzer,  133. 
Synthesis,  147  f.,  150, 241, 284  f. 

Taine,  287. 

Teleology,  50  f.,  79  U  87,  112, 

119,  140,  151  f.,  161,250. 
Telesius,  24. 
Tetens,  133,  135. 
Theism,  219^,274. 
Theodicy,  87  f. 
Toland,  96. 
Trendelenberg,  214. 
Tycho  Brahe,  31,  38. 
Truth,  49,  69,  74  f.,  185,  296  flf. 

Utilitarianism,  232,  243,  259. 

Values,  Problem  of,  2,  87  f.,  90, 

104,  198  f.,  277,  303. 
Vives,  7. 
Voltaire,  118. 
Voluntarism,  282. 
Vries,  248. 

Weisse,  214. 

Whewell,    237. 

Windelband,  292. 

Welfare,  Principle  of,  104,  232. 

Wolff,  132. 

Wundt,  280. 


npHE  following  pages  contain  advertisements  of  a 
few  of  the  Macmillan  books  on  kindred  subjects. 


t    I 


'BF 


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i«i 


The  Persistent   Problems  of  Philosophy 

BY  MARY  WHITON  CALKINS 
Professor  of  Philosophy  and  Psychology   in  Wellesley    College 

AN  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY  THROUGH 
A  STUDY  OF  MODERN  SYSTEMS 

Cloth,  octavo,  575  pages,  $2.50  net.    First  Edition,  igo7;  Second, 
Revised  Edition,  igo8;  Third,  Revised  Edition,  1912 

"To  expound  the  metaphysics  of  modern  Europe  is  no  light  task, 
but  Professor  Calkms  has  accomplished  it  for  the  most  part  in  a 
clear  and  scholarly  manner.  Beginners  may  read  her  'Introduc- 
tion' with  understanding;  and  even  those  who  are  weary  with  the 
confusion  of  metaphysical  tongues  will  be  interested  in  the  freshness 
of  her  comment  and  criticism.  The  chapters  on  Descartes  and 
Leibnitz  are  good  examples  of  the  way  in  which  the  history  of 
philosophy  should  be  written  and  the  criticism  of  philosophy  per- 
formed. .  .  .  The  exposition  of  Fichte  is  undertaken  in  such  sym- 
pathy with  that  philosopher,  that  it  is  almost  dramatic.  No  author 
writing  in  English  has  surpassed  Professor  Calkins  in  giving  a  clear 
and  simple  interpretation  of  Hegel,  free  from  the  imcouth  language 
which  disfigures  most  Hegelian  commentaries. 

*****♦♦ 

"Professor  Calkins  not  only  criticises,  but  constructs,  and  sets 
forth  her  own  doctrine  with  such  ability  that  she  should  have  a  dis- 
tinguished place  among  contemporary  Hegelians|" — From  The 
Nation,  New  York. 

"The  historical  and  critical  portions  of  the  volume  are  written 
with  a  facile  pen.  Few  recent  treatises  on  philosophy  have  com- 
bined so  constant  reference  to  the  sources  with  so  readable  an  ex- 
pository style.  The  writer  exhibits  a  comprehensive  acquaintance 
with  the  history  of  modem  thinking,  at  the  same  time  that  she 
exercises  independent  historical  judgment.  .  .  .  Unstinted  com- 
mendation must  be  given  to  the  spirit  of  Miss  Calkins's  work. 
Never  has  there  been  a  fairer  attempt  to  solve  the  difficult  problem 
of  evolving  doctrine  from  historical  analysis." — Professor  A.  C. 
Armstrong,  in  The  Journal  of  Philosophy. 

^  "  It  is  exceptional  in  lucidity,  candor,  and  the  freshness  with  which 
It  surveys  well-worn  doctrines.  More  than  any  Introduction  to 
Philosophy  with  which  I  am  acquainted,  it  will  induce  its  reader  to 
turn  to  the  original  sources,  and  to  find  pleasure  in  seeing  Philosophy 
as  it  rises  in  the  minds  of  the  great  thinkers.  While  the  book  is 
unusually  attractive  in  style,  and  well  fitted  for  popular  use,  it  is  the 
work  of  an  original  and  critical  scholar.  The  temper  with  which 
the  history  of  philosophy  should  be  studied  finds  here  admirable 
expression."— Professor  George  H.  Palmer,  Department  of  Phi- 
losophy, Harvard  University. 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

Publishers  64-66  Fifth  Avenue,  New  York 


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A  LIST  OF  MACMILLAN  PUBLICATIONS 

ON  PHILOSOPHY 


A  Student's  History  of  Philosophy.  By  Arthur  Kenyon  Rogers, 
Professor  of  Philosophy  in  Butler  College.  Published  in  New 
York,  1901.  Second  edition,  1907.    Cloth,  511  pp.,  8vo,  $2.00  net 

^k  History  of  Philosophy.  With  Especial  Reference  to  the  Fonnation 
and  Development  of  its  Problems  and  Conceptions.  By  Dr.  W. 
WiNDELBAND,  Profcssof  of  Philosophy  in  the  University  of 
Strassburg.  Authorized  translation  by  James  H.  Tufts,  Ph.  D, 
Professor  of  Philosophy  in  the  University  of  Chicago.  Pub- 
lished in  New  York,  1893.  Second  edition,  revised  and  en- 
larged, 1 901.  Latest  reprint,  1907.   Cloth,  726  pp.ySvo,  $4.00  net 

An  Introduction  to  Philosophy.  By  George  Stewart  Fullerton, 
Professor  of  Philosophy  in  Columbia  University.  Published  in 
New  York,  1906.    Reprinted,  1908. 

Cloth,  322  pp.,  i2mo,  $1.60  net 

The  Persistent  Problems  of  Philosophy.  An  Introduction  to  Meta- 
physics through  the  Study  of  Modem  Systems.  By  Mary 
Whiton  Calkins,  Professor  of  Philosophy  and  Psychology  in 
Wellesley  College.  Published  in  New  York,  1907.  Second 
edition,  1908.  Cloth,  575  pp.,  8vo,  $2.50  net 

Introduction  to  Philosophy.  By  William  Jerusalem,  Lecturer  in 
Philosophy  and  Pedagogy  at  the  University  of  Vienna.  Trans- 
lated from  the  fourth  edition  by  Charies  F.  Sanders.  Published 
in  New  York,  1910.  Cloth,  319  pp.,  i2mo,  $1.50  net 

An  Introduction  to  Systematic  Philosophy.  By  Walter  T.  Mar- 
vin, Ph.D.    Published  in  New  York,  1903. 

Cloth,  572  pp.,  8vo,  $3.00  net 

A  Brief  Introduction  to  Modem  Philosophy.  By  Arthur  Kenyon 
Rogers,  Ph.D.  Published  in  New  York,  1 899.  Latest  repnnt, 
1909.  Cloth,  360  pp.,  i2mo,  $1.25  net 

Bnglish  Philosophy.  A  Study  of  its  Method  and  General  Develop- 
ment.   By  Thomas  M.  Forsyth.    Published  in  London,  1910. 

Cloth,  231  pp.,  8vo,  $1.75  net 

Dogmatism  and  Evolution.  Studies  in  Modem  Philosophy.  By 
Theodore  de  Lacuna,  Ph.D.,  Professor  of  Philosophy  in  Bryn 
Mawr  College,  and  Grace  Andrus  de  Lacuna,  Ph.D.  Pub- 
lished in  New  York,  1910.  ^  Cloth,  259  PP-y  8vo,  $1.75  net 

Outlines  of  Metaphysics.  By  John  S.  Mackenzie,  M.A.,  Glasgow; 
Litt.D.,  Cambridge.  Published  in  London,  1902.  Second 
edition,  1906.  Cloth,  175  pp.,  i2mo,  $1.10  net 


A  System  of  Metaphysics.  By  George  Stewart  Fullerton,  Pro- 
fessor of  Philosophy  in  Columbia  University.  Published  in  New 
York,  1904.  Cloth,  627  pp.,  8vo,  $4.00  net 

Elements  of  Metaphysics.  By  A.  E.  Taylor,  Professor  of  Philosophy 
in  McGill  University,  Montreal.    PubUshed  in  New  York,  1907. 

Cloth,  419  pp.,  8vo,  $2.60  net 

Concepts  of  Philosophy.  In  Three  Parts.  Part  I,  Analysis.  Part 
II,  Synthesis,  a.  From  Physics  to  Sociality,  b.  From  Sod- 
ality to  Religion.  Part  III,  Deductions.  By  Alexander 
Thomas  Ormond.    Published  in  New  York,  1906. 

Cloth,  722  pp.,  8vo,  $4.00  net 

The  Problems  of  Philosophy.  By  Harald  H6ffding.  Translated 
by  Galen  M.  Fisher.  With  a  preface  by  William  James.  Pub- 
lished in  New  York,  1905.    Reprinted,  1906. 

Cloth,  201  pp.,  i6mo,  $j,oo  net 

What  is  Pragmatism?  By  James  Bissett  Pratt,  Ph.D.,  Assistant 
Professor  of  Philosophy  in  Williams  College.  Published  in  New 
York,  1909.  Cloth,  256  pp.,  i2mo,  $1.25  net 

Studies  in  Humanism.  By  F.  C.  S.  Schiller,  M.A.,  D.Sc.  Pub- 
lished in  London,  1907.  Cloth,  492  pp.,  8vo,  $3.25  net 

Riddles  of  the  Sphinx.  A  Study  in  the  Philosophy  of  Humanism. 
By  F.  C.  S.  Schiller.    Published  in  London,  19 10. 

Cloth,  478  pp.,  8vo,  $3.00  net 

The  Critical  Philosophy  of  Immanuel  Kant.    By  Edward  Cairo, 

LL.D.,  Professor  of  Moral  Philosophy  in  the  University  of  Glas- 
gow.   Published  in  Glasgow,  1889.     Second  edition,  1908. 
Vol.  I,  654  pp.    Vol.  II,  660  pp.      Two  volumes.     Cloth,  8vo 

The  set,  $6.2$  net 

The  Philosophy  of  Kant  Explained.  By  John  Watson,  M.A., 
•LL.D.,  Professor  of  Moral  Philosophy  in  the  University  of 
Queen's  College,  Kingston,  Canada.  Published  in  Glasgow, 
1908.  Cloth,  515  PP'f  Svo,  $3.75  net 

The  Philosophy  of  Kant.    As  contained  in  Extracts  from  His  Own 

•  Writings.    Selected  and  translated  by  John  Watson,   LL.D. 

Professor  of  Moral  Philosophy  in  the  University  of  Queens 

College,   Kingston,   Canada.    Published   in   Galsgow,    1888. 

Second  edition,  1908.  Cloth,  356  pp.,  i2mo,  $1.75  net 


The  World  and  the  Individual.  Gifford  Lectures  delivered  at  Uni- 
versity of  Aberdeen.  By  Josiah  Royce,  Ph.D.,  Professor  of 
the  History  of  Philosophy  in  Harvard  University. 

Part  I.  The  Four  Historical  Conceptions  of  Being. 

Cloth,  588  pp. J  I2m0j  $3.00  net 

Part  II.  Nature,  Man,  and  the  Moral  Order. 

Cloth,  480  pp.,  i2mo,  $2,2$  net 

Published  in  New  York,  1899.    Third  reprint,  1908. 

The  World  a  Spiritual  System.  An  Outline  of  Metaphysics.  By 
James  H.  Snowden.    Published  in  New  York,  1910. 

Cloth,  316  pp.,  i2mo,  $1.50  net 

Modem  Thought  and  the  Crisis  in  Belief.  By  R.  M.  Wenley,  of 
the  University  of  Michigan.    Published  in  New  York,  19 10. 

Cloth,  364  pp.  ,i2tno,  $1.50  net 

From  Epicurus  to  Christ.  A  Study  in  the  Principles  of  Personality. 
By  William  de  Witt  Hyde,  President  of  Bowdoin  College. 
PubUshed  in  New  York,  1904.    Third  reprint,  1908. 

Cloth,  285  pp.,  i2mo,  $1.50  net 

The  Religious  Conception  of  the  World.  An  Essay  in  Constructive 
Philosophy.  By  Arthur  Kenyon  Rogers,  Ph.D.,  Professor 
of  Philosophy  in  Butler  College.     PubUshed  in  New  York,  1907. 

Cloth,  284  pp.,  i2mo,  $1.50  net 

The  Library  of  Philosophy.    Edit  .d  by  J.  H.  Muirhead,  LL.D. 
Erdmann.    History  of  Philosophy.    Three  Volumes. 

Cloth,  8vo,  $10.50  net 
Bosanquet.    History  of  ^Esthetic.  Cloth,  8vo,  $2.75  net 

Pfleiderer.     Development  of  Rational  Theology  in  Germany  and 
in  Great  Britain  since  Kant.  Cloth,  8vo,  $2.75  net 

Bonar.     Philosophy  and  PoUtical  Economy  in  Some  of  their 
Historical  Relations.  Cloth,  8vo,  $2.75  net 

Bradley.    Appearance  and  Reality.  Cloth,  8vo,  $2.75  net 

Ritchie.     Natural  Rights.  Cloth,  8vo,  $2.75  net 

Sigwart.    Logic:  Two  volumes — ^Vol.  I,  The  Judgment,  Con- 
cept, and  Inference.    Vol.  II,  Logical  Methods. 

Cloth,  8vo,  $5.50  net 
Stout.    Analytic  Psychology.    Third  Edition.    Two  volumes. 

Cloth,  8vo,  $5.50  net 
Albee.  History  of  English  Utilitarianism.  Cloth,  8vo,  $2.75  net 
Villa.    Contemporary  Psychology.  Cloth,  8vOt  $2.75  net 

Baldwin.    Thought  and  Things. 

Cloth,  8vo,  two  vols.,  each  $2.75  net 
Urban.  Valuation:  its  Nature  and  Laws.  Cloth,  8vo,  $2.75  net 
Pillsbury.    Attention.  Cloth,  8vo,  $2.75  net 

Bergson.    Time  and  Free  Will.     Matter  and  Memory. 

Cloth,  8vo,  each  $2.75  net 
Baillie.    Hegel's  Phenomenology  of  Mind. 

Cloth,  8vo,  two  vols.,  each  $2.75  net 


The  Evolution  of  Mind.  By  Joseph  McCabe.  Published  in  Lon- 
don, 1910.  Cloth,  287  pp.,  8vo,  $2.00  net 

Psychology:  Normal  and  Morbid.  By  Charles  A.  Mercier. 
PubUshed  in  London,  1907.  Cloth,  518  pp.,  8vo,  $4.00  net 

Studies  hi  CUnical  Psychiatry.  By  Lewis  C.  Bruce,  M.D., 
G.R.C.P.E.    Published  in  London,  1906. 

Cloth,  246  pp.,  8vo,  $4.00  net 

Clinical  Psychiatry.  A  Text-book  for  Students  and  Physicians. 
Abstracted  and  adapted  from  the  seventh  German  edition  of 
Kraepelin's  * '  Lehrbuch  der  Psychiatric. "  By  A  Ross  Diefen- 
dorf.    Published  in  New  York,  1902.    Second  edition,  1907. 

Cloth,  562  pp.,  8vo,  $3.75  net 

Neurological  and  Mental  Diagnosis.  A  Manual  of  Methods.  By 
L.  Pierce  Clark,  M.D.,  Neurologist,  Vanderbilt  Clinic, 
Columbia  University,  and  A  Ross  Diefendorf,  M.D.,  Lec- 
turer in  Psychiatry  in  Yale  University.  Published  in  New 
York,  1908.  Cloth,  illustrated,  188  pp.,  i2mo,  $1.25  net 

The  Major  Symptoms  of  Hysteria.  Fifteen  Lectures  Given  in  the 
Medical  School  of  Harvard  University.  By  Pierre  Janet, 
M.D.    Published  in  New  York,  1907. 

Cloth,  337  pp.,  i2mo,  $1.75  net 

A  Text-Book  of  Insanity.  By  Charles  Mercier.  Published  in 
London,  1902.  Cloth,  222  pp.,  i2mo,  $1.75  net 

The  Animal  Mhid.  A  Text-book  of  Comparative  Psychology.  By 
Margaret  Floy  Washburn,  Ph.D.,  Associate  Professor  of 
Philosophy  in  Vassar  College.    Published  in  New  York,  1908. 

Cloth,  333  pp.,  i2mo,  $1.60  net 

The  Dancing  Mouse.  A  Study  in  Animal  Behavior.  By  Robert 
M.  Yerkes,  Ph.D.,  Instructor  in  Comparative  Psychology  in 
Harvard  University.    Vol.  I  in  the  Animal  Behavior  Series. 

Published  in  New  York,  1907.  ^  . 

Cloth,  illustrated,  290  pp.,  i2mo,  $1.25  net 

iEsthetlc  Principles.  By  Henry  Rutgers  Marshall,  M.A.  Pub- 
lished in  New  York,  1895.    Latest  reprint,  1901. 

Cloth,  201  pp.,  i2mo,  $1.25  net 

Consciousness.  By  Henry  Rutgers  Marshall.  Published  in 
New  York  and  London,  1909.        Cloth,  686  pp.,  8vo.,  $4-00  net 

The  Psychology  of  ReUgious  Belief.  By  James  Bissett  Pratt, 
Ph.D.    Published  in  New  York,  1906.    Repnnted,  1907. 

Cloth,  327  pp.,  i2mo,  $1.50  net 


;i 


The  Principles  of  Religious  Development.  A  Psychological  and 
Philosophical  Study.  By  George  Galloway.  Published  in 
London,  1909.  Cloth,  362  pp.,  8vo,  $3.00  net 

Social  Psychology.  An  Outline  and  Source  Book.  By  Edward 
Als WORTH  Ross,  Professor  of  Sociology  in  the  University  of 
WisconBin.    Published  in  New  York,  1908. 

Cloth,  372  pp.,  i2mo,  $1.50  net 


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Mind  in  Evolution     By  L.  T.  Hobhouse.    Published  in  London, 
1901.  Cloth,  406  pp.,  8vo,  $3.25  net 


■I 

•1 


Hume:  the  Relation  of  the  Treatise  of  Human  Nature.  Book  I  to 
the  Inquiry  Concerning  Human  Understanding.  By  W.  B. 
Elkin,  Ph.D.    Published  in  New  York,  1904. 

Cloth,  330  pp.,  i2mo,  $1.50  net 

The  Psychology  of  Thinking.  By  Irving  Elgar  Miller,  Ph.D. 
Published  in  New  York,  1909.     Cloth,  303  pp.,  i2mo,  $1.25  net 

Experimental  Psychology  of  the  Thought  Processes.  By  Edward 
Bradford  Titchener,  Sage  Professor  of  Psychology  at  Cornell 
University.    Published  in  New  York,  1909. 

Cloth.  308  pp.,  $1.25  net 


Lectures  on  the  Elementary  Psychology  of  Feeling  and  Attention. 
By  Edward  Bradford  Titchener.  Published  in  New  York, 
1908.  Cloth,  404  pp.,  i2mo,  $1.40  net 


Instinct  and  Reason.  An  Essay  concerning  the  Relation  of  Instinct 
to  Reason,  with  Some  Special  Study  of  the  Nature  of  Religion. 
By  Henry  Rutgers  Marshall,  M.A.  PubHshed  in  New 
York,  1908.  Cloth,  $73  PP-t  8vo,  $3.50  net 

Structure  and  Growth  of  the  Mind.  By  W.  Mitchell.  Published 
in  London,  1907.  Cloth,  $12  pp.,  8vo,  $2.60  net 

Why  the  Mind  has  a  Body.  By  C.  A.  Strong,  Professor  of  Psy- 
chology in  Columbia  University.  Published  in  New  York, 
1903.    Reprinted,  1908.  Cloth,  3S5  pp-y  8vo,  $2.50  net 


PUBLISHED  BY 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

64-66  Fifth  Avenue,  New  York 


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